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African Union (AU) multilateral efforts in governance flounder at the level of implementation 
and their substantive intervention worth do not accord with the aspirations embodied in adopted 
normative frameworks and instruments. The research served to uncover the policy and delivery 
challenges within the overall AU institutional system as a means of providing a perspective on 
the future of AU governance mechanisms and related intervention modalities. Detailed 
empirical engagement, through an institutional lens, with norm formation and implementation 
in accountability, the rule of law and state capacity, and related delivery practices, enabled the 
extraction of crucial efficacy challenges in the AU institutional system. The exploration, using 
evidence embodied in documents from the AU governance implementation system, served to 
confirm that the AU continues to struggle between the imperatives of integration through 
established shared values and the exercise of state sovereignty. Within the policy-delivery 
nexus, the research points to the importance of agency by AU institutions and how practices 
and incentives serve to pervert the aspiration for a multilateral value-adding system in 
governance.  In addition to providing a comprehensive historical macro-overview of AU 
governance intervention and related implementation modalities, the research served to uncover 
the implementation ‘black-box’ through a careful and comprehensive study of practices in each 
of the governance intervention terrains.  The institutional focus serves to affirm that 
answerability for performance in the use of public resource and the structuring of organisations, 
matter for delivery and the production of substantive regional integration value. The core 
efficacy challenges at the level of AU multilateral engagements and implementation, such as 
norm proliferation, the exercise of power and sovereignty, staffing and capacity gaps, point to 
the need for a substantive and strategic reorientation of the AU governance normative 
framework and related intervention modalities. As an outcome of the analysis and reflection, a 
‘norm graduating model’ is proposed to accommodate contextual realities in AU Member 
States on the back of historically hard-fought-for shared values in governance. At the level of 
implementation modalities, efficacy challenges point to the importance of a more tempered and 
realistic delivery approach. The primary focus in the immediate term should be on building 
governance through a diffused peer-engagement strategy culminating in norm compliance and 
full adherence to the provisions of established AU governance instruments over the long-term. 
Key Terms: African Union, African Multilateralism, African Governance, African 
Integration, African Shared Values, African Governance Architecture, Multilateral 
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Chapter 1: Exploring Interventions in Governance 
African Union (AU) multilateral interventions in governance1 is a complex and dynamic terrain 
of practice, and subject to wide-ranging analytical and epistemic perspectives. This chapter 
begins with a background of the AU governance intervention ontological space. The overview 
of the terrain and related implementation challenges serves to underpin the explorative journey 
and articulate the core research problem, purpose and questions. Central to framing the research 
parameters is enunciating a conception of governance that would facilitate aggregating and 
understanding varied AU interventions. Linked to this is presenting a framework that enables 
the capturing and examination of the different modalities of multilateral intervention in 
governance. Before outlining the available theoretical approaches and the specific 
methodology utilised for the research, an analysis of the challenge associated with measuring 
the efficacy of multilateral institutions is provided.  The governance construct, intervention 
modalities, theoretical lens and efficacy analysis serve to articulate the conceptual framework 
and related methodological orientation for the research. 
1.0 Introduction 
At the opening of the 1st AU Summit in July 2002, the inaugural Chairperson, President Thabo 
Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa, pronounced that ‘...we must work for a continent 
characterised by democratic principles and institutions which guarantee popular participation 
and provide for good governance. Through our actions, let us proclaim to the world that this is 
a continent of democracy, a continent of democratic institutions and culture. Indeed, a continent 
of good governance, where the people participate and the rule of law is upheld’ (Mbeki, 2002). 
Just over a decade and a half later at the 29th AU Summit, held during July 2017, in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, the Union stood at a critical crossroad in its history. The incoming 
Chairperson of the 30th AU Summit, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, remarked that the AU 
has yet to prove its regional integration and development value (Kagame, 2017). The 29th 
Summit concluded on the need for substantive reform to close the wide gap between aspiration 
and reality. The candid reflection during the 29th Summit tangentially serves to encourage more 
active research-driven analysis on the efficacy of the AU system in, amongst others, its 
 
1 All usage of the word ‘governance’ will be in the forms of the small letter ‘g’ and not in the form of the capital 
letter ‘G’, unless at the beginning of a sentence. This is to avoid confusion in usage when referring to ‘Governance’ 
as an area of focus, versus ‘governance’ as an activity.  Each instance of use is contextualised by the contents of 
the sentence in which it is used.  
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governance commitments and interventions.  
A significant element of the transformation from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to 
the AU was the incorporation of African governance values, norms and standards and related 
multilateral interventions. Khadiagala and Nganje (2016:1568) articulate the shift as a duality 
where efforts to deepen integration essentially ‘dovetailed with a normative framework 
anchored on shared responsibilities, commitment to democratic principles and African 
ownership of African problems’. In stark contrast to the Charter of the OAU, which emphasised 
‘state sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ in internal affairs of African States, the Constitutive 
Act of the AU established the notion of ‘non-indifference’ and space for the organisation to 
intervene on national ‘governance’ related prerogatives (Kwasi Tieku, 2004). Even before the 
formal launch of the AU in 2002, there has been a substantive drive towards enhancing the 
democracy, human rights, participation and anti-corruption role of this African integration 
institution (Adejumobi & Olukoshi, 2009). By many accounts, the articulated and implied 
significance of the overall transformative shift has not fully materialised in the governance 
terrain at the level of AU Member States. 
The notion of ‘chronic failure’ within the AU institutional system and the imperative for 
substantive change is expressed in the ‘Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the 
Institutional Reform of the African Union’ presented to the January 2017 AU Summit of Heads 
of State and Government. The report asserts that ‘we have a dysfunctional organisation in 
which member states see limited value, global partners find little credibility, and our citizens 
have no trust’(Kagame, 2017). The momentum towards internal institutional self-reflection and 
steps towards the organisational transformation of the AU stands in contrast to an extended 
period of intellectual dominance of structural realists, for whom the efficacy of the multilateral 
system, predominantly rests on the exercise of state power and sovereignty (Jaafar, 2018). 
While substantively accepted by Member States2 of the AU and lauded by analysts, the 
Kagame Report, as it is now known, is not predicated on a systematic study or analysis of AU 
institutional interventions and the limits thereof in the African context.   
 
2 All further use of ‘Member States’ in this thesis is in reference to the 54 Member States of the AU. The Member 
States are as follows: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, eSwatini, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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The specific implementation challenge from a realist structural perspective is aptly 
characterised by Lopes3 (2016:16) as one where matters of ‘realpolitik’ and ‘classic perception 
of sovereignty supersede the liberal one when strategic interests and national pride are at stake’. 
While asserting the realist perspective, Lopes (2016:16) himself concludes that African 
politics, within the context of multilateralism, is complex and requires ‘social analytical 
approaches and methodological tools that take cognisance of history, social structure and 
context, political agency and the institutional framework of political action and policy’. Part of 
the challenge in developing our understanding of what works and what does not in African 
multilateralism is a propensity to study what has unfolded through the limited lenses of 
dominating theories from the global north. The intellectual challenge confronted in 
understanding the politics of change in Africa is articulated by Olukoshi4 (2017:1) as one where 
‘the bulk of the knowledge that has been produced …comprises various generations of 
competing theories and concepts purporting to explain the underlying drivers of politics and 
policy on the continent on the basis of a pathologised reading of the region…’. The significance 
of engaging in more detailed research through a broader theoretical lens and by way of a 
broader methodological framework cannot be overstated. There is a widely articulated need for 
more substantive research as a basis for alternative theory construction and analysis. However, 
even as there is a need to broaden perspectives, it is essential to avoid, as Smith notes,  (2017:9) 
‘being hamstrung by grand ambitions of innovative theorising and a perpetual search for 
difference’. A substantive analysis is derivable from reinterpretations existing frameworks and 
the introduction of new ways of looking at existing challenges (Smith, 2017).  
The more considerable analytical challenge is that AU multilateralism in governance, while 
engaged with, in practical terms, through the adoption of various legal instruments and by way 
of active implementation through the AU system5, remains under-theorised, with limited 
empirical research and reflective knowledge. Scholars have generally not engaged in 
descriptive and analytical work to explain and understand the efficacy of multilateral 
interventions within particular terrines of engagements, such as governance. In the main, the 
 
3 Dr Carlos Lopes served as the Executive Secretary of the UNECA between 2012 and 2016. Dr Lopes is currently 
a Visiting Professor at the University of Cape Town in South Africa and also serves as on the AU Reforms 
Advisory Committee established by President Paul Kagame.  
4 Professor Adebayo Olukoshi serves as the Regional Director of International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) responsible for Africa and West Asia. IDEA has a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the AUC in the governance terrain.  
5 AU system’ is used in this thesis to characterise the overall organisational system of the AU, which includes 
relevant policy organs, implementation institutions, linked RECs and partner organisations involved in policy 
processes and implementation actions. These are detailed in Chapter Two, Section 4 of this thesis.  
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focus historical has been on issues of power and sovereignty as it relates to peace and security, 
with limited focus on the sophisticated manner in which the AU functions and the agency 
exercised within the intervention modalities and implementation activities. Solana and Zas-
Carranza (2015) express that there is a dearth of scholarly work on the ‘administrative’ aspects 
of multilateral institutions. They provided that while it is understandable that International 
Relations scholars have an interest in these organisations, it is ‘ astonishing’ on how ‘little 
attention they have attracted from administrative and organisational scholars’ (Solana et al., 
2015:776). In addition to shifting the focus towards institutions, administrative and 
organisational scholars have developed a range of methodological tools to facilitate a deeper 
understanding of multilateralism and the complexities embedded in state-to-state interactions. 
In further establishing the significance of an institutional approach to AU multilateralism in 
governance for research, broader reflection and theorisation, it is imperative, to begin with, a 
brief background of AU multilateral intervention in governance. An outline of the 
implementation challenges that face the AU and its institutions within the governance fold 
follows on from the brief historical sketch. 
1.0.1 Background to AU Governance Interventions 
African countries have, by and large, established modalities that facilitate political dialogue, 
civic participation and a level of democratic inclusivity in governance. A reality that stands in 
contrast to the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, where over 30 of the 54 African 
countries were under military rule or subject to protracted internal conflicts at some stage. 
Military coup d'états are now seldom heard of, and only a few geographical territories still 
experience violent clashes (Matlosa, 2014). In most countries, regular multiparty elections have 
emerged as a shared norm and standards (AUC, 2010:2). There is a broader commitment in the 
continent to accountability, to the rule of law, and public services delivery to citizens. This 
journey of democratic governance progress has not been easy or without challenge. There is 
uncertainty on whether the advancements made are sustainable and if the current modalities of 
democratic governance will suffice for the future (Matlosa, 2014:25). The treatment of 
elections as a zero-sum-game, the growth in popular uprisings against democratically elected 
governments, and a propensity to amend constitutions to allow for political leadership 
continuity are indicative of the fragility of governance institutions and democracy on the 
continent (Nathan, 2005).  
Since the release of the 1989 World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to 
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Sustainable Development which contended that underlying Africa’s slow development is the 
‘crisis of governance’ (World Bank, 1989), several multilateral institutions, bilateral donor and 
civil society initiatives emerged to support and encourage the democratic governance 
momentum. The interventions from these organisations varied in orientation and approach. 
They are broadly inclusive of initiatives directed at improved governance by-way-of support 
to political level structures, towards those that focus on the more technical aspects of enhancing 
implementation capacity (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013). The difference in approach is from 
a combination of the mandate of the organisation and how governance is defined.   
By the early 1990s, the efforts of African civil society served to assign a more political 
orientation to governance issues on the agenda of the continent (Mkandawire, 2007). Many 
development agencies also began to change their engagement strategies to explicitly 
incorporate political level support initiatives or related conditions in their development efforts. 
The changed orientation in the 1990s coincided with the global spread of liberal democratic 
practices. Authoritarian collapses accelerated dramatically during this period, and the 
developing world experienced the most intensive levels of democratisation since 
decolonisation (Carothers et al., 2013). The momentum also spurred a new wave of democracy 
champions within African multilateral structures.  As Landsberg (2012b:3) notes, ‘African 
leaders such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria’s 
Abdulaziz Bouteflika, Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano, Ghana’s John Kuofor, Ethiopia’s 
Meles Zenawi, Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, and others have all 
helped shape this new agenda’.  
By the launch of the AU in 2002, most African States had introduced constitutional guarantees 
with provisions for periodic elections, as well as mechanisms for the transfer of power and the 
renewal of political leadership. Shared values in governance were introduced into the 
provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, in that it contains a direct reference to upholding human 
rights and promoting ‘good’ governance (AUC, 2010). The Act builds upon previous 
declarations and treaties, such as the 1991 Abuja Treaty, the Lagos Plan of Action and the 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) (Abass 
& Baderin, 2002:7). The CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, formally adopted in 2002, detailed a 
range of core governance values, together with the commitments to give effect to these. In 
addition to requirements on the need for civil society participation, there are provisions relating 
to peace, security, democratic governance, human rights and anti-corruption (Adisa, 2002). In 
addition to the CSSDCA related momentum on governance within the African continent, 
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Member States of the AU also launched the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). The founding document of NEPAD emphasised issues of governance, incorporating 
elections, human rights, anti-corruption and state capacity.  The overall significance of the 
NEPAD for governance efforts was the founding of the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) as an African specific approach to governance improvements through peer-level 
interactions between African Heads of State and Government (Gruzd, 2014a:10).   
By the January 2011 AU Summit on Shared Values, governance standards were in a range of 
AU instruments and declarations. Legal frameworks, such as those covering humanitarian 
issues, the youth, gender and culture also incorporate elements of governance. As a result of 
the deepening momentum, including amongst sub-regional organisations in Africa, the 
Declaration of the 2011 AU Summit placed attention on the need for a more coordinated 
approach to governance for broader impact, by way of affirming the existence of an ‘African 
Governance Architecture (AGA)’ and by establishing the ‘African Governance Platform 
(AGP)’ (AU, 2011d). This platform, with participation from all AU institutions and Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) with a governance mandate, was officially launched in 2012 
and has since established a series of structures to facilitate a more coordinative approach to 
governance interventions (Wachira, 2014). The AU has over forty (40) formal instruments and 
a range of declarations and decisions that incorporate governance considerations (infra 2.3.2).  
However, only a selection of the existing instruments relates to the core governance 
considerations of accountability to society, the adherence to the rule of law and the modalities 
for the organisation of the state. These instruments directly embody the governance norms and 
standards that the Member States of the AU are expected to adhere to as part of their 
commitment to African integration and shared standards of conduct and practice (AUC, 
2010:11). Each of the adopted instrument contains provisions relating to the reporting period 
for Member States who have ratified (State Parties) and the overall channel for further action 
by relevant policy structures. Most legal instruments require that Member States provide 
comprehensive reports every two years from the date of ratification. In some instance, such as 
in the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), state 
parties are required to report at least once a year. The assumption behind reporting is that these 
should provide a basis for oversight and to secure compliance on the part of AU Member States 
(AU, 2013). Each instrument provides that the relevant policy structures (Executive Council 
and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government) may initiate follow-up action on reports. 
The types of follow-up actions anticipated are not specified in the instruments and are generally 
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presumed to be some form of sanction in the case of non-compliance.  In support of its work, 
the AU has established elected oversight structures together with related supportive 
institutional entities in the governance fold (Infra Table 60).  
The adopted instruments furthermore embody guidance on the institutions responsible for 
implementation and the roles and responsibilities of particular organs of the Union. In most 
cases, final authority rests with the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Within the 
core governance instruments, there is a diffusion of implementation responsibilities between 
specially elected bodies or individuals and related support structures (AUC, 2010). In addition 
to elected structures, the AU has established the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights6 
(African Court) and the Pan African Parliament (PAP). The current focus of the Court is on all 
cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified 
by the States concerned (Udombana, 2000b).  Over time, the African Court would engage with 
cases brought forward based on other ratified governance instruments. PAP currently only has 
consultative and advisory powers within the AU and is thus primarily focused on securing the 
full participation of Africans in the development and economic integration of the continent. 
After the ratification of a new protocol by Member States, PAP would have legislative powers 
and be the principal custodian of governance compliance oversight (Dinokopila, 2013).    
The summary overview interventions demonstrate that there has been a steady growth in the 
number of legal instruments and actions directed at enhancing the state of governance in AU 
Member States. While some of the actions unfolded during the OAU period, many new 
instruments and processes, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Election and 
Governance (ACDEG) and APRM, emerged after the formal establishment of the AU (AUC, 
2010). The rapid growth and slow pace of implementation have given rise to efforts to secure 
higher levels of internal coordination within the AU and with RECs, as embodied in AGA and 
the establishment of the AGP in 2011 (AU, 2011d).  
1.0.2 Implementation Challenges 
The trajectory of AU multilateral actions in governance reveals an overall substantive concern 
with implementation and hence, the efficacy of interventions. There is, for many in the AU 
 
6 African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights is referred to as the African Court in this thesis to avoid confusion 
with the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the acronym ACHPR that is used for the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.  
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system, a wide gap between the adoption of legal normative instruments at the level of the AU 
Summit of Heads of State and Government and actual implementation actions at the level of 
AU institutions and concomitantly within AU Member States. Landsberg (2012a:116), for 
example, articulates the perspective by indicating that ‘there exists in Africa a very serious 
policy-to implementation crisis – a gap between stated policy and commitments on the one 
hand, and the operationalisation of values and instruments on the other’. The ‘Discussion 
Document’ leading to the Shared Values Summit in 2012, outlines that the ‘capacity and 
resources for implementation have not matched the progress achieved’. It furthermore provides 
that implementation has not met expectations and that the non-domestication of instruments 
remains a matter of grave concern at the level of the AU (AUC, 2010:11). The explanations for 
the lack of follow-through and implementation at the level of Member States are varied and 
include a conclusion that the lack of commitment is a reflection of the propensity to only engage 
on the basis of domestic interests and related claims of sovereignty (Matlosa, 2008; Khadiagala 
et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016). Landsberg (2012a) notes that the period from 2007 to 2011 
experienced a diminishment in the agency, leadership and ownership of the APRM and other 
initiatives. He thereby concluded that the ‘leadership retreat exposed many weaknesses and 
challenges faced by the APRM and other continental bodies, structures and programmes’ 
(Landsberg, 2012a:114).  
The reasons for non-ratification of instruments and non-compliance is often deemed to be much 
more complicated. They relate both to the lack of capacity within responsible AU institutions 
and the complexities of internal administrative processes within Member States. The 
Discussion Document on the Shared Values Summit provides that ‘(t)he capacity and resources 
of the Organs and institutions have simply not been adequate to deliver on expectations. 
Furthermore, limited attention has been focused on monitoring and supporting implementation 
at the level of Member States’ (AUC, 2010:11). The complexities of ratification and some of 
the related challenges are in a study on ratification of treaties completed by the Legal Counsel 
of the African Union Commission (AUC, 2009a). Aside from a more legal analysis on the slow 
pace of ratification, there has been inadequate engagement with the complicated relationship 
between adoption, ratification and implementation at the level of Member States. An analysis 
by Kane (2008), provides that there are substantive institutional and policy challenges within 
the AU system and within the text of particular instruments that render it difficult to secure 
compliance and full implementation of governance-related commitments. Kane’s (2008) 
exploration points to the complicated relationship between AU adopted governance-related 
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normative instruments and those adopted at the level of RECs. The reality is that very often the 
reason for non-ratification or compliance relate directly to the implementation efficacy and AU 
multilateral institutional capacity.     
A further substantive challenge in the terrain of AU governance-related interventions has to do 
with continuing contestation around the interpretation of adopted governance norms and 
standards. Even after instruments are adopted and sometimes ratified, Member State and 
officials from multilateral institutions would engage in debate around the value and limits of 
specific provisions. As an illustration, one of the principal intellectual architects of ACDEG, 
Dr Khabele Matlosa (2008:11), argues that ‘given the socio-economic, religious, ethnic and 
gender cleavages that mark diverse African societies, power-sharing arrangements (at both 
national and sub-national levels) should be institutionalised so as to transform politics from a 
zero-sum game into positive-sum game’. The comment, while expressed in the context of 
academic engagement, does bring into sharp focus the overall emphasis in the Charter on 
majoritarianism in democratic elections.  
At a broader level, contestation around adopted norms within inclusive and entirely consensual 
processes of decision-making at the level of the AU Summit does raise a problem around 
whether there is an internalisation of adopted governance instruments in multilateral 
negotiation and when formally accepted. This bringing forward the importance of questioning 
the overall commitment and hence intended efficacy of multilateralism when it comes to 
governance commonality for development and integration purposes. The disjuncture also arises 
when discussing adopted Charters in broader platforms that include civil society and academia. 
The consequence of post-adoption debates is that they create compliance uncertainty and hence 
declining levels of commitment to implementation. Reflecting on the principles associated with 
the Right to Protect, one commentator concluded, based on the crisis in Zimbabwe, that 
‘different camps are emerging that articulate different local positions on, and express varying 
degrees of scepticism about the protection principle’(Williams, 2009a). The global challenge 
that continuing discourse on adopted norms and standards poses is that they create indecision 
and hence lowers adherence expectations. Linked to this, is the extent to which instrument 
adoption is a substantive process or just a procedural activity within which decisions to accept 
an instrument as part of a collective do not reflect the orientation of Member States.    
At a more grounded state level, there are also substantive challenges relating to engagements 
within Member States on AU multilateral intervention and related legal instruments. In addition 
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to the complexities of communication around adopted instruments between different 
Ministries, the internal legal and political processes for ratification sometimes serve as a 
stumbling block for implementation. Some countries have to contend with cumbersome and 
lengthy legal procedures before a treaty is eventually ratified (Maluwa, 2012:34). There are 
also difficulties associated with the lack of technical capacities, such as in drafting relevant 
legislation and providing a full assessment of the domestic level implications of ratification 
(Maluwa, 2012). Linkages between AU institutional process and Member States, and 
challenges associated with the flow of multilateral information point towards our limited 
understanding of the efficacy of existing strategies directed at ensuring active follow through 
with Member States on obligations arising from the adoption of specific governance 
instruments.  
The centrality of AU institutions and their role in the multilateral process is often lost in a 
broader analysis of the authority exercised by Member States. The weakness of the institutions 
and the low capacity levels is alluded to in the Kagame Report (2017), but the challenges are 
not engaged substantively. Aside from broader descriptive overviews of the workings of AU 
institutions, the complexities of implementing AU governance shared values have not been a 
subject of intense research or analysis. Some general engagement with the weaknesses of AU 
institutions is in the report of the Panel set up during the AU Accra Summit in 2006 to audit 
the performance of the AU, led by Adebayo Adedeji. In its report, the Panel determined that 
the ‘state of internal institutional incoherence and disarray that has been in evidence for some 
time in the AU itself and between the AU and other institutional mechanisms such as the RECs’ 
(AU, 2007c:190).  
Aside from widespread criticism of the AUC as an organisation, there has been limited 
engagement on the implementation agency and challenges associated with other multilateral 
governance institutions, such as the Secretariats for the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights7 (Banjul Commission), the AU Advisory Board on Corruption and the APRM. 
The APRM is described as ‘a system that was creaking with fatigue, mismanagement and 
stagnation’(Gruzd & Turianskyi, 2018:2). Institutional challenges and claims of weaknesses 
are often identified in passing. There is no substantive analysis of the workings of AU 
multilateral institutions and the general efficacy of the intervention established. Despite the 
 
7 The African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights is referred to as the Banjul Commission in this thesis. 
The acronym AfCHPR is sometimes used by scholars, but this often gets confused for the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights. The African Commission is popularly known as the Banjul Commission after the 
name of the city it is located in. Banjul is the capital city of The Gambia. 
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often alluded to reality, the propensity has been to increase the responsibilities of these 
institutions without any consideration of what works and what does not in the terrain of 
governance-related interventions.  In this respect, Gruzd and Turianskyi (2018:2) note that ‘the 
APRM has been tasked by the AU with an ‘expanded mandate, to track the governance aspects 
of the AU’s 50-year development blueprint, Agenda 2063, and the UN’s 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals. Other ambitions include positioning the APRM Secretariat as a 
knowledge hub on Governance (although with little visible progress)’.  
Perspectives on the implementation challenges within governance broadly range from those 
that emphasise the role and agency of Member States towards those that grapple with 
organisational elements embodied in the action of AU institutions. The common thread is that 
the AU system is not functioning optimally and there is an urgent need for more substantive 
analysis and measures to improve overall performance. The drive towards introducing 
immediate rapid changes as part of the overall reform efforts have generally served to shift 
focus away from building a more in-depth analysis of what works and what does not in AU 
multilateral interventions in governance.  
1.0.3 Framing the Exploration  
Building on the initial overview and outline of challenges within AU multilateralism in 
governance (supra 1.0.1 & 1.0.2), this section focuses on articulating the parameters for the 
research. It includes delineating the broader intended purpose of the analysis. Coupled with 
this, is an outline of the explorative question and sub-questions that guide the research. The 
purpose of expressing the explorative framework is to establish the foundations for the choice 
of research approach and related conceptual framework for the research, as presented at the 
end of this chapter.  
1.0.3.1 Problem Statement 
The discussion on the contemporary challenges with AU multilateral intervention on 
governance serves to provide a broad summary of institutional and implementation difficulty. 
Execution problems are approached differently by scholars and commentators on AU 
multilateralism.  These differences point, not only, to diverse theoretical approaches, but also 
variances in research focus and methods across the delivery performance process associated 
with AU intervention in governance.    
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A review of scholarship on implementation challenges suggest that, outside of general 
speculation on the commitment of AU Member States to adopted and domesticate AU 
multilateral governance norms and standards (Landsberg, 2012a; Matlosa, 2014; Khadiagala 
et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016), there is inadequate institutional analysis on the ‘efficacy’ of 
governance intervention efforts. Available analysis tends to be speculative and range from 
unsupported comments on the complexities of the legal process (Kane, 2008; Maluwa, 2012), 
the weaknesses of national institutions (Maluwa, 2012) and, possible mismanagement (Gruzd 
et al., 2018). Actual workings of AU multilateral institutions remain an intellectual black-box, 
despite the broader acceptance of their importance for governance-related interventions and 
hence for development and integration.  
An understanding of AU multilateralism is partial and incomplete without an in-depth analysis 
of what unfolds within AU institutions tasked with implementation responsibilities. An 
evidence-driven research analysis would serve to fill this gap by engaging in a more detailed 
uncovering of the ‘institutional;’ process that unfolds within a specific terrain of engagement, 
such as in governance. A critical understanding of African multilateralism is not possible 
outside of the policy context within which it unfolds. The available analysis in AU policy 
terrains is speculative on ‘what works or what does not’, as there is minimal reflective 
immersion in actual practices. Given which, the central societal level problem to be engaged 
with is as follows:  
AU multilateral institutional efforts in governance have floundered at the 
level of implementation and their substantive intervention worth do not 
accord with the integration and development aspirations embodied in 
adopted normative frameworks and instruments. 
Multilateralism in African governance is approached from tapered scholarly lenses that tend to 
overemphasise the responsibilities and authority of Member States, with limited or no real 
engagement with the efficacy of intervention as they have unfolded within the institutional 
structures of the AU. Systematic analysis of implementation and related institutional practices 
provide insights into AU multilateral governance policy expectations, associated interventions 
and what would be optimal from a multilateral institutional perspective. The anticipated overall 
concluding hypotheses would be that there is some degree of causality or correlation between 
choices made around institutional implementation modalities, practices and approaches and 
multilateral governance intervention success or failure. This working hypothesis would guide 
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the analysis, but the research approach would be explorative and inductive. That is, it would 
seek to generate an operational framework on the efficacy of different AU multilateral 
intervention in governance. A theoretical model would be the outcome of the research and 
would entail drawing generalisation through detailed empirical research (Bryman, 2015:24).  
1.0.3.2 Purpose of the Research 
The difficulty with current perspectives, such as those offered by Landsberg (2012a), Matlosa 
(2014), Khadila and Nganje (2016), Lopes (2016), Kane (2008), and Maluwa (2012), is that 
they only provide a partial view of AU multilateralism in governance and hence no substantive 
insights into initiatives and practices within institutions established to shape interventions and 
securing compliance for integration purposes. While there is some detailed analysis in areas, 
such as in election (Aniekwe & Atuobi, 2016), corruption (Ikubaje, 2010), human rights 
(Murray, 2004) and the APRM (Gruzd, 2014a), these generally fail to make the connections 
with the overall AU governance agenda. Selective analysis of a governance intervention area 
is limiting as it does not provide an appreciation of the efficacy of interventions within the 
overall terrain of governance and hence the concern with the efficacy of AU interventions. 
Based on current analysis, practitioners are unable to engage with shaping solutions for optimal 
governance intervention for integration and development across the African continent. The 
scholarly analysis is also limited, as there is incomplete information on what has and is 
unfolding in AU governance intervention terrain and what happens in the institutional 
implementation ‘black-box’8 (Powell et al., 2017).   
The research will hence not only serve to fill an information and knowledge gap on the overall 
AU governance intervention terrain but will also seek to provide a theory-based framework for 
shaping choices on multilateral governance interventions. While there is a broader 
understanding of the overall governance discourse at an African level, typified by analysis of 
normative frameworks, resolutions and decisions, there is no real engagement with actual 
interventions and organisational processes within the AU institutional system. The analytical 
biases in approach to African multilateralism are, in part, a reflection of the dominance of the 
field of international relations when it comes to scholarly work on the AU. The gap in 
understanding requires that we approach the subject matter from a more institutional outlook 
and hence draw on theoretical models and approaches that emerge, from ‘institutionalism’ in 
 
8 The idea of a ‘black-box’ serves to capture the reality that institutions and what unfolds within them, through 
the actions of individuals,  are often dismissed as insignificant (Powell & Rerup, 2017).  
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International Relations and more prominently from analytical traditions within the field of 
Public Administration. The overall determination of the research would be to build a 
substantive understanding of the efficacy of AU multilateralism in governance, without 
discarding the importance and significance of the broad normative discourse on governance 
and the analysis of power, authority and sovereignty. The research-based contention is that 
existing and dominating modes of analysis limit our understanding of AU multilateralism as it 
ignores the workings of multilateral organisations. The dominant analytical traditions, 
furthermore, perhaps inadvertently, subsume the agency of institutions and those tasked with 
the responsibility of implementation, from scrutiny. In keeping with this concern, the following 
serves as a societal level guiding purpose statement for the research: 
To provide analytical guidance on optimising AU multilateral practices to 
inform intervention decisions and for the appropriate utilisation of resources 
for the implementation of governance frameworks and instruments for 
continental integration and development. 
The research has both academic and practitioner value. At a broader level, it may be perceived 
as an ‘implementation evaluation’ within existing applied research approaches. It serves to 
collate implementation and institutional information on AU multilateralism in a manner that 
facilitates a deeper understanding of the efficacy of governance interventions. The research 
thereby contributes to closing knowledge gaps in the terrain by providing a theoretical 
framework for guiding future research and the choices on optimal AU multilateral governance 
interventions (infra 6.4).  
1.0.3.3 Research Questions 
The value and limits of AU multilateralism in governance cannot be grasped adequately 
without engaging with the exercise of power and authority, the normative discourse and most 
importantly, without a deeper appreciation of the modes of intervention and institutional 
processes that characterise what gets done. In the process of answering an overall question and 
related sub-questions, it would be possible to establish an understanding of institutional level 
agency within AU multilateral engagements in governance. As the approach is to focus on 
institutional processes and their efficacy, the question and sub-questions are focused on 
assessing implementation and not on the substantive impact of adopted governance norms and 




The following will serve as the overall research question for the research.  
What are the optimal AU multilateral governance interventions from an institutional 
perspective?  
To ensure that the overall question is grappled with substantively, the following sub-questions 
served to shape the more detailed analysis. The inclusion of these sub-questions assisted in 
ensuring that the analysis is comprehensive, and conclusions are reliable, relevant and valid on 
the efficacy of different AU multilateral intervention in governance.  
i. What are the different AU multilateral governance interventions?  
ii. How do AU institutional modalities and practices shape governance interventions?  
iii. How effective are the different institutional interventions for AU Member States?  
The research is exploratory and hence directed at confirming the working hypothesis on the 
agency of AU institutions; namely that there is some degree of causality or correlation between 
choices made around institutional implementation modalities, practices and approaches, and 
multilateral governance intervention success or failure. Given the range of variables that shape 
what unfolds on governance at the level of Member States, it is not possible to establish a 
correlation between AU multilateral interventions and impact.  Using ‘institutionalism’ and 
methodological tools derived from Public Administration, the research serves to uncover the 
patterns of activities that operationalises the intervention and hence establish a perspective on 
the overall efficacy of such interventions. How this is done, and the full rationale for not 
including an impact analysis is detailed in the research methodology section of this chapter 
(see infra 1.2.1).  
1.0.3.4 Knowledge Value and Contribution 
It is crucial to rearticulate the linkage between the problem, the purpose and research question 
in order to establish the knowledge value and contribution of the research. Outside of broad 
speculation on the agency of AU Member States on multilateral governance intervention, there 
is limited knowledge on what unfolds in the institutional black-box and hence on the normative 
frameworks adopted and their relationship with what unfolds at a national level. Core to filling 
the knowledge gap in understanding what would work optimally from an African multilateral 
perspective on the basis of an in-depth understanding of implementation processes within the 
AU institutional system. Such an orientation serves to close the knowledge gap, as there is 
limited institutional analysis of the AU system as a whole.  
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At the most basic level, there is no substantive scholarly reflections and research on AU 
multilateral intervention modalities and institutional practices as it relates to governance 
initiatives. Although there is some literature on AU governance issues, mainly from a peace 
and security perceptive and especially within the framework of the work of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU (infra 2.2), AU governance interventions on their own have not 
been documented systematically or examined as a whole.  Available research and analysis 
focus only on some aspects of the governance agenda, such as on the APRM, African human 
rights challenges, anti-corruption and elections across AU Member States. The exercise of 
collating and systematically presenting information on governance intervention represents, in 
itself, a substantive contribution to knowledge. Presently, there is no single text which captures 
all that has unfolded within the AU multilateral system on governance. Nor has such 
information been presented in a manner that facilitates understanding of what has transpired in 
different areas of governance.  
Studies on African multilateralism in governance emanate primarily from the dominant 
narrative and research traditions in the field of International Relations (Matlosa, 2008; 
Khadiagala et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016).   Structural realist forms of analysis, where the primary 
focus is on power and authority within the AU system and the exercise of sovereignty by AU 
Member States, dominate the field. A secondary research approach, from a more idealistic 
research tradition, arises from those embedded in ‘discourse analysis’, where the primary mode 
of research is on the substantive content of documents and related articulation on governance 
from Member States and other actors in Africa and globally. A comprehensive analysis reflects 
that there are no research studies of AU multilateralism that emanate from a more ‘institutional’ 
tradition that characterises the field of Public Administration. Examining governance 
intervention and related modalities of implementation from an ‘institutional’ research tradition 
would hence make a substantive contribution to our understanding of what works and what 
does not (efficacy) in AU governance multilateralism. Such an analysis contributes 
substantively to knowledge as it paves the way for further analysis from a Public 
Administration tradition and would assist broader actors in understanding the challenges 
associated with implementation within the AU system.   
The research furthermore contributes to knowledge by providing a broad theoretical framework 
on optimal AU multilateral governance intervention. It thereby further opens the space for 
those who seek to develop a more engaged institutional analysis of multilateralism in Africa. 
It also directly responds to the call from Lopes (2016:16) for different ‘social analytical 
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approaches’ and to the plea by Olukoshi (2017) for more internal African reflections that are 
not rooted in a ‘pathologised reading’ of Africa.  
1.0.4 Conceptualising Governance and Intervention Efficacy 
Definitions of governance and what it comprises of differ substantively in the literature and 
within the overall AU system. Governance interventions that have emerged in the AU system 
are varied and range from the establishment of specific legal instruments and more nuanced 
capacity building interventions. It is imperative for the research that a focused definition is 
provided and conceptually located within a clear framework. A theoretical explanation of what 
governance entails would also facilitate detailed engagement with related interventions. In 
addition to outlining the different types of intervention, the research calls for a substantive 
approach towards assessing the efficacy of AU multilateral interventions in governance. Such 
an approach aids in outlining the levels of analysis that is relevant for the research and hence 
the information that is collected, collated and analysed.  
1.0.4.1 Framing Governance  
How governance is defined, shapes perspectives on the multilateral interventions that would 
be appropriate. The term has unfolded with varied meaning within African discourse and the 
AU space. The substantive challenge with the numerous AU instruments and processes as they 
relate to governance is the lack of an encompassing and agreed framework on what is included 
or excluded (infra 2.1.4). Governance is often considered a cross-cutting issue that features in 
all sectoral engagements, such as health, education and economic development or constituency 
specific engagements, such as those on women, refugees, the youth and children (AUC, 
2010:2). A more comprehensive and inclusive approach generally entails a loss of substantive 
focus. A more prudent approach would be to focus on governance through the lens of AU 
instruments and resolutions that feature in the AGA. However, even in such an instance, there 
has been a tendency to brush widely and hence render it challenging to establish a focus for 
any forms of direct evaluative assessment of the efficacy of interventions.  
A further definitional challenge within the AU system is the conflation of perspectives on the 
governance of the AU multilateral system, versus those that relate to governance interventions 
directed at establishing commonality and shared values in Member States for integration. The 
governance of the AU systems relates to the overall responsibilities of the AU and hence the 
accountability role of different AU structures and the approaches taken towards ensuring that 
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the AU is a people's driven organisation. While there is some level of overlap between the 
governance of the AU system and governance interventions, the focus for this research is on 
the governance actions or activities that unfold to shape practices within AU Member States. 
There is a thin separation wall between these, as in some instances, such as human rights, 
actions within the AU systems inherently serve to enhance practices within Member States. 
Even as these need to be engaged with, appreciating the distinction between the overall 
governance of the AU system, from governance intervention by the AU is essential for 
analytical purposes.  
Outside of a specific and formal adopted definition within AU multilateralism, the approach 
taken is to establish a context relevant definition that facilitates more in-depth engagement with 
the AU multilateral interventions that have emerged historically. Over the last two decades, 
governance has been a catchword for policymakers and academics in both the north and the 
south. The varied contributions have often led to different and contradictory definitions of the 
governance construct (Kjær, 2014).  The meaning intended is often contingent on the context 
in which the construct is used. In its earlier construction, ‘governance’ was directed at 
explaining the practice of social steering (Peters & Pierre, 1998:225). Inspiration for a 
governance approach that would be relevant for evaluative purposes comes from the analytical 
model that  Fukuyama (2011) uses in the ‘Origins of Political Order’. According to Fukuyama 
(2011), societies that achieve a higher level of success do so based on the evolved maturity of 
three institutions, namely, the state, the rule of law and accountability. In other words, societies 
that get it right have succeeded in having a state sector that is fit for purpose, inclusive 
accountability and a legal system predicated on the rule of law. Decay and the necessity for 
change unfold when institutions are not fit for expected purpose or do not meet new realities 
and transformative pressures (Fukuyama, 2011). It is not improbable to conceive of 
interventions that lead to better institutions and higher levels of prosperity, even though change 
is complex and subject to a range of contingencies. Successful societies are the ones that can 
combine all three sets of institutions in a stable balance, the achievement of which represents 
the miracle of modern society (Fukuyama, 2011). To understand the African governance space 
and the related policy and institutional interventions on the part of the AU, we would hence 
need to see what has unfolded in each of these areas within the overall system. The following 
table provides an outline of each area of focus. The areas of inclusion are derived both from, 
analytical reflection and from what has emerged within the overall AU system in each of the 
focus areas (infra 2.1). Perspectives on what is included within a terrain of focus are somewhat 
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fluid and tend to evolve with changes in wider society. However, for analytical purposes it 
remains imperative to delineate what is broadly included in each area. The framework is 
substantive and focused enough to ensure that specific and more detailed elements of 
intervention in each area can be accommodated in the analysis. The framework also allows for 
a reasonable level of differentiation between multilateral interventions relevant to each area of 
focus.  
Table 1: Governance Focus and Areas of Inclusion 
Focus Areas of Inclusion  
 
Accountability ‘Accountability’ is inclusive of all modalities directed at ensuring that state and state 
institutions are accountable to the broader society. It is inclusive of modalities 
directed at ensuring economic inclusivity and democratic participation. Also 
included are civil society participation and broader practices that facilitate active 
community engagements. Also included are issues relating to the rights of minorities 
and the participation of women and the youth.   
 
The rule of law ‘The rule of law’ is inclusive of all intervention directed at ensuring countries abide 
by the separation of powers and the rule of law principle. It also includes initiative 
related to Constitutionalism, Human Rights, the Judiciary and Constitutional 
changes of government. All matters of justice, including transitional justice and 
related modalities for ensuring adherence to national laws within the framework of 
the rule of law.   
 
State capacity ‘State capacity’ focuses on modalities relating to the overall functioning and 
responsibility of the state, including initiatives directed at enhancing the capacity of 
the state to function optimally and to deliver per mandates. The focus will be on the 
core state system and not necessarily all of the intervention related to building 
capacity or regulating actions within specific sectorial terrains, such as health, 
agriculture, infrastructure and related detailed terrains of engagement. Also included 
here is Anti-Corruption broadly and more specifically as it relates to the agency of 
state systems.   
 
Source: Abbreviated and consolidated from Fukuyama (2011; 2014) and established AU 
normative instruments in governance (infra 2.1.3)    
Outside of collating and framing the parameters of AU multilateral interventions in 
governance, it would be impossible to provide an overarching substantive perspective on the 
efficacy of interventions. An overarching framework provided a basis for establishing a balance 
between detailed analysis of individual interventions, such as in elections, human rights, 
constitutionalism, state-building and anti-corruption, and the broader need to engage with the 
overall efficacy of the AU in governance.  
Outside of a conception of what governance is constitutive of, it cannot be separated from the 
philosophical, ideological and related normative perspectives on what it should be at the level 
of Member States. Such perspective ranges from the more liberal articulation of specific 
standards of inclusivity related to democracy, towards the more radicle articulation of 
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inclusivity at a more profound social level and within the economy. As with the AU, normative 
pronouncements of what governance is, and related standards are often embodied in specific 
instruments. At a global level, normative pronouncements on governance are in different 
measurement instruments, such as the Mo Ibrahim Index. Each of the indicator measurement 
system embodying differential perspectives on what is essential within the governance fold 
(Best, 2017).   Grindle (2007) outlines the varied definitions of governance and the implied 
standards from a range of organisation and authors. What is particularly significant in her 
analysis is the restatement of the conclusion made in an earlier article (Grindle, 2004) that there 
are ‘no magic bullets, no easy answers, and no obvious shortcuts towards conditions of 
governance that can result in faster and more effective development and poverty reduction’. 
Even as there continues to be a global and regional impulse towards establishing standards, 
there is an increased push towards recognising that context and local exigencies often shape 
what is possible and achievable in governance and hence through related multilateral 
interventions. The tension in debates is between those who affirm governance standards as key 
to development and those who argue for a less norm driven approach in practice and analysis. 
This tension between norm development and the realities of intervention practice and 
implementation are central to an understanding of the efficacy of AU multilateralism in 
governance.  
1.0.4.2 Conceptualising Governance Interventions  
As a step beyond consideration of the substance content dimensions of governance, it is 
essential to reflect on the different intervention modalities. In general, these range from those 
directed at ensuring compliance to agreed norms through legal instruments, towards those 
predicated on information sharing as a strategy to influence actions within AU Member States. 
While multilateralism has been around for a long time, there is limited scholarly literature 
which looks at categorising the intervention modalities as they have emerged within 
multilateral organisations. Aside from a broaden categorisation framework by Börzel (2015) 
the focus tends to be on the broader consensus building functions performed by multilateral 
institutions and not on the modalities of intervention or actual work performed. Börzels 
(2015:6) provides that the instruments for ‘governance transfer’ vary with respect to the degree 
to which they interfere with the sovereignty of states, ranging from ‘ military force and 
litigation (coercion), sanctions and rewards (negative and positive incentives), financial and 




 In the main, the focus within the literature is on particular elements of work performed by 
multilateral and bilateral institutions across different intervention modalities. In order to 
provide a lucid summation of the various intervention modalities, it is necessary to provide 
some form of classification based on a broader reading of the literature and an overarching 
review of the work of multilateral and bilateral development organisations. An initial study 
titled ‘Mapping of Governance Interventions in Africa’ commissioned by the AUC as part of 
the process leading to the affirmation of AGA and the establishment of the AGP outlined 
several intervention areas on the basis more extensive research on interventions across Africa.   
The consultant’s report outlined a total of nine (9) intervention areas and detailed some of these 
across a range of institutions active in the continent in governance. These interventions are 
outlined in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Governance Interventions  
Source: Mapping of Governance Intervention Report (DPA, 2008b). 
Although the ‘mapping study’ was useful for appreciating the spread of intervention 
possibilities, the scope of coverage was comprehensive and hence included interventions that 
covered a broader range of institutions, including direct intervention from Development 
Partners (DP) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The challenge for a research initiative 
of this nature is to establish a framework that relates to interventions that have unfolded in the 
AU multilateral system. While legal documents, resolutions and related plans prescribed some 
interventions, many of the actions that unfold as ‘relevant activities’ arise from the broader 
overall agreement amongst Member States and related mandates. The following table is hence 
constructed based on an expansive reading of interventions that have emerged in the AU system 
and the broader literature on the work of multilateral and bilateral institutions.  

























































































































Table 2: Multilateral Intervention Modalities 
Intervention 




In keeping with established treatise, convention and binding resolutions, this mode of 
intervention is directed at activities initiated to monitor compliance of agreed 
governance norms and values and related sanctions. These incorporate strategies 
directed at ensuring Member States report on compliance with agreed commitment 
and related strategies for securing implementation or domestication at the Member 
State level.  
Peer Review and 
Diplomacy 
 
Peer Review in governance has emerged as a central pillar within the AU and 
reflected in the establishment of the APRM. However, peer-level engagements are 
also established in several other instruments and an emerging practice across all areas 
of governance. Aside from formal compliance demands, governance intervention 





As with many other multilateral institutions, AU institutions organise numerous 
events and produce publications directed at sharing information and securing more 
in-depth exchange amongst Member States. While many of these are directly focused 
on terrains within which there are specific instruments, they sometimes extend to 





Capacity and technical support often related to supporting the implementation of 
specific agreed governance norms and standards. These range from training 
interventions for officials and the provision of direct support for actions at the level 
of Member States through the provisions of technical support staff and related 
capacity-building efforts.  
Source: Authors extraction and interpretation from the literature.  
How interventions are clustered varies from the framework provided by Börzel (2015). Direct 
forms of military or peacekeeping intervention are excluded as these are often a matter of last 
resort and hence secondary to the more conventional and established modes of governance-
related intervention.  
1.0.4.3 Efficacy of Multilateral Interventions  
A clear conceptual orientation to governance and related intervention modalities provide a 
pathway for exploring the efficacy of interventions. Such a pathway needs to be coupled with 
some understanding of how efficacy judgments are made on the value-add of AU 
multilateralism. The modalities of African multilateral interventions range from legal 
agreement secured, coupled with related enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions or 
adverse resolution, towards the softer initiatives associated with capacity building for 
compliance purposes. How these unfolded varies across sectors and terrains of engagement. 
As with many other similar organisations, the AU is criticised for being ineffective. However, 
even with such criticism, the general literature on the performance of the AU and other similar 
organisations remains limited in the ability to explain ineffective or effective performance  
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(Gutner & Thompson, 2010:228).  
The predominant realist or neo-realist ‘regime effectiveness’ literature from International 
Relations scholars generally focused on state interest and how these shapes what unfolds from 
within such organisations. Multilateral institutions from such a perspective are the product of 
state interests, and their performance is generally contingent on delegations and the control 
mechanisms established (Biermann & Bauer, 2004:190). The realist literature generally 
perceived performance variations as being a product of the underlying challenges of 
cooperation and consensus amongst Member States (Gutner & Thompson, 2009:4).   Realists 
do not engage with details on different institutional designs or what unfolds in practice as 
officials within multilateral institutions implement their mandates.   
The results and performance culture that emerged under the guise of the ‘reinventing 
government movement’ or the New Public Management (NPM) momentum of the 1980s 
served to established a focus on ‘outputs and outcomes’ and hence on the substantive value and 
impact of multilateral organisations (Gutner et al., 2010). The mere introduction of the notion 
of the efficacy implies a level of institutional autonomy and agency over multilateral 
interventions. A perspective that goes against the more traditional International Relations 
dominated perceptive that multilateral institutions lack any substantive agency outside of 
delegation and control exercised by the states which established them in the first instance 
(Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney, 2006). While such perceptive continue to persist, more 
micro-level analysis suggest that institutions do matter and can exercise a varying degree of 
independent influence of a variety of intervention terrains, including governance (Leon, 2010; 
Leon, 2011).  
Gutner and Thompson (2009:3) outline an analysis of performance by Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) wherein it is postulated that such ‘..bureaucracies may become obsessed with their own 
rules at the expense of their primary missions in ways that produce inefficient and self-
defeating outcomes’ (Gutner et al., 2009:3). They nevertheless conclude that the study from 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) is limited as they do not go far enough to explain variations 
across international organisations. However, at a broader level, and from related concern with 
the value derived from the use of donor funds by multilateral institutions, there has been a move 
towards establishing and using specific criteria to make judgments on the performance of 
multilateral institutions. Of particular significance is the propensity is to use amongst others, 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD/DAC) criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability for assessing 
‘development’ performance or the fulfilment of objectives (Chianca, 2008:41).   In the terrain 
of multilateral intervention in governance, this mostly implied a focus on visible governance-
related changes within the Member States. The overriding concern driving the results approach 
is that outside of a more in-depth analysis of impact, there would be a disconnect between 
delivering on activities engaged upon by development-oriented agencies and the changes that 
they are expected to produce (Picciotto, 2006).  Picciotto (2006) however notes that results 
based approached have not fully resolved a host of measurement problems that relate both to 
the power exercised by contractual principles and the many variables that impact on local level 
anticipated changes. Others are sceptical that causal links are possible between activities, 
outputs, outcomes and impact.  It is, for example, argued that it is difficult to identify if and 
how an output, such as capacity building, leads to a significant change in a country (Picciotto, 
2006). A poorly run multilateral organisation may still achieve results. Biermann and Bauer 
(2004:191) provide that linking ‘…observable environmental improvements to the specific 
influence of an international regime in a meaningful way is virtually impossible regarding the 
complexity of ecological processes’.  
If the debates are taken a step forward, some argue that multilateral organisations can be 
dysfunctional as a result of the internal structure and organisational culture, and not because of 
being perverted by the power exercised by their members (Barnett et al., 2004). As Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004) note that ‘rather than designing the most appropriate and efficient rules and 
procedures to accomplish their missions, bureaucracies often tailor their missions to fit the 
existing, well-known and comfortable rulebook.’ (Lindoso & Nina, 2016:12). A shift towards 
more micro-level institutional focus builds a realisation that the overall study of multilateral 
organisations is, understandably, dominated by writings from the field of International 
Relations. Those with a more significant interest in how institutions function and the more 
micro-level realities of what unfolds in multilateral institutions have been slow in taking up the 
challenge (Gutner et al., 2010:2). The overall consequence is that analysis mainly arises from 
researchers and practitioners linked to development agencies that provide funding for 
multilateral interventions.  
A useful outline of the different models and approaches that exist for developing performance-
related judgments on multilateral institutions are from Obser (2007) and Lindoso and Nina 
(2016). These authors detail frameworks established by donor countries or consortium of 
countries. There is some independent assessment from multilateral organisations, such as the 
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World Bank (WB), the United Nations and a few from Donor countries with specific 
multilateral funding portfolios, such as the Australians, Swedish and Norwegians (Lindoso et 
al., 2016:20-25). The most established of these, where donor states combine their efforts, is the 
Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), launched in 2002 as 
a network for monitoring the performance of multilateral development organisations. MOPAN 
mainly unfolds through a joint Annual Survey of multilateral organisations’ partnership 
behaviour with national stakeholders and other donor organisations at the country level. The 
challenge with MOPAN, as expressed by Obser (2007:23) is that ‘…both the ‘expectation gap’ 
and the ‘attribution gap’ remain significant problems for multilateral organisation performance 
assessments by donors. Lindoso and Nina (2016:19) similarly conclude there are many 
challenges that academics and practitioners face and ‘include accurately and robustly 
measuring effectiveness’, and establishing the link between ‘organisational outputs to impact’. 
It may well be prudent to turn directly to the vast body of literature within the fold of Public 
Administration and ‘institutional studies’ to seek inspiration for a framework to assess the 
efficacy of multilateral interventions in governance.  However, as Solana and Saz-Carranza 
(2015:776) note, it is surprising how ‘little attention they have attracted from administrative 
and organisational scholars’. The general focus of Public Administration scholars has been on 
the functioning of national governance and implementation institution. Within the broader 
purview of Public Administration and Institutional Studies, there is a substantive emerging 
critic of ‘one size fits all’ approach towards implementation (Grindle, 2007; Andrews, 2010). 
The common point of departure for such critiques is complex political realities at the level of 
nation-states and the different motivations driving how people engage with the governance-
related intervention (Andrews, 2013; Levy, 2014).  
The more national-level analysis of the complexities of change does raise questions around the 
efficacy of the strategies of African multilateral institutions. While many, such as Andrews 
(2013) and Levy (2014), have some ideas on works and does not work at a national level, such 
analysis has never permeated how we view what unfolds as interventions from multilateral 
institutions. Often, these institutions are perceived as separate, with little agency for what 
unfolds at the national level and somewhat innocent of what works and what does not. This 
approach loses sight that multilateral institutions and the contents of outputs and the choices 
made, reflect a level of agency and hence cannot merely be divorced from our appreciation of 
what happens at a level of nation-states. A simple line between multilateral decision and actions 
cannot be drawn. An in-depth analysis of how things unfold within multilateral processes and 
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the driving incentives and perspectives on needed actions are crucial to understanding the 
efficacy of governance-intervention. Especially if we are to understand whether these can make 
a material difference to the governance realities in Africa.  
Amongst International Relations scholars, some distinguish between the measurement of 
multilateral performance on a continuum from outputs, outcomes and impact (Biermann et al., 
2004). However, the reality is that performance measured by outcomes and impact may not be 
appropriate when constrained by factors outside of the organisation's control (Gutner et al., 
2009; Gutner et al., 2010). Gutner and Thompson  (2010:235) argue well for more micro-level 
analysis and hence a focus on process and what they term ‘midterm outputs’. They also, 
amongst others, suggest that the critical issue for analysing the performance of International 
Organisations is framing the focus and level of inquiry. Gutner and Thompson (2010:235) 
provide a useful diagrammatic framework for thinking through where a study would 
appropriately be focused. A ‘black-box’ is imposed on the figure to capture the terrain, which 
reflects a focus on ‘midterm outputs’ as provided for by Gutner and Thompson (2010).  
Figure 2: Multilateral Performance Matrix 
Source: Adapted from Gutner and Thompson (2010:235) 
What is most evident from both the growing International Relations and Public Administration 
literature is that we cannot easily separate the internal and external variables of performance 
and hence privilege one set over another. Barnett and Finnemore (Barnett et al., 2004:36) 
provide a useful way of characterising the sources of the performance of a multilateral 
institution. At an internal (micro) level, these include ‘organisational culture, bureaucratic 
dysfunction, leadership deficit, inadequate staffing and resources, and career self-interest’. At 
an external (intermediate) level, this includes ‘competing norms, lack of consensus on 
problems, power politics, incoherent mandates, short-sighted principles and on the ground 



















Thomson (2009:12).  
The focus on mid-term outputs, as proposed by Gutner and Thompson  (2010:235) implies an 
emphasis on both the internal and external in a focused manner. That is, in a way that 
established the connection between internal institutional action established by multilateral 
organisations for implementation purposes and related multilateral state engagements as 
expressed through policy mandates and by way of AU Member State responses to intervention 
activities. Drawing from the different frameworks established, a focus on mid-level outputs 
implies analysis at the level of multilateral engagements and implementation. The table below 
captures the efficacy analysis relevant to each level. It serves to make a distinction between the 
content of work and agency that emanates at the level of multilateral engagements where 
agency is primarily exercised by Member States, versus multilateral implementation, where 
agency is largely contingent on the institutions of multilateralism, and hence officials employed 
to take administrative leadership.  
Table 3: Levels of Analysis 




‘Multilateral engagement’ analysis is focused on the overall decision process related 
to the establishment of mandates. It incorporates negotiation processes leading to the 
adoption of decisions and levels of commitment embedded in these. The bias would 
be on understanding the agency exercised by Member States in the process. The 
substantive focus will on the challenges arising from competing norms, power 
relations and the linkages with ‘on the ground constraints’ as it related to interactions 




‘Multilateral Institutional Implementation’ analysis will serve to provide a focused 
analysis of AU institutional practices in the development and implementation of 
mandates in the governance fold. It incorporates a focus on the plans generated and 
the activities initiated for implementation. The substantive focus will be on the 
challenges that arise from organisational culture, leadership approaches, bureaucratic 
incentives and staffing/resourcing issues.  
 
Source: Extracted from a broader analysis of the literature.  
Building on what has emerged from International Relations and Public Administration 
scholarship is the need to concentrate more on institutional processes and the inherent 
connection between internal and external factors without losing sight of the focus and level of 
analysis. A focus on impact and sustainability would suggest an external orientation. Efficiency 
and effectiveness would suggest an internal focus. Carefully bridging, within the analysis, the 
internal and external, and yet retaining proper emphasis suggests a more ‘institutional 
approach’ and hence a focus on mid-term outputs.  In line with a more engaged institutional 
approach, the word ‘efficacy’ is borrowed from health research (Kim, 2013) and is used to 
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denote the value of particular institutional interventions in themselves and not necessarily 
direct impact in real-world condition. In many respects, such an approach represents a different 
lens for understanding African multilateralism in governance and is appreciated better in the 
context of the different schools of thought that have emerged in the broader terrain of 
exploration.  
1.1 Understanding Multilateral Interventions in Governance 
A more detailed analysis of African multilateralism and AU multilateral institutions in 
governance follows in Chapter Two. In order to appropriately locate the research, it is 
imperative, at this stage, to engage with the different available lenses for research on African 
multilateralism. While scholarship on the ‘multilateralism’ and ‘multilateral institutions’ has 
increased, it has not emerged as a separate and distinct field of study with specific theoretical 
constructs, outside of the broad terrain of International Relations or more comprehensive theory 
construction from the broader social sciences. Some assert that international politics, of which 
multilateralism is an expression of, is not susceptible to scientific inquiry (Burchill, Linklater, 
Devetak, Donnelly, Nardin, Paterson, Reus-Smit & True, 2013:1). Noam Chomsky (1994) has 
gone as far as to claim that international relations ‘ historical conditions are too varied and 
complex for anything that might plausibility be called “a theory” to apply uniformly’ (Burchill 
et al., 2013:2).  
One challenge in efforts directed at understanding multilateralism and related institutions is the 
attempts to cast it as requiring theory construction that is separate from broader social science 
reflections on state formation and mutual coexistence. Even as International Relations emerged 
as the discipline seeking to theorise and explain cooperative interactions amongst states, it was 
and continues to be influenced by old disciplines, such as law, philosophy, politics, sociology 
and economics. It is impossible to entirely separate theoretically driven reflections on African 
multilateralism from the broader philosophical space. It hence is imperative to draw on what 
has emerged in the broader social sciences to establish the conceptual parameters for a research 
undertaking. Engaging with some of the broader theoretical perspectives also provides a base 
for putting forward a more institutional Public Administration informed approach towards 
understanding AU multilateralism in governance.     
The challenge with theory engagements and seeking to outline existing frameworks is that even 
when identified, there remain many nuances and variations amongst individual scholars within 
specific philosophical traditions.  Burchill et al. (2013) outline the more influential theories as 
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articulated within International Relations as including, liberal internationalism, realism, neo-
realism and the English School, as well as Marxism and feminism. Anne- Marie Slaughter 
(2011) provides a similar outline, but includes institutionalism as a viable approach within the 
field. A more nuanced clustering from Simmons and Martins (2002) categorises the theories 
as ‘realist school of thought’, ‘rational functionalism’ and ‘English school’ to ‘social 
constructivism’. Purpose generally drives how the theories are clustered and explained., The 
perspective here is to capture the broader parameters of the perspective and the underlying 
implied mode of analysis while recognising that there are many nuances in broader 
philosophical approaches and variations within a seemingly similar tradition. The analysis of 
analytical traditions is done to put forward an institutional perspective to assess and understand 
the efficacy of AU multilateral interventions in governance. The use of ‘institutionalism’ does 
not serve to dismiss other theoretical approaches, as often no single theory thoroughly explains 
all aspects and dynamics of international politic interactions (Burchill et al., 2013:23), and 
hence AU multilateralism in governance. Realist (structuralism) and idealist (liberalism) 
represent the broad philosophical traditions. Constructivism, while presented by some as 
philosophical traditions, represents a methodological approach. Institutionalism incorporates 
both realist and idealistic variations, and hence perceived here as a framework to establish a 
research focus. To fully appreciate the methodological orientation that would be relevant for 
the research, it is imperative to engage briefly with each of the broader theoretical tradition and 
capture their value and limitations. The approach is one of ensuring that the approach embraced 
for the research does not ignore the value that may be derived from specific theoretical lenses 
available to understand African multilateralism.  
1.1.1 Realism  
Realist or neo-realist approaches towards understanding international organisations and 
international relations continues to be a dominating paradigm (Simmons et al., 2002:329). The 
emphasis of realists is on sovereignty interests and the power exercised by Member States of 
the AU (Matlosa, 2008; Khadiagala et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016).  The functional efficacy of the 
AU multilateral system is hence contingent on state interests. Cooperation agreements and 
implementation actions only unfold when specific state interest is secured. The implementation 
of formal agreements through bureaucratic actions is contingent on self-interests driven 
interactions. Member States of the AU will only pursue those actions that will benefit them 
directly, or that can be used to foster their interest in the future. The overriding emphasis on 
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the power of states by realists leads them to a dim view of international law and institutions 
(Slaughter, 2011:2). They generally argue that states may create institutions, such as the AU, 
but that these institutions will only be able to act per underlying interest and power relations.  
Outside of the variations amongst realists, the general proposition is that state commitments 
define what works or does not work at the level of multilateralism. While most realist tends to 
dismiss the possibility of agency on the part of international institutions, a few recognise that 
states may give up some level of agency to multilateral organisations to secure broader 
interests. Some states may well also use international organisations to force others to adjust 
and hence make them worst off than before. States may also buy-off cooperation of smaller 
ones within the overall multilateral system (Simmons et al., 2002:330). Realists of all 
persuasions perceive power and interest at work in all aspects of cooperation within multilateral 
organisations. 
Realist insights provide a useful basis for engaging with state interests as it relates to 
agreements and intervention in the AU governance space.  The primary focus in understanding 
what works or does not work and the interest’s states might have in establishing and 
implementing governance norms and standards. More in-depth analysis from such a realist 
perceptive would be to reflect on the interests within states, and the power exercised by local 
elites and other domestic forces, on what is agreed to and acted upon concerning AU 
governance norms and standards. Institutions are treated as mostly reducible to the material 
interests of powerful domestic or international forces (Burchill et al., 2013:46). They are, at 
most, variables that can be expected to have effects only on minor issue removed from the 
struggle for power. These insights cannot be ignored in any analysis of AU governance 
interventions, as it does pose a question as to why states engage in establishing common 
governance standards and rules if they are not likely to agree to them in the first place     
The weakness of realist perspectives and related structural modes of analysis is that they cannot 
account for the emergence of normative frameworks and the agency exercised by multilateral 
institutions. States often comply with values related to humanitarian actions without the threat 
of coercion or any direct self-interest. When there is norm violation because of the absence of 
an enforcement mechanism, the moral force of an infringed norm may serve as a significant 
part of the calculus of both the state and those who judge it (Burchill et al., 2013:49). At the 
most basic level, AU institutions not only sustain interactions but can be instrumental in 
judgements and actions from international and local stakeholders as they collect information 
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on compliance or non-compliance with governance norms and standards.  
1.1.2 Idealism  
The principal challenge to realism and hence, for a more idealist perspective on AU 
multilateralism in governance comes from the broad family of liberal theories (Walt, 1998:32). 
The foundational insight from a liberal theory perspective is that the national character of 
individual states matters for multilateral relations (Slaughter, 2011:3). A central tenant of 
liberal perspectives in international relations is that democracies do not attack each other and 
hence democratic practices need to be spread to secure peace across the world (Khadiagala et 
al., 2016:1562). While classical liberalism places emphasis on the character of individuals 
states for broader cooperation, more recent emphasis is on ideas projection into the 
international system. While there are many nuances, there is a general belief in the superiority 
of specific forms of governance and that these will or should command consent from all states. 
Within such a world-view, cultural distinctions and claims of sovereignty will and should fall 
away when it comes to norms and standards in governance (Fukuyama, 2006).  
Rooted in the idealistic frame of liberal perspectives, is a firm belief that global or African 
norms and standards in governance are derivable from the principles that have evolved from 
domestic political orders. While there might be divergences on how governance shared-values 
have evolved within the AU system, the general proposition is that these constitute appropriate 
standards to be applied to all Member States (Murithi, 2017). Even as some defend state 
sovereignty and engage multilateralism from a liberal self-interest perspective, the general 
ideational orientation is that contravention of agreed governance norms and standards can 
justify interventions in internal affairs (Murithi, 2017). The liberal framework can, in part, 
explain the rapid growth of AU instruments in democracy and human rights, amongst others. 
The general caution, however, is the claim that many of these instruments contain ideas that 
are specific to African realities and hence there is no melting into the universal or the general 
march of modernisation.  The challenge with those who propagate African governance values 
as separate from western liberal constructs is that, very often, the norms and values are mostly 
the same (Souaré, 2014).  
Idealistic liberal perspectives allow for a deeper appreciation of why states will agree to norms 
and standards that may not accord with the interest of ruling elites. To counter the superiority 
of specific ideas, and concomitant governance norms and standards, state representative might 
find it impossible not to agree within formal processes to specific governance instruments. 
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Also, they may well be subject to pressure from different domestic and international sources, 
including civil society. The value of the approach is that it facilitates reflection on the 
governance frameworks developed outside of any pretence that these only unfold because of 
state interests. It furthermore also facilitates an appreciation of the agency of wider 
stakeholders, including donors, on what unfolds within AU governance-related processes. A 
further distinct value of a liberal perceptive is that it builds an appreciation for what is now 
termed ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the multilateral context (Souaré, 2014), whether these be from 
a liberal or Pan-African integration perspective.  
Within the African governance space, idealists often engage in matters of discourse and related 
contestations around African perspectives and ownership (Mkandawire, 2007). An argument 
around distinctively African perceptive on governance issues is often made. Such perspectives 
include a need to counter dominating western ideas, especially those embodied in liberal 
perspectives. Idealist within this space includes the Pan Africanist who would argue for deeper 
integration on the back of African shared values. While there would be contestation around 
economic liberalism, they do not necessarily substantively articulate governance norms and 
standards that are different from those articulated by liberal from across the globe.  
Ideas often unfold in specific social contexts and take root as a result of the agency exercised 
by individuals and organisations within the AU multilateral system. What is agreed upon by 
AU Member States is often not just a reflection of the dominance of specific ideas but may 
well also be as a result of either capacity strength or weaknesses within specific supportive 
institutions or institutional processes. The more substantial weakness of the focus on ideas is 
that there is a lack of appreciation of the context within which ideas unfold and implemented. 
Including the meaning attached to specific governance documents when an agreement is 
forged. Idealist focus on norm adoption and implementation outside of any appreciation of the 
agency and hence the capacity of AU multilateral institutions to implement these. An idealist 
frame is more geared towards engaging in the superiority of some instruments over others and 
hence not on the efficacy of interventions that unfold within AU multilateralism in governance. 
Asserting that AU instruments, for example, in corruption, are different to or better than UN 
or other regional instruments, does not provide any insights into what works and what does 
not. It is vital to recognise that it is not possible to delink ideas from institutional processes.  
1.1.3 Constructivism 
Constructivist approaches emerged mainly as a response to more traditional rational self-
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interest explanations of multilateralism and the work of multilateral institutions. In contrast to 
self-interest explanation, they argue that actors within the multilateral process are inherently 
social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed and re-constructed on an 
ongoing basis (Klotz & Lynch, 2014:3). Constructivists are generally critical of value-neutral 
theorising and argue well that all knowledge is wedded to interests, and that theories should be 
explicitly committed to exposing and dismantling structures of domination.  In general, 
constructivist appose empirical claims on a single criterion of validity, claiming that such move 
marginalises alternative viewpoints and moral positions (Klotz et al., 2014). Normative 
elements, such as those established to drive forward a multilateral agenda, are as crucial as 
structures, where the focus is on the self-interest of Member States. Shared ideas, beliefs and 
values have structural characteristics that exert a powerful influence on social and political 
action. 
The value of a constructivist approach is that it allows for deeper peering into the institution of 
multilateralism and multilateral institutions in a way that goes beyond self-interest or idea-
driven explanations. Individuals and stakeholders involved in AU multilateralism are perceived 
to be social, in that identities is constituted from institutionalised norms, values and social 
environment in which actions unfold. How engagements unfold is from identity acquisition, as 
learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment. 
From such a perspective, what unfolds within AU multilateral intervention in governance is 
shaped by the agency of actors as knowledgeable social and political agents.  By re-imagining 
the social as a constitutive realm of values and practices, and by situating individual identities 
and interests within such a field, constructivists have placed a sociological inquiry at the centre 
of analysis (Adler-Nissen, 2016). A constructivists lens allows for peering into AU structures 
in a manner that builds an appreciation of how norms and practices are shaped and reshaped 
through communication and various modes of active socialisation. At the level of a focus on 
AU governance interventions, this approach could well serve to explain the shift and the 
contradictions that emanate from the choice to move beyond state sovereignty towards none-
indifference amongst others. It would also help explain how AU governance-related 
institutions may well be driven to pursue their interest against the wishes of the States that 
create them.  
Constructivist theories have generally inspired a level of rich empirical analysis into the role 
of multilateral organisations in setting the standards of appropriateness, diffusing norms, and 
in mobilising various group socialising mechanisms to shape actors behaviour (Simmons et al., 
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2002:339). While helping to shift away from a pure focus on state interest and articulated norms 
and standards, towards social and institutional context within which actions unfold, a 
constructivists approach on its own might not provide enough insights into the complex 
interplay between different variables that shape what unfolds in AU multilateralism in 
governance. Methodologically, it would be prudent to draw on constructivism and the other 
broader philosophical traditions to establish an institutional approach towards understanding 
the efficacy of AU multilateralism in governance.  
1.1.4 Institutionalism 
Institutionalism, in contrast to the other broader approaches, serves to shift perspectives onto 
the varied forms of agency exercised within the multilateral process.  Institutions, defined as a 
set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999), 
serve to overcome the uncertainty that may undermine cooperation and hence deeper African 
integration.  At the most basic level, multilateral institutions, such as the AU, can extend the 
time horizon for actions and hence create the possibility of compliance over a period. Some 
institutionalist share realist assumptions and hence focus on multilateral institutions officials 
both as agents of their principles (Member States) and as agents prone to acting upon their self-
interest within the process of shaping and implementing governance interventions(Jönsson & 
Tallberg, 2008; Amenta & Ramsey, 2010). However, there are others within the broad fold of 
institutionalism, who cast attention both on historical path dependencies and on institutional 
norms and values for understanding institutional actions. Institutional approaches to the study 
of multilateral organisations generally derived from the study of domestic institutions. As with 
state-level bureaucratic structures, multilateral organisations can develop identities that are 
distinct to and sometimes separate of constituting states. Such identity emerges through social 
interactions and mutual understandings or interest, which can lead to an independent 
bureaucracy or culture (Jaafar, 2018:14) that is either positive or negative for the overall policy 
momentum of the organisation.  
The more recent recurrence of the approach is termed ‘New Institutionalism’ and derives from 
the fields of Political Science and Sociology, with two distinct schools of research. The first 
school (Historical Institutionalism), generally looks at the background framework of 
institutions, to better understand the norms, they foster. The second school (Sociological 
Institutionalism), looks towards complex networks of social and economic relationships to 
understand preference formation within institutions (Caporaso, 1992; Jupille et al., 1999). Both 
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schools have generated methods and findings, which are of value to the study of African 
multilateralism in governance. The macro-level analysis undertaken by so much of 
International Relations research is a perfect setting for New Institutionalist research which 
could, through a blending of macro and micro-level analysis, shed new light on the relationship 
between state interests, norm formation and actual implementation within AU governance-
related institutions. 
Institutional approaches towards analysing and understanding international organisations and 
multilateralism have generally grown across the world and, in particular, have served to build 
a deeper understanding of the function and value-add of European Union (EU) institutions 
(Jupille et al., 1999). Although the field has grown internationally and within the purview of 
International Relations, there is no evidence of its application towards understanding African 
multilateralism in any manner. At most, studies are conducted on the administrative leadership 
of the AU and the functioning of AU structures for multilateralism. Even as there are practice-
driven conclusions on the agency of AU institutions and weaknesses in implementation, most 
studies focus on the more macro-considerations of state interests and norm contestation with 
the broader world.   
While establishing a methodological orientation for substantive engagements with the efficacy 
of AU governance-related intervention, institutionalism does not provide ready crafted 
frameworks for collating and analysing information. Outside of creating a basis for more in-
depth reflections on institutional processes and linking these more engagingly with the 
institutions of multilateralism, the approach does not embody specified methodologically ready 
tools. As the orientation generally embodies a shift away from realist and idealist theoretical 
models, it pushes us towards considering a more ‘constructivist’ approach towards 
understanding AU multilateralism in governance.     
1.2 Research Methodology and Approach 
Institutionalism, while having a rich history within the social sciences, does not inherently have 
a methodological orientation suitable for all research endeavours. It is hence vital to engage 
with the overall methodological challenge when it comes to an understanding of the efficacy 
of AU Governance intervention. An overview of the value and limits of the dominant 
philosophical approaches for research follows on from an outline of existing institutional 
approaches towards analysing the efficacy of multilateralism and more detailed 
characterisation of qualitative institutionalism as a mode of inquiry for the research. The chosen 
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research method will be outlined together with the related information required for analysis.  
1.2.1 The Methodological Challenge 
The efficacy of interventions in governance presupposes specific relationships and hence, some 
level of causality between intervention and related actions. A search for causality requires the 
identification and delineation of specific variables and the relationship between these. How 
variables are connected, differ across theoretical traditions. Such connections also embody 
assumptions on causality. Agency, from a realist structural perspective, arises from self-interest 
relationships between Member States and hence predicated on building an understanding of 
choice by rational actors seeking to maximise their interest. Understanding what works and 
what does not, requires uncovering national interest that drives states to either act or not act in 
response to governance initiatives (Matlosa, 2008; Khadiagala et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016). From 
a methodological perspective, this approach implies looking at decisions or non-decisions 
purely by establishing causality with country-based interests. Practically, this implies looking 
at variables relating to proposed actions, the response of Member States and the specific 
interests that explain actions. A realist perceptive is useful for deepening our understanding of 
possible self-interest arguments on why some things work or do not. They do not, however, 
encourage engagement with the complexity of decision-making that unfolds in a range of 
institutions and on actual interactions within multilateral processes and institutions. National 
level interest nevertheless remains an element of concern and cannot be excluded from sound 
analysis. However, more engaged research cannot be limited to these as it would fundamentally 
exclude the complex ways in which agency unfolds and is exercised in multilateral processes 
and at the level of Member States.  
A more liberal or idealist perspective closes the realist gap by casting light on the development 
and promotion of shared values within multilateral processes. From a research perspective, it 
would turn attention towards the discourse within the multilateral processes and to the 
normative agency exercised by multilateral institutions. In this context, the focus would shift 
towards the substance of debates on the values to be upheld and general contestation around 
these. The variable to be considered from such a perspective are the values of agents involved 
in the process, including those from Member States. Causality would be between the 
agreements derived, the support these have and the commitment to optimal implementation or 
related disjuncture between values and what unfolds in practice (Khadiagala, 2015; Murithi, 
2017). The problem with this is that it excludes interests and that the values articulated, and 
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actions related to these, are a product of institutional processes and related negotiations or 
engagements.  
An institutional approach to research builds on both the realist and idealistic tradition but seeks 
to engage actions and inactions that emerge from the range of implementation actions that 
shape multilateral interactions (Caporaso, 1992; Jupille et al., 1999). In the main, the focus will 
be on AU established institutions but incorporate some analytical linkages on implementation 
at the level of Member States. While the relationship between AU institutions and actual 
actions by national institutions is vital for determining causality and hence the efficacy of 
interventions, causality in such a context is not an easy matter and influenced by many 
variables. Tracing causality is difficult, but necessary to demonstrate what intervention would 
work better in a multilateral context. In the absence of doing tracer studies within the 
framework of this research, the approach would be to look at relationships to highlight elements 
of complexity and to capture the challenges that confront each mode of intervention. As the 
focus is mainly on the role and value-add of AU institutions, the approach has been to look at 
the choices made, the historical, sociological and economic incentive that shape such choices 
and hence the limits and value of identified interventions. In essence, it entailed tracing the 
modalities and incentives structures on what drives people to acts in particular circumstances.  
1.2.2 Qualitative Institutional Analysis  
Institutionalism, as a theoretical frame, does not in itself directly imply a specific research 
method. At most, it implies a spread of research approaches directed at uncovering institutional 
practices and related motivations for actions or inactions. By implication, it suggests a more 
‘constructivist’ research method. Constructivism, stresses that structural continuity and 
processes of change are based on the agency (Klotz et al., 2014:3) embodied in institutions and 
processes, and as exercised by individuals.  Rather than granting priority to either structure, 
ideas or agency, constructivism generally views these as being constructed and reconstructed 
on an ongoing basis.  
A constructivist approach requires a level of openness to the terminology used in alternative 
schools of thought. In the constructivist perspective, norms, rules, languages, cultures, and 
ideologies are a phenomenon that creates identities and guides actions (Klotz et al., 2014:4-5). 
Constructivist approaches furthermore imply situating research question within spatial, 
historical and socio-structural contexts. As multiple meanings may coexist in tension with each 
other, constructivist also ask how and why particular practices prevail in specific contexts. 
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Such a framework offers a researcher with the ability to assess the meaning attached to actions 
and why there is a preference of one over another. A constructivist approach inevitably pushes 
research work into a hermeneutical circle of ever deeper and more implicit interpretation of 
what has unfolded. Such an exercise implies appreciating the uniqueness of situations through 
a comprehensive understanding of what has unfolded (Klotz et al., 2014:14). Structural 
approaches, be they driven by realist or idealistic assumption, focus on the possibilities and 
constraints on actions. Constructivist claims generally tend towards reality as it exists, rather 
than as provided for within particular epistemologies. It is hence, a methodology that 
acknowledges contingency and context and better suited to an institutional approach to AU 
multilateralism in governance.  
In establishing the boundaries for the analysis, it is imperative to indicate that the focus would 
be on understanding the workings of AU multilateralism in governance as it relates to 
institutions established for such purposes. The focus cannot, however, be done, without looking 
at the presumed or expected response or engagement from Member States. Attempting to 
understand what unfolds within Member States would push the research beyond what is 
possible and hence render it impossible to have focus. In looking at such causality, it is hence 
here only necessary to look at the interactions as is presumed within multilateral processes and 
that arises from the specific relationships crafted between multilateral institutions and specific 
state structures or actors at the national level. The focus in this context would be on the 
relationship and not on the functioning of state-level institutions. Extending the causality 
approach would imply a much more in-depth analysis and would require a focus only on one 
aspect of intervention and hence a tracer study to determine all forms of interactions of a state 
with the multilateral institution. Such a detailed analysis would render it impossible to do a 
global analysis of the efficacy of governance interventions. A broader case-based analysis may 
well be prudent for understanding the details of what transpires within AU Member States but 
is beyond the scope of this research.  
The primary focus here would be on doing an institutional analysis of those organisations and 
actors that occupy the multilateral space itself. It would hence be a focus on the institutions 
established by the AU for implementation and related processes within which there is 
participation from Member States and other stakeholders. It would seek to uncover the logic of 
choices made, how resources flow, the activities engaged upon and the general actions or 
inactions that unfold. This form of institutional analysis comes from a long tradition of 
understanding the exercise of agency within multilateral processes.  
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1.2.3 Research Approach  
A constructivist institutional approach, while not implying a single research strategy, does 
entail providing a complete story based on a broader range of documents and a reinterpretation 
of previous studies. In this way, a scholar can use texts, including official documents, to 
uncover evolving practices and hence, general preference patterns (Klotz et al., 2014). The 
challenge for research from an institutional perspective is that there are no established research 
frameworks or tools that comfortable fit the orientation. It thus stands before the researcher to 
establish the framework and the specific tools to be utilised and explain the validity of the 
approach used. Building on Barnetter and Finemore (2004) framework explained previously, a 
constructivist institutional approach would, by its nature, emphasis organisational practices and 
the inherent connection between internal and external factors without losing sight of the focus 
and level of analysis. In practice, this also entails doing both a historical and contemporary 
analysis of what has unfolded in AU multilateralism in governance and hence the decisions on 
actions or the failure to act. Such an approach does not suggest a neutral characterisation of 
development as they have unfolded since the formation of the AU but instead implies a specific 
form of analysis from the perspective of institutionalism.  
The research approach entailed an engaged analysis of all that has emerged from across the 
three areas of governance focus (accountability, the rule of law and the state) and across the 
spectrum of the four areas of governance interventions (Compliance and Sanctions; Peer 
Review and Diplomacy; Information and Knowledge Exchange; and Capacity Building and 
Technical Support). In line with a constructivist approach, the methodology involves providing 
a historical description and analysis of AU governance interventions and the key drivers or 
logic of choices made.  This approach allowed for a fuller demonstration of agency exercised 
by the range of actors engaged in the multilateral process. In support of the methodological 
orientation, attention would then focus on uncovering what, why and how actions unfold and 
the incentives driving those involved in implementation.  
Given the complexities of working through governance areas and related terrains of 
intervention, it is imperative to paint a broad overview of developments in the governance area, 
before engaging in detail around specific interventions. Within each terrain, it was not possible 
to capture every intervention that emerged historically as these often cover a wide range of 
inconsequential initiatives. The approach has been towards gathering the more prominent 
activities that capture the logic of intention and not every initiative, such as minor or less 
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significant actions. Embedded in the research approach is hence an exercise in making choices 
around what to include and what to exclude within the analysis. The choice of what to include 
and exclude is on the extent to which an initiative is a good illustration of an intervention and 
is materially able to shed light on the agency exercised within AU institutions. The need to 
make such research choices is driven, in part, by recognising that no matter how much data is 
collected and collated, it is not possible to know every specific activity that has unfolded in all 
of the terrains of intervention in governance. It is important to note that very often, governance 
activities would emerge as a result of partnership arrangements between AU institutions and 
external stakeholders and hence are not adequately recorded as AU interventions within the 
overall system. Analysis invariably embodies the theoretical ‘institutionalist’ assumption that 
underpins the research. As articulated, a constructivist orientation serves to guard against 
substantive bias. Such an approach also served to ensure that the research is context-specific 
and hence ‘avoids the trapping of having to wrestle with the tensions between generalisation 
and detail’ (Klotz et al., 2014:21). 
1.2.4 Research Data and Usage 
The choice of research tools is driven by the data sources that are most relevant for such an 
institutional analysis.  Substantive reliance is on primary sources of information, such as 
official reports, memorandum, meetings reports, strategic plans, audits and evaluation reports 
on AU multilateralism in governance. Interviews are not a direct source of evidence in this 
study, as these are subjective on institutional processes and decision-driving motivations. 
While there are many, who would propagate interviews as being essential to construct a more 
detailed ethnography of what unfolds institutionally, the perspective here is that these are 
limited in that they provide largely an ex-post reflection of implementation actions that have 
unfolded (Lamont & Swidler, 2014). Social Scientist generally viewed documents primarily as 
sources of evidence and as holders of passive content. The central research strategy is 
consequently associated with styles of content or thematic analysis (Prior, 2008). Consistent 
with the views of Prior (2008:821), the approach here is to see documents as ‘active agents in 
the world, and to view documentation as a key component of dynamic networks rather than as 
a set of static and immutable ‘things’’. The formal content of documents is only a part of the 
story and hence need to be contextualised and interpreted within the framework of institutional 
interactions and human agency. Official documents provide direct and valid evidence of what 
has unfolded AU multilateralism in governance and hence, the most objective source of data 
62 
 
for the articulated research method and approach.  
Atlas Ti9 was utilised for searching, coding documents and extract the required information for 
analysis. The database contained over 5500 primary documents from within the AU system 
and partner institutions, such as donors and technical partners. Where necessary and 
appropriate, some are referenced in the thesis either directly or within footnotes. A coding 
system was used to search documents to develop a comprehensive appreciation and 
understanding of AU multilateralism in governance.  The document database included all OAU 
and AU Assembly decisions and resolutions, reports from within AU Departments, internal 
memorandum, planning and events reports. A summary of the data sources, categories and 
search code on all documents collected, collated and analysed is in Annexure One.  
Given the scale of documents collected and collated for the study, it is not possible to reference 
all of these in the analysis. The approach taken was one of only drawing on specific documents 
as an illustration or to provide examples of evidence utilised for analysis and related 
conclusions on the efficacy of the AU governance intervention system. It is thus vital to 
appreciate that the need to balance having a critical macro-overview of governance 
interventions, together with a more detailed institutional understanding, exposes a limitation of 
a study of this nature. While too much of detail will detract from the purposes of building an 
overall perspective of the efficacy of AU interventions in governance, it was essential to engage 
in some elements of detail in the data analysis process to ensure that conclusions derived are 
based on available substantive evidence. 
1.2.5 Literature Review and Analysis 
In addition to the primary sources of data for the research, there is the use of secondary 
literature sources10. Substantive scholarly work on AU governance intervention contains 
primary data sources. A review of secondary published literature would conventionally seek to 
provide a critical summary of existing knowledge in the terrain of research focus (Bryman, 
 
9 ATLAS.ti is data management and research tool that helps a researchers uncover and systematically analyse 
complex phenomena hidden in unstructured data. The program provides tools that let the user locate, code, 
and annotate findings in primary data material, to weigh and evaluate their importance, and to visualize the often 






2015:8).  Alternatively, such a review could serve as a framework to synthesise existing 
information for evaluating or analysing its value for the research (Onwuegbuzie & Weinbaum, 
2017). The challenge for research of this nature is that the literature is both a source of data and 
a source for shaping the parameters of the analysis.  The approach is consistent with the 
literature methods propagated by Onwuegbuzie and Weinbaum (2016:284) which entails a  
‘more multidimensional, interactive, emergent, iterative, systematic, dynamic, holistic, and 
synergistic process of exploring, interpreting, synthesising, and communicating information 
that is extracted from a comprehensive literature review’.     
As a more multidimensional approach has been utilised as it relates to the literature engaged 
with, it is imperative to provide a brief explanation so that this approach is appreciated. The 
wider available global literature and more specific African literature has been central to 
constructing an overall historical outline of AU intervention in governance. In addition to 
informing the overall background to AU governance intervention (supra 1.0), the more detailed 
characterisation of intervention (infra 2.1 and 2.2), historical assessments have been used to 
shape the historical outlined contained in each of the substantive chapters (infra 3.1, 4.1 and 
5.1). In the analysis of the different ways in which African multilateralism has been engaged 
with (supra 1.1), an analysis is provided of the wider literature that has emerged on the AU. 
Section 1.04 provides a substantive review of the wider literature as it relates to governance, 
multilateralism and the efficacy of governance interventions. As indicated, the wider literature 
is also engaged upon and incorporated within the detailed data related evidence outlined in 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5.  
1.2.6 Referencing approach  
The referencing approach used in the thesis is primarily the Harvard approach. This referencing 
style uses the author name and year of publication within the text to indicate the source utilised. 
Extensive use is made of footnotes for the purposes of explaining data utilised. However, the 
approach remains consistent with the Harvard method and is directed at ensuring that a reader 
has a fuller appreciation of the sources and data used in the information presented and 
concomitant analysis. This approach is necessary, given the range of primary documents 
utilised and related authorship within AU institutions.      
In the list of sources at the end of the thesis, a separation is made between secondary literature 
and primary document. Primary documents include official public documents available from 
the AU archives database and are referenced accordingly. In addition, the listing includes 
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internal documents from AU governance implementation institutions. However, direct 
reference is only made to those that are used as an illustration or referred to in the narrative of 
the thesis and does not include all the documents contained in the database outlined in 
Annexure One. In the list of sources, secondary documents are listed before the primary 
documents. This approach to listing serves to ensure that there is a full appreciation of the 
primary documents utilised, relative to the secondary sources of information and data.  
1.2.7 Research Ethics and Clearance  
Substantive attention has been focused on utilising information and documents that are within 
the broader public realm and hence available on AU websites and related sources. However, 
for the purposes of a deeper exploration of institutional processes, it proved necessary to utilise 
internal documents that are not necessarily publicly available. Permission for utilising such 
documents was obtained from a senior AUC official and was included in the ethics clearance 
process (see Annexure Two: Ethical Clearance). To ensure that rights are protected, and the 
information shared and analysed do not infringe on an individual's right to privacy, careful 
attention was focused on ensuring that names of officials are only used were necessary and 
unavoidable.  
As the analysis embodies some questioning of the efficacy and value of work within AU 
institutions, it has the potential of influencing future policy perspectives and resource flows to 
organisations. This is, however, an inevitable product of research and analysis and hence 
unavoidable. However, careful attention was directed at ensuring that the analysis is understood 
to be focused on the efficacy of organisations and units and not necessarily on the performance 
of individuals within such institutions. Public officials and institutions are nonetheless subject 
to wider accountability imperatives, and it is inevitable that their work is a matter of wider 
public discourse and scrutiny. A careful balance has been established at ensuring that the 
research serves to uncover institutional realities and modalities of performance without 
impacting on the reputation and standing of individuals. Data collection, collation and analysis 
was constantly informed by general ethical standards for scholarly research and the more 
specific ethics standards and procedures required by students in tertiary institutions.  In 
summary:   
i. The rights of individual public officials named in thesis or that may be gleamed from 
the evidence and analysis in the research process were carefully protected. Where 
relevant, the right to anonymity of individuals who were a subject of the research was 
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upheld throughout the research process. 
 
ii. The research ethics requirements of the University and those derived from global 
agreements and conventions have been considered, respected and applied. Care has 
been taken to ensure that no reputational harm is suffered by either institution. The 
benefits of the research are greater than any critic of the institutions that emerged from 
the analysis.  
It is imperative to recognise and appreciate that the process of data collection unfolded long 
before the formally articulated research endeavour. While the past experiences of the author 
within multilateral institutions may serve to shape some elements of the analysis, personal 
observations, and information derived in confidential sessions have not been used for the 
research. The permission to use documents collected and collated over a long period of time 
was also derived before the ethics clearance application process unfolded as part of the research 
process.   
1.2.8 Conceptual Framework  
A conceptual framework serves as the overall foundations for the research, the information 
collated, and the analysis that followed. In line with the overall analysis of the problem, purpose 
and the research questions, the framework served to integrate the various strands and articulate 
how the research unfolded. The overall research bias embedded in the methodology and 
approach is towards building an explorative understanding the workings of AU institutions as 
they engage in implementing mandates within the fold of governance. Given the historical bias 
towards realist macro-level analysis and more idealist pronouncements on multilateralism, the 
approach seeks to build an institutional perspective on what has unfolded and the efficacy of 
such intervention in the face of the governance challenges. Table 4 below provides an overview 
of the conceptual framework used to guide the research and detailed analysis. A summary 
explanation of each area follows from the overview. In substance and form, the table provides 
an outline on how each of the substantive chapters (accountability, rule of law and state 






































































































































Introduction  An analytical overview of the 
focus so that the reader grasped 
the full breadth of inclusion in 
each of the governance focus 
areas.  
Overview of Interventions  
(Secondary and Primary 
Data)  
A substantive historical and 
dense analytical outline of what 
has unfolded in the focus area at 
an AU multilateral level.  
Areas Analysis  
(Primary Data)  
A descriptive-analytical 
overview of AU multilateral 
practices across intervention 
modalities. Substantively 
explaining implementation 
methods in each area.   
Institutional Analysis In line with the theoretical 
framework, a global analysis of 
the institutional realities and the 
choices made. The analysis is 
done both at the level of 
Multilateral Engagements and 
the level of Multilateral 
Implementation.  
Efficacy of Interventions Core challenge related themes 
are derived from the area and 
institutional analysis. The themes 
are presented as core 
implementation challenges.  
Conclusion  Brief conclusions derived on 
what works and what does not on 
the basis of the preceding 
analysis. 
Source: Summary as derived from analysis and review embodied in Chapter 1.  
The following provides a more detailed explanation for the overall elements of the conceptual 
framework. This outline further serves to ensure appreciation of the fact that the data collected, 
and collated, and related analysis is embodied in the three core chapters that are central to the 
focus for the research. It is important to appreciate further that framework serves to ensure that 
each of the substantive chapters may be viewed as a standalone explanation and analysis of 
governance intervention within the identified focus areas.  
• Focus Areas: Governance definitions are varied and embody within them a perspective 
on what is included for research purposes. In the analysis of African governance 
discourse and related literature, it is evident that there is a need to articulate clearly a 
conception of governance. A comprehensive systematic approach would hence require 
looking at the rule of law, accountability and the state as the broader areas of 
67 
 
governance focus. However, it has to be appreciated that actions in each of the terrains 
are interconnected, and not all intervention elements would fit neatly into one focus 
area. Overlaps and some repetition are inevitable but do not detract from the overall 
value of the three categorised focus areas for the analysis.   
 
• Intervention Modalities: The terrains of intervention, as embodied in the ontology of 
actual AU multilateral initiatives and that emanate from the literature are, a) 
Compliance and Sanctions, b) Peer Review and Diplomacy, c) Information and 
Knowledge Exchange, and d) Capacity Building and Knowledge Exchange. The 
terrains of engagements are defined broadly by the different modes of governance-
related interventions from within AU institutional system. These are the different type 
of activities that are identifiable within the established intervention categories. 
Activities often cross over between different categories and sometimes overlap. Where 
this is relevant and impacts on the substance, this is indicated in the detailed analysis. 
Interventions initiatives are generally distinguishable by the core motivation, which 
serves to establish them.  
 
• Level of Analysis: The levels of analysis vary across each of the focus areas and in part 
of contingent on how initiatives have unfolded. This variation is in part a reflection of 
the level of engagements and type of agency exercised by both Member States 
representatives and those who exercise implementation authority within AU 
institutions. In keeping with the constructivist approach, the research analysis draws on 
the guidance embedded in the general literature related to institutional analysis and, in 
particular, the framework extracted from, amongst others, Barnetter and Finemore 
(2004). It served to uncover the drivers and choices around interventions established, 
and hence, the agency exercised within AU institutional processes. The analysis 
focused on the two interconnected levels of multilateral engagement and multilateral 
implementation as it pertains to institutional actions within AU multilateralism in 
governance.  
 
• Organisational Framework:  Each substantive chapter under the broader heading of 
the areas of governance focus for brevity and logical flow in data presentation and 
analysis. A brief historical overview of what has unfolded is provided to facilitate the 
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more detailed level of engagement that follows on how implementation unfolds in each 
of the intervention areas. The institutional analysis focuses on multilateral engagements 
and implementation to extract the core efficacy challenges in the governance focus area. 
The extracted issues are presented as the core thematic ‘efficacy of intervention’ 
challenges. Overlapping and common challenges feature in the consolidated analysis 
derived from each of the substantive chapters.   
In keeping with the conceptual framework articulated and the research approach, the thesis 
unfolds over six core chapters. Chapter One served to establish the framework for exploring 
AU multilateral intervention in governance. Chapter Two provides a descriptive summary of 
AU governance intervention as it relates to continental integration, the multilateral institutions 
involved, and the related policy development and implementation process. Chapters Three to 
Five serve as the core data and analytical chapters for the study. Each chapter provides a history 
of interventions in the area of focus, together with a detailed outline of intervention and related 
analysis. Central to each of these chapters (3 to 5) is the extraction of the core efficacy 
challenges as it related to AU governance interventions11.  Chapter Six serves to provide both 
a consolidated analysis and a perspective on the future.  Core to the final chapter (seven) is 
responding to the research purpose through the provision of a governance graduation normative 
framework and value-adding matrix to guide AU multilateral interventions in governance. It 
also serves to highlight potential areas of future research and related proposals on the future.  
1.2.9 Limitations of the Study 
It is inevitable that a study of this nature would have some substantive limitations. In seeking 
to understand the working of AU institutions of multilateralism reliance has been placed on 
formal documents and related institutional decision processes. In so doing, the study does not 
incorporate the range of informal interactions that shape the decisions made and hence 
individual internal motivations for implementation and related actions. The general 
methodological perspective is that formal documents reflect what has unfolded and hence the 
most authoritative source of decision making and related motivations. However, it cannot be 
discounted that these documents and decisions are often influenced by a range of stakeholders 
 
11 As there is no firm separation wall between accountability, the rule of law and state capacity, or between 
different intervention modalities, some repetition of description and analytical duplication is inevitable. However, 
careful attention was focused on ensuring that this is minimal and only done where it proved necessary for optimal 
flow and logic of analysis.  
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and motivations that can only be articulated by way of direct interviews with individuals.  
While interviews or a survey of stakeholders, including Member States may be revealing, the 
overall orientation here is that these would be subjective and be shaped by an attempt to explain 
choices and actions after they have unfolded. In general, it is highly unlikely that individual 
will reveal the reasons why they acted in certain ways, outside of trying to justify these as 
optimal within context. As the study is wide in scope, a detailed ethnography of actors and their 
motives was large beyond the scope of what is possible. Such a detailed approach would also 
only be relevant if one were engaged in only one or a limited range of actual decision and 
implementation processes within governance. While it may be useful to understand individual 
decision-making through interviews, it would be difficult to derive objective conclusions on 
what informed decisions based on possible contending views. While interviews could have 
enriched the study content, it is highly unlikely that they would have fundamentally changed 
the analysis and conclusion as these were derived from the formal documents that are current 
in AU institutions and reflect what actually transpired.  
The study is qualitative and explorative in nature as it seeks to provide a more institutional 
understanding of AU governance interventions. While it is predicated on a broad overall 
hypothesis on the efficacy of multilateral institutions, the range of variables renders it difficult 
to construct a quantitively oriented model to measure the efficacy of AU interventions.  
Establishing causality between norm establishment and active implementation is impossible 
for a study of this nature. A more detailed quantitative study, which incorporates a survey, 
would require that the study and analysis be more focused on a specific element of governance 
intervention focus. The study is hence limited by the overall broadness of its orientation.  
A more detailed study of governance intervention in specific terrains may well have been 
possible if there was substantive prior research on actions that unfold within the AU 
institutional system. Most studies on the AU have been wider in focus and have not engaged 
in internal institutional processes. A further substantive limitation of the study is that it could 
not engage with details of what emerges as the level of individual Member States. To a large 
extent, reliance is on AU documents and related interactions with Member States. To fully 
understand how AU Member States, respond to AU governance interventions, it would have 
been prudent to engage each through a survey or related forms of research engagement. Such 
a study would be much wider and beyond the scope of what was possible. The many variables 
that shape the responses of Member States would also have had to be considered. Despite the 
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methodological and other possible limitations, the study nevertheless served to establish a 
substantive and justified perspective on the value and limits of AU multilateral intervention in 
governance.  
1.3 Conclusion  
A key challenge for research engagements on AU multilateral interventions in governance is 
that it is a complex and dynamic terrain of practice, and subject to wide-ranging analytical and 
epistemic perspectives. A central analytical difficulty is the absence of an overarching 
operational perspective on what to include for research purposes. The approach here is to 
provide a more encompassing but manageable perspective on the core governance focus areas. 
The research terrain is dominated by realist from within the field of International Relations 
who focus on state power as it pertains to multilateralism and hence fails to engage with the 
granular realities of institutional actions as it relates to implementation. An institutional 
approach, as it unfolds in the chapters that follow allows for a more substantive understanding 







Chapter 2: Integration and Interventions in Governance 
AU multilateral governance norms, values, standards and related implementation actions are 
intertwined with the continents political, economic and social integration trajectory. 
Perspective and action on governance have both served to shape the trajectory and have been 
influenced by dominant and contested integration orientations within the AU. In order to 
establish an overall perspective on engagements in governance, this chapter provides a 
historical overview of the integration trajectory as it pertains to governance interventions and 
related actions. The different governance intervention modalities are elaborated upon in a way 
that allows for appreciation of the intention underlying each. An analytical description of the 
AU institution of multilateralism, AU governance implementation organisations and other 
stakeholders that have a role and influence over governance interventions and related initiatives 
follows from the elaboration. Core to the descriptive analysis that follows is a summary 
overview of the AU policy and delivery process as it pertains to multilateral governance 
engagements and implementation.  
2.0 Introduction 
AU multilateral integration initiatives unfold both at a normative policy discourse level and in 
the terrain of active implementation initiatives. The aspiration and related commitments to 
intervene in the terrain of governance emerged gradually within the OAU and were affirmed 
more broadly with the launch of the AU in 2002 through the articulated shift from ‘sovereignty’ 
towards ‘non-indifference’(Vandeginste, 2013:4). It is imperative to engage both with how 
governance considerations evolved within the overall integration journey and, in particular, 
with how conceptions of governance find practical expression in AU specific intervention, 
ranging from shared values to the APRM and the AGA in order to understand the AU 
governance intervention journey.  
It is essential at this juncture to reemphasise the analytical distinction made between the 
governance of the AU as a multilateral institutional system, versus AU related governance 
interventions. While there are overlaps and two are substantively connected in particular areas 
of governance concern, such as human rights and the rule of law, the governance of the AU is 
generally articulated in the context of the democratisation of the integration process and hence 
securing the AU as a people's driven organisation. The interest for the research is centrally on 
the issue of AU governance interventions directed at building commonality at the level of 
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Member States for more profound forms of integrations.  
Of importance for more in-depth scrutiny, is an outline of the institutional parameters of AU 
multilateralism and multilateral implementation. The overview of AU multilateral structures 
incorporates an exploration of the role of RECs in governance interventions, in so far as they 
are perceived as the ‘building blocks of the AU’ (Fagbayibo, 2013:426). Civil Society 
Organisation (CSOs), Developmental Partners (DP) and United Nations (UN) organisations 
have historically played a significant role in AU governance intervention efforts and hence 
their role and influenced are analytically engaged. The overview of AU governance 
implementation institutions builds on the outline of AU multilateralism and directed at 
providing a more granular perspective on how the AU functions and how implementation 
unfolds. While there are many nuances, implementation dynamics and complexities within 
implementation processes, the overall objective is to provide a globalised perspective to pave 
the way for the more detailed analysis that follows in subsequence chapters. Building on the 
integration overview as it relates to governance interventions, a synopsis, on the AU policy 
process and how implementation unfolds, is provided. The global overview of AU governance 
interventions, as intertwined with integration, is significant, as it serves to provides a basis for 
more detailed engagements on the efficacy of AU multilateralism in the terrain. While the 
contents of the sections that follow are intended to be descriptive, the approach taken is to 
engage the integration process and related practices from the lenses of seeking to understand 
the institutional architecture of AU governance interventions.  
2.1 Governance and Integration  
Regional integration is reflected on from a range of different perspectives, with a wide array of 
approaches and theoretical perspectives. Schneider (2017) provides a clear outline of the 
differential meaning associated with integration. At one level, it could refer to a process of 
change from a lack of cooperation towards increased convergence in a variety of areas. On the 
other hand, it could refer to practices aimed at creating common standards associated with 
agreed ideas, values and objectives. Integration could take many forms, ranging from informal 
arrangements to various degrees of interaction, which embody a transfer of sovereignty to a 
regional structure (Schneider, 2017:2). This diversity in approach and perspectives in many 
ways resembles the history of integration in the African continent. A diversity that has also 
prompted some to suggest that there are no natural regions and that they are constructed 
deconstructed and continuously reconstructed (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:3).  
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Within the framework of enduring African discourse on unity, Adebayo (2010:37) puts forward 
that integration cannot be understood ‘exclusively in terms of economic processes and the 
institutional mechanisms’ but has to be reflected on by way of the ‘associated political visions 
and actions’.  The more nuanced approach to integration reflects, to some extent, the tensions 
embedded in how different actors within the African integration terrain have come to view the 
overall process and hence the trajectory and value of AU multilateralism. It is imperative to 
cast a net over the historical trajectory of normative debates on integration in the continent to 
appreciate the variances in perspectives on the optimal approach to multilateralism.  In casting 
the net, reference is both to the broader discourse or ‘vision’ establishing events and related 
policy documents, as well as actual implementation initiatives that have unfolded over the 
period. Such an approach allows for a deeper understanding of governance-related activities 
and actions that have unfolded within the AU. The African journey has broadly been one of 
shifting from an initial post-independence emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, 
towards one of non-indifference, shared values and the desire for optimal governance 
intervention impact at the level of AU Member States.  
2.1.1 Sovereignty and Non-Interference 
African anticolonial activists, including those from within the diaspora, were crucial to the 
initial perspectives on African integration and a shared future. Of significance is the 1945 Pan 
African Congress in Manchester, where young Africans, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo 
Kenyatta and others evoked the idea of independence and African unity.  Soon after Ghanaian 
independence, Nkrumah organised the first All African People’s Conference in Accra. At this 
Conference, Nkrumah explicitly articulated a perspective that ‘there can be no solution to our 
political and economic problems’ without integration (Mohammed, 2015:97). Since this initial 
momentum, many other continent-wide African unionist movements, defined by the African 
cities at which they met, emerged and proposed their idea and mechanism for the unification 
of Africa. The movements include the Casablanca, the Monrovia and Brazzaville Groups 
(Adogamhe, 2008). The Casablanca Group proposed a more centralised system for economic 
and political integration, and the Brazzaville Groups proposed a more conservative phased 
approach to integration.  The Monrovia Group was perceived to be somewhere in the middle 
between the two approaches (Gnaka, 2009:46).  
Full political unity versus a more conservative incremental approach, defined integration 
debates before, during and after the formal launch of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
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During the Opening Session of the launch, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia appealed for a 
sacrifice of differences to establish an organisation that would serve to construct the 
foundations for unity (Adogamhe, 2008; Dirar, 2016:88). While Nkrumah's ideas for political 
integration were opposed by many, it remained core to continuing engagements around the 
mode and pace of African integration (Adejo, 2001; Bujra, 2004:2). The compromise which 
paved the way for the formal launch of the OAU allowed for the recognition of the geographical 
boundaries inherited at independence. The common interest of African countries is discussed 
without prejudice to the principle of non-interference in the internal governance affairs of 
Member States. The political unity project is left at the level of the loose coordinating role 
entrusted to the institutions of the OAU (Adejo, 2001; Laporte & Mackie, 2010; Mohammed, 
2015:99). The OAU was reduced mostly to an annual assembly which did not seem to be able 
to muster the will to push the more activist agenda of continental unification further (Olukoshi, 
2010:46).   
Although the OAU included as an objective the ‘promotion of international cooperation having 
due regard to the charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’(Kindiki, 
2003:101), its primary objectives were the speedy decolonisation of all territories in Africa, the 
unity of the continent and the defence of the territorial integrity of states (Akokpari, 2004:244-
245). The consequence of the initial emphasis on sovereignty and the full political and 
economic liberation from colonialism was the absence of any discourse on governance, as it 
relates to how Member States engaged with issues on the rule of law, accountability and state 
capacity. While there were some indications of a shift in the late 1980s, and early 1990s the 
approach was very nuanced and reflected in the June 1993 ‘Declaration on the Political and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World’. 
Within the Declaration, the Assembly committed itself to further democratisations but asserted 
that all countries would ‘determine, in all sovereignty, their system of democracy on the basis 
of their socio-cultural values, taking into account the realities of each of our countries’ (OAU, 
1993).  
Governance issues and concerns were considered matters outside of the scope of the work of 
the OAU and hence not subject to any forms of direct consideration or multilateral intervention.  
As far as in 1992, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government found it necessary to 
reaffirm its approach in a ‘Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination 
among African States’ within which emphasis was placed on the OAU Charter provisions on 
the strengthening of solidarity and the non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States 
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(OAU, 1992). The adoption of the resolution at the time reflecting ongoing internal tension 
within the OAU between integrationist and those who sought to reaffirm sovereignty in the 
face of a growing demand for democratisation from civil society actors, amongst others.  
2.1.2 Economic Crisis and Non-Indifference 
The substance shifts towards governance considerations largely emanated as a result of 
deepening debt-related economic crisis facing many African countries in the 1980s. During 
this period of imposed Structural Adjustments, Africa regional cooperation and integration 
were, not a priority concern to the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). These institutions were, in fact, hostile to the sub-regional cooperation and integration 
projects that were in existence (Olukoshi, 2010). The state adjustment focus was to be on 
internal policy and structural economic imperatives within OAU Member States. While WB 
adjustments were unfolding across the continent, the discourse on unity remained central for 
many, and the African political leaders attempted to give attention at various moments to how 
cooperation and integration could be intensified and accelerated as a collective response to 
overcome the economic crises that were overwhelming their countries. African Heads of States 
and Governments met in a summit in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1980 at which they approved the Lagos 
Plan of Action (D'Sa, 1983). The commitment to a path of united action, underpinned by an 
agenda of economic integration, was agreed upon, complete with a time frame and 
implementation milestones. Elements of the Plan of Action were later to be carried forward 
and written into the 1991 Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) 
(Bujra, 2004; Olukoshi, 2010).  
The Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty represented the first direct effort to emphasise 
the importance of governance for development and hence an initial step away from the 
predominant focus on sovereignty and non-intrusion into the internal affairs of Member States 
(Kouassi, 2007). The governance concerns substantively unfolded within the context of the 
Conference on Security, Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The 
formal CSSDCA process was adopted at the Extraordinary OAU Summit held in Sire, Libya, 
in September 1999 (Lloyd & Murray, 2004). The 36th OAU Summit in Lomé adopted the 
Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA, acknowledging that it served to consolidate the work of 
the OAU. Of importance to CSSDCA was that it incorporated the 1990 African Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development. Central to the areas that emerged within CSSDCA and 
related action-plans adopted at the 1st Summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa, was the 
76 
 
identified need for ‘democratisation, good governance and popular participation’ within 
Member States (Lloyd et al., 2004:168). The CSSDCA process coincided with the 
establishment of NEPAD and the development of the ‘strategic framework for socio-economic 
development of the continent’. While CSSDCA was perceived to be focused on governance 
and NEPAD on economic issues, both of the adopted documents contained specific provisions 
relating to governance. The NEPAD base-document went as far as articulating concrete future-
oriented actions which culminated in the establishment of the APRM (Gelb, 2002).  
Amidst the reflections and debates that took place amongst Heads of State and Government, a 
resolution was reached to dissolve the OAU and replace it with the AU, with a new Constitutive 
Act and Organs. The AU was formally founded in 2000 in Lome, Togo, where its Constitutive 
Act was adopted 12. The Union emerged as a conscious design to give a new impetus to African 
integration and unity. At an overall level, the discourse began to shift away from non-
interference towards the more nuanced perspective of non-indifference, thereby inferring a 
more active role for the continental body on the internal affairs of Member States  (Kindiki, 
2003). The substantive shift towards governance consideration was driven by both the political 
imperative of countering WB imposed structural adjustment, through the CSSDCA process 
and by internal African recognition of the link between governance and development as 
reflected in the NEPAD base document (Olukoshi, 2010).  
The CSSDCA process served as a fundamental formal counter perspective to the dominance 
of the WB institutional approach to governance (Nathan, 1992:215). The CSSDCA was driven 
both by civil society actors and by OAU Member States. There was a shared African orientation 
on the need to shift towards a more holistic approach towards governance, which substantively 
incorporated the active participation of Africans in the development trajectory of the continent. 
CSSDCA also served as the foundations for the eventual establishment of the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as the structure for ongoing civil society participation 
within the AU (Adisa, 2002). When coupled with the governance considerations within the 
NEPAD founding document, the general African orientation on governance was less on the 
institutions of the state, as has emerged from the WB and as emphasised in other parts of the 
 
12 The adoption of the Constitutive Act was the first stage in the process towards the formal launch of the AU. 
The formal launch took place in 2002 in Durban and only after the Constitutive Act was ratified by Member 
States. As the Constitutive Act is ratified on different dates by Member States, it is generally not accorded a 
specific date as with conventional national legislation. In each instance of usage, ‘Constitutive Act’ is in reference 
to the founding AU document, akin to a national constitution.  Many commentators generally ascribe the 26th of 
May 2001 as this was the date that the Constitutive Act came into force after full ratification by all Member States 
of the AU.  
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world. The more holistic African perspectives on governance set the stage for more extensive 
engagements on African governance issued through the emerging shared values agenda of the 
AU.  
2.1.3 Shared Values and the APRM 
The birth of the AU generally served to reignited deliberations on the question of the political 
unity of the continent. The proposal for a complete political unification of Africa was expressed 
by the Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, during the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the OAU held 
in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999, and at the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria on 30 and 31 January 2005 (Edo & 
Olanrewaju, 2012). These proposals were received with mixed feelings, thus sustaining the 
historical pull between those who desired rapid and full integration, versus those who 
propagated a gradualist approach (Elvy, 2012). A ‘Grande Debate’ on the proposed Union 
Government took place at the level of Heads of State and Government at the 9th Ordinary 
Summit in Accra, Ghana, during July 2007. During the debate on the proposed Union 
Government in Accra, the divergent perspectives between maximalists and the gradualists were 
reaffirmed, albeit in a different institutional context of the AU (Wapmuk, 2009:661; Laporte 
et al., 2010:52).  
The Arab Spring in North Africa and the collapse of the Gadhafi regime in Libya, to some 
extent, served to close the chapter on a Member State-driven maximalist approach to 
integration. While the debates remain alive, the creation of the AU has allowed these to 
permeate dialogue on issues of sovereignty and shared values within specific terrains of 
engagement. Although the AU Constitutive Act provided for non-indifference to internal state 
realities, how this strategy is interpreted suggest that the divergence remain very real within 
policy and institutional processes (Adejumobi et al., 2009). At a more institutional level, 
substantive governance-related efforts unfolded under the leadership of Alpha Konari, the first 
Chairperson of the AUC. These efforts are reflected in, amongst others, the adoption of 
ACDEG and the AUCPCC. During the tenure of Konari, the AU approved Strategic Plan of 
the Commission incorporate a direct focus on what was termed ‘shared values’ (AUC, 2004) 
which embraced matters relating to governance and hence an affirmation of the agency of the 
AU as a collective process and the AUC as a multilateral institution with a level of active 
agency.  
The compromise between maximalist and gradualist in the OAU period serve to establish an 
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institutional entity with limited agency beyond arranging the Summit of Head of State and 
Government. In the period of the AU, the debate moved away from permeating summit 
dialogues towards more detailed policy work and hence the enhanced agency of AU institutions 
(Olukoshi, 2010). As the AU Constitutive Act provided some level of authority to specific 
Organs and structures, it served to increase the overall agency of institutions. At the level of 
discourse on integration, the consequence of the shift from the OAU toward the AU is one 
within which maximal and gradual become matters of judgement and contestation in specific 
policy terrains (Olukoshi, 2010). The strength of the gradualist and more tempered approach 
to integration eventually reflected itself in the interactions between the AUC and a selection of 
RECs. Building on the initial foundational document which asserted that RECs ‘were the 
building blocks of the AU’, the Commission, through the Department of Economic 
Development established a process to develop a Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) that 
directly involved RECs. The logic of the MIP was that it would clearly define the terrains for 
integration and change in a staged manner, with clearly articulated roles and responsibilities. 
The strategy covered several areas of focus of the AU and RECs and hence incorporated issues 
related to governance. In this respect, the MIP provided for the ratification of the ACDEG and 
the establishment of regional peer-review mechanisms (AU, 2009c). While MIP generated 
some interest and a level of active commitment from RECs, it has been overtaken by the 
Agenda 2063 process introduced under the leadership of the Chairpersonship of Dr Dlamini 
Zuma.  
Under the overall rubric of the ‘shared values’, there was a substantive attempt within the AU 
processes to articulate a set of values that by and large reflect a specific conception of what 
governance entails. The table below is extracted from a document entitled “The Ascendancy 
of Shared Values in the African Union Government”. The document is an annexure to the 
Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Union Government, which was noted by the 
Assembly (AUC, 2010). The table is an aggregation of the shared values at the individual, state 
or regional level. 
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Table 6: Shared Values in the African Union 
Source: Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Union Government (AU, 2008d; AUC, 
2010) 
 
Outside of the inclusion of the table as an attachment to a Ministerial Report, it had no real 
formal status within the overall AU system and the listed ‘shared values’ has had no substantive 
influence or value in the governance initiatives of the AU. In formal terms, the real ‘shared 
values’ in governance would only be those that are within the framework of the Constitutive 
Act and all other legal instruments of the AU. In such instances, the values espoused serve to 
establish a compliance obligation amongst those countries that have formally ratified such 
instruments.  
Outside of the direct AU internal momentum on shared values, the APRM rapidly developed 
its approaches and related practices for peer engagements on governance (OAU, 2002). The 
APRM does not in its core establishment documents, articulate a consistent definition of 
governance outside of expressing four assessment areas. These are: (i) democratic and political 
governance, (ii) economic governance and management, (iii) corporate governance and (iv) 
socio-economic development. To many NEPAD and the APRM served to establish an 
orientation towards governance that substantively links the idea of good governance to 
economic development (Herbert & Gruzd, 2008). The general notion being that ‘good 
governance’ involves the creation of the conducive socio-economic, legal, political and 
institutional environments to foster the state’s material strength; to free people from the evils 
of abject poverty, preventable diseases, ignorance, squalor and idleness; to provide the citizenry 
with the voice to choose those who rule over them, to hold those in power accountable when 
they do not work for the greater good, to demand transparent structures and to fight down 
At the individual level 
1. Basic rights to life, identity and opportunity 
2. Basic Freedoms (Expression and worship) 
3. Tolerance 
4. Participation in governance 
5. Solidarity with each other in times of joy and in 
times of sadness 
6. Dignity and Respect 
7. Justice 
8. Sense of Fairness 
9. Equality of persons (Gender, race, sex etc.) 
10. Respect for age 
11. Integrity 
12. Community spiritedness 
13. Self determination 
At the state or regional level 
1. Sovereignty and the interdependence of states 
2. Adherence to the the rule of law 
3. Democracy and Representation of the popular 
will 
4. Care for the weakest 
5. Self-reliance (economic and social) 
6. Justice 
7. Law and order 
8. Equity and equality 
9. National determination 
10. Solidarity of states (brother’s keeper) 




socially regressive policies, and to treat every citizen equal without regard to gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion, and creed. A substantive critic of NEPAD and APRM suggest that it merely 
served to re-establish the WB perspective on governance and hence, the imposition of neo-
liberally inspired conditions for economic growth (Bond, 2009).   
Notwithstanding the critics, the assessment areas identified, together with further details, 
served to substantively broaden how governance is perceived and what the related imperatives 
are for governance at the level of Member States. Details are in the guiding objectives, 
standards, criteria and indicators for the assessment. For example, the sphere of democratic and 
political governance is guided by the overall objective to ‘consolidate a constitutional political 
order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers 
and effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable development and a 
peaceful stable society’(Kanbur, 2004; Grimm, Nawrath, Roth, Triebel & Utz, 2009). Nine key 
sub-objectives are drawn from the overall objective. These are conflict prevention; 
constitutional democracy including periodic political competition and the rule of law; human 
rights; separation of powers; accountable civil service; fighting corruption; protection of 
women’s’ rights; children’s rights and of the rights of vulnerable groups (APRM, 2015). 
While the APRM approach suggests a degree of comprehensiveness in coverage, it generally 
embodies some level of confusion around the logic of peer engagements as a basis for 
appreciating localised realities and the application of specific standards that Member States 
have to adhere. This tension between specific normative pronouncements, as contained in AU 
legal instruments, and the anticipated relativism embodied in the peer review process was 
particularly evident in the instance of the APRM review of Ethiopia. The response of the 
Ethiopian President was particularly sharp in this instance as he accused the APRM Panel of 
failing to appreciate Ethiopian realities and the developmental model that was appropriate to 
Ethiopia (APRM, 2011)13 . The ongoing challenges for APRM continue to be one of finding 
the balance between peer engagement and the application of particular governance standards. 
The general push from civil society organisations that participate actively in the establishment 
of the APRM questionnaire has been on the application of specific standards as part of the peer-
review process and less on an openly appreciative process (Gruzd, 2014a). 
 
13 The response of the President is contained as an Annexure to the report on the 14th APRM Summit deliberations 
on Ethiopia (APRM, 2011:359) 
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2.1.4 AGA and AU Reforms 
In the years leading towards the Shared Values Summit in 2011, there was a growing concern 
with the proliferation of instruments and institutions, but with limited overall governance 
impact. This concern is in the discussion document leading to the Shared Values Summit 
(AUC, 2010). A crucial response within the AU institutional system was to engage in the 
process of bringing together the numerous organisations and related process to facilitate better 
coordination and impact. The initiative culminated in the development of a Declaration for the 
Shared Values Summit that affirmed the existence of an AGA based on what has historically 
unfolded and hence the establishment of the AGP (AU, 2011d). The logic of the AGP is that it 
would facilitate effective coordinative action amongst AU institutions and RECs in the fold of 
governance and overcome the challenge associated with multiple instruments with overlapping 
mandates, such as is reflected in the ACDEG and the APRM process. Within a year of the 
adoption of the Declaration, the Department of Political Affairs of the AUC established a 
Secretariat for the Platform, the Rules of Procedure for the functioning of the platform, several 
sub-committees and an implementation work-plan (Wachira, 2014).   
When establishing the overall AGA framework, there was no specific definition of governance. 
In the main, the approach was to delineate governance by a broad notion of specific instruments 
that fall within the broader purview of governance and the institutional mechanisms that were 
a part of the focus of AGA. Wachira (2014)   provides that AGA takes at least 24 different 
norms and standards into account, including the AU Constitutive Act. The formally adopted 
instruments are in the table below, together with a brief explanation of the overall orientation.  
Table 5: African Union Governance Instruments 
Governance Instrument Orientation 
Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (AU, 1981). 
The Charter promotes protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on the African continent. It incorporates the right to 
participate in government and related protections from arbitrary state 
action.  
Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance (AU, 2007a) 
This Charter is central to governance as it sets down requirements 
related to elections, participation and accountability to society. It 
incorporates issues of constitutionalism, the separation of power and 
adherence to the rule of law.   
African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) – Questionnaire (APRM, 
2015)     
The APRM is described as more of a process than an instrument. Its 
questionnaire nevertheless embodies instrumental elements in so 
much as it poses a range of normative questions on the optimality of 
governance and accountability in countries.  
Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AU, 
The Convention outlines the obligations of African states in the areas 
of corruption prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation 
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2003a). and asset recovery. It covers a range of offences including bribery, 
diversion of property by public officials, trading in influence, illicit 
enrichment and money laundering.  
Charter on Values and Principles of 
Public Service and Administration 
(AU, 2011a).  
The aim of this Charter is the modernisation of service delivery by 
public institutions within Member States. It incorporates provisions 
relating to the development of state capacity and the protection of the 
right of public servants and citizens in the delivery process.  
Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Decentralisation, 
Local Governance and Local 
Development (AU, 2014b). 
This charter is focused on promoting decentralisation, local 
governance and local development in Africa. It incorporates 
provisions directed at protecting local government institutions as 
vehicles for local democracy and delivery.  
Source: Adapted and consolidated from relevant AU Charters, Conventions and Instruments14.  
In addition to these listed legal governance instruments, numerous other declarations, 
resolutions and decisions of the AU embody some focus on governance. These are captured in 
the table below:  
Table 6: Declarations, Resolutions and Decisions relevant to Governance  
Declaration, Resolution and Decision Year of 
Adoption 
Place Adopted 
Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the 
Fundamental Changes taking place in the world 
1990 Addis Ababa  
Ethiopia 
Declaration on the Code of Conduct on relations between States 1994  Tunis  
Tunisia  
Agenda for the Re-launch of Africa’s Economic and Social Development 1995 Cairo 
Egypt 
Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government 1999 Algiers  
Algeria 
Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action 1999 Mauritius 
 
Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government 
2000 Lomé  
Togo 
CSSDCA Solemn Declaration  2000 Lomé  
Togo 
OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in 
Africa 
2002 Durban  
South Africa 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Declaration on 
Democracy Political Economic and Corporate Governance 
2002  Durban 
South Africa 
Memorandum of Understanding on Security Stability Development and 
Cooperation in Africa 
2002  Durban South 
Africa 
Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in Africa 2003 Kigali  
Rwanda 
Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) 2004 Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
Decision of the 12th AU Assembly on the Resurgence of the Scourge of 
Coups d’état in Africa 
2009 Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
Decision of the 14th AU Assembly on the Prevention of Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African 
Union to Manage such Situations  
2010 Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
Source: Discussion document on the Shared Values Summit (AUC, 2010) 
 
14 For a full list of these and their contents see https://au.int/en/treaties. 
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Outside of the listed instruments, resolutions and decisions, governance relevant contents are 
contained in a particular sector or constituency-based initiatives, such as those on the youth, 
gender issues and children. As the AGP process unfolded, the thoughts of what is to include 
are embedded in an operational document through the implied contents of the clusters of the 
Platform.  The AGA Platform has five thematic clusters: (1) governance, (2) human rights 
(including transitional justice), (3) democracy, (4) constitutionalism and the rule of law, and 
(5) humanitarian affairs (AUC, 2015a). Under the Rules of Procedure of the AGP, each cluster 
is obliged to mainstream the cross-cutting issues of knowledge and data generation and 
management, gender equality and empowerment (Wachira, 2014). 
The logic of the clusters and what is included in each is never fully explained by the AGA 
Secretariat. The inclusion of humanitarian affairs is perceived to be because this portfolio of 
work is within the DPA of the AUC. Since establishment, only one or two of the clusters have 
had meetings, and there is general uncertainty around their operationalisation and the 
substantive value they would add to the overall objective of the AGP15 (DPA, 2013). The 
consequence of the clustering approach and related work of the AGA Secretariat has been to 
broaden the mandated focus and hence a loss of substantive strategic engagements on building 
the coordination and impact-related efforts that the AGP was meant to facilitate16. Since 2012, 
the Secretariat of the AGP within the AUC initiated several activities related to shared values 
in the form of cluster meetings and a range of consultative conferences and events.17 Of 
particular significance was the introduction of an annual Conference on Democratic 
Governance Trends (infra Table 7). The Secretariat also focused on arranging consultative sub-
regional events with youth and gender communities as it related the overall theme of the AU 
for the year. During 2018, some events on ‘fighting corruption’ were arranged. The general 
orientation was that the events were vital for consultation and participation in AGA and 
generally within the AU18. 
The growing frustration with the efficacy of the AU and general difficulties with 
 
15 For a full account of the discussions on establishing the AGA clusters see the Report of the Governance, Human 
Rights and Elections Division on the Retreat to fine tune The 2013-17 Strategy and Action Plan of the African 
Governance Architecture and Platform, Kuriftu Resort, Debre Zeit, Ethiopia, 26-28 March 2013 (DPA, 2013).  
16 To appreciate the difficulties of implementation and establishing the clusters, see for example Report on the 
Consultative Meeting on the Action Plan of the African  Governance Platform on the Strategy to Ratify the African 
Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance was held in Lome, Togo, 7-8 August 2012 (DPA, 2012c).  
17 For a full account of some of the work of AGP, see the report of the Commission on Governance in Africa 
(With Focus on the African Governance Architecture and Elections) presented to the AU Assembly in 2015 (AU, 
2015b). 
18 Details on the activities of the AGA Secretariat are contained on a dedicated website http://aga-platform.org. 
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implementation culminated with the reform process introduced through the leadership of 
President Paul Kagame.  While the reform exercise covers a broader terrain of issues that 
impact on the overall AU system, there is substantive recognition of the limited governance 
impact of the AU and its institutions. The initially introduced reform process focused attention 
on promoting the APRM as the premier lead institution on governance matters and proposed 
that it would serve to monitor governance in the continent (Kagame, 2017). The APRM itself 
has suggested that it constitutes a broadening of its role (see Gruzd et al. 2018), rather than a 
substantive strategy to overcome historical coordinative and impact challenges within the 
governance fold.  
The decisive step forward in the institutional reform of the AU emerged during the Eleventh 
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU held during November 2018. In this Summit, 
there were formal decisions on the overall structure of the AUC and the funding of the APRM 
(AU, 2018b). Contrary to the initial concern on duplication and overlapping roles in the 
governance space, the decisions of the Summit is muted substantively on building the efficacy 
of the overall AU system in governance. Of some significance to the evolution of governance 
implementation efforts was the restructuring of the AUC, which entailed the merging of the 
peace and security and political affairs portfolios under a single Commissioner (AU, 2018b). 
The precise implication of this for governance intervention have not been spelt out, beyond the 
general assumption of the need for active synergy between AGA and the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA). The Summit further determined that the APRM will provide 
leadership on the development of an annual State of Governance in Africa Report (SoGR). The 
decision of Summit provides that the report will serve to assess the status of Member States 
governance in five areas: leadership, constitutionalism and the rule of law, the nexus between 
development and governance, and the role of RECs. The decision further provides that the 2019 
report will establish the basis for future regular and continuous monitoring and tracking of 
governance trends in all Member States (AU, 2018b).   The Summit also affirmed the full 
integration of the APRM into the AU by the direct provision of its programme and operational 
budget, hence removing an obligation of participating states to make a direct contribution to 
the APRM Secretariat (AU, 2018b).  
The first Africa Governance Report produced by the APRM Secretariat in collaboration with 
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AGA (APRM, 2019) was delivered at the February 2019 Summit of the AU19. The Summit 
decision on the report provides that Member States should consider the recommendations and 
urges countries ‘to develop national governance reports as a self-assessment tool for promoting 
good governance in line with the recommendations of the Report’. (AU, 2019c) . The report’s 
recommendations are generic and substantively mirror the outcomes of the Shared Values 
Summit, which include a call for greater coherence and coordination between the AU and 
RECs.   
2.2 Governance Interventions 
The historical overview of the governance and integration journey of the AU provides a 
generalised outline of what has unfolded. It does not, however, fully capture the actual 
interventional modalities and the different types of interventions that have unfolded. As these 
are core to detailed data and analysis, it is imperative to provide an overview of the modalities 
of intervention in order to appreciate the evolution of governance considerations within the AU 
system. As outlined (supra 1.0.1), some interventions are prescribed in legal documents, 
resolutions and related plans. Many nevertheless unfold as ‘activities’ arising from the agency 
exercised by AU implementation institutions. It is necessary to draw on broader literature as it 
relates to each area of multilateral governance intervention in order to broadly outline the core 
intervention modalities as a basis for more detailed analysis in later chapters. The 2004 AUC 
Strategic Plan outlined a series of ‘missions’ ranging from capacity building, advocacy, 
brainstorming and follow up evaluations (AUC, 2004). The 2009 Strategic Plan under the 
Chairpersonship of Jean Ping moved away from the mission approach and focused solely on 
articulating a range of strategies without any enunciation of missions or the nature of 
interventions (AUC, 2009b).  Agenda 2063, on the other hand, asserts a more results orientation 
without any detailed specification on intervention beyond very general assertion on the 
developing guidelines on implementation, monitoring and evaluation (AUC, 2015b). Aside 
from the initial 2004 strategic plan, the AUC has generally not focused attention on specifying 
its specific value-add to achieve strategic results. The strategic modes of value-adding 
intervention in governance are hence derived both from what emerges in the literature and from 
evolved activities in the fold of AU multilateral interventions (supra 1.0.1). In line with the 
research framework the four areas of intervention within the governance space are 1) 
 
19 The report prepared by APRM in collaboration with the AGA Secretariat was presented, but copies of it have 
not been distributed and generally not available online. Whilst a copy was email to this author, it has not been 
widely distributed.  
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Compliance and Sanctions, 2) Peer Review and Diplomacy, 3) Information and Knowledge 
Exchange and 4) Capacity Building and Technical Support  
2.2.1 Compliance and Sanctions 
A dominant perceptive in the literature is that compliance with international or regional laws 
established through multilateral institutions is mostly contingent on the political will to secure 
compliance through relevant sanctions and state self-interest in the compliance process.  Hence, 
the extent to which an AU Member States behaviour is compliant with ratified instruments or 
adopted norms will largely depend on the power it exercises relative to other States. In such a 
context, sanctions and other forms of direct intervention are the only available modality for 
coercing a recalcitrant state towards full compliance (Elvy, 2012:81).  An alternative 
articulated approach is that shared rules and norms, for example, in governance, will serve to 
reform a state decision-making process, thereby encouraging a state to comply in order to reap 
the longer-term benefits. Accordingly, governance-related violation will occur when the 
conditions supporting compliance are weak and when norms are ambiguous (Elvy, 2012:81).  
To appreciate ‘compliance and sanctions’ as a mode of intervention within the purview of AU 
multilateralism in governance it is thus essential to draw both from the literature on power and 
authority within the AU compliance system and on scholarly and related work on the 
operational modalities for securing compliance.  
As indicated, much of the literature tends to focus on the legal basis for AU intervention and 
the exercise of power. At the level of authority, many commenters reflect on the change from 
the OAU to the AU and related implications for compliance with agreed norms and standards. 
The shift implied for many a greater willingness to intervene in situations of crisis or where 
there are governance failures and concomitant acts of violence (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002a). In 
particular, Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act provides that ‘any Member State that fails to 
comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such 
as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other 
measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly’ (Cilliers et al., 
2002a:97).  The modalities and actual work of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 
situations of governance distress and violence has been substantively documented by a variety 
of scholars (Nathan, 1992; Abass et al., 2002; Cilliers et al., 2002a; Engel & Porto, 2009; 
Williams, 2009b; Vines, 2013; Williams, 2014) active in the peace and security terrain. 
However, outside of the more direct forms of peacekeeping and diplomatic intervention 
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through a decision of the PSC, there is limited reflective work on the modalities for securing 
compliance in the governance terrain. The primary instrument for ‘compliance and related 
sanctions’ would be the Constitutive Act and related provisions on governance. Article 4(m) 
provides for “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance”. Article 4(o) provides for “respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation 
and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive 
activities”. Article 4(p) provides for the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional 
changes of government”(AU, 2002a). The frameworks adopted by the AU also provides that 
sanctions can be imposed on any Member State for non- payment of assessed contributions, 
violation of the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, non-compliance with the decisions 
of the Union and unconstitutional changes of government.  
AU sanctioned interventions in a number of crisis situations, such as in Kenya, South Sudan, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo are well documented and 
subject to more extensive scholarly reflection (Nathan, 1992; Abass et al., 2002; Cilliers et al., 
2002a; Engel et al., 2009; Williams, 2009b; Vines, 2013; Williams, 2014). What is perhaps 
less a subject of scholarly reflection is actual efforts towards monitoring compliance and the 
imposition of sanctions outside of the suspension of AU membership.  Beyond the provisions 
and instruments associated with APSA, there is a range of adopted legal instruments in the 
governance terrain that imply compliance and sanctions for failure to domesticate after 
ratification. Even before engagements with the levels of compliance, there are substantive 
challenges concerning the legal ratification of relevant governance-related instruments.  These 
have been aptly analysed by Tiyanjana Maluwa (2012:33) who concludes that various factors 
determine the slow rate treaty ratification, among these, are a ‘lack of political will; 
administrative lethargy; inadequacy or lack of the necessary bureaucratic coordination and 
cooperation among relevant branches of government; and the lack of technical capacity.’ While 
full ratification of adopted governance instruments represents a concern within the AU 
multilateral system, the more considerable challenge relates to securing and monitoring actual 
compliance. In addition to the modalities established through the PSC and the AUC, specific 
treaty monitoring bodies, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and 
the AU Advisory Board on Corruption have been established for such purposes.  While scholars 
(Landsberg, 2016; Lopes, 2016) are quick to point out that compliance with treaties is a huge 
problem, there is hardly any institutional analysis of the monitoring and compliance processes 
that fall primarily within the operational agency of established multilateral institutions.      
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The general assumption is that when there is agreement over an instrument, and the AU adopts, 
it will be followed by ratification and actions towards compliance by Member States. All of 
the legal governance instruments embody some element of sanction related to non-compliance. 
In each instance, the legality of ratified instruments, also implies that individuals or 
organisations in Member States may take the matter of non-compliance to a local Court or to a 
regional or continental legal structure to force compliance (Mutua, 1999).  In general terms, 
the most effective instruments for compliance within the multilateral and bilateral sphere in 
Africa has been in the form of conditionality’s relating to loans or aid (Hernandez, 2017). Such 
instruments have nevertheless not been available to the AU in any direct way as it has never 
really been a donor or a provider of loans, outside of the work of the African Development 
Bank (AfDB). In general, the AU does not have direct authority over the use and disbursement 
of AfDB funds. The only real conditionality to force particular kinds of governance-related 
actions have been from the WB and bilateral donors. Such practices emerged in the 1980s and 
unfolded well into the 1990s and continue in some parts of the continent and among some 
development partners (Carothers et al., 2013).  
Existing scholarship on Member State compliance and related sanctions as instruments for AU 
multilateralism mostly focuses on security issues and actions or inactions at the level of 
Member States (Nathan, 1992; Abass et al., 2002; Cilliers et al., 2002a; Engel et al., 2009; 
Williams, 2009b; Vines, 2013; Williams, 2014). Aside from the modalities for reporting on 
compliance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, there is no substantive 
literature on the practices established to secure ratification and compliance with all governance 
instruments and adopted norms and standards. To appreciate these and to analyse the efficacy 
of such intervention, reliance is placed on information about what has and is unfolding within 
AU institutions. In general terms, all the adopted instruments either embody directly or 
indirectly a commitment to impose some form of sanction for non-compliance20. However, 
there is no consistent view of this within the AU beyond the notion that a failure to comply 
would either result in appropriate action from the Executive Council or Assembly. 
Alternatively, and a complement to AU Assembly related processes is the view that the AU 
Court will serve as a channel for ensuring compliance when its authority is fully established 
(Ssenyonjo, 2018:39). The ability to exercise some form of sanction for compliance purposes 
 
20 As illustration, Article 46 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides that the 
‘Assembly and the Peace and Security Council shall determine the appropriate measures to be imposed on any 
State Party that violates this Charter’(AU, 2007a). 
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is very nuanced and will be reflected on in further detail in each of the governance focus areas.  
2.2.2 Peer Review and Diplomacy 
Conventionally, ‘peer-review’ is associated with academic practices wherein a critical 
examination of written work seeks to ensure compliance with research standards and as a 
means for securing quality (Kanbur, 2004:159). The practice of ‘peer review’ as it relates to 
multilateralism, is defined as a systematic examination and assessment of the performance of 
a state by other states as a means for helping the state adopt better practices, comply with 
established standards and improve its policy-making (Pagani, 2002:15). The practice of 
‘diplomacy’ is generally associated with all forms of external engagements by emissaries of 
States. However, within multilateral governance-related processes, it is associated with 
multilateral driven initiatives where designated ‘diplomats’ are sent to engage with state and 
non-state actors where governance crisis is unfolding and especially where there is political 
violence. Peer Review and Diplomacy are conceptually linked as they both represent ‘softer’ 
forms of engagement on governance-related challenges.     
Some multilateral organisations use peer-review practices in specific terrains of policy 
engagement (Gruzd, 2014b). The practice has become synonymous with the policy 
development and learning approaches used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The methodological orientation for peer-review fundamentally 
defined the practices prevalent in the OECD (Kanbur, 2004). The OECD does not exercise any 
direct power over its Member States, and neither does it establish overall legal frameworks to 
govern practices within Member States. In the main, the focus is to encourage change through 
active research initiatives predicated on the collation and comparison of information from 
Member States in a variety of engagement terrains, including in governance. The Governance 
Unit in the OECD has for years engaged in a range of comparative studies in specific areas and 
presented these for discussion to Member States. In general, the responses to these include a 
desire to effect change within OECD States in light of ‘technical conclusion’ on shortfall 
(Kanbur, 2004).  
Within the AU context, the idea of utilising reviews as the basis of exerting pressure towards 
conformity with standards is associated with the methodological orientation of the APRM. The 
value of the APRM for African governance has been engaged with by some scholars (Kanbur, 
2004; Gruzd, 2011; Wachira, 2014) and the general orientation is that it represents substantive 
hope for change and compliance with appropriate governance standards. However, there is 
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criticisms of the APRM from an ideological perceptive (Bond, 2009) and based on weaknesses 
associated with the practice of self-review (Jordaan, 2006; Killander, 2008a). To some, it 
embodied, amongst others, a ‘self-protective impulse’ in the country self-assessment phase of 
the review. Some opponents of the APRM argue that its theory of change is overly idealistic 
as it works on the questionable assumption of peer pressure as a driver of positive behavioural 
change. Proponents counter that a sanctions-based system will risk losing the support of 
participating states (Bello, 2016). Within the practice of peer-review, the general view is that 
the value of the process is that it can give rise to peer pressure by way of public scrutiny that 
will influence change and bring about corrective actions (Hope, 2005). 
While the APRM Secretariat has a general monopoly over the use of the ‘peer-review’ concept 
within AU multilateral processes, there are those who argue for the further diffusion of ‘peer-
review’ into other terrains, such as the ‘extractive industries’ (Bello, 2016). There is also 
recognition that ‘peer- review’ practices are embedded in several continental and regional 
instruments. In the area of human rights, the idea of review as a basis for exerting pressure is 
in the global Universal Periodic Review and to a large extent the methodology that 
characterises the work of the Banjul Commission (Murray, 2004). Whilst the process around 
the APRM has evolved and is relatively sophisticated, in that a separate report is produced by 
APRM Panel, relative to the Country Report (Killander, 2008b), the practice in other terrains, 
such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) remains relatively similar, 
but at a much lower level and mainly involving officials from Member States. Peer review is 
also the presumed methodology of the Advisory Board on Corruption21. The process presumed 
in ACDEG is unclear on the related compliance process. Member States are expected to submit 
reports every two years to the Commission (AU, 2007a). Even as the practice of peer review 
as a form of AU multilateral intervention is associated with the APRM, the interest for the 
study is substantively on engaging with the efficacy of such a mode of intervention for 
governance in Africa. The literature on the efficacy of multilateral peer-review processes for 
governance remains nascent outside of the general critic of APRM practices and institutional 
modalities.  
Beyond the broader strategy of peer-review, it has also become common practice to deploy AU 
multilaterally diplomatic missions to engage on governance crisis that emerges within Member 
 
21 In particular, the Convention provides that ‘state parties to co-operate and encourage each other in taking 
measures to prevent corrupt public officials from enjoying ill-acquired assets by freezing their foreign accounts 
and facilitating the repatriation of stolen monies to the countries of origin’ (Olaniyan, 2004:82)  .  
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States. Diplomatic efforts around peace and security are primarily associated with the work of 
the Panel of the Wise established within the Peace and Security Architecture of the AU. The 
efficacy of the work of the Panel of the Wise has been review by Jo-Ansie Van Wyk  (2016), 
who concludes that its track record on preventive diplomacy and the reducing conflict remains 
mixed due to the complexity of African conflicts, its limited mandate and structural location. 
Outside of the expectation that the Panel of the Wise would serve as the central vehicle for 
governance-related crises, the AU approach in practice is a little more complicated. It 
incorporates the appointment of notable senior individuals (such as former Heads of State) for 
governance-related diplomatic missions (Williams, 2009a; Williams, 2009b), or the 
affirmation of a leading role for a particular President and country in a situation of crisis, or the 
deployment of senior officials, including the Chairperson of the AU in specific circumstances. 
As the practice emanates from within the AU Peace and Security Community, the general 
approach has been for the designated diplomats to engage with representatives from States and 
non-state actors to avoid or overcome crisis or conflict situations.  The practice has since 
permeated other areas of work and includes the deployment of diplomatic missions related to 
elections, the ratification of instruments, the implementation of specific charters and even to 
encourage adherence to adopted standards22.  
To some, this form of diplomacy represents an example of African solutions for African 
problems in practice. This notion carries the idea that African actors should have the space to 
decide on policy prescripts in seeking to address the continent’s vast political and socio-
economic problems. From a scholarly and theoretical point of view, “quiet” or “soft” 
diplomacy possess several characteristics, as elucidated by Graham (2006:17). It embodies, 
amongst others, personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or government or senior 
officials and tactful negotiation with all stakeholders in a non-threatening atmosphere. This 
form of governance-related diplomatic intervention is purported to enjoy a great deal of 
currency throughout Africa, because of its reliance on “personal and multi-lateral” forms of 
engagement, as well as the back-up of regional and continental institutions (Landsberg, 2016). 
Analysis of African intervention efforts mostly, either centre on the deployment of 
peacekeepers in instances of deep conflict, such as in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and Darfur or specific experiences, such as in Kenya, Libya or Cote d’Ivoire 
 
22 The work of the AUC DPA in preventative diplomacy is detailed in the Report of the Commission on 




(Cilliers & Sturman, 2004; Engel et al., 2009; Williams, 2009b; Vines, 2013; Van Nieuwkerk, 
2014; Williams, 2014; Van Wyk, 2016; Murithi, 2017). There is no broader analysis of the 
different types of diplomatic missions and their relative value for governance practices within 
Member States.  Success, as in the instance of Kenya, is generally attributed to African 
diplomatic efforts (Juma, 2009). Failures, on the other hand, are either because of the lack of 
unity and capacity (Apuuli, 2012) or to interference from countries outside of Africa (Sithole, 
2012:112). The analysis generally unfolds from a ‘realist’ prism and do not engage with the 
modalities of diplomatic engagements as they unfold from within AU institutions themselves.  
While not discarding power and the agency of individuals (either Presidents or other notables) 
deployed by the PSC or the Commission itself, the analysis generally fails to capture the 
efficacy of institutional modalities established to support all forms of governance-related 
diplomatic intervention efforts. In general, the analysis tends to focus on the institution of 
multilateralism itself, rather than the supportive actions that emanate from the multilateral 
institution itself. Without discarding agency, the supportive groundwork and shape of 
diplomatic efforts often unfold because of the actions or inactions of officials within the AU 
institutional system itself.   
2.2.3 Information and Knowledge Exchange  
Initiatives directed at enhancing information and knowledge exchange appear to be prevalent 
within AU governance-related multilateral practices. However, such ‘intervention strategies’ 
are hardly ever reflected upon and, it would appear, generally perceived as a soft intervention 
and secondary to more significant compliance-related initiatives. This perception is surprising, 
given the range of research and event-related reports produced within the AU multilateral 
space. Part of the challenge as Barnett and Finnemore (1999:699) note is that existing theories 
often pay little attention to how multilateral organisations behave and the autonomy that they 
exercise. Such autonomy is particularly evident in the information resources produced and in 
the numerous knowledge related event that these institutions organise.   
Though it is argued that information resources and knowledge events, such as meetings, 
workshops and conferences are only instrumental in the larger frame of fulfilling particular 
implementation functions, the reality is that the exercise of agency is through choices made on 
what these are and the contents and actors included or excluded within such processes. In the 
absence of any literature which engages this mode of governance-related intervention, it may 
well be prudent to look at the role of information and knowledge broadly within the purview 
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of multilateral organisations. The agency exercised within the terrain of governance-related 
intervention through information and knowledge is perhaps best illustrated in the work of the 
WB, which at a point in time began to define itself as a ‘knowledge bank’. In 1996, the then 
president of the Bank, James Wolfensohn rebranded the Bank by articulating a formal vision 
of a “Knowledge Bank” as a provider of information expertise on development (Teresa & 
Bessma, 2013).  
The multilateral organisation that, perhaps more than others, articulates the importance of its 
knowledge and information role is the OECD. In contrast, to the World Bank, the OECD lacks 
the formal power and authority to secure compliance with its decisions. The OECD  is therefore 
pushed towards becoming a vehicle for knowledge construction and dissemination of 
transnational research and policy ideas embracing a wide range of contemporary issues, 
including within the governance fold (Mahon & McBride, 2009:84). The knowledge value of 
the OECD is characterised as one where it ‘provides a mechanism for selected states to engage 
in the process of mutual recognition of the superiority of the social and economic policies that 
are central to their identities’ (Porter & Webb, 2007:12). The information and knowledge role 
of the OECD is generally perceived to be within the broader terrain of its overall emphasis on 
‘peer-engagements’ as a change-inducing strategy (Porter et al., 2007; Mahon et al., 2009). 
The AUC or other AU institutions with a governance mandate have never really articulated 
precise information and knowledge functions. The lack of definition is probably as a result of 
perceiving knowledge related initiatives as only instrumental to terrains of responsibility as it 
pertains to their mandates. A preliminary analysis from reports suggests that information and 
related knowledge products and events are for many in AU institutions a core functional 
activity and hence an essential mode of intervention when it comes to governance23. AU 
multilateral governance institutions engage in all manner of partnership with other 
organisations and mobilise huge amount of donor resources for all types of events in the 
governance terrain. The work that unfolds in this respect and analysis of the value of such 
interventions for Member States remains outside of scholarly reflection or evaluative analysis.  
In general, there is limited scholarly work on the information and knowledge role of 
multilateral organisations aside from the work of the OECD and the World Bank. In an in-
depth analysis of the knowledge role of the World Bank, John and Richard Toye (2005:1) 
 
23 A review of the AU website reflects that the Commissions Departments arrange events on a weekly basis. In 
addition to capacity within Departments, the AUC has an established divisions dealing the organisation of 
Conference and Events in the Office of the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission (AUC, 2014a).  
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conclude that the ‘production of social knowledge in all international organisations is 
problematic, because of their nature as a form of public bureaucracy’. Academic analysis on 
the role of the OECD as it pertains to information and knowledge has been positive, and the 
general conclusion is that the diffusion of knowledge product and peer-events fundamentally 
serve to drive change and shape the identities of participating Member States (Porter et al., 
2007; Mahon et al., 2009). The general proliferation of events and publications associated with 
all multilateral organisations do point to the general importance accorded to information and 
knowledge produces and processes as modes of intervention for change at the level of Member 
States.  
A growing scholarly body of work, from a particular lens, is on the ‘norm entrepreneurship’ 
role of multilateral organisations. One commentator from within the AU institutional system 
describes norm entrepreneurship as an exercise wherein an organisation ‘takes up a cause, and 
employs the necessary skills and resources to convince members of the group about the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the cause, with or without explicit incentives or 
enforcement mechanisms for conformers or deviators’ (Souaré, 2014). Based on an analysis of 
AU responses to unconstitutional changes in government, Souaré (2014:92) concludes that the 
shift in the AU reflects a ‘bold undertaking to break up with the status quo and chart a new way 
forward’. Souaré (2014) substantive contribution is recognising the agency that emanates from 
within the AU multilateral institutional system. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide an 
appreciative perspective on the information and knowledge related events arranged by 
international organisations in their analysis of ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’. The different organisational platforms or events provide norm entrepreneurs and the 
organisations they inhabit with spaces to secure the support of state actors to endorse their 
norms and hence allow for their inclusion as part of their agenda (Finnemore et al., 1998:900).  
The available literature point to the importance of appreciating information and knowledge as 
a critical form of intervention from within multilateral institutions. However, it is also vital that 
to engage with this from a critical perceptive of recognising that they sometimes unfold, as 
Barnett and Finmore (2004) reminds us, as practices that come at the expense of an 
international organisation's primary mission.   
2.2.4 Capacity Building and Technical Support  
Aside from the emphasis on capacity building in Agenda 2063, the AU as a multilateral 
organisation has never formally fully defined itself as having a capacity building or technical 
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support function towards its Member States in the governance terrain. A preliminary analysis 
of reports in the terrain of governance nevertheless suggests that substantive resources are 
expanded in providing support to Member States, in for example to the terrain of elections24. 
To understand these, it is hence vital to engage with the broader literature as it relates to the 
role and value-add of international organisation in such form of assistance to Member States. 
Capacity building as an exercise is generally closely linked to technical co-operation and 
assistance. In international development discourse terrain, technical assistance as a change-
inducing modality is thought to have unfolded after World War II along with the emergence of 
the UN. As a practice, technical assistance initiatives are conceived as furnishing states with 
expert advice. In essence, it is a ‘linear’ apolitical transfer of knowledge from the developed to 
the underdeveloped world (Wilson, 2007:186). The rapid growth of such assistance culminated 
in the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the technical 
assistance arm of the UN. Within the broader multilateral and bilateral aid system, the 
modalities of ‘technical assistance’ changed over time to absorb criticism, particularly as it 
relates to the difficulties of transferring technical know-how and capacity across socio-
economic contexts (Wilson, 2007:183).  
Wilson (2007) traces the evolution of the criticism of technical assistance and, in particular, 
the failure to secure adequate in-country participation and ownership. He notes that this 
resulted in a change from technical assistance to technical cooperation to denote more equal 
relationships. As a result of further reflections in the early 1990s by the World Bank and UNDP, 
the language shifted towards the more encompassing construct of ‘capacity’. Capacity-building 
is a term embodying a less instructive and much more empowering approach, where developing 
countries would be enabled to define their problems (Wilson, 2007:190). The intense interest 
in ‘capacity development’ within multilateral institutions is a more recent occurrence. A review 
of the literature suggests that it first appeared in the 1970s to describe intervention directed at 
supporting local government and was often used as a synonym for ‘management 
improvements’ (Venner, 2015:86). Within the broader purview of governance, capacity 
development is defined to ‘encompass the development of institutions, the reform of political 
and legal systems, and far-reaching change in the recipient country’s social 
organisation’(Venner, 2015:90). Discussions on capacity development generally point to the 
 
24 In the report to the Commission to the Assembly on Governance in Africa (With Focus on the African 
Governance Architecture and Elections) indications are that ‘ (n)ot less than 20 Members States have benefitted 
from the AUC capacity building programme for EMBs’ (AU, 2015b:21).  
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fact that it cannot be perceived as politically or culturally neutral. Based on substantive 
experience with capacity development, the UNDP expressed the view that the efforts to 
strengthen skills, processes and systems do not produce the intended results if they fail to 
engage the inherently political realities of the context. They further provide that to be effective, 
capacity development requires the creation of political and social incentives and effective 
mobilisation for strong ownership and commitment (Analoui & Danquah, 2017). 
The term ‘capacity’ is generally entrenched in ‘governance’ related interventions and implies 
some level of policy prescription. It justifies specific programmes and incorporates a range of 
activities, including direct training, workshops, the production of manuals, information 
products and the placement of technical staff in Member States institutions. While debates 
around the utility of capacity based intervention, given contextual realities and the difficulties 
of driving change through top-down initiatives continue, the practices are generally entrenched 
within multilateral processes (Andrews, 2013; Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock, 2013; Levy, 
2014). While it features as a strategy and option in AU multilateral interventions, documented 
evidence of this happening within Member States is limited, and if exercised generally unfolds 
from supportive partnerships between the AU and other better-placed capacity building 
institutions. This mode of support often characterises the work of the African Capacity 
Building Foundation (ACBF)25. While recently described as the ‘capacity building arm of the 
African Union’26, the ACBF retains an arm’s length link to the AU. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has also positioned itself to provide direct 
capacity and technical support to the AU and its Member States in specific terrains of 
governance27. Discussion on capacity building generally tends to focus on the development of 
capacity within AU institutions themselves and less on them embodying the function of 
building capacity within Member States for governance.  
As capacity building and development is included explicitly within direct forms of AU 
multilateral interventions in governance, it is crucial that these are engaged upon from the 
perspective of the global challenges that confront such activities, and their substantive value 
add. In particular, it is imperative to appreciate that within the wider literature (Andrews, 2013; 
Andrews et al., 2013; Levy, 2014) there is deep scepticism with the value of capacity-related 
intervention as they embody for many a top-down ‘best practice’ orientation to the substantive 
 
25 For details on the work of the ACBF see https://www.acbf-pact.org/. 
26 See decision of the January 2017 Summit (AU, 2017a) 
27 The role of the UNECA is more recently captured as one of ‘repositioning ECA as premier think tank in Africa’ 
and captured in a Report on ‘ECA – 60 Years in Step with African Development’(UNECA, 2019).  
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governance realities that face AU Member States. Levy (2015:238) provides a critic of the best 
practice approach to capacity development and governance reforms. He concludes that the 
central challenge has to less to do with the ‘endpoint than with the journey of getting from here 
to there’. Outside of the fact that many suggest that ‘the generic ‘theory of change’ on which 
governance initiatives for state capability are based is deeply flawed’ (Andrews et al., 2013:2) 
they continue to be perceived as necessary forms of intervention from multilateral institutions, 
such as the AU.  
2.3 African Multilateralism  
It is crucial to establish the difference between African regional integration and African 
multilateralism. The discussion on regional integration focused on the institution of 
multilateralism, hence concentrating on the less formal element of debates and shifting values 
on African integration and governance interventions. African multilateralism has a deeper 
significance for agency beyond that exercised within the institution of multilateralism (Renard, 
2016:20). The institution of multilateralism may manifest itself in, formal organisation, but its 
significance arises from less formal practices and norms of international society. Multilateral 
institution, on the other hand, focuses on the formal organisation elements characterised by a 
permanent location, distinct headquarters, a secretariat with staff and budgetary allocation 
(Caporaso, 1992:602). 
The importance of maintaining this distinction is that multilateral institutions and the institution 
of multilateralism do not always mirror one another broadly or within specific issue areas. 
Without overstating the agency of African multilateral institutions, it is essential that there is 
some engagement with actual multilateral institutions, as separate to integration efforts and the 
institution of multilateralism.  The institution of multilateralism exists whenever there are 
formal or even informal interactions amongst more than two countries (Caporaso, 1992:602). 
These do not necessarily entail having formal organisation structures outside of those within 
the countries themselves or those joint interactive structures temporarily created to facilitate 
dialogue.  While the institution of multilateralism may be related to multilateral institutions in 
a cause and effect manner, the organisational entities provide arenas within which actors learn 
to alter perceptions of interest and beliefs. The institution of multilateralism may, in turn, 
spawn, maintain, alter, and undermine specific organisations (Renard, 2016). Given 
expectations of agency and the prominence of Political Science and International Relations in 
the study of African multilateralism, the literature has been dominated by writings on the 
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institution of multilateralism, with very little attention being focused on multilateral institutions 
themselves (Gutner et al., 2010:2). This neglect of institutions is, in part, a reflection of the 
intellectual leaning towards the political nature of multilateralism and regional integration.  
2.3.1 African Union Institutions of Multilateralism 
The institution of multilateralism exists whenever there are formal or even informal 
interactions amongst more than two countries. At the level of the AU, formal multilateral 
engagements unfold through several established institutional structures and organs. While 
supported by the AUC and other Secretariat structures within the AU system, they represent 
terrains of formal multilateral engagements and hence platforms for decision-making and 
policy construction. Appreciating these is important as they provide insights in how mandates 
are established and hence the expectations that States have of implementation-related 
multilateral institutional structures28. Rather than provide a detailed outline of the modalities 
of the institutions of multilateralism, the approach here is to provide an analytical overview of 
role relative to actual implementation structures. The figure below provides a broad overview 
of the macro-political structures of the AU. A generic descriptive overview of the structures of 
the AU is in an ‘African Union Handbook’ (AUC, 2014a) produced by the AUC29. Oxfam has 
produced a similar compendium on the structures and functioning of the AU. The primary 
purpose of the Oxfam compendium has been to guide civil society organisations on their 
interactions with the AU, its structures and institutions (Oxfam International, 2012).  
 
28 In providing an overview of the AU institutions reliance is placed on the Handbook of the AU. The Handbook 
is now in its sixth 2019 edition and was first published in 2014. (AUC, 2014a). 
29 The African Union Handbook has been produced by the AUC with support from the Embassy of New Zealand 
as part of a ‘commitment towards accountability, as well as providing a valuable guide to structures and work of 
the AU’.  
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Figure 3: Macro Political Structures 
Source: Information extracted from the AU Handbook 2019 (AUC, 2014a) and the Oxfam 
Compendium (Oxfam International, 2012).   
At the apex of the overall systems is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The AU 
Assembly is the political organs of the Union, headed by a Chairperson who is ‘elected after 
consultations amongst Member States’ (AUC, 2014a:27). The Assembly meets at least once a 
year in ordinary session and when approved by a two-thirds majority, in extraordinary session. 
In line with the practice established within the OAU, the Summits of the Heads of State is held 
twice a year. The January Summit is typically held in Addis Ababa, at the Headquarters of the 
AUC, and the mid-year Summit takes place in another Member State (OSISA and Oxfam, 
2009:6). The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is considered the highest decision-
making body and receives reports from other established organs and the Executive Council of 
the AU. The Assembly is tasked with authority to determine policies of the Union and monitor 
implementation. Also, it has the authority to adopt the budget, receive and consider reports of 
other organs, and appoint principles officers of other AU Organs (AUC, 2014a:27).  In general, 
decisions are based on consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority. Decisions may be 
in the forms of binding regulations, directives to Member States or non-binding 
recommendations, declarations and resolutions. Within the broader governance fold, an 
African Peer Review Forum of participating Heads of State and Government is established. 
This structure meets typically before the Summit and functions as the platform for actual peer-
review engagements and to receive reports from the APRM Panel and Secretariat (OAU, 2002).  
Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
Executive Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
Pan African Parliament (PAP) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) 
Regional Economic Commissions (RECs)  
African Court  
African Peer Review Forum  
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A substantive critic of the functioning of the AU is that the Assembly is often overwhelmed 
with many agenda items and documents, and there is never enough time to focus on strategic 
issues (Kagame, 2017). The shift towards one Summit a year and a more manageable agenda 
of strategic issue, as part of the AU reform process, suggest a substantive recognition that the 
structures that involve Heads of State and Government, such as the APRM forum, have not 
functioned optimally. It is hence difficult to conclude that the decisions of Summit have the 
substantive buy-in from Heads of State and Government. As part of the reform process, the AU 
Summit in July 2017 decided to reduce the number of Summits to one a year, with the second 
Summit focused on interactions between the AU and RECs (AU, 2017c).  
At a secondary and lower level, the AU has an Executive Council, made up of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs or those designated by Governments and usually meets before the Assembly 
to consider all submission and decisions to be made by the Assembly. The Executive Council 
also receives reports from Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) composed of Ministers 
or other Senior Officials and from Conferences of Ministers convened directly by Member 
States or through the efforts of the AUC. The overall logic of establishing STCs was that they 
would serve to provide oversight over programmes and projects relevant to their areas of focus.  
The Constitutive Act provided for the establishment of seven specific STCs, but this was 
enlarged to fourteen in order to incorporate a broader thematic focus. The STCs of particular 
relevance for governance is the STC on Public Service, Local Government, Urban 
Development and Decentralisation (AUC, 2014a:60-67). It has taken some time for the formal 
establishment of STCs as the main conduit for programmatic work within the AU system. AU 
Departments have had a history of arranging meetings of Ministers and officials in particular 
areas of policy consideration outside of the STC process. The agency of officials during these 
meetings is relatively high as they determine the agenda and substantive content issues for 
consideration and engagement30. There has been an ongoing concern on the number of 
Ministerial meetings convened and on the relative efficacy of such arrangements. In the terrain 
of governance, the AUC has arranged meetings and conferences on a variety of governance 
issues in, for example, the areas of Public Administration, Local Governance and Anti-
Corruption. The approach has generally been of an ad-hoc nature. In 2014, the Conferences of 
Ministers of Public Service and Local Governance were incorporated as the STC in Public 
Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralisation. The substantive push 
 
30 See for example the AUC DPA report to the Executive Council on the 5th Pan African Conference of Ministers 
of Public Service (AU, 2006b).  
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for the establishment of the STC arose from the effort of Ministerial meetings that were held 
in local government outside of the AUC and through the structure of the African Ministerial 
Conference on Development and Decentralisation (AMCOD) (Aschmann, 2011:71).  
In the broader governance intervention terrain, the more significant and influential AU Organ 
is the PSC. The PSC primarily grew out of an ad hoc process to reform the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which had been adopted by the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1993. Article 2.1 of the PSC Protocol 
established it as ‘a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts’(AU, 2002c). It hence serves as collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and political crises in Africa.  
Article 3 of the PSC Protocol outlines six objectives for the institution. These are to promote 
peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities; coordinate and harmonise continental 
efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects; develop a 
common defence policy for the Union; and encourage democratic practices, good governance 
and the rule of law, as well as protect human rights and fundamental freedoms (Williams, 
2009b:607).  
The PSC has fifteen members elected by the AU Executive Council: five elected for terms of 
three years, and ten for terms of two years. According to Article 5 of the PSC Protocol, the 
Council’s membership is according to the principle of ‘equitable regional representation and 
rotation’ (thus the five regions of north, west, central, east and southern Africa present 
candidates for election). The article also lists criteria on which to judge prospective candidates. 
These include an assessment of whether the state in question is in good standing (whether it 
has paid its dues, and respects constitutional governance and the rule of law), and whether it is 
willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities that membership would place upon it (Cilliers 
et al., 2004:100). Historically, the PSC has primarily focused on responding to a crisis, where 
conflict has emerged and not on structural issues that encourage ‘bad governance’. Most of the 
countries that have become the focus of the PSCs deliberations have experienced a coup or 
armed insurgency. Outside of the instances when the PSC takes place during the Summit 
period, its meetings are attended mainly by members of the Permanent Representative 
Committee (PRC) (Levitt, 2003).   
The PRC is made up of Ambassadors from Member States. In the main, it is constitutive of 
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Heads of Mission of representative countries based in Addis Ababa. Submission to the PRC 
arises from the AUC and all other multilateral institutions, including the PSC. As the PRC 
meets more often and its members are involved in day-to-day interactions at the level of AUC. 
It is widely considered the most powerful body in the AU and makes decisions regarding 
budgets and submission to higher level organs (Lisakafu, 2016). More detailed engagements 
unfold at the levels of PRC and its sub-committees. Lisafaku (2016) provides a detailed 
analysis of the PRC and concludes that it lacks transparency in its operations. The PRC is 
nonetheless instrumental in determining what features in the decision-making process during 
Summits. The AU reform process incorporates concerns around the functioning of the PRC 
and the substantive authority it tends to exercise around the overall implementation system 
(Kagame, 2017). The PRC has historically been a vital connection between multilateral 
institutions and the institutions of multilateralism. The role and power that the PRC has, is 
recognised by AU governance implementation institution. The AUC DPA has arranged some 
specific PRC related engagements on governance issues as a means for securing broader 
commitment, and in particular, more appropriate budgets for interventions31. At one of these 
meetings in 2017, the PRC went as far as committing towards established a sub-committee to 
deal with governance intervention issues (DPA, 2015)32. In recognition of the fact that the PRC 
exercises undue authority over implementation matters, a vital element of the AU reform 
process has been to reduce the power of the PRC by reaffirming the authority of Ministers of 
Finance on all budget-related issues within the AU system (Kagame, 2017).  
In addition to the listed Organs, the AU has established the African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (African Court) and the Pan African Parliament (PAP). The current focus of 
the Court is on all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and 
application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and any other relevant human 
 
31 The first such meeting was held as ‘Brainstorms Between the PRC and the ACHPR on the 4th to 5th May 2007 
in Lesotho. On consequence of the meeting was an increase in the budget of the ACHPR. The second was held as 
a retreat between the Department of Political Affairs of the AUC and the PRC and took place on the 13th to 15th 
July 20009 in Kenya. One outcome of the retreat was a general commitment to increasing the budget of the 
Department. A further such meeting was held from the 3rd to 4th September 2015 in Arusha Tanzania and focused 
on the African Governance Architecture. A key outcome here was the commitment to establish a sub-committee 
to deal with issues of governance. There is nevertheless no evidence that this has happened.  
32 The report from the meeting provides that ‘Members of the PRC to prioritise establishing a PRC Sub-
Committee on Governance, Democracy, Human Rights and Elections to ensure that the Member States effectively 
participate and engage in strengthening democratic governance in Africa and are fully appraised of and engaged 
on the work of the AGA Platform. The Secretariat of the AGA Platform and the Office of the Legal Counsel to 





rights instrument ratified by the States concerned (Udombana, 2000b).  The Court is, over time, 
expected to engage with cases brought forward based on other ratified governance instruments. 
PAP currently only has consultative and advisory powers within the AU and is hence primarily 
focused on securing the full participation of Africans in the development and economic 
integration of the continent. After the ratification of a new PAP-related protocol by Member 
States, it would have legislative powers and may become the principal custodian of governance 
compliance oversight (Dinokopila, 2013).    
African level integration has, to some extent, been similar and different to what has unfolded 
in other parts of the globe. Beyond smaller issue related integration efforts, such as the Southern 
African Customs Union or the Franc Finance Zone, there have, since independence many 
efforts toward regionalisation and the establishment of related structures (Hartzenberg). 
Numerous sub-regional African structures emerged since the 1960s, and there are currently 
over twenty African multilateral formations of varying membership. The relationship between 
these and the more considerable Africa wide momentum as reflected in the formation of the 
OAU and then the AU has varied over the years (Aniche, 2015). The current approach, with 
many nuances, is that a selection of RECs constitutes the building blocks of the AU. The AU 
has formally recognised the RECs listed in the table below for ongoing engagement.  
Table 7: RECs Recognised by the AU 
Name  
 
Member States  Location 
of Head 
Office 





Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 




Community of Sahel–Saharan 
States (CEN–SAD) 
 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt; Eritrea, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé 




East African Community 
(EAC) 




Economic Community of 
Central African States 
(ECCAS) 
 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 






Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia 




on Development (IGAD) 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, 






Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Gaborone 
Botswana 
Source:  As extracted from the AU website (www,au.int) and related Assembly decision (AU, 
2006a).   
Outside of directly recognising the listed RECs for ongoing interactions, the general practice 
within specific areas, such as in governance, is to engage within a consultative process and in 
meetings with a broader range of RECs, including those not formally listed as recognised. In 
term of its practices and for representation purposes, the AU has designated five regions. These 
are in the table below.  
Table 8: AU Geographical Regions 
Region 
 
Designated Members  
North Africa Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi and Tunisia 
Central Africa  Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
 
Southern Africa  
 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
West Africa  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
East Africa  
 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda 
Source: African Union Handbook (AUC, 2014a)  
Aside from consultations between selected Member States within regions during Summit 
events and related process, the designated regions have no further standing or role. More often 
than not, formal consultations, as it relates to championing specific policy perspectives or the 
appointment of individuals for various positions would unfold within the structures of formally 
established RECs. Even as RECs are recognised as being key to the AGA and hence part of the 
AGP, there role and interventions in the governance space have generally varied. While 
ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC have established several governance-related initiatives, and 
almost all RECs involve themselves in the observation of elections, the levels of active 
105 
 
involvement in governance remain limited (Wachira, 2017). In some instance, such as Anti-
Corruption several RECs have established instruments and, in other areas, such as democracy, 
there has been some replication of existing AU instruments.  
2.3.2 African Union Implementation Institutions in Governance 
Historically, analysis of the AU has tended to treat the institutions in singular terms, with little 
attention to implementation institutions and the complex oversight and implementation 
arrangements established for these. Aside from the established Policy Organs, the overall AU 
approach has been to create implementation institutions with elected individuals at the apex of 
the institutions33. The existence of these structures, somewhat separate from appointed officials 
serves to create a layer of added complexity to multilateral interactions and implementation 
processes. The different elected structures within the governance intervention fold are outlined 
in the table below. The period of election and the actual status varies across each of the 
structures. All positions, aside from the individuals elected to lead the AUC, are considered of 
a part-time nature. Members of the African Commission on International Law are elected by 
the Executive Council. All other individuals are elected directly by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. As with all other elected positions, there is an emphasis on ensuring 
regional representation in elected structures (AUC, 2014a).  
Table 9: Elected Oversight Structures 
Structure Number  Appointment Period 
Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners of the 
African Union Commission 
11 Members  Four years renewable once 
African Peer Review Panel of Eminent Persons  7 Panellists Four years by rotation  
Commissioners of Human and Peoples Rights  11 Members Six years renewable once 
Members of the Advisory Board on Corruption  11 Members Two years renewable once 
Judges of the African Court  11 Judges Six years renewable once 
African Commission on International Law 11 Members Five years fixed 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child 
11 Members Five years fixed 
 
33 A complete listing of these structures is provided in the AU Handbook (AUC, 2014a)  
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Source: Information extracted from the websites of each of the structures.   
At the level of the AUC, the primary mandate for matters within the broader governance 
portfolio are with the elected Commissioner of Political Affairs. There is in practice mandate 
overlap with the roles established for the Commissioner for Peace and Security and, to a lesser, 
extent with the Commissioner for Social Affairs, amongst others. The Chairperson and Deputy 
Chairperson of the AUC engage in all areas of the mandate. While actual authority and 
responsibilities of elected bodies and individuals vary across institutions, the general 
orientation is that they function at a more ‘policy guidance’ level and hence not directly 
involved in implementation. Formal rules and actual practices nevertheless vary across 
structures. The elected individuals and structures often exercise direct authority over plans and 
central to approving implementation level actions. The terms of office of elected individuals 
range from two years’ renewable in the instance of the Advisory Board on Corruption and six 
years in the case of the Banjul Commission.  
By virtue of their elected status, through the provisions of relevant instruments, the structures 
established within the broader governance fold are considered AU Organs with direct reporting 
lines to the Executive Council and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Each of 
the ‘elected structures’ is supported by an ‘administrative secretariat’. As the intended analysis 
seeks to build a substantive perspective on overall implementation efficacy, it is crucial that 
these be captured. The figure below outlines the ‘administrative head’ of the structures 
established and their physical location.  








Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and Commissioner 
at the AUC (11 Members) 
AUC Director of Political 
Affairs and Officials 
Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
African Peer Review Panel of Eminent Persons (9 
Panellists) 




Commissioners of Human and Peoples Rights (11 
Members) 




Members of the Advisory Board on Corruption (11 
Members) 




African Commission on International Law (11 
Members) 




African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (11 Members) 








Source: Information extracted from the websites of each of the structures.   
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While the definition of the mandate of elected members is within relevant instruments, their 
policy oversight role, relative to ‘administrative’ and ‘operational’ leadership is not fully 
specified, and the actual division of roles varies between each institution and often contingent 
on the personalities of the elected and administrative heads. In theory, the ‘administrative head’ 
is appointed on merit, subject to AU country quota framework and related rules. In practice, 
appointments are influenced by high levels of active lobbying within AU systems, often giving 
rise to appointments driven by choice of lobbying Member States34. The number of fixed 
establishments posts at the level of the administrative structures is limited as salaries are 
dependent on the core operating budget of the AU (Engel, 2015). Despite attempts to increase 
the size of organisational structures, consummate with mandate demands, this has proven 
difficult for most AU institutions. The more substantial consequence of this reality is a heavy 
reliance on funded contracted positions, linked to budgets made available by donors 
(Pharatlhatlhe & Vanheukelom, 2019) or donor-funded positions through partner 
organisations. These include the European Commission (EC), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 
the United Kingdom established Department for International Development, and the German 
development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GiZ)35. 
These organisations either a) appoint persons directly and second them to the relevant 
Departments for contract periods, with the possibility of extension, or b) provide the resources 
for direct appointments, as additional to the fixed establishment.  
Each of the adopted governance instruments embodies guidance on the institutions responsible 
for implementation and the roles and responsibilities of particular Organs of the Union.  In 
most cases, final authority rests with the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In the 
core governance instruments, there is a diffusion of implementation responsibilities between 
specially elected bodies or individuals and related support structures. Outside of writings on 
the substantive mandate of the governance-related institutions, there is very little analysis of 
the internal operations of the AU established institutions and the workings of the official levels 
structures that have implementation responsibilities. Within a year of the adoption of the 
Declaration on Shared Values, the AUC’s Department of Political Affairs set out to establish a 
further internal structure to support the AGP. This structure is known as the Secretariat of AGA 
 
34 The challenges associated with recruitment and appointments in AU institutions has been highlighted in reports 
(AU, 2007c) and more recently has been the subject to deep contestation within the AUC (Allison, 2018b)   
35 Information has been extracted from various AU DPA documents relating to donor support.  
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and, in theory at least, reports directly to the Chairperson and Bureau of the AGP, elected in 
terms of the Rule of Procedure of AGA. In real terms, accountability for resources used and 
for all actions is through the Director and Commissioner of Political Affairs. AGP has 
established several sub-committees to facilitate the anticipated coordination work. While the 
Declaration on Shared Values and related summit decisions refers to the informal status of the 
AGP (AU, 2011d), DPA attempted to formalise the role through the rules of procedure and 
hence a relatively formal perspective on membership and related structures (Wachira, 2017). 
The Membership of AGP is in the table below.  
Table 11: Members of the African Governance Platform  
Organisation  Location  
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights The Gambia 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Ethiopia 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Tanzania 
African Peer Review Mechanism  South Africa 
African Union Advisory Board on Corruption Tanzania 
African Union Commission on International Law Ethiopia 
African Union Commission (Department of Political Affairs)   Ethiopia 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council Ethiopia/Zambia 
The NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency South Africa 
The Pan-African Parliament South Africa 
The Peace and Security Council Ethiopia 
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Varied locations 
Source: Information extracted from the AGA Framework Document (AUC, 2015a) 
The adopted AGP Rule of Procedure further provides that it may incorporate any further Organ 
or Institution that may be given the mandate or established by the Assembly to promote 
governance, democracy and human rights. Outside of a broader indication that the AGP 
includes all structures with some element of governance, the incorporation of vastly different 
entities, with some conflation of role separation between structures such as PAP, the African 
Court and others is not explained. At a more operational level, the indications are that the AGP 
will arrange meetings of the platform at two levels. That is meetings of the Chairperson of 
elected structures and meetings of the Heads of Administrative Institutions (Wachira, 2014). 
The Rules of procedure further provide that AGA Platform has five thematic clusters: (1) 
governance, (2) human rights (including transitional justice), (3) democracy, (4) 
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constitutionalism and the rule of law, and (5) humanitarian affairs (AUC, 2015a). The full logic 
of the clusters and what is included is not fully explained and generally anticipated that the 
participating individual from members would define the work of each cluster.  The work of the 
Secretariat is funded by DP, including the salaries of officials located within the AGA 
Secretariat.   
2.3.3 AU Partners in Governance   
Within the governance fold, AU Organs and Institutions have actively sought to and established 
a variety of implementation partnerships for their work. Some of the partner relationships 
emerge within the overall AU system, such as those with the UN and others are the product of 
specific interactions between individual institutions and different partners. In general, the 
partnership established can be divided into three broad categories. These are partnership 
arrangements with civil society and technical partner organisations, those with UN 
organisations and others established with DP36. Given their relative impact on Governance 
engagements, it is worth providing a descriptive overview of all three categories of partnership.  
2.3.3.1 Civil Society and Technical Partners 
Civil society engagements in the AU unfolded at two levels. The first is through the established 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). In line with the adopted statute, 
ECOSOCC is as an advisory organ of the AU. It can give recommendations on existing policies 
and programs, as well as propose programs fitting to the principles of the AU. ECOSOCC is 
meant to function as the connecting organ between civil society formations and the AU, and 
through that contributor to the promotion of human rights, gender equality, child rights, the 
rule of law, good governance and democratic principles (AU, 2004). ECOSOCC has several 
Committees that mirror Departments in the AU Commission, including one that focuses on 
Political Affairs. While elected ECOSOCC officials are invitees at numerous consultations by 
Departments and other structures involved in governance, the level of active engagements and 
representation on issues is deemed to be very limited and of no substantive consequence 
(Houghton 2005).  
 
The challenge for ECOSOCC has and continues to be on the level of representation it provides. 
 
36 The categories have been established after a detailed review of primary documents from AU governance 
implementation institutions, including concept notes, meeting reports, planning documents and memorandum 
related to meetings arranged with external partners.  
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Many civil society organisations that are active in the governance space are not members of 
ECOSOCC, as they do not comply with the strict, but limiting statutory requirements that at 
least 50 per cent of the resources of the CSO is from the membership to the CSO. A further 
requirement is that CSOs need to be registered in a Member State of the Union or either meet 
the general conditions of eligibility for the granting of observer status or be a proven or 
registered diaspora CSO for at least three years (Sturman & Cilliers, 2003). ECOSOCC has 
generally struggled to sustain a level of active membership and perceived as being 
dysfunctional (Houghton 2005). The perception of dysfunctionality is confirmed by reports 
stating that the quality and substance of debates in ECOSOCC have been inferior, raising the 
concern that fora were used more in order to endorse past decisions than to influence future 
ones. The overall concern with the role and function of ECOSOCC led to an AU Assembly 
decision that a study should be conducted on its role and function and is to be presented to the 
Assembly (AU, 2014c).  
The more active and influencing form of civil society activism has been through direct 
engagements with AUC Departments and relevant institutions. Many regional and global civil 
society organisations that are active in advocacy within the governance space have perceived 
the AU as an optimal channel to lobby for particular governance orientations and ensure that 
Member States are accountable in terms of the provisions of the Constitutive Act and adopted 
instruments.  A number have also engaged the AUC for promoting specific policy orientations. 
Some of these have emerged as both advocacy groups and as indirect ‘donors’ or ‘technical 
partners’ to the AUC. Through active advocacy, participation at meetings, workshops and 
conferences and by-way of sponsoring specific activities, partners can exercise a level of 
agency on what gets done within the AU system (Kane & Mbelle, 2007).  
AU institutions in the governance space have historically engaged with a variety of Civil 
Society Organisations. These range from well-resourced international non-governmental 
organisations, such as Oxfam and the Open Society Foundation (OSF), towards more 
technically focused institutions, such as Transparency International (TI), the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for 
Sustainable Africa (EISA) and Centre for Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). In addition to 
these, there are organisations, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
111 
 
(IFES) and inter-governmental organisations such as International IDEA37. The relationships 
with these organisations range from those that have established formal Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs) with specific AU structures, towards those that cooperate through 
participation in various meeting and by way of providing a combination of indirect funding 
and technical support.  
Engagements between AU institutions and civil society partners is a terrain of intricacy as it 
often entails a push for such interactions both from AU officials and individuals from such 
organisations. AU officials are driven to establish partnerships as they often lack the direct 
capacity to engage in delivering all elements of their mandate and often have to mobilise 
technical capacity and resources through such arrangements (Kane et al., 2007).  Civil society 
organisations of varying status, size and reach are often driven towards such engagement for 
influence and as a channel for mobilising further funding in their areas of interest and focus. 
Many organisations can use their access, either formal or informal, as a means for mobilising 
resources from traditional donors for AU related work. The following table provided a full 
listing of organisations that have been working with AU institutions at a more technical level. 
The list is not meant to be exhaustive and hence only serves as an illustration of some of the 
active partnerships established and the nature of the collaboration.   
Table 12: Technical Partners in Governance  
Organisation Nature and Area of Collaboration  
IDEA38  International IDEA has an MOU with the AUC to support areas of governance. IDEA has 
worked with the DPA over the years and has established numerous joint activity plans. 
IDEA has appointed individuals for secondment to the AUC since 2009. IDEA has 
actively arranged numerous governance-related events with DPA over the past years and 
has supported a variety of DPA initiatives through direct and indirect funding and 
technical support.  
Open 
Society39  
The Opens Society has actively worked with the DPA since its establishment. In the main, 
the focus of Opens Society has been on advocacy work around various instruments of the 
AU and in providing support for active civil society engagements. In addition to 
supporting civil society engagements with the APRM, it has supported initiatives relating 
to the popularisation of ACDEG through PAP and provides technical support to the 
Advisory Board on Corruption.  
 
37 In compiling this list, reliance was placed on a range of AUC DPA documents on meetings held, plans and 
related memorandum. It is not possible to list all of these here. Where relevant reference is made to specific 
documents within detailed discussions that unfold in each of the governance areas.   
38 As illustration of the partnership see Speech by Vidar Helgesen, Secretary-General, International IDEA Launch 
of the African Union Commission and International IDEA Joint Activity Plan (Helgesen, 2008).  
39 Opens Society work with the AU DPA is reflected more recently in the funding provided for the production of 
a report on ‘Civil Society Perspectives on African Union Member State Commitments to Democratic 
Governance’(WITS School of Governance, 2017).  
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Oxfam40 Oxfam role and support has varied over the years and generally focused on ongoing 
advocacy work. The organisation actively engages AU institutions on implementation and 
has arranged numerous civil society engagements around ACDEG implementation.  
EISA41 EISA has an MOU with the DPA and has been an active partner in the terrain of elections. 
In addition to providing training for elections observation, it has arranged numerous 
election-related events with the AUC. EISA also provides technical support for most 
election observation teams of the AU and maintains a data system of elections observation 
for the AUC.  
IFES42 IFES is active in supporting election management bodies across the African continent. IN 
the main, it has provided technical support to the AUC in the forms of seconding an official 
to work with the AUC on elections matters since around 2007.   
ECDPM43 ECDPM is mainly focused on elements related to the African-EU partnership and 
engagements around governance within such processes. It has however historically 
provided technical support to the AUC and was initially instrumental in developing the 
initial perspectives around AGA and the AGP.  
SAIIA44 SAIIA has established a unit dealing with governance and the APRM. In the main, it has 
supported the APRM process by providing technical support for the development of the 
APRM Questionnaire. More recently it has focused attention on civil society engagements 





CSVR has an MOU with the AUC focused on issues of transitional justice. CSVR has led 
the process of establishing the AU Transitional Justice Framework. Within this process, it 
has supported numerous engagements for the development and further implementation of 
the framework.  
Source: Extracted from primary documents and related information from TP organisations.  
Outside of the formal structured relationships, many civil society organisations remain 
regionally active in matters related to governance within Member States without necessarily 
having structured relationships with the AU.  As their influence is often within particular areas 
of governance focus, these are engaged within the detailed chapters that follow. In addition to 
civil society organisations, there are a number of other African associational and multilateral 
organisations, such as the African Ombudsman and Mediators Association (AOMA), the 
African Parliamentary Union (APU), The Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) and the African 
Management Development Institutes Network (AMDIN) that engage with AU institutions 
within implementation processes46.  A general review of the nature and number of collaborative 
activities between AU institutions involved in governance implementation suggest that there is 
a substantive push for such collaboration from both AU institutions and CSOs. Their value and 
role in building the overall efficacy of AU multilateralism in governance are crucial for further 
 
40 Oxfam has established a liaison office at the level of the AU (Oxfam International, 2019) 
41 EISA has a formal MOU with the AU DPA mainly focused on elections (EISA, 2019) 
42 Some elements of the history of the relationship are contained in a book from the first IFES individual seconded 
to the AUC DPA (Dundas, 2012).  
43 ECDPM initially led the drafting of the concept documented related to the establishment of AGA and the AGP.  
44 SAIIA works with civil society on APRM issues and has a structured MOU with the APRM Secretariat.  
45 CSVR has mainly focused on the drafting of the Transitional Justice Policy Framework and has worked with 
the DPA on wider human rights issues.  
46 As extracted from various documents of the AU DPA relating to conferences and workshops arranged. Including 




2.3.3.2 Development Partners 
Development Partners (DP) have historically been very active in supporting the overall 
progress of the AU, including the work that has unfolded in the governance fold. At a global 
level, the AUC has historically actively worked with DP on channelling support directly 
through the AU approved budget (Engel, 2015). Engel (2015:17) estimates that DP funding for 
the programme budget of the AU has increased from  27,3 per cent in 2007 to 71.8 per cent in 
2015. The Broad of Auditors Report on the AU lists over 100 specific donors to the AU in 
2017 (AUC, 2018f). The AUC has established a forum for Development Partners, and meetings 
are held regularly for planning and reporting purposes. These meetings range from meetings 
with technical institutions established with partners, such as DFID, GiZ, and the EC, amongst 
others and meetings at a more political level with relevant Ministries from the countries 
identified47.  
The most significant initial development partner within the AU governance intervention fold 
was the European Commission (EC). During the initial AU establishment period, it provided 
direct earmarked budgetary support for specific governance activities. The initial EC approach 
was followed in later years by direct budget support to the AUC as part of a larger pool, with 
some resources devoted to governance and the appointment of senior governance officials 
within the Department of Political Affairs of the AUC. Over the years the terrain has attracted 
further support from other traditional donors, such as the Department of International 
Development (DFID), GiZ, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the Spanish Cooperation Agency for International Development (AECID) and Scandinavian 
donors, such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway (AUC, 2018f). While some of the support is in 
the form of direct budgetary support through the AUC, others are provided indirectly through 
organisations, such as IDEA, IFES, EISA, UNDP and the UN Democracy Fund. The flows of 
resources and hence, the influence of donors is relatively complex and sometimes shaped by 
DP related prioritise (Pharatlhatlhe et al., 2019). While there have been assertions on donor 
control through budget support and funding, how resources flow and related accountabilities 
are often complex and subject to a range of engagements. New donors, such as China and India, 
 
47 Information extracted from a range of documents, including more recent financial statements of the AUC and 
documents from AUC DPA on meetings with donors. There are no consolidated documents on donors in 
governance.   
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have not focused any direct attention to governance-related support. The table below broadly 
captures some of the more prominent DP and the funding channel.  The outline is significant 
as it serves to provide a synopsis of the operations of donors and concomitantly the direct or 
indirect influence on the agency of officials within the AU institutional system.  
Table 13: Development Partners in Governance48  
DP Nature and Support Channel 
EC  The EC has been a substantive donor for governance-related efforts within the AUC. 
Building on support during the early phase of AUC establishment, EC supported broaden 
within its overall budgets support to the AUC. Since the 2011 Shared Values Summit, 
support has increased and includes direct support to civil society organisation and AU 
institutions involved in governance interventions. EC support also shapes and is shaped 
by the ongoing engagements through the Joint Africa Europe Partnership Strategy. A 
significant area of EC funding support includes election observations.  
GiZ GiZ has actively supported AUC work since establishment. In addition to directly funding 
and seconding officials to the DPA, amongst others, it has supported numerous activities 
and consultancies relating to several governance instruments. Core to more recent support 
has been on the establishments and operationalisation of the AGP. GiZ support includes 
direct funding of events and, in some instances, providing such funding through the 
financial structures and systems of relevant AU institutions.  
DFID DFID support in governance substantively evolved after the Shared Values Summit in 
2011. While DFID sought to provide direct budget support, limitation in the AUC system 
served to channel the support through IDEA. Funding includes the provision of consultants 
in annual contracts and the funding of a variety of events related to governance 




Norway, Denmark and Sweden have provided support for governance intervention 
through a variety of channels, including through UN agencies and specific technical 
partners, such as IDEA. Direct support through AU budgets has been limited and only on 
particular areas of engagement within AU implementation institutions. Sweden has 





Both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and USAID have 
provided indirect and some level of direct support for AU interventions in governance. 
USAID provided support to IFES in its efforts within the AUC on elections and has 
provided support for civil society engagements on ACDEG. CIDA has, amongst others, 
provided support for APRM and other governance intervention processes.  
AECID  
 
The Spanish government has provided substantive support for governance-related 
intervention in Africa through the UNDP. The support substantively focused on 
engagements related to State Capacity. The support is located in ongoing engagements 
between UNDP and the AUC on cooperation in the broader governance terrain.  
Source: Information extracted from a variety of AU DPA documents.  
The AU budget process and approach has been conservative, as Member States are often 
concerned about the institutions capacity to absorb. The overall orientation towards the 
generally approved budget is to limit annual growth to a certain percentage (Engel, 2015:13). 
One consequence of this is that DP would search for an alternative channel of supporting the 
 
48 The table is constructed on the basis of information scattered in a range of internal AUC DPA planning 
documents and related correspondence with DP. It is not possible to reference this information to a specific 
document. A search was conducted of DP in over 5000 documents using Atlas Ti to ensure that the table is an 
accurate reflection of the supportive work of dominant DP in the governance fold.  
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work of the AU. In the instance of peace and security-related issues, the channel has historically 
been through the Peace and Security Fund established within the overall structure of APSA 
(Vines, 2013). In the instance of governance, DP’s have been able to channel funding directly 
to specific structures, such as APRM or the Court. In addition to such channels, some partners 
also providing funding on activity bases either through AU systems, by way of direct 
expenditure or through TP or UN agencies. In a few instances, support of AU related initiatives 
is through the activities of civil society organisations without any direct inputs from AU 
institutions49.  
The levels of DP support for AU Governance initiatives and their influence levels is impossible 
to quantify as its difficult to ascertain the full scale of support. In general, the level of resources 
available appears to be more than the capacity to absorb, hence leading to indirect support 
through technical organisations. While there is speculation that DP’s determine the AU agenda 
as they control the funding, direct evidence of such influences is limited. However, some 
interactions based information suggest that DP would exercise influence on activities to be 
funded for accountability purposes and also to fit into their priority concerns for a given period, 
which at times may include incorporating priority constituencies, such as women and youth 
(Pharatlhatlhe et al., 2019).  
2.3.3.3 United Nations Institutions  
The UN has, over time, emerged as a partner to the AU in Africa and has established particular 
modalities for shaping support. UN institutions, such as UNDP, would mobilise resources from 
traditional development partners based on having established an active partnership with the 
AU. In addition to appointing officials for direct and ongoing engagements with the AUC, the 
UN has formally established a Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) to facilitate joint 
prioritisation and actions (AUC, 2016b). The RCM meets annually with AU institutions to 
establish priority terrains of support, and this included some deliberation on governance and 
related terrains (UNECA, 2019:113-114). Within this process, AU and UN institutions would 
present their initiatives and hence provide some indication of areas of priority for more active 
coordination. In some instances, this would result in joint initiatives to be funded by DP50. 
Funding for such initiatives would flow through the relevant UN agency. The most active in 
 
49 As extracted from a range of AU DPA documents.  
50 A classic example of such an initiative is the UNECA and AU Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa 
(2011 – 2016) funded by Norway (UNCEA, 2011).  
116 
 
the governance space has been the UNDP and UNECA.  
The UNECA has historically engaged with the AUC in several joint activities, where the 
resources are managed directly by the UNECA.  Agreements are with officials, with limited 
direct oversight from Member States or Organs of the AU. In the governance area, the UNECA 
has, for example, been very active in producing the African Governance Report, and has 
historically arranged the African Governance Forum and provided direct support for national-
level APRM processes. After some restructuring in 2011, the UNECA moved away from some 
of these areas and shifted towards, for example, Anti-corruption and issues related to the 
governance of natural resources. The UNDP has historically been a significant partner for 
governance initiative through its Africa Office in Addis Ababa. This office was initially located 
in Johannesburg, South Africa and relocated only in 2011. UNDP, through its global Head of 
Governance, mobilised substantive resources for its Africa governance engagements in 2008 
(UNDP, 2012). To this end, an initiative was established for affirmation by the AUC for 
implementation by the UNDP. The programme substantively focused on areas of AU mandate 
and related activities in governance, but expenditure and related activities were under the 
overall direct control of UNDP officials51.  
As with the relationship between AU institutions and DP, the relationships with UN institutions 
is often complex, unfolding in a variety of different ways within the governance intervention 
terrain52. While the RCM provides some level of active coordination, UN agencies construct 
specific relationships with AU institutions and actively mobilise funding to sustain 
implementation activities. In general terms, AU institutions would have little or no control over 
how resources are allocated and utilised.  The arrangements are complicated, and the levels of 
partnership involvement often vary, even where activities directly relate to established AU 
governance intervention.  
2.4 Policy Making and Implementation in Governance 
In order to understand the policy process and the realities of implementation practices, it is 
essential to engage with details around such processes. The purpose of the more detailed 
analysis in the Chapters that follow is to build an institutional understanding of the efficacy of 
 
51 Details on the approach and orientation of the UNDP are captured in the Outcome Evaluation UNDP Regional 
Programme for Africa (2008-2013) (UNDP, 2012). 
52 The complexity of relationships between the AU and UN system is somewhat embodied in the Outcome 
Evaluation UNDP Regional Programme for Africa (2008-2013) (UNDP, 2012).  
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AU intervention in governance. However, before engaging in the detailed policy and 
implementation activities, through an institutional lens, it is essential to provide a broad 
analytical overview of the policy and implementation process, as it is generally perceived to 
be. On the outset, it is essential to recognise that even though it is conceivable to provide a 
broad and general overview of the policy process and implementation actions, the reality within 
the AU system, as with any organisation, there is always a gap between envisaged processes 
and what unfolds in practice. To this end, it is important to capture some elements of nuances 
policy-making and implementation. Outside of documents relating to the structure of the AU, 
related budgets and programme plans, there is no substantive document on the policy and 
implementation procedures beyond primary documents explaining planning and budgeting in 
the AU.   
2.4.1 Policy Process and Decision Making   
The policy-making process of the AU is complex, and each instance of policy development 
may well provide a different story on initiation, development, completion and decision. The 
focus here is to capture the general modalities and manner in which ideas become policies and 
to make the distinction between different types of policies, such as in the form of declarations, 
resolutions and decisions53. This outline is done broadly through the lens of policy-making 
within the governance space and not necessarily as it involves wider policy issues within the 
broader AU portfolio.  
While the descriptive overview of AU multilateral institutions indicates the functions, authority 
and role of each structure, it does not fully capture the policy-making process and the related 
decision procedure. Even as the structure indicates authority, it is essential to recognise that 
authority is allocated to a particular structure based on past decisions or the content of particular 
legal instruments54. In general, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is considered 
the highest decision-making body in the AU and has overall authority over the activities of the 
Union. The Executive Council and the PRC, however, exercise substantive authority as they 
are the main conduit for all documents, declarations, resolution and decisions to be made by 
 
53 In constructing a picture of the policy process and decision-making within the AU system extensive use was 
made of the African Union Handbook (AUC, 2014a), the Oxfam Compendium on the AU (Oxfam International, 
2012), the Open Society Institute for Southern Africa (OSISA) and Oxfam publication Strengthening Popular 
Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structures and Processes (OSISA and Oxfam, 2009) and related 
secondary literature.  
54 The text The African Union and its institutions by Akopi et al (2008a) provides some useful analytical 
engagements with the institutional structures of the AU and hence utilised to enrich the overview provided.      
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the Assembly (Packer & Rukare, 2002:375). The PRC and Executive Council would also hence 
have the authority on deciding what would go through and what would not. In general, there 
are three forms through which policy gets established55. These are as follows:  
I. Declarations: These often relate to a topic of a general nature discussed at a Summit. 
Most often, they would relate to the chosen theme for the Summit. As an illustration, 
during the Shared Values Summit in January 2011, the Assembly made a Declaration 
on Shared Values. In many cases, such Declaration would be followed up with a 
Resolution on future actions.  
II. Resolutions: This form of decision is a step forward on the Declaration and directed at 
instructing further actions from implementation and other institutions. The summit 
would hence establish a resolution that outlines further actions on a given issue or 
concern.  
III. Decisions: These are more binding forms of outcomes from the Assembly and creates 
an obligation on the part of the AU and its institutions. Decisions typically provide 
direction on the next steps. As an illustration, a decision on a Charter, Convention or 
Treaty. Such a decision would be in the form of an instrument adopted by the Assembly.  
Decisions to be made by Summit would conventionally arise from a recommendation made by 
the Executive Council. In other words, the Executive Council would decide to recommend the 
adoption of declarations, resolutions and decision to the Summit. Recommendation to the 
Executive Council would arise from the PRC (OSISA and Oxfam, 2009:39). The channel for 
a particular decision is established in instruments. In some instances, reports would have to be 
presented directly to the Executive Council or Assembly and do not have to pass through 
specific structures. All formal organs have direct administrative support from the Secretary of 
the Commission and related office. The conventional practice is for Member States to establish 
a Drafting Committee led by a Member of the PRC or Minister from the country that is 
currently chairing the AU56. This committee retains the final responsibility for the agenda and 
related draft decisions. The committee would also hence make adjustments to initially prepared 
declarations, resolutions and decisions.  
 
55 The different types of decisions arrived at are not specified in any of the available AU document and hence 
derived from an analysis of numerous AU Assembly documents. All outcomes of AU summits are generally 
published on the AU website as Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Summit.  
56 This practice and the specific role of the Secretary of the Commission has not been formally documented within 
the AU system. This is based on the authors experience and participation within the Committee process during 
the Summit on Shared Values.   
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While there are provisions relating to decision-making based on a majority within AU authority 
structures, the general practice has been to make decisions based on consensus.  In the instance 
of particular legal instruments, Member States can register their reservations when a decision 
is made (Udombana, 2002:92). The practice of registering reservations is seldom used and is 
noted in the instance of numerous human rights instruments, where Egypt is recorded to have 
expressed reservations (Allain & O'shea, 2002). While decisions are accepted as a conclusion 
of the full meeting of relevant Organs, including the Assembly, the reality of practice indicates 
that very often Heads of State and Government may not even be in a room when a specific 
decision is made. This reality is attributable to the complicated way in which Summit 
proceedings unfold and the reality of time pressures on Heads of State57.  
Decisions of the Assembly and Executive Council would often emerge as a result of work that 
has unfolded months before each of the Summits. The AUC and other organs of the AU 
prepared documents well in advance of a Summit. Member States pre-approve the majority of 
what is presented in Summit for decision.  While there are multiple different channels by which 
a document might come before Assembly for a decision, the typical route is through expert 
meetings, followed by Ministerial Meeting and then submitted through the relevant Organs 
(Oxfam International, 2012). The following diagram broadly captures the process before the 
formal submission through relevant Organs.  
Figure 4: AU Policy Process 
 
Source: Adapted from the AU Handbook (AUC, 2014a), the Oxford Compendium (Oxfam 
International, 2012) and the Oxfam OSISA Guide for Civil Society (OSISA and Oxfam, 2009).   
The diagram captures the broad policy process. However, the actual way in which policy 
proposal emerges is complicated, and sometimes an initiative may arise from different sources, 
 
57 The challenges associated with the Assembly have been noted within the AU reform process (Kagame, 2017) 





































including from a civil society organisation or a Member State. The approach has also changed 
since the formation of the AU. A decision was made that all documents that have a legal 
dimension would need to be channelled through the Legal Counsel of the AU and hence 
through a Meeting of Ministers of Justice, now established as an STC.  
The general assumption on a decision is that the relevant structure of the AU would initiate 
actions and that Member States will take forward implementation in the instance where they 
are directly affected. The process by which this happens would typically entail some level of 
follow up between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other responsible Ministries. In the 
instance of legal treaties, convention and charters, the general AU approach is that Member 
States would sign, hence indicating the commitment to ratification. Signature is followed 
typically by ratification within the Member States and hence the depositing of a given 
instrument with the Legal Counsel of the AU. All legal instruments have provisions relating to 
when an instrument would come into force. Typically, an instrument would come into force 
only after 15 countries have ratified and deposited the instruments. The period between 
adoption and ratification by a minimum number can take between three to seven years 
(Maluwa, 2012).  
2.4.2 Organisation and Implementation  
How implementation unfolds is complex and, in part, driven by a combination of an overall 
long-term Strategic Plan, such as Vision 2063 and shorter-term annual programme plans. In 
practice, planning is influenced by the availability of resources, both from the approved 
operational and programme budget of the AU and earmarked budgets in specially established 
accounts, such as in the instance of the Democracy Fund established in terms of ACDEG.  
Further planning outside of the programme budgets also emerges from specific arrangements 
with DP and Civil Society Partners that make available resources. The formally approve 
programme budgets often only reflect an aspect of what is intended for a year. Some 
implementation activities and budgets are located within specific channels and hence not 
subject to the full and direct authority of AU implementation structures ((Maluwa, 2012; 
Pharatlhatlhe et al., 2019).  
The overall organisational and implementation modalities of the AU have been evolving since 
establishment and have been subject to continuing reform and related improvement efforts. The 
current system reflects some elements of central oversight and control, coupled with high levels 
of decentralisation through directly negotiated arrangements between partners and specific 
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implementation institutions.58 The complexities of management, budgets and implementation 
within the AU institutional system is captured in the 2007 Audit Report on the African Union 
(AU, 2007c). In some instances, implementation institutions have direct sources of funding 
channelled through specific accounts with different accountability arrangements (Engel, 2015). 
The following diagram provides a macro-overview of authority and responsibility within the 
implementation process. In general terms, overall decision authority over programmes and 
budgets reside with the Executive Council and Assembly.  
Figure 5: AU Implementation Authority and Responsibility 
 
Source: Information extracted from a variety of AUC budget and planning documents.  
In general terms, governance implementation structures of the AU would present both their 
operational and program budget for approval through an administrative and higher-level 
decision process. The Office of the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission has overall 
responsibility for the budget process and would typically also include within the budget, 
commitments from DP in the form of direct budget support. Direct budget support, in most 
cases, would be earmarked following DP priorities or because of past negotiations on what is 
budgeted. Seldom are DP budgets allocated for general purposes or according to the priorities 
 
58 Details on the process and implementation practices, including budget allocation approaches are not well 
documented for external stakeholders and largely remain a ‘black box’ for detailed scholarly analysis. In the main, 
reliance has been placed on a scattering of internal AU DPA documents to understand the implementation 
approaches and related budget practices.   
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established by the AUC. Within the programme planning and budget process, AU institutions 
would present the activities planned for the period. While internal guidance exists on the 
structure and format, the complexity is that guidelines are provided on possible budget amounts 
for the coming period as they relate to programme implementation and not real budgets arising 
from actual contributions. As Member States do not contribute consistently and sometimes fail 
to make actual transfers of finances in the expected period, certainty around programme 
implementation is often rendered difficult.  
The operating budget of the AU is generally in keeping with the structures and personnel 
numbers approved. The structure of the AUC since its establishment has been within the 
framework of the approved organogram at the Summit held in Mozambique in 2003 and 
generally referred to as the Maputo Structure (AU, 2003b). This structure has been adjusted 
modestly over the years, and organograms have been approved for new mandated structures. 
While some structural expansion is sometimes approved because of demands from 
implementation institutions, the operationalisation of these is often contingent on expected 
budget growth and hence not all formally sanctioned posts are filled unless there a decision on 
allocating the requires budget59.  
Aside from the filling of formal posts for implementation, AU institutions are guided by their 
programme budgets for active implementation. In many instances, the programme budget only 
reflects a part of what would unfold for the year. The actual implementation would be through 
a combination of initiatives arising from the programme budgets and the resources channelled 
through other sources (Engel, 2015). Using the budgets and programmes to determine what 
unfolds is hence not a feasible strategy. Outside of the formal AU programme and budget 
process, structures and units would outline broad plans for internal guidance on what would 
unfold during the year. Many of these plans would also be contingent on the capacity available, 
beyond the individual appointed to the fixed establishment. Hence, plans would often 
incorporate the work efforts of individual seconded to the AU through various appointment 
modalities. While some individuals are appointed on contracts through specifically earmarked 
funds channelled through the AU, others would typically be appointed directly by partners and 
seconded to the AU institutions. In general, officials in the AU system would have some 
authority on who is appointed and may well be part of interview panels arranged by partners.   
 
59 See for example Report of the PRC Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial 
Matters to the Executive Council (AU, 2008e).  
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Implementation is mostly event-driven and contingent on what budgets have been set aside for 
the period. At a secondary level, studies and related activities are contingent on the appointment 
of consultants. Actual work unfolds under the direct authority of the formally appointed 
officials. Most of these official rely on contracted consultants for the drafting of documents 
related to events or for engagements with partners, amongst others60. Contracted consultants 
are hence reliant on the appointed officials for a contract extension and would generally carry 
out work as instructed. As activities implementation is determined by budget availability, the 
level of activity on mandates, outside of what gets planned for the year, in real budget terms, 
is minimal.  Activities that relate to mandates may never unfold if not budgeted for or if no 
resources are forthcoming. Performance is activity driven and not based on expected outputs 
or outcomes as it relates to mandates. Activities may well expand based on added funding. 
Uncertainty around funding and capacity makes long-term planning around mandates difficult 
for officials.  
In the instance of specific Organs, such as the Advisory Board on Corruption, the budgets 
challenges are relatively complex as often the number of formal meetings held are limited by 
the budget available. Elected Members often also establish the activities they want to be 
involved in and over which budget is to be set aside. This reality sometimes serves to create 
competition between appointed officials and elected individual (AUC, 2018a). In the instance 
where elected officials are not permanent, their travel and related activities is a significant cost 
source for institutions and leave very little for other implementation-related activities.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The Governance intervention trajectory must be understood in the overall context of integration 
in the continent. The historical overview reveals that the overall integration tension between 
those who propagate rapid integration, versus those who argue for a more incremental approach 
shapes what gets done in the overall AU system. While shared values and related governance 
instruments are predicated on rapid integration, the level of actual implementation movement 
reflects a more incremental reality and hence a continuing difficulty of finding a balance 
between sovereignty and the demand for compliance with adopted legal instruments.  
The diversity of interventions in the governance space reflects the complexities of how policy 
 
60 The reality of the extensive use of consultants and seconded staff is noted in the Audit report of 2017. The 
reports provide that staffing levels stood at 57 per cent and that extensive use was made of staff on short-term 
contracts (AUC, 2018f) 
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and implementation emerge within the AU systems.  Even as perspectives on governance have 
evolved, the microanalysis of what has unfolded reveals that a high level of diversity in what 
it is perceived to be and what the overall governance agenda is. The diversity of definition has 
impacted on the contents of the overall agenda and hence the perceived role of the institutions 
in the attempt to build coherent through the establishment of the AGP. The structural overview 
provided an outline of how authority unfolds in the overall AU system. It is revealing on the 
role of different partner communities and hence the extent to which they shape what gets done 
in the AU system. The processes related to decision-structures have also provided insights on 
the extent of Member State agency and activism in AU decision processes.  While the AU 
collective generally makes decisions, the level of actual ownership is contingent on the extent 
to which a Member State engages with the issues and hence the commitment to participate in 
follow up activities.  
The policy and implementation process overview provides a broad characterisation of the AU 
system. The synopsis further reveals that policymaking and implementation is a complicated 
exercise and often contingent on the agency exercised by multiple players and individuals. It 
does, however, adequately reveal the driving orientation of Member States and officials 
involved in the process. A more substantive understanding is built by engaging in detail within 
each of the core focus areas. Beyond serving as a backdrop to more detailed analysis, the overall 
macro overview reveals that the ‘black-box’ of implementation needs more in-depth analysis 
in order to understand the efficacy of AU Governance intervention and what would be 




Explanatory Note: Data, Analysis and Findings 
The approach taken for each of the substantive chapters (3,4 and 5) is broadly outlined in the 
Conceptual Framework for the study (supra 1.2.8). It is deemed essential to provide a broad 
summary of the approach taken in presenting the data, conducting the analysis and in outlining 
key finding in each of the governance areas to assist engagement with the chapters that follow. 
As per the articulated framework, a comprehensive analysis of AU multilateral intervention in 
governance requires a full review of what unfolded under each of the focus areas of 
accountability, rule of law and state capacity. In line with which, the following broadly explain 
the data presented, the analysis and the finding articulated.  
Data Presentations: Data from collected documents is used to construct a comprehensive 
historical picture of AU interventions within the governance focus area. Data from the searched 
documents were also used to construct a comprehensive perspective of the different 
intervention modalities. The data collected and collated and searched through Atlas Ti is hence 
spread across Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This approach is necessary as it serves to provide a 
comprehensive analysis within the framework of the three (3) governance areas.  
Data Analysis: As each of the three governance areas often embodies different institutions and 
intervention, it was essential that the analysis is initially focused within each of the areas. The 
framework for the analysis, as per the outlined methodology unfolded at both the level of 
multilateral engagements ( power relations and competing norms, and realities within member 
states) and at the level of multilateral implementation ( organisational culture and financing, 
and human resource and bureaucratic strategies).  
Key Finding Extraction: As the data and related analysis are presented within the core 
governance areas, it is essential that there is an extraction of key conclusion on each of the 
areas. In line with the overall research purpose and related question, the core findings are 
expressed as the central efficacy challenges pertaining to AU governance interventions. These 
findings are extracted across each of the governance areas, with a view that they would be 
consolidated in Chapter 6.  
The explanatory note serves to guide engagement with the study and how the information is 
presented. This is crucial as the thesis does not have a traditional data chapter or a related 
chapter for analysis and findings. Data presentation, analysis and findings are all incorporated 




Chapter 3:  African Union Interventions in Accountability  
AU multilateral interventions directed at enhancing accountability in Member States have 
emerged through a series of policy pronouncements and the active agency of officials and other 
stakeholders. A historical outline of these, together with a detailed analysis of practices and 
how these unfold within different modes of intervention serves to expedite the analysis of 
multilateral engagements and implementation. To pave the way for the overview and detailed 
characterisation of practices, it is imperative, to begin with, an outline of accountability and 
what it generally implies for AU Member States. In line with the conceptual framework, the 
chapter concludes with the core efficacy challenges that emerge from the analysis. The focus 
is only on a selection of the core efficacy issues germane to accountability related intervention. 
Many of the identified challenges are relevant in other areas of governance, and hence, the 
approach taken is to consolidate and cluster the finding from each governance area in the final 
chapter of this thesis.  
3.0 Introduction 
Accountability encompasses the idea that those who exercise public power do so based on the 
will of the people (Fukuyama, 2011; Fukuyama, 2014). While associated with democracy and 
electoral processes, accountability is deemed to be broader and embodies the notion of 
substantive deliberative engagements within society on actions within all spheres of mutual 
coexistence (Warren & Gastil, 2015). Accountability incorporates the idea that decisions on 
the use of public authority and resources incorporate community perspectives and concerns. It 
is hence founded on the notion of ongoing engagements and a willingness to listen to all voices, 
even if these are contrary to dominating perspectives at particular points in time (Enslin & 
Horsthemke, 2004; Edigheji, 2010).  
A broader reading of the construct, suggests that it has evolved to include considerations such 
as participation, transparency, representation, rights, answerability, voice, access to 
information and media freedom (Schedler, 1999). Over recent years there has been a growing 
concern that elections in themselves do not produce accountability within society and hence 
there is a need to go beyond electoral consideration and systems of representation towards more 
substantive reflections on the levels of accountability and policy inclusivity that is prevalent in 
a particular context (Jegede, 2009:424). While liberal perspectives on the need for democratic 
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elections and political party based contestation is entrenched across the tapestry of African 
politics, there continue to be a concern that elections in themselves are not yielding substantive 
accountability in the political, social and economic spaces. The need for a broader perspective 
on accountability in Africa is articulated consistently by African civil society (Mkandawire, 
2007; Jegede, 2009:424).  
There is no singular definition of accountability within AU processes or instruments. 
Perspectives on accountability and what it embodies are rooted in the activities, outputs and 
work that has unfolded in the overall AU systems. Within the African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation, adopted in Arusha, Tanzania in 1990, 
accountability is referenced in the context of the answerability ‘of leadership at all levels 
measured by the use of checks and balances’(AU, 1990:22). In ACDEG, adoption in 2007, 
accountability, electoral democracy and constitutionalism are linked (AUC, 2015c). In the 
instance of the APRM, accountability is treated as being synonymous with governance and as 
an overarching framework for a wider variety of issues. Accountability is defined in the APRM 
Country Review Questionnaire as ‘the ability to determine who in the government is 
responsible for a decision or action and the ability to ensure that officials in government are 
answerable for their actions.’ The term accountability is used throughout the country review 
questionnaire of the APRM and directly embedded in the objectives and questions relating to 
‘democratic political governance’, ‘economic governance and management’ and ‘corporate 
governance’(APRM, 2015).   
3.1 Accountability Initiatives within the African Union 
It is imperative to engage the core developments across the system, including the issues that 
arose during the OAU period, in order to understand the full breadth of accountability 
interventions within AU multilateralism. The historical outline provides a substantive overview 
of accountability related interventions and hence sketched based on core events or 
developments within the AU system. Intervention within the accountability space is spread 
between those embodied within specific Charters and those that arise from the exercise of 
agency by AU and related partner institutions. Accountability concerns are spread from 
election observations, to peer review practices, towards those embodied in enhancing youth 
and women participation within the governance process.  
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3.1.1 Accountability and the OAU 
The OAU emerged in a context where several African geographical spaces remained 
colonialized and where there was substantive global ideological contestation on appropriate 
development approaches. Accountability is tied, in the initial period of African wide 
multilateralism, to the issue of sovereignty and the full liberation of all African territories from 
the colonialism and neo-colonial influences (Adogamhe, 2008). While the transition from 
colonial rule to liberation was primarily in the form of multiparty elections, the accountability 
momentum in many African countries included a propensity towards more direct or alternative 
forms of representations and accountability that characterised the Soviet Union and other 
countries under communist or socialist rule. Although independence for many African 
countries was through liberally inspired multiparty elections, several post-colonial African 
leaders expressed an affinity towards more socialist or collectivist modes of accountability 
(Cohen, 2019).          
While a few African countries retained some semblance of liberal multiparty democracy in the 
first two decades after independence, many rapidly shifted towards alternative forms of 
democratic representation. In some cases, this embodied a shift away from multiparty electoral 
processes towards other forms of single-party representation. The shift is reflected in various 
forms of socialist experimentations in, for example, Islamic Socialism in Libya, Ujamaa in 
Tanzania, Harambee in Kenya, and variations of such approaches in Mali, Senegal, Ghana and 
Guinea (Young, 2012). The consequence of the democratic experimentation in many African 
countries and the ongoing cold war was a push against any form of interference with internal 
accountability realities within OAU Member States. Despite the growth of single-party 
authoritarian systems and military dictatorships between 1960 and 1980, accountability issues 
were considered internal to Member States and perceived as being matters related to 
sovereignty and hence not a subject of any form of interference through African multilateral 
processes (Kumssa & Jones, 2015).  
As with the experimentation with single-party systems, the post-colonial OAU period saw the 
rise of military governments and related coup d’état. The general rationale for coup d'états was 
that electoral democracies were prone to misuse and that many elected governments were often 
corrupt. The overall assumption being that military governments would provide stability and 
the order required for economic development (Powell, Lasley & Schiel, 2016). One immediate 
consequence for the OAU was that military rulers removed many Presidents and Prime 
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Ministers who were part of the initial launch of the OAU. The operational consequence for the 
OAU was that Heads of State and Government who participated in OAU Summit meetings 
often found themselves sharing a stage with individuals who removed the person who 
previously occupied the same space (Powell et al., 2016:490). While a complicated reality for 
many, the established traditions and rules precluded any forms of engagement on the issue or 
any form of contestation. The inability of OAU to hold Heads of State accountable served to 
affirm a perspective that it constitutes a club of dictators who had no interest in substantive 
accountability to their people or to the wider collective African community (Adejo, 2001).  
3.1.2 Civil Society Participation and Structural Adjustments 
The rise of single-party rule and military dictatorships in many countries did not come without 
substantive opposition from civil society and other stakeholders in the continent. In many 
countries and within OAU processes, civil society representatives consistently raised concerns 
around the accountability of African leaders (Mkandawire, 2007). By the early 1980s, many 
concluded that the OAU was a club of authoritarian rulers who were bent on protecting their 
positions and related privileges (Omorogbe, 2011a).  The opposition from civil society to the 
varied and mostly authoritarian modes of accountability coincided with the rapid growth in 
imposed structural adjustment from the Bretton Wood Institutions. In many of the Member 
States, the rise of authoritarian governments and concomitant lack of accountability unfolded 
together with high levels of foreign borrowing and corruption through state structures and 
institutions. The WB structural adjustment responses couched as a concern with governance 
primarily focused on cutting down the size of the state and deepening privatisation as a means 
of spurring economic growth (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). The WB focus on economic 
growth, outside of social considerations and deepening forms of political participation, inspired 
many in civil society to voice their concerns on participation and the impact adjustments will 
have on the people of the continent. This opposition from civil society enthused some Member 
States to initiate a discourse around new approaches to counter the dominance of the WB and 
Donor countries on the internal trajectory of many African countries (Bujra, 2004; Adejumobi 
et al., 2009).  
The efforts of civil society and UN agencies culminated in the organisation of an International 
Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa in 
Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania from 12 to 16 February 1990. The conference was 
deemed to be a rare collaborative effort between African people’s organisations, African 
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governments, non-governmental organisations and the UN agencies, in the search for a 
collective understanding of the role of popular participation in the development and 
transformation of the region (Shaw, 1990). The conference concluded with the adoption of the 
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. While the 
Charter did not embody a requirement for legal ratification by individual Member States, it 
firmly sought to place on the OAU agenda the imperatives of popular participation at the level 
of Member States and within African multilateral processes. To many, the provisions of the 
Charter served to inspire the development of ECOSOCC within the AU. Provisions from the 
Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation also fed into the 
CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, adopted in 2002. The Solemn Declaration went a step further 
by making direct reference to democracy, elections and participation of civil society 
(Adejumobi et al., 2009).  
3.1.3 Elections Observation  
The practice of observations to determine the credibility of elections unfolded gradually within 
the OAU and formally only affirmed at the launch of the AU in 2002.  The first real instance 
of observation unfolded at the instruction of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government relates to the elections held under the auspices of the UN during the transition in 
Namibia (OAU, 1990). The Secretary-General of the OAU led the observation delegation in 
this instance. The substantive mandate for the observation of all elections in Member States of 
the AU unfolded through the OAU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic 
Elections in Africa (AU, 2002b). Through the Declaration Heads of State and Government 
requested the AU ‘to be fully engaged in the strengthening of the democratisation process, 
particularly by observing and monitoring elections in Member States, according to strict 
guidelines’(Börzel & van Hüllen, 2015:17).  
Since the launch of the AU in 2002, the organisation has sent observer missions to over 500 
national elections. Practices around the observation of elections have evolved since 2002, and 
the AUC has developed detailed guidelines on the election observation process. In addition to 
election observations, the AUC, through the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) 
within the DPA also established a capacity building and technical assistance initiatives for, 
131 
 
amongst others, Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)61. The overall logic was that Member 
State structures were finding it challenging to manage elections and that the AU should be 
involved in providing technical assistance, either directly or through information sharing 
capacity building initiatives (AU, 2015b; Aniekwe et al., 2016). By the end of 2010, the AUC 
also began to recognise that observer teams are sent from a range of organisations, including 
PAP and RECs that were part of the building blocks of the AU. A strong push was made 
towards encouraging greater coordination through information sharing on the ground and the 
prior preparations for observer missions. After intervention by the PRC, the Executive Council 
and Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a decision was made that PAP would not 
send separate observer delegations and that PAP member would feature as members in the team 
deployed by the Chairperson of the AUC (Aniekwe et al., 2016:38). In addition to coordinated 
approaches, the DEAU developed a stronger perspective on the need to engage in longer-term 
electoral observation missions and to engage in pre-electoral preparatory missions to countries 
(AU, 2015b). With support from TP, the DEAU began, in around 2014, to establish pre-election 
assessment missions to several countries, with a focus mainly on those within which there have 
been high levels of political tension.   
As part of developing its capacity for preventative diplomacy, the DPA also worked with 
International IDEA to develop its methodologies around doing substantive pre-electoral 
analysis to identify situations of difficulty within Member States. Working with IDEA, the 
DPA contracted some individuals to conduct country missions and produce reports on these 
countries for further substantive engagement and possible submission to the PSC. The teams 
conducted pre-election62, post-election63 and technical assessment64 missions. Unlike the PSC 
driven diplomatic peace and negotiation driven missions, these initiatives were constructed as 
more technical level missions, rather than as political missions (IDEA, 2017). They, however, 
 
61 The establishment of the units is noted as follows in the report of the Chairperson of the Commission to the 
January 2008 Executive Council: ‘The effective establishment early in 2008 of a Democracy and Elections   
Assistance Unit will also enable the Commission to more effectively coordinate its activities in the domain of 
elections observation and monitoring in Member States’(AU, 2008f). 
62 Pre-Election Assessment Missions: These missions were directed at assessing contextual issues that may 
influence the holding of periodic elections in Member States and on recommended further engagements to address 
challenges.  (Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritania and Zambia) (IDEA, 2017). 
63 Post–Election Assessment Missions: These were focused on the implementation of past elections observation 
recommendations and on issues relating to the resolution of electoral disputes and the support provided to 
Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs). (Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) (IDEA, 2017). 
64 Technical Assessment Missions: These were primarily directed at assessing issues of compliance with overall 





embody similar processes and often engaged with a variety of local actors on the electoral 
challenges faced.  
3.1.4 Accountability through Diplomacy 
Engagements on accountability through direct AU multilateral diplomacy types interventions 
have unfolded mainly in a situation of national-level internal political crisis.  In most instances, 
actions have generally unfolded based on growing stakeholder contestations as it relates to 
elections and constitutional changes. The AU has historically dispatched numerous diplomatic 
missions in situations that are deemed to be bordering on a crisis of where there is a high 
potential for violence (Wilén & Williams, 2018). Such missions are initiated through the 
structure of the PSC. It has also become traditional for the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
to deploy a Special Representative in situations of crisis to negotiate with local parties. 
Accountability through negotiated diplomatic engagements has mostly been the preserve of the 
DPS and general exercised through the authority of the PSC (Moolakkattu, 2010). The 
modalities have varied from the appointment of mediators, such as in the instance of South 
Sudan, in the form of Thabo Mbeki, the former President of South Africa.  In the instance of 
Kenya, this was in the form of Kofi Anan, the former Secretary-General of the UN. In other 
instances, it was in the form of a delegation of sitting Presidents, as in the case of Libya and 
Côte d'Ivoire. The AUC has also, at times, deployed the Chairperson or a Commissioner to 
negotiate a peaceful transition. The Commissioner for Peace and Security, for example, played 
a central role in negotiating the transition in Mauritania in 2009 and the Chairperson of the 
Commission was deployed to Malawi in 2010 (Omorogbe, 2011b; Wilén et al., 2018; Desmidt, 
2019).  
While most diplomatic missions are of a short-term nature and not established with a steady 
presence in a country, the more recent approach has been to deploy notable individuals on a 
more fixed-term basis in a country. The AUC, through the Chairperson, deployed such 
individuals to countries such as the DRC, Gabon, Somalia, South Sudan and Mali. The overall 
orientation of such deployment is for the individual to facilitate negotiations that would serve 
to avoid violence and usher in peaceful and credible elections. The practise appears to be 
entrenched as part of the overall orientation towards peace and security and is integral to the 
AU focus on Silencing the Guns by 2020 (Khadiagala, 2015).  
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3.1.5 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
Outside of diplomatic engagements and negotiations as a strategy for securing accountability, 
the AU has amongst others, adopted the ACDEG in January 2007. The process for the 
development of the Charter unfolded in 2003 at the Maputo AU Summit and emerged in 
parallel to the NEPAD governance initiative and the APRM process. At the Maputo Summit, 
AU Member States were concerned that numerous decisions and resolutions unfolded on issues 
relating to democracy and governance that were not being implemented and hence expressed a 
view that these need to be incorporated into a single and definitive Charter on Democracy 
Elections and Governance (Wiebusch, Aniekwe, Oette & Vandeginste, 2019a). The decision 
from the Summit is based on the outcomes of a Conference on Elections, Democracy and 
Governance which took place in Pretoria, South Africa, on 7-10 April 2003. The South African 
Independent Electoral Commission organised this Conference in partnership with the AUC 
(Falk & Storksdieck). ACDEG was, in practice, a product of civil society activism that 
unfolded in the Pretoria Conference.  
The details of ACDEG was crafted by experts in the terrain65 and after a series of conferences, 
adjustments from Member States and meetings of relevant Organs, was adopted at the Summit 
in Addis Ababa in January 2007 (Matlosa, 2017). In line with the rule of procedure of Summits, 
Egypt was the only country to register reservations when the ACDEG was adopted. Details on 
the nature of the reservation have not been documents in the decisions of the Summit (AU, 
2007b). ACDEG is perceived as the central instrument for driving accountability related 
compliance at the level of Member States. When the Charter process unfolded the overall 
rationale is that it would serve as the primary vehicle for democracy at the level of Member 
States. For many Member States, the agreement to initiate the process was done on the basis 
that the Charter would serve to consolidate past efforts and disjointed initiative that emerged 
in the governance and democracy terrain (Wiebusch et al., 2019a).  
The Charter process unfolded in parallel to the APRM process, with little or no dialogue on the 
connection between the two. At the Maputo Summit, Heads of State and Government 
welcomed progress on the APRM and encouraged Member State of the Union to accede to 
APRM. After a broader campaign to popularise ACDEG by the AUC, PAP and civil society 
formations, the Charter came into force shortly after the Shared Values Summit in January 
 
65 Included amongst the initial experts who drafted the ACDEG is the current Director of the Department of 
Political Affairs of the AUC, Professor Khabela Matlosa (Matlosa, 2017).  
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2011(Faten & Apiko, 2017). ACDEG provides that the AUC will evaluate the implementation 
of the Charter in partnership with other organs, such as the PAP. It further provides that State 
Parties will report on the implementation of the Charter every two years. The Charter does not 
specify the modalities for reporting or any substantive process or framework for reporting (AU, 
2007a).  
Since ratification and the coming into force of the Charter, only one country (Togo) has directly 
responded to the AUC and provided a report on compliance (AU, 2017b). It took some time 
for the DPA to produce a guiding framework for countries to report on compliance with the 
ACDEG. This questionnaire was taken through a consultative process, culminating in its 
adoption by the Executive Council66. Responsibility for engagement with the reports to be 
produced is somewhat ambiguous, and the questionnaire seems to suggest that the AGP will 
be responsible, hence, making it very unclear on the reporting process and how reports will be 
engaged with and the role of civil society in the process. In general, the Charter goes beyond 
elections and hence addresses other elements of substantive concern in national-level 
accountability. There are provisions within the Charter on more engaged post-elections 
participation (AU, 2007a). To encourage more extensive reporting from AU Member States, 
the DPA has embarked on an initiative directed at enhancing Member State capacity for 
reporting by facilitating local stakeholder consultations. The first of such initiatives was held 
in Rwanda in October 2018 (DPA, 2018).  
3.1.6 Peer Review Engagement  
Peer Review in the accountability terrain has unfolded to be synonymous with the APRM. The 
process, methodologies and decision processes around the APRM were disconnected initially 
from the formal structures of the AUC. While there are several decisions at the level of AU 
Summits67 directed at encouraging Member States participation in the APRM, the general 
orientation was that it was a separate, but a linked process, and only directly involved the 
countries that have volunteered to participate in the review process (Achieng, 2014). In line 
with its separate status, the APRM Secretariat developed, in consultation with Member States, 
the overall APRM process to be followed in each country, the review process, the framework 
 
66 The Guidelines were adopted by the 28th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council on 28 January, 2016 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
67 See for example the Decision on the African Peer Review Mechanism at the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the 




of questions to be used for the review and the methodology for the work of the Panel. Panel 
Members are elected directly by the Heads of State. During the initial years, the APRM 
Secretariat functioned outside of the administrative rules and procedures of the AU (Kanbur, 
2004; Gruzd, 2014a). While numerous decisions are made on the incorporation of the APRM 
into the AU, the process has been slow. The November 2018 Summit provided that the APRM 
is to be incorporated into the overall budget of the AU (AU, 2018b).   
The voluntary approach towards APRM served to establish meetings of APRM of Heads of 
State and Government as separate to AU Summit level engagements.  The APRM Forum 
engagements typically take place before the actual AU Summit of Heads of State and 
Government. At an operational level, APRM Focal points from participating countries 
meetings are held. The overall logic of the APRM process is that the reports produced are 
delivered directly for reflection by Heads of State and would not, in any way, be subject to 
scrutiny at a lower level. In other words, the APRM Panel would report its finding directly to 
Heads of State for engagements and consideration (Kanbur, 2004; Gruzd, 2014a).  
A significant consequence in the establishment of the APRM was a more substantive focus on 
more profound forms of accountability. While matters of how elections are organised are 
incorporated in the review process, the APRM ushered in a more detailed form of deliberation 
on accountability within broader society by way of focusing attention on all levels of 
governance.  The detailed questionnaire of the APRM raises issues on how accountability is 
secured in a variety of policy spaces and hence allows for engagement on the extent to which 
policies generated are based on broader accountability to society. Since establishment, the 
APRM has completed over twenty country reviews and in some instances, has begun to conduct 
a second review in countries that have volunteered. Over 37 Member States have now acceded 
to the APRM (Gruzd et al., 2018).  
3.1.7 Coordination and Participation through the AGP 
The substantive rationale for the establishment of the AGP as part of the overall AGA was that 
it would facilitate some level of coordinated synergy within the AU system on governance 
issues and, by implication, between ACDEG and the APRM process. While establishing a 
specific cluster on the issues, the essential focus of the DPA has been on arranging an annual 
Governance Dialogue and more extensive consultative engagements as part of deepening 
participation of civil society actors in the AU. In 2012, the DPA established what is referred to 
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as the AGA Secretariat within the Department with direct accountability to the Chairperson of 
the AGP and the Administrative Head of DPA (Wachira, 2014).  
The AGA Secretariat defined as central to its mandate, the responsibility of initiating 
community engagements and hence arranging a series of regional consultative events on a 
specific topic of focus (Sanusi, 2017). A firm focus of the consultation has been on 
incorporating the voices of the youth in the continent and took off in 2017. How these 
engagements fit into the overall purpose of the AGP has never been fully defined beyond that 
it serves to facilitate more involvement of African citizens and stakeholders in AGA.  During 
2017 and 2018 periods, the AGA Secretariat focused attention on arranging a serious of 
regional ‘youth and gender consultations’ on the theme of the Summit for the year 
(Netshivhale, 2018).  
By the end of 2017, there was some concern around the role and value of AGP and how it was 
fulfilling its mandate. Under the Chairpersonship of the APRM, the strategic orientation was 
that the APRM would take the lead in producing an African Governance Report for 
presentation to Heads of State and Government as part of the efforts to facilitate more active 
coordination (ACBF, 2017). By the time of the 2018 Special Summit on AU Reform, there 
were little indications of a more integrated approach to governance. In general, the 2018 
Summit merely reaffirmed the role of APRM and that it would produce an African Governance 
Report for the Summit of Heads of State and Government in January 2019. The issue not 
addressed is coordination and greater synergy between APRM and ACDEG. All indications 
are that they will continue as parallel processes.  
3.1.8 Broadening of Accountability Consideration 
Beyond the core mandate on the ACDEG and the APRM, the AUC initiated several other 
interventions that broadly fall within the fold of enhancing accountability within Member 
States. Of particular significance was the adoption in 2009 of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) 
is a policy framework ensure that Africa utilises its mineral resources strategically for broad-
based, inclusive development (AU, 2009a). The AMV has attracted substantive attention, and 
there have been numerous engagements around its implementation as a basis for facilitating 
higher levels of economic inclusivity (AUC, 2014b; Besada & Martin, 2015:17).   
To implement the Vision through more direct supportive efforts, the AUC worked in 
partnership with the UNECA to establish the African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC). 
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The Centre primarily serves to provide knowledge products, technical support and capacity 
building to AU Member States with efforts directed at deriving higher local value from 
extractive industries. However, eight years after its inception, implementation has been slow, 
and there is a low level of awareness of the framework among critical stakeholders in the 
mineral sector (Bello, 2014). In addition to initiatives around Mining, the AU also has direct 
initiatives to enhance the participation of women and young people in the development and 
governance processes (Sanusi, 2017). These initiatives are somewhat separate to overall 
mandated governance interventions but incorporate direct considerations relating to the 
participation of women and young people in the political process to enhance accountability at 
the national level. Through the partnership with technical support organisations, the AUC also 
arranged a series of conferences and workshops across the continent on a variety of 
accountability related issues68.  
As part of its democracy development efforts, the DPA in 2018 published a document relating 
to the role of Political Parties and their promotion for democracy purposes. The initiative 
unfolded in direct partnership with a civil society organisation with an interest in the 
development of political parties in Africa. A workshop directed at introducing ‘the DPA 
Political Parties Engagement Programme to stakeholders to solicit inputs on the draft 
guidelines and key focus areas of engagement with political parties in Africa’ was held in 
Ghana on the 14th and 15th June 2018 (AUC, 2018c). The workshop served to affirm a draft 
programme and range of activities for engaging with political parties in the continent. 
Participants were drawn from RECs, national and international institutions with experience on 
political parties’ engagement of one form or the other, thinks tanks and the academia (AUC, 
2019c). What is absent from the initiative is the precise mandate for the activity and how it 
strategically locates in the overall intervention work of the AU.   
3.2 Accountability Intervention 
It is necessary to engage with accountability interventions systematically across the different 
intervention modalities in order to appreciate and analyse the range of accountability-related 
activities that have unfolded within the AU. The analysis seeks to build a deeper understanding 
of the working implementation modalities within the AU, both as it relates to the interactions 
at the level of multilateral engagements and the level of active implementation. The essence of 
 
68 Numerous events arranged by the AG Secretariat are detailed on its dedicated website (http://aga-platform.org/) 
and on its official twitter account (@AGA_Platform)  
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the descriptive overview that follows is to provide a more detailed account of how policy and 
implementation actions unfold in the AU system and hence to bring to the fore some of the 
contradiction, challenges and nuances embedded in the mandate establishment and 
implementation nexus.  In the terrain of actions, there is substantive overlap between what 
unfolds in one part of the intervention terrain and other parts. The approach nevertheless is to 
engage systematically so that there it may facilitate more profound reflections. The underlying 
purpose of the descriptive analysis that follows is that they provide a basis for a more detailed 
institutional analysis of multilateral engagements and related implementation in the 
accountability area.    
3.2.1 Compliance and Sanctions 
The idea of compliance to shared values, as embodied in legal instruments, is rooted in the 
perspective of rapid integration through deeper AU multilateralism.  It embodies the notion 
that Member States are legally obligated to adhere to instruments as soon as ratified. In the 
instance of accountability, this would mean that Member States are legally responsible at 
relevant national and African courts if they do not adhere to ratified instruments (Elvy, 
2012:81). However, ratification obligations are viewed differently, as to some, it indicates a 
commitment to comply with provisions over time and to others, it implies immediate 
compliance (Kioko, 2019).  
An analysis of the decisions process around the development of ACDEG, its eventual adoption 
by Member States and subsequent efforts to lobby for ratification, provide no firm evidence of 
an appreciation of the full legal nature of the instrument. During the period of popularisation 
through workshops organised by PAP, it has been noted that communication on the instrument 
was weak and that very often documents and related follow-up from the AUC were lost during 
interactions within Member States (Kane, 2008; Achieng, 2012). The need for ratification, 
outside of substantive follow-up from the AUC, appeared not to be a priority for Member 
States.  
No matter the meaning attached to ratification, the basic idea is that AU Member States would 
have to comply and that non-compliance would lead to some of form of sanction. In the 
instance of the ACDEG, the presumption is that actions, in the form of sanctions, may be taken 
by the Executive Council and Assembly based on a recommendation from the AUC (Kioko, 
2019). However, within the AU there is no substantive agreement on a sanction regime that is 
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to be implemented, outside of the formal suspension of membership69. Beyond global 
compliance issues, the further assumption with ACDEG is that action will be taken in situations 
where a specific clause is not adhered to by a Member State that has ratified (Kioko, 2019). As 
an illustration, ACDEG contains a clause that precludes individuals who have been involved 
in military coup d’état from engaging in electoral processes, even if, as a civilian, as has 
unfolded in Mauritania, Egypt and more recently in Zimbabwe70. In the instance of Mauritania, 
ACDEG was not in force at the time, even though Mauritania was the first country to have 
fully ratified the instrument. In the instance of Egypt and Zimbabwe, both countries have not 
ratified the instrument (Wiebusch, Aniekwe, Oette & Vandeginste, 2019b; Wiebusch & 
Murray, 2019c).  
There is a strong push within the AUC that the Charter requires universal ratification for it to 
be useful as an accountability instrument (Matlosa, 2014). The Charter has often served as a 
reference point in situations of political conflicts and has featured in dialogue within the PSC71. 
Given the number of countries that faced popular revolutions since 2010, the AUC has 
struggled with the provisions of the Charter on unconstitutional changes of government, and 
there has been some dialogue on changing the provisions72.  There is no evidence that such 
changes will be made and given the time it takes for ratification; it is highly unlikely that the 
AUC would engage in such a process. The more considerable challenge with ACDEG is that 
only one country has reported based on the guidelines for reporting produced by the DPA 
(Wiebusch et al., 2019b). Despite the formal request for reports through relevant diplomatic 
channels, there has been no response from countries that are State Parties to ACDEG73. All of 
the countries that have produced APRM reports and have subjected themselves to the process 
 
69 According to paragraph 2 of article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union ‘ .. any Member State that 
fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial 
of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic 
nature to be determined by the Assembly’ (AU, 2000). 
70 Article 25 (4) provides that ‘(t)he perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed 
to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political 
institutions of their State’ (AU, 2007a). 
71 See for example Assembly Decision on The Inaugural Report of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union on the Implementation of the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in 
Africa by the Year 2020, Twenty- Ninth Ordinary Session Assembly of the Union, 3 - 4 July 2017, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia (AU, 2017b).  
72 This is partially reflected in the contents of the Annual Report of the Chairperson on the Activities of the 
African Union Commission covering the period January to December 2014, Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of 
the Executive Council, 23 – 27 January 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (AU, 2014a).  
73 Data collated indicate a few instances where the DPA sent communication to Embassies requesting a response 
on ACDEG reporting.  
140 
 
have not submitted ACDEG reports74. The response of the DPA to this reality has been to 
engage in a series of workshops with relevant local actors, including civil society, to encourage 
reporting on ACDEG. 
The general framework established by the DPA suggests that the AGP would consider state 
reports before they ‘prepare and submit to the AU Assembly, through the Executive Council, 
a synthesis report on the implementation of the ACDEG.’ (AU, 2007a). The DPA guiding note 
on ACDEG provides that the Assembly shall take appropriate measures aimed at addressing 
issues raised in the report as envisaged under Article 49 (4). Article 49 (4) of ACDEG states 
that the ‘Assembly shall take appropriate measures aimed at addressing issues raised in the 
report’(AU, 2007a). The nature of the measures is not specified and generally assume that these 
could include some form of sanction for noncompliance. Outside of the general provisions in 
the guidelines on the reports to be assessed by AGP members, how this is will be done is not 
specified. Nor has there been engagements on the capacity to evaluate and make 
recommendations. Outside of transparent evaluations processes, and benchmarks, as per the 
provision of ACDEG, the modalities for ensuring compliance remain uncertain75.  
The process and standard by which an election is judged are contained in relevant declaration, 
decisions and ACDEG. The deployment of AU Election Observers, are, at least in theory, 
meant to ensure that there is compliance with basic standards so that elections are pronounced 
as free, fair and credible. The general procedure, which has improved over time, is for the 
DEAU in the AU to compile a proposed list of observers, together with a recommendation on 
who should lead the team. The general practice is that the team be led by a former President or 
former Minister from an AU Member State. The Unit has established a database of observers, 
some who have been trained in the practice of elections observation (Aniekwe et al., 2016). 
The decision process within DPA and the AUC allows for changes to be made on the proposed 
election observer list. Changes in the composition of a team are made at each step in the 
 
74 To date only Togo has submitted a report in line with the provisions of ACDEG. The Charter provides that 
Member States will report within two years of the Charter coming into effect. The Charter formally came into 
effect in March 2011.  
75 During 2012, there is some evidence that the DPA was intending to produce a set of benchmarks for ACDEG 
and a Terms of Reference for such as study was produced and titled: Develop benchmarks for implementation of 
Commitment and Principles, and evaluation of Member States’ Compliance to the African Charter on 




approval process, with the final decision residing with the Chairperson of the AUC 76.   
There is a substantive discretionary authority on the composition of AU Election Observers, 
and the team includes Ambassadors from the PRC, Members of PAP, Civil Society individuals 
and individuals included in the database of the DEAU.  During 2011, the DPA decided that 
officials from the Department should be involved in the observation of elections as part of the 
process of enhancing their knowledge of elections in the continent77. In theory, the observation 
reports have to be drafted by appointed observers, but in practice, technical writing support is 
provided either by AU staff from the DEAU or a TP, such as EISA. EISA has worked more 
substantively and directly in partnership with the AUC since 2010. It has been responsible for 
providing on the ground technical support for AU elections observation mission (EISA, 2019). 
The size, time, spread and the number of elections observers deployed varies across countries 
and often contingent on the availability of funds. Much of the AU, funding for election 
observation is derived from DP78.  
In 2007 the PAP established its electoral observer missions with financial support from DP and 
with technical support from EISA. According to EISA, it assisted with the conception and 
administration of training for elections observation, for the establishment of PAP election 
observer mission, as well as managing the first ever PAP election observer mission to Kenya. 
PAP teams were also deployed to observe elections in Angola, Swaziland, Ghana and 
Zimbabwe in 2008 (EISA, 2019).  A key conclusion of the PAP mission in Zimbabwe was that 
‘the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the conduct of free, fair 
and credible election’. A separate team of AU election observers deployed by the Chairperson 
of the AUC provided a more nuanced conclusion which accepted the results, hence 
contradicting the PAP mission (Kebonang, 2012). The overall consequence of this was that the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government effectively putting an end of PAP missions and 
instructed that the AUC will only deploy missions under the direction of the Chairperson79. In 
addition to AU observation teams, most RECs deploy their teams for the observation of 
 
76 The process around the nominations and changes to the list of election observers is reflected in internal 
memorandum within the DPA on elections observer teams.  
77 Details of this are contained in an internal advisory memorandum from the Head of Democracy, Governance, 
Elections and Human Rights to the Director and Commissioner of DPA (DPA, 2011m).  
78 This reality of reliance on DP has been noted in the Report of the Commission On Governance in Africa (With 
Focus on the African Governance Architecture and Elections) (AU, 2015b) 
79 This is reflected in a budget related decision of Assembly that provides that it ‘decides to remove the budgetary 
allocation of election monitoring under the Pan African Parliament and any other Organ, following the decision 
that the Commission should harmonize  the organization of joint election observation   missions with other Organs’ 
(AU, 2010a).  
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elections. While there have been attempts to coordinate initiatives on the ground, all of the 
teams generally deliver their separate reports (Aniekwe et al., 2016:42).  
In the first decade of AU elections observation, the practice has been to issue a short arrival 
statement and a preliminary observation statement at the end of the elections. The initial 
statement is typically followed up with a more detailed report that focused on the technical 
aspects of the elections and communicated directly to the Electoral Management Body in the 
country (Aniekwe et al., 2016). During the first decade of formal observation (2002-2012), 
there was confusion around whether the more detailed reports should be made public. The 
practice changed in 2012 and reports are now published on the AU website80. In general, the 
reports tend to avoid internal politically controversial issues and focus more on the technical 
aspects of the elections. As a report does not feature on the agenda of any formal organs of the 
AU, there is no substantive pressure for Member States to implement the recommendations 
made for future elections. Outside of the overall value that arises from elections observations, 
there is nothing within AU processes to compel any level of adherence to set standards and 
principles concerning elections. In response to challenges related to the overall democratic 
process, the DEAU has motivated for the deployment for longer-term missions.  Actual 
deployment has nevertheless varied and has been a practice contingent on the availability of 
resources (Aniekwe et al., 2016). The AUC has historically been highly dependent on DP for 
the required resources for elections observations. Funding is also channelled through the 
Democracy and Elections Fund. As the fund is separate to the AU budget, the accountability 
lines to Member States is not as affirmed as in the instance of the regular budget process81.   
3.2.2 Peer Review and Diplomacy 
The peer-review process and related engagements on accountability represent the most direct 
form of multilateral intervention at the level of Member States.  Peer Review in governance 
and hence accountability at the level of the AU has mostly emerged as being synonymous with 
the APRM and the process established by the Secretariat based in South Africa. The APRM 
has historically functioned in a very separate manner to the AUC, even though there have been 
 
80 The AU website has a full listing of the reports completed by AU Election Observers. These reports are not 
discussed within Organs and, at most, are included in the narrative report of the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission to the Executive Council.  
81 The challenges of funding is noted in the Report of the Chairperson to Executive Council in 2008 which provides 
that ‘ (t)he Commission’s performance in the area of elections monitoring/observation and promotion of  
democracy has, over the years, been   somehow dampened particularly as a result of the constraints it had to 
contend with,   mainly in regard to institutional capacity as well as human and financial resources’ (AU, 2008f) 
143 
 
several Assembly decisions on its gradual incorporation into the structures of the AU. The 
process remains voluntary, and the governance structures function at arm’s length to the AUC 
and Organs of the AU (Herbert et al., 2008; Gruzd, 2011; Gruzd, 2014b; Gruzd, 2014a; 
Makokera & Gruzd, 2014; Gruzd et al., 2018). The Executive Secretary is generally 
accountable to a Forum of APRM Focal Points from Member Countries. The Forum comprises 
Ministers or Senior Official from APRM Member Countries. The APRM Panel members are 
appointed by the APRM Heads of State and Government and hence directly accountable to this 
Forum (Kanbur, 2004).  
The APRM is not a formal legal instrument in the same manner as ACDEG and does not 
directly articulate legal standards, norms or practices for adherence by Member States. 
However, specific accountability standard’s and norms are in the detailed questionnaire 
developed for the APRM review process.  In summary, the APRM process involves a country 
self-assessment exercise, a country review mission by Panel Members and appointed experts 
and the development and presentation of the report for review to APRM Heads of State and 
Government (Gruzd, 2014a). The APRM Secretariat receives some basic funding form the core 
budget of the AUC and additional funding from DP. Funding is usually channelled through an 
APRM Trust Fund established by the UNDP (Kajee, 2003). Member States who accede to the 
APRM, by way of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are also expected to make 
an annual contribution towards the work of the APRM Secretariat. In general, few of the 
countries make the direct expected contribution.  
The APRM exercise is resource-intensive, as it also involves the establishment of an APRM 
Governing Council within a country undergoing a review. The Council is expected to include 
stakeholders from civil society. The drafting process often also includes the appointment of in-
country experts. Civil society actors at the country level also receive some level of DP funding 
and technical support for their participation in the APRM process. Until around 2012 support 
for Civil Society engagements was through a unit within the UNECA. More recently, support 
has is through the SAIIA.  Such support varies across countries and is not consistently provided 
(Masterson, 2006; Nzewi, 2012).  
The APRM Secretariat has over the years established working practices around the process and 
related activities to produce Country Review Reports. In most instances, the final report is a 
product of the country self-review, drafting from appointed expert consultants and Members 
of the Secretariat. While participating Panel Members may or may not engage in the writing 
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process, they retain final responsibility for the reports drafted.  Given the breadth of coverage 
and the extensive nature of the consultations, the period for report production varies and can 
extend beyond two years before their presentation at a Forum of Heads of State and 
Government (Masterson, 2006). In terms of established APRM practices, the final report 
remains confidential until discussed by Heads of State and Government. The reports are 
generally very lengthy, and a member of the Panel would present a summary. A response from 
the Country under review follows from review comments from attending Heads of State. The 
responses and comments are included in the final published report. The authority to publish 
and release the reports resides with the reviewed Members State. Since its inception in 2003, 
the APRM has reviewed about 20 countries. During the period 2013 and 2015, not one country 
was reviewed (Gruzd et al., 2018:2).  After the appointment of Professor Eddy Moloka as Head 
of the APRM Secretariat in 2015, there was a renewed sense of confidence on increasing the 
pace of reviews and hence completing more than four in a single year (Gruzd, 2011; Gruzd et 
al., 2018).  
The overall logic of the systems is that change unfolds because of engagements around country 
practices and the related gaps identified.  Over 15 countries have engaged in the process, and 
a number are in the second stage of review. There are ongoing debates about the value and 
substance of peer review as a mechanism of change (Landsberg, 2012a; Makokera et al., 2014). 
While the process is deemed highly participatory at the level of Member States, it is 
substantively centralised at the continental level, and peer reports are engaged with by Heads 
of State in a relatively closed meeting. The actual review process is limited to a few individuals, 
and reports can only be published with the permission of Member States. The APRM process 
incorporated the development of country-specific Actions Plans and subsequence follows up 
on the implementation of such plans (Kanbur, 2004). The APRM Secretariat has established a 
process to ensure follow-up on country Actions Plans through reports presented at the Forum 
of Focal Points. While DPA and the APRM Secretariat are on the AGP, there is no structured 
relationship between country review reports submitted to the APRM and the reports submitted 
for ACDEG or any other governance-related process in the AU (Matlosa, 2014:21).   
Diplomatic missions relating to governance issues, especially in conflict situations or where 
contestations might lead to conflict, is a growing phenomenon within the AU system. The 
dispatching of envoys or related missions has historically been through a process led mainly 
by the Department of Peace and Security (DPS) in the AUC. In practice, proposals for a mission 
or the sending of an envoy to negotiate with local stakeholders to avoid conflict and resolve 
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governance-related contestations are channelled through the PSC (Moolakkattu, 2010). The 
practice varies and, in some instances, the appointment of an envoy would come directly from 
either the authority of the Chairperson of the AUC or the AU. In all instances, officials from 
the DPS would prepare the groundwork and would provide the necessary substantive and 
logistical support to the appointed envoy. For longer-term missions, officials will be 
responsible for opening a local office in the identified country, as has been the case in the 
instances of Mali, DRC, Kenya and Sudan. Budgets for such initiatives is from the Peace and 
Security Fund. Short term missions generally function in the same manner and may entail 
repeated visits to a country. In the instance where there is the deployment of a Head of State or 
Government, as in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, Member States would provide the additional 
support required and would cover the costs of such missions 82.  
The general logic attached to a diplomatic mission is the historic negotiation orientation 
embedded in the DPS. The overall strategy, in line with the Peace and Security Architecture, 
is to negotiate arrangements between parties to avoid all possibilities of conflict and violence. 
Within such a framework, the AU has negotiated arrangements in several countries, including 
Kenya, Sudan, Mali and has attempted to do the same in Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and Gabon. 
Analysis of these suggests a mixed bag of success and failure (Murithi & Lulie, 2012). 
Negotiations are generally disconnected from adopted governance compliance instruments. 
The DPS is more substantively staffed and has taken the lead in situations of governance crisis 
outside of and separate to the governance work that has unfolded within DPA. DPS has also 
established some supportive activities as part of the overall APSA and includes an early 
warning situation room that serves to monitor governance development in Member States. It 
has also established offices in some of the key RECs in the continent. The realities of 
overlapping mandate and separation are expressed as a matter of coordinated concern, and 
many Assembly decisions point to the importance of greater synergy between AGA and APSA 
(Wachira, 2017). In practice, however, all actions generally arise from the PSC, which is open 
to both of the Departments and other Organs and institutions involved in governance. Aside 
from contestation around the turf, there is nothing substantive to prevent deeper forms of 
synergy between the Departments and hence a better balance between negotiated arrangements 
 
82 The range of missions deployed are scattered throughout the period of existence of the PSC and there is no 
comprehensive available individual report on these within the AU system or within wider literature. A useful 
summary of some of the missions is contained in an article by Tim Murithi on ‘The African Union’s evolving role 
in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African 
Union Mission in Somalia’ (Murithi, 2008). 
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within the framework of adopted shared values as embedded in governance instruments 83.   
The substantive overlap has prompted the DPA to propagate for the deployment of diplomatic 
missions for preventative diplomacy. This form of deployment is mainly in instances where 
there are signs of potential for conflict or constitutional and electoral disputes. A substantive 
orientation in DPA has been towards the deployment of longer-term election observer missions 
as part of the initiative to prevent election-related conflicts (Aniekwe et al., 2016). This 
orientation is also in keeping with the conclusion of the Panel of the Wise, managed by DPS, 
which argued for longer-term preventative diplomatic missions (Nathan, 2005). In the report 
of the panel, a strong argument was put forward on the need to utilise panel members for longer-
term engagements in Member States experiencing high levels of electoral contestation (Gomes 
Porto & Ngandu, 2014). As part of the efforts towards broadening the diplomatic approach 
with more proactive diplomacy, IDEA worked with the AU to pilot the approach by appointing 
senior consultants to visit a selection of countries and produce reports for possible further 
diplomatic engagement.  Under the overall authority of DEAU, the individuals travelled to a 
selection of countries, engaged in consultations with available stakeholders and produced 
reports84 (IDEA, 2017).   
The challenges associated with overlapping mandates between the DPA and DPS prompted 
several decisions urging for greater synergy and cooperation. The substantive push forward on 
this unfolding in the Special Summit on AU reforms where a decision was made that the 
portfolios merge under a single Commissioner for Peace, Security and Political Affairs (AU, 
2017c). How this would serve to reshape actual work on deepening accountability are not stated 
within the reform process.  
3.2.3 Information and Knowledge Exchange 
AU implementation structures in the accountability space have always perceived their role as 
 
83 This was affirmed in the consultations between AGP members and the PRC, within which the ‘Members of the 
PRC called on the Department of Political Affairs and the Peace and Security Department to jointly and regularly 
brief the PRC on specific steps and initiatives being undertaken to enhance greater synergy between the AGA and 
APSA’  (DPA, 2015). 
 
84 International IDEA completed 12 separate activities, including several post-election assessment missions in 
Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, to discuss recommendations made by AU electoral observation missions and to 
assess plans for the implementation of the recommendations ahead of the next electoral cycle in each of these 
countries. Additional technical assessment missions were conducted in Burkina Faso and the Central African 
Republic.   
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encompassing a variety of knowledge and information sharing activities85. Conferences, 
workshops, seminars and consultative meetings are either organised directly or with a variety 
of TP within the governance space86. In many instances, TP would directly organise events, 
with the participation of AU implementation structures. The use of the AU logo would often 
serve to legitimate events and hence serve to attract relevant role players and DP87.  The process 
for developing ACDEG, as is noted, arose from a conference organised by the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) in South Africa in partnership with the AUC. The events 
organised hence have a substantive advocacy impact on the development of instruments in the 
continent. The IEC arranged event points to the importance of knowledge exchange and 
generation events for the overall development of the AU and for influencing Member State 
actions.  
Within the accountability space and in keeping with the mandate relating to the ACDEG, DPA 
has since the adoption organised workshops and sub-regional conferences, for the 
popularisation, ratification of the instrument. The following table provides an overview of the 
events arranged directly on ACDEG by the DPA since the adoption of the Charter in 2007. The 
table is not exhaustive as information and records of actions is dispersed and hence challenging 
to establish a full tabulation of such information and knowledge-oriented events. The 
substantive purpose of the table is to illustrate the actions that have unfolded within the terrain. 
While events may be defined as meetings, with specific outcome reports, they generally emerge 
as conventional conferences or seminars with no further purpose beyond the active 
engagements that unfold during the actual event. Aside from a follow-up in the development 
of educational material on the Charter, there is no evidence of any event serving a broader 
follow-up purpose, beyond the immediate value for those who attended and participated.  
 
 
85 On its website (http://aga-platform.org/index.php/what-we-do), the AGA Secretariat provides ‘Through its 
knowledge management work, AGA has facilitated the Palm Tree Circle Series, the Democratic Governance (DG) 
Trends Debates and Africa Talks DG Trends in addition to various online foras. The flagship dialogue hosted on 
an annual basis by AGA is the High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Elections and Governance which is now in 
its sixth year’.  
86 The events arranged by International IDEA are a classical example of events arranged separately of the AUC, 
but benefiting from its overall legitimacy. A full listing of these is contained in Table 10. 
87 A classic example of this is reflected in Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration between DPA-AUC and 
CSVR on 30 March 2011 held at AYU International Hotel in Nazareth Ethiopia, which provides that ‘that CSVR 
was ready to support the DPA during the envisaged meeting of AU organs/institutions and RECs for adoption of 
the Human Rights Strategy by sharing some of the costs of that meeting with a proposed side line joint dialogue 




Table 14: Selection of ACDEG Events Arranged by the DPA 
Topic  Year Place 
Brainstorming on Charter on Democracy, Elections And Governance. 2007 Mali 
Meeting with Experts on the Popularisation and Ratification of the Charter 2007 Namibia 
Regional Meeting on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (Southern Africa)  
2007 Lesotho 
Regional Meeting on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (West Africa)  
2007 Ghana 
Regional Meeting on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (Central Africa)  
2008  Burundi 
Regional Meeting on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (East Africa)  
2008 Rwanda 
Workshop with RECs on the Popularisation and Ratification of the Charter 2008  Nigeria 
Meeting on the Popularisation and Ratification of the Charter with RECs  2009 Sudan 
Technical Meeting with RECs and Stakeholders on the Charter 2010 The Gambia 
Consultation on the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2011 Mauritius  
Consultation on the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 2011 Bamako  
Workshop on the Strategic Directions of the Charter  2011 Mauritania  
Consultation with AU Member States to Facilitate Ratification of the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
2011 Mali 
Consultation on the Establishment of a Framework to Undertake Periodic 
Review of AU Member States Compliance to Democracy and Governance 
Instruments 
2011 Mali 
Expert Consultative with Education Ministers on the inclusion of ACDEG in 
the School Curricula  
2015 Nigeria 
National Stakeholders Consultative Workshop on State Parties reports under 
ACDEG 
2018 Rwanda 
Source: Data extracted from a range of AU DPA reports, plans and related internal 
memorandum.  
The overall logic of many of the popularisation and consultative initiative is that they would 
serve to bring to the attention of government, civil society actors and academia the importance 
of ratification and hence the implementation of ACDEG. Funding for such events is derived 
from DP and attendees include representatives from Member States, CSOs and a range of 
experts88. In addition to DPA led popularisation initiatives, some other organisations, such as 
the PAP and CSO’s have arranged similar events (Faten et al., 2017). In instances where partner 
organisations arrange events, DPA officials would be invited to attend and make presentations. 
Very seldom are such engagements arranged at the headquarters of the Commission in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia89.   
 
88 According to Aggad & Apiko (2017) ‘…ACDEG, was until 2016 almost fully funded by external donors. 
Indeed, the bulk of the funding is provided by international partners, with the German Development Cooperation 
(GiZ) being the largest of the funders, followed by the EC, DIFD and International IDEA’.  
89 Table 8 and 9 are illustrative of the propensity to arrange events away from the AUC Headquarters in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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The table is illustrative of the ‘information and knowledge ‘related events arranged for ACDEG 
and does not capture the broader range of initiatives that have unfolded in the terrain, including 
other conferences arranged by civil society organisations separate of AU processes and 
institutions. In addition to the ACDEG specific events, the AGA Secretariat has been very 
active in the organisation of an Annual AGA Conference and regional consultative events 
which centrally focus on ACDEG promotion and broader governance issues. Since 2012, 
numerous consultative events, including a launch of AGP have also been organised, with 
funding derived from some DP.   
Table 15: African Governance High-Level Dialogue Events  
High-Level 
Dialogue 
Topic  Year Place 
7th  Winning the Fight Against Corruption  
 
2018 Botswana 
6th  Enhancing Youth Participation and Representation in 
Governance in Africa 
2017 South Africa 
5th  Democracy, Human Rights and Governance  
 
2016 Tanzania 
4th  Women's Equal Participation and Leadership in Political Parties 
 
2015 Rwanda 
3rd  Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, 
Manage and Resolve Conflicts in Africa. 
 
2014 Senegal  
2nd  Enhancing Constitutional Order and the rule of law in Africa 
 
2013 Senegal 
1st  State of Governance and Democracy in Africa 
 
2012 Senegal 
Source: As extracted from the AGA Secretariat website http://aga-platform.org 
A dominant DP in this terrain has been GiZ. In addition to funding some direct personnel costs 
for individuals in the AGA Secretariat and some consulting arrangements for the production of 
concept papers and related activities, GiZ has been a central donor for several events (Faten et 
al., 2017). Based on available information, including the funding set aside by GiZ for the AGA 
programme, that AGA Secretariat has spent an annual average of around USD 1, 200 000,00 
since 2012. As budgets are often expanded outside of the formal AUC Budgets and often 
through direct payments, it is impossible to track the overall spent on ‘information and 
knowledge ‘exchange events. It is conservatively estimated, that over USD 20 million was 
expended on accountability related events since the launch of the AU in 2002.  
Considering the number of events arranged by the DPA, the small team often spends a 
considerable amount of time with approval, logistical and communication issues. An event is 
typically preceded by the drafting of concept notes, the development of a list of officials and 
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participants funded and the preparation of all logistics, including the booking of flights and 
related accommodation arrangements in an AU Member State.  Events are often preceded by 
deployment of an advance team for logistical arrangements, with the participation and 
involvement of senior officials90.  While practices have evolved and shaped by budget 
availability, the AUC team would often include interpreters, translators, secretaries, a 
document distributor, a protocol officer and a communications officer. Substantive event-
related costs relate to flights and stipends for the period of absence from Addis Ababa91. The 
AUC would also typically pay the costs of the venue and related equipment for interpretation 
and the reproduction of documents. In the instance of events arranged by partners, costs would 
generally be covered directly, including the attendance of DPA officials92. In the case of DPA 
arranged events, brief narratives are produced for internal submission and eventual inclusion 
in reports to relevant Organs or DP. While funds utilised is audited, there are no real evaluations 
of the ‘value for money’ derived from the events arranged93.  
In 2009, International IDEA signed an MOU with the AUC through DPA. The MOU served 
as the foundation for a structured working relationship that culminated in the development of 
a Joint Activity Plan (JAP) which included a substantive range of activities associated with 
accountability related interventions (Helgesen, 2008).  Of particular significance was that 
IDEA would, in partnership with the DPA, appoint three to four ‘experts’ to second to DPA 
for three years94. The initiative has since been extended based on funding derived through 
IDEA, from amongst others, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International 
Development (DFID) and traditional IDEA Donors, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Canada and Australia (IDEA, 2016a).  IDEA established an office in Addis Ababa in 2010 by 
moving its Africa regional office from Pretoria to Addis Ababa in 2013. The number of 
 
90 Documents reviewed included numerous examples of internal memorandum for the approval of the Chairperson 
of the AUC which list the participants for DPA related events and provide details on budgets to be utilised.  
91 Numerous instances of the complexities related to event organisation and delivery are contained in internal 
memorandum related to approval of budgets, participant list and concept notes.  
92 Documents reviewed include numerous examples of memorandum requesting travel approval for events 
arranged by Technical Partners (TP).  
93 An example of the propensity towards events for a long duration supported by external funding is contained in 
a memorandum related to Consultations organised by the DPA on the margins of the 49th Ordinary Session of the 
ACHPR, 26-30 April 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia. The memorandum provides that the ‘following partners will 
be supporting the consultation through a direct financing arrangement:  UNDP through the agreement between 
the UNDP and AUC on the Implementation of the Project entitled Consolidating Democratic and Participatory 
Governance in Africa Programme and the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR).  Open 
Society Institute East Africa (OSIEA) and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) have 
also offered to contribute towards the organisation of the meetings’ (DPA, 2011a). 
94 Details related to this form of support are contained in an end of period ‘project review’ conducted by DFID in 
2013 (DFID, 2013).  
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‘knowledge and information’ activities and support to the DPA rapidly expanded since the 
move.  
IDEA functions as a ‘knowledge and information’ sharing organisation and established as a 
multilateral democracy promotion organisation with several African Member States, including 
South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana and Ghana95. The partnership between IDEA and DPA is 
complex but generally predicated on IDEA, adding substantive value to AU initiatives in 
governance. While indications are that AU provides inputs into all IDEA organised events and 
there is participation for senior DPA officials, the precise value beyond the general reflection 
of invited participants, experts and officials from Member States is not evident96.   Available 
event concept notes from reports produced emphasise the learning and knowledge exchange 
value of the events. The following table provides a synopsis of some of the events arranged by 
IDEA directly since 2012. IDEA officials are typically also invited to events arranged by the 
DPA and often provide a level of funding to such events, including the various AGA related 
annual dialogue events.  




Youth Participation in Political Processes: Second Annual Summer School for 
Young Leaders from African Political Parties 
2018 Rwanda 
Financing Of Electoral Processes: An Investment For Inclusive And 
Sustainable Democracy 
2018 Namibia 
The New Developmental Approach to Natural Resource Governance:  
Lessons Learnt, Experience sharing and Emerging Practices for 
Parliamentarians and Political Party Leaders in African Countries’ 
2018  South Africa  
Scaling Up the Support to Structural Preventive Diplomacy and Political 
Analysis in the Area of Elections in Africa 
2017  South Africa  
Three decades of democratic transition in Africa: What are the dividends for 
citizens? 
2017  Benin 
Southern Africa Policy Dialogue: Money in Electoral Processes 
 
2016  Namibia 
Regional Dialogue on ‘Emerging Trends and Challenges of Electoral 
Democracy in Africa’ 
2016 Nigeria 
Constitution Building and Constitutionalism in Transitional and Post-Conflict 
Situations 
2016  Tunisia 
Political Parties and Electoral Processes: Preventing Electoral Violence in 
Africa 
2016 Cape Verde 
Challenges to the rule of law in Africa 
 
2015 South Africa 
Democracy and Service Delivery 
 
2015 South Africa  
 
95 Details on International IDEA and its role, mandate and membership are on its website - www.idea.int.  
96 Reports of the listed IDEA events are on its website and include details around participation. In each event, an 
input is provided during the opening session by a representative from the DPA. Each of the reports include details 
on the input from DPA, the programme and concept note for the event.  
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Source: Extracted from the website of International IDEA https://www.idea.int/.  
The AUC has organised a range of conference in elections in partnership with other civil 
society or multilateral organisations active in the governance space. The DEAU has over the 
years arranged conferences of exchange and learning with EMBs. In 2018, the unit also took 
the lead in arranging a Conference on African Political Parties. While the primary 
preoccupation of DEAU is on the observation of elections, conferences are organised as part 
of the overall mandate of assistance for the organisation of elections (DPA, 2013).  
In the instance of the APRM, the primary orientation over the years has been to arrange events 
directly related to the mandate. These include technical meetings related to the development of 
the APRM system and the further development of its methodologies and events related to 
consultations with members. Based on available information, the number of events is relatively 
limited and include conferences for the popularisation of the APRM and broader dialogues on 
the process and its value. Arrangements of events of a more reflective nature are by TP of the 
APRM Secretariat, such as the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) 97. 
Outside of such events, APRM officials participate in broader AU governance-related events 
and activities. In 2018, the APRM Executive Secretary served as the Chairperson of the AGP98.    
The AUC has not engaged substantively in producing output documents from its events for 
broader dissemination of information and knowledge. The produced summary event report is 
rarely distributed and generally only generated for internal reporting purposes or to inform 
proposals to be taken to relevant AU Organs.  In the instance of IDEA, the orientation is to 
produce events reports and, where possible, policy briefs for dissemination. Given the complex 
array of information and knowledge exchange events arranged and products produced within 
the broader accountability related events and the substantive involvement of a range of TP, it 
is not feasible to provide a detailed outline of these or have a full financial account of these. 
The approach in this instance is to provide a broad picture of the number of events organised 
and hence illustrate the significance accorded to such events by AU multilateral institutions in 
the accountability space.  
 
97 As illustration SAIIA arranged a Brainstorming Workshop for Governance Experts on Operationalising the 
Extended Mandate of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (APRM, 2017).  
98 APRM events, as depicted on the organisation’s website, primarily focus on those that relate to delivering on 
their core mandate. Whilst there are broader events and APRM representatives attend many of the DPA events, 
the orientation is different to the DPA.  
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3.2.4 Capacity Building and Technical Support  
AU institutions involved in accountability related interventions have over the years defined 
their mandate, through approved work-plans, as including capacity building of Member States 
and civil society formations. Outside of the work related to elections management support, 
there is no formal articulation on how capacity building and related technical assistance 
initiative would unfold, and the precise value add to Member States. At times, workshop and 
conference type events are defined as capacity building initiatives as they embody imparting 
information and knowledge.  At the level of ACDEG, actual capacity related initiatives have 
been minimal and often unfold in the forms of knowledge and information related events. The 
DPA has nevertheless, in partnership with other organisation, produced smaller ACDEG 
explanatory booklets for distribution99. The DPA has also been working on developing material 
for inclusion in the curriculum of schools on ACDEG100. While there are instances where the 
DPA has defined itself as having a more proactive capacity building mandate, there have been 
limited interventions in the terrain.   
Within the area of accountability related intervention, the DEAU broadly established a mandate 
to engage with EMBs to enhance their technical and operational capacity for the management 
of elections. In addition to arranging ‘capacity building’ related events for EMBs, some 
attention has been focused on providing technical support to such bodies through the 
contracting and placement of experts in specific areas of request at EMB’s. Funding for such 
purposes has been channelled through the Democracy and Elections Fund but has always been 
modest relative to the funding for elections observation. In partnership with IDEA, the DEAU 
also rolled out the ‘Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE)’ 
training for EMBs. These were generally done on a regional basis and, in some instance, at a 
national level101. BRIDGE is essentially a modular professional development program with a 
particular focus on electoral processes. In general, the target group for the training has been 
officials working in EMBs. The channelling of the training through the AUC has been 
functional for IDEA as it provides direct access to EMBs across the continent.  
 
99 This has been detailed in a note from Open Society foundation (Achieng, 2012).  
100 Details of this initiative are contained in a Terms of Reference for the appointment of Consultants for the 
development of ACDEG material for inclusion in School Curriculums (DPA, 2017a). There is no evidence that 
this project has been completed or that the relevant material has been produced.  
101 See for example Press Release: African Union BRIDGE Training for Elections Cameroon opens today in 




One of the central partners for election-related capacity building has been EISA. Working with 
the Carter Centre (TCC) and the International Foundation for Electoral Assistance (IFES), 
EISA developed a database of elections experts and electoral institute in Africa and produced 
a manual for DEAU staff on the arrangement of election observer missions. It furthermore 
compiled a handbook for the training of election observers. In addition to providing technical 
support for most AU observation missions, EISA has been conducting training of elections of 
AU observers since 2009. Initial training was for PAP observers and subsequently for AU 
observers. In 2016, EISA co-facilitated a series of workshops for long-term observers with the 
AU. Much of the funding for such capacity development initiative is channelled through EISA 
and based on an MOU signed with the AUC initially in 2008 and subsequently renewed in 
2014 (EISA, 2019).  
A further initiative towards capacity building arising from AUC processes focused on young 
leaders within African political parties. Two Summer Schools for Young Political Leaders were 
arranged in Kigali, Rwanda in 2017 and 2018. The initiative funded and organised by IDEA 
reportedly served to enhance the capacity and confidence of the youth to engage in political 
processes. The initiatives were broadly perceived to be a part of the outreach activities of AGA 
Secretariat (IDEA, 2018). Outside of the workshops and conferences defined as capacity 
building initiatives, there have only been few initiatives directly focused on building state-level 
capacity for accountability and the implementation of ACDEG. APRM related initiatives, in 
contrast, have placed substantive attention on enhancing the capacity of civil society to engage 
in APRM related activities. In the initial few years of APRM, UNECA support for the APRM 
concentrated on building the capacity of national civil society institutions. The Open Society 
Initiative (OSI) has been key to such engagements and continue to support activities to engage 
national-level civil society in the APRM process.   
At a more distant level, UNDP and the ACBF have positioned themselves as engaging in 
capacity building initiatives related to the work of the AUC. In addition to providing direct 
support to the DPA in governance-related intervention, UNDP, through its Africa regional 
offices in Addis Ababa engaged in some level of capacity support that unfolded in the form of 
technical support to the DPA and by way of organising workshops related to AU interventions 
in governance.  
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3.3 Institutional Analysis  
The overview of intervention in accountability, together with the descriptive analysis of 
interventions in each of the areas provide a rich account of what has unfolded since the launch 
of the AU in 2002. It is imperative to analyse the interventions at two levels, as outlined in the 
‘analysis framework’ in order to extract some of the efficacy related challenges as they pertain 
to accountability challenges. These are at the level of multilateral engagements and, in 
particular, the role of Member States of the AU, and at the level of multilateral implementation, 
as signified by actions that unfolded within implementation processes. The focus on both the 
internal and external, including the social and material dimensions is in line with the analysis 
framework adopted from Barnette and Finnemore (2004:24) 
3.3.1 Multilateral Engagements  
At the level of multilateralism engagements, the analysis is embedded in formal decision 
processes and hence the substantive role of Member States as it impacts on norm establishment 
and implementation. Of particular importance in this respect, is engaging with the role of 
Member States in approving and taking forward implementation. It includes understanding the 
consensus process, the realities of competing norms and practices, and on the ground realities 
as it relates to Member States. In keeping with the framework and for brevity purposes, the 
analysis is in two broad areas: 1) Power Relations and Competing Norms, and 2) Realities 
within Member States.  
3.3.1.1 Power Relations and Competing Norms 
The process of norm formation and establishment has always been relatively complex, and 
often resolutions and instruments adopted arise from a combination of initiatives from within 
and outside of formally established structures. One consequence of the complexity and 
competition amongst Member States championing different instruments is the reality of 
normative incoherence and hence a disjointedness in the frameworks established. The reality 
that typifies part of this complexity is Member States largely approved the APRM at the same 
time as they approved the process leading to the establishment of ACDEG102.  
 
102 Both the ACDEG process and the APRM were approved at the 2003 Maputo Summit. However, Member 
States failed to appreciate the overlap, in part as the instruments were championed by different policy 
communities. The ACDEG process was championed by the IEC in South Africa through the structures of the 
Commission. Whereas the APRM was championed by the NEPAD Secretariat through Heads of State.  
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It has to be appreciated that the process by which instruments development unfolds and 
resolutions drafted within formal spaces of the AU, is often fraught with institutions and 
countries competing for spaces to affirm agendas that they would be championing. In the 
absence of countries who are prepared to raise issues on competing instruments and a robust 
coordinative centre within the AUC, the adoption of contradictory norms or competing 
instruments in the AU was inevitable103. Even when there is awareness of possible challenges 
in the future, the consensus approach in AU Summits, coupled with the low levels of available 
technical capacity and the intensive lobbying by Member States championing specific 
initiatives, such as South Africa, in the instance of the APRM, adoption of decisions, that might 
not be optimal for the efficacy of the AU, are unavoidable.  
While the APRM has been described as a process and not as a set of standards, inherent within 
its initiative is a set of norms that require Member States adherence. Although there are claims 
that the standards are the same as in ACDEG, the reality in practice is that the instruments 
stand separate of each other.  A detailed reading of the reporting process around ACDEG, 
including the proposed structure of the reports, suggest that ACDEG is essentially a peer-driven 
process. While the ACDEG processes have been described as mandatory and as separate to the 
voluntary APRM, process (Matlosa, 2014), the reality, in practice, is that all instruments in the 
AU are substantively voluntary, even when ratified. Despite the legal status of instruments, 
there is little to compel Member States to adhere or report on the implementation of an 
instrument104.  
Outside of the participation of PRC Members as election observers, there is little direct 
involvement of Member States, as a collective, in the observation of elections. Detailed reports 
are not present to AU Organs unless the country in questions becomes a subject of 
consideration at the PSC. Direct oversight over electoral observer missions, their organisation, 
the individuals appointed as observers, is limited and often confined to short briefs in the annual 
activity reports of the Chairperson of the Commission105. While Member States participate in 
 
103 Different structures of the AU would make submissions to the Secretary of the Commission for inclusion in 
the Summit. Seldom are the contradictions or overlaps noted at the centre of the AU institutional system.  
104 While there is often reference to ACDEGs legal status, relative to the APRM, the substantive implied process 
to review country reports suggest a more peer oriented approach is most likely. However, there has been no 
movement on ACDEG reporting since it came into force in 2011.  
105 Beyond local national media attention to AU Observer Reports, these are not really discussed at the level of 
the AU and the practice has largely emerged as routine within the AU system. There is no capacity for detailed 
follow up on recommendations and no evidence is documented of actions by Member States on reports produced. 
The substantive value of observations remains at the level of affirming credibility and hence are generally 
perceived as positive by donors. See for example the DFID review report (DFID, 2013).   
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various activities of the DPA as it related to accountability intervention-related activities, the 
level of active accountability related engagements is minimal. PRC members participate in 
such events but exercise limited active agency over issues discussed and proposals that unfold 
from such activities.  
3.3.1.2 Realities within Member States  
The existence of competing norms and instruments and the lack of coordination do not 
necessarily impact directly on internal state actors within Member States. Ministries, 
Departments and individuals would participate in separate processes relating to accountability 
related instruments. Generally, meetings are attended by individuals chosen by Ministries or 
relevant focal institutions without them necessarily engaging on the coherence or synergy 
between different instruments106. Member States are, as a matter of practice, reliant on 
communications and Diplomatic Note Verbal’s transmitted from their representatives in Addis 
Ababa. The discretion of directing the communication and invitation for expert participation to 
relevant line Ministries responsible resides with offices in Addis Ababa or with Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs. The practice of embassy officials attending all manner of events to represent 
their countries, especially when the AUC funds this, suggest that many governances related 
invitations are never really channelled to appropriate departments and officials at the national 
level107.  
Member States may well exercise substantive sovereignty and autonomy when it comes to 
interactions with the AU on implementation processes. Member States may choose to ignore 
implementation imperatives on whatever grounds they choose, without having to articulate 
these formally.  At another level, the lack of response may be because of a lack of internal 
coherence and communication as it relates to AU instruments108. Follow-up communication 
for DPA and other institutions involved in multilateral governance implementation compliance 
and action often get lost between different state institutions and Ministries within a particular 
country. To overcome communication challenges, AU department would sometimes 
 
106 AU Departments often engage directly with Ministries or Departments on their particular instruments and often 
ACDEG Focal points and APRM Focal points are different government departments and individuals.  
107 Attendance list of DPA organised and DP paid for events indicate that many meetings and conferences are 
attended by officials based at embassies in Addis Ababa.  
108 Using South Africa as an example comments from a Parliamentary Committee Chairperson that the ‘…Charter 
had been inexistence since 2007 but was only now submitted to the Committee. The Office of the State Law 
Adviser had confirmed compliance with domestic legislation. The matter had been raised with the Department on 
previous occasions’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010) is telling about local institutional complexities when 
it comes to ratification of instruments.  
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communicate directly with specific Ministries or other actors to establish progress on specific 
instruments and related ratification. The challenge for accountability related intervention is that 
the responsibility and implied reporting requirements are spread between Ministries, thus 
rendering it difficult for AU officials to establish solid relationships for active ongoing 
communication and follow up.  In the instance of the APRM, this has been easier as each 
country is required to designate a focal point and APRM Secretariat does not necessarily 
channel communication through embassies.  The centralised coordinative approach of the 
APRM through a designated focal point renders communication and ongoing interactions much 
more accessible.  
Outside of Member State commitment to AU multilateralism and the imperatives of 
integration, the accountability realities within a country and ongoing local priority efforts and 
concerns, may serve to establish some level of compliance resistance.  In part, this relates to 
internal political realities and the possibility that ratification may prompt civil society and other 
local actors to use instruments to demand accountability (Kane, 2008). As customarily an 
instrument is adopted by full consensus, Member States would hardly ever express any formal 
opposition after adoption. At most, Member States who have not ratified would indicate that 
they are already compiling and do not need to ratify formally. In the instance of ACDEG, this 
has been the case with both Tanzania (Daily News, 2017) and Botswana (Saungweme, 2007). 
Where Member States have been slow to ratify despite continuous follow-up engagements, it 
may be concluded that there is a lack of commitment, as realist do, but the evidence of 
expressed State level concern with the content ACDEG does not exist.  
A more significant consideration when reflecting on the agency of Member States are the 
incentives available to participate. Member States may well be considering the substantive 
value derived from ACDEG or the APRM process. There is no sanction regime in the AU 
system for non-ratification, aside from the fact that there is a record of non-ratification in 
reports on the ‘status of treaty ratification’ produced and published at AU Summits. In some 
instances, ratification of international instruments may be perceived as a matter of prestige and 
hence creating political opportunities109. The APRM has succeeded in attracting attention, as 
it often garners the support of DP and because it entails substantive media attention. As the 
APRM process established internal national structures, the incentives for civil society 
 
109 While the AUC regularly produces an update on instruments ratification, Member States hardly ever do 
appropriate follow up on instruments at the national level. Aside from communications from DPA to Member 
States through embassies, there is no evidence of detailed follow up.  
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engagement has been higher, and Member States have generally been more attracted to the 
process. However, the costs of the process have historically been a matter of concern (Gruzd 
et al., 2018). Member States are expected to contribute by making an annual contribution to 
the APRM. Member States are also expected to support the establishment and functioning of 
local structures for the period of the APRM review process. The direct funding requirement 
may well create some level of disincentives. However, there is no indication that APRM 
processes are held up because country fees are not paid (Gruzd, 2014a).  
While election observation has been a continual process for some time now, the precise value 
for Member States has never been fully evident. Observers are either welcomed and interacted 
with actively by ruling parties or left mainly on their own as part of the overall obligation to 
accommodate such observer teams. Where ruling parties are subject to substantive concerns 
around the electoral process, they tend to embrace observer missions substantively and attempt 
to engage to ensure that the observer teams provide positive conclusions. The shift to a more 
technical approach has been somewhat valuable to local EMB’s as the recommendations from 
AU observer missions are often used to justify the mobilisation of further resources and to 
request technical assistance from donors110. The reality of observation is that they are a terrain 
of substantive resource distribution and patronage, and the actual value for AU multilateralism 
in governance may not be substantively apparent (Diatta & Woldemichael, 2019). The value 
of observations must be viewed in the context that many countries, especially those struggling 
with conflict, have been subject to many different observer missions, including from RECs. 
The value to Member States of having many different missions is not apparent and often comes 
at high costs to institutions. Donors would often fund mission from separate institutions. At 
one point in time, DP supported missions from different parts of the AU system. DP supported 
both PAP and the AUC when it comes to the observation of elections in Zimbabwe in 2008. 
The value of extended long-term missions on stability is yet to be realised. In practice, longer-
term generally implies value for AU officials and those who benefit directly, including 
consultants.  
3.3.2 Multilateral Implementation  
At the level of multilateral institutional implementation, the analysis engages with issues 
related to organisational culture, bureaucratic strategies, financing issues and the related human 
 
110 The shift from a more political approach towards a more technical approach to elections is outlined by Aniekwe 
and Atuobi (2016) 
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resource limitations. The analysis of implementation engagements is directed at establishing 
an understanding of the driving culture, incentives and orientations that shape actions amongst 
officials.  Drawing from the overview of accountability interventions and the different 
interventional modalities, it seeks to engage with the challenges that unfold in the 
implementation process and the agency exercised by officials. For brevity purpose, the analysis 
unfolds in two areas: 1) Organisational Culture and Financing, 2) Human Resource and 
Bureaucratic Strategies.  
3.3.2.1 Organisational Culture and Financing 
Accountability related intervention are spread between the DPA, the APRM and to a certain 
extent, the DPS. As with the rest of the AU system, these institutions are reliant on substantive 
DP funding for activities and personnel to engage in actual implementation initiatives. The 
overall consequence of this is that it drives forward a level of bureaucratic competitions for 
scarce resources.  The drive to mobilise resources serves to establish a culture where officials 
push forward the value of their mandate relative to others. The willingness to coordinate and 
build appropriate synergies is minimal, despite the semblance of cooperative work in the 
context of the overall AU budget process.  Even with direct budget support to the AU, DP’s 
generally establish their areas of priority support. Since the establishment of a budget increase 
ceiling within the AU system, many DP’s also establish alternative channels of support, 
including through specific funds, such as the Peace and Security Fund, by way of direct 
expenditure by DP, or through TP working with the AU institutions, such as International 
IDEA and EISA 111.  
The reality for the AU is that it continues to be heavily reliant on DP for the substantive portion 
of funding for its accountability related work. All work on the ACDEG, the APRM and in the 
areas of election observation arises from donor funding112. While the idea of donor control may 
be simplistic, the reality is that they do exercise substantive discretion on what is to be funded. 
 
111 Since over 80 per cent of the programme budget comes from donors, the substantive and competing approaches 
of Departments is not a matter that is subject to substantive oversight. Donors also compete to ensure that their 
funds are spent and would move between Department to facilitate prioritisation and spending of resources.  
112 The reliance in DP funding is aptly captured in the Assembly Report of the Commission on Governance in 
Africa (With Focus on the African Governance Architecture and Elections) which provides that ‘(t)here are also 
limited funds available to the AUC to provide technical assistance to Member States holding elections. The 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance Fund receives inadequate contributions from Member States making it 
impossible for the AUC to offer the needed assistance to member states that require it. Currently, there is 
overdependence by the AUC on partner funding for elections observation and related activities. There is also 
inadequate human resource capacity for the AUC to provide the needed support to Member States in the area of 
democracy, elections and governance (AU, 2015b). 
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For example, GiZ has been a substantive donor for the AGA process and has over the past few 
years placed substantive attention on funding initiatives relate to the youth. GiZ found a very 
willing partner from within the youthful leadership of the AGA Secretariat113. The overall 
consequence of this is that the Secretariat shaped a programme towards what it has terms 
‘community outreach’, which included arranging regional consultations with young people on 
the theme of the AU summit114. While such consultations may be of value in themselves, it 
does raise fundamental questions around the priority value of such engagements to the actual 
mandate of the AGA Secretariat, specifically as it relates to driving forward a more coordinated 
approach in governance.  
The AU has historically been an event-driven organisation. Work unfolds through the 
organisation of meetings, workshops, seminars, consultations and conferences. Even outside 
of broader considerations on how particular objectives, such as full ACDEG ratification is 
achievable, the planning culture is on the arrangement of events. While there was an attempt 
by the first AUC Chairperson to push for the organisation of events in Addis Ababa, to limit 
costs, AU officials and relatively autonomous Commissioners justify events outside of Addis 
because it establishes greater visibility in Member States 115. The personal value to individual 
officials within the AU system arising from travel has always been substantive. Outside of the 
costs associated with accommodation and local expenses, officials often derive substantive 
personal savings from events attended outside of Ethiopia. There is hence an influential culture 
and tradition of maximising the number of events for the year, including the number of days 
outside of Ethiopia. The primary purpose of the event and any introspection on measurable 
achievement becomes a secondary issue 116.  
The terrain of ‘election observation’ has been an area of lucrativeness for officials and often 
for those appointed as observers. The longer the period, the more there are direct financial 
benefits for observers and officials. In the face of this momentum, the propensity towards 
 
113 This influence of GiZ is somewhat captured by Aggad & Apiko (2017). The influence of GiZ is further reflected 
in numerous meetings held with the DPA on AGA and related support issues. Included amongst these are agreed 
minutes of joint meeting held (DPA, 2010).   
114 This is captured on the AGA website as follows; ‘AGA has developed an elaborate youth engagement strategy, 
dubbed AGA-YES to ensure the deliberate and meaningful engagement of over 60 per cent of this continents 
human resources. It is also working on a women’s engagement strategy’ http://aga-platform.org/index.php/what-
we-do.  
115 The listing of DPA and TP events related to governance reflects this propensity to arrange such events outside 
of Addis Ababa.  
116 Details around travel as an incentive are contained in numerous reports on corruption and gender discrimination 
within the AUC.  
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establishing longer-term missions does raise questions around the substantive rationale, 
relative to the real purpose served to officials and observers. The conclusion is not meant to 
suggest that all observers are complacent in a patronage system, but to raise the issue of the 
organisational culture that is prevalent in the system and how this often serves to drive 
initiatives including the observation of elections. In 2012, after the appointment of a new 
Commission of Political Affairs, senior officials in the Department motivated for their 
inclusion, together with the Commissioner in election observer missions117. The rationale is 
that they would benefit from learning for broader governance and accountability work. The 
inclusion of members of the PRC and PAP members as observers often renders accountability 
arrangements murky. The approval pathway of DEAU list submissions also contributes to a 
situation where senior individuals would nominate observers, thus rendering it difficult to 
engage on substantive questions around the value derived from observation and other events 
for accountability related interventions. Events facilitate expenditure performance per formal 
AU rules and hence may not necessarily encourage deeper accountability and value for money 
concerns from DP. The culture of travel and related reciprocity across the system creates a 
circle of affection and hence, reciprocity in event attendance. The overall culture embodies low 
levels of substantive outcomes related to answerability on the use of resources118.     
The willingness to centre work at the headquarters of AU institutions remains limited, as self-
interest drives bureaucratic behaviour. This self-interest also serves to define relationships with 
outside parties seeking to influence the AU or use the link with the AU to mobilise resources. 
Senior officials are invited, with their costs being covered. No matter the orientation of TP, 
they often have to acts in a way that affirms senior AU official in the system as their continual 
resource mobilisation is dependent on such arrangements. TP often pay a very high cost 
associated with the AU official powers to convene119. 
 
117 A classic example of this is reflected in an internal memorandum relating to the elections in Senegal in 2012. 
The memorandum provides that the ‘AU should consider sending a pre-elections assessment team to Senegal to 
evaluate the political situation with a view of helping the diverse political actors to resolve their differences ahead 
of the elections’ (DPA, 2012d).  
118 Details documents reveal that TP and AUC DPA officials would often invite each other to events with costs 
covered. One consequence is that events are attended repeatedly by the same group of individuals.  
119 The drive towards arranging events is reflected in available information on the work of the DPA. Whilst there 
might well be a range of motivations for the organisation of such events, the fact that they attract more attention 
than work related to mandate implementation does indicate the incentives at work in the system. This however 
does not imply that all the individual are corrupt or driven solely by financial incentives. The system has to be 
appreciated in context.  
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3.3.2.2 Human Resource and Bureaucratic Strategies.  
In term of the approved organisational structure of the DPA, which carries responsibility for 
ACDEG and elections, amongst other areas in governance, the department has six formally 
established professional posts and around four administrative related posts120. Outside of any 
consideration of performance, the numbers do not accord in any way to the vast terrains of 
responsibility entrusted to the Department. The issue of capacity has historically featured in 
many decisions of the AU, but the realities of budget contribution from Member States, which 
generally covers all permanently appointed officials, has been a limiting factor for sustainable 
growth121. The consequence of this is a high level of dependence on contracted consultants 
appointed through DP funds, individual appointed on contract and seconded to the organisation 
by TP and funded interns from Universities122.    
AU staff selection processes are often complex and do not necessarily facilitate the 
appointment of the best and brightest to drive forward the African agenda and to exercise a 
level of active agency in the interactions with Member States. Appointments to formal 
positions can take over a year to complete and often to more extended periods. Those appointed 
to formal positions, while subject to an interview process, are often in posts as a result of active 
lobbying from Member States. There has been a long history in the AU of appointing 
individuals from within the African diplomatic community in Addis Ababa based on an 
established quota system123. Many officials also enter the institutional system after completing 
short consulting assignments at the AU. Renewal of contracts is often contingent on the 
decisions of senior officials in fixed establishment posts124. Consultants would not engage 
substantively or raise accountability concerns because of the fear of contracts not being 
renewed.   
AU multilateral implementation institutions in governance are dependent on staff contracted 
through TP, such as IDEA. Since 2012, IDEA has contracted four consultants for secondments 
to the DPA based on choices made by the Department itself. Consultants are also often 
 
120 This limited structure is reflected in the DPA draft Strategic Plan for the 2009-2012 period (DPA, 2009a).  
121 The retention of the Maputo structure and gradual changes are reflected in the numerous meetings of the PRC 
Sub Committee dealing with structures. The PRC has historically been conservative in approving an increase in 
post that have a recurrent cost.  
122 A range of internal documents reviewed indicate that these were drafted by consultants, junior officials and 
interns within AU governance intervention institutions. This includes memorandum, speeches, planning 
documents and reports.  
123 A review of this has been provided in numerous reports and contained more recently in the work unfolding 
around AU reforms.  
124 See the report on gender discrimination within the AU as confirmation of this (AUC, 2018e).  
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appointed with resources derived from DP, such as the EC and GiZ, amongst others. Within 
the DEAU, IFIS has over the years seconded individuals to work with the team. Since 2006, 
the number of seconded staff has increased from two (2) to approximately fifteen (15). A 
similar reality exists within the APRM, as only a few officials are permanently appointed. 
Individuals appointed as consultants generally operate as regular staff in the system and carry 
day-to-day work responsibilities. In practice, they complete all of the tasks required for events 
and any other work allocated to them by permanent officials. The short, mostly annual, 
consulting contract periods, creates a high level of uncertainty and job security 125. One 
consequence of this is that the contracts tend to attract younger and inexperienced graduates126. 
These consultants are the producers of work within the organisation and generally compliant 
to demands of more permeant seniors, given uncertainties around contract renewal. 
Strategically, the orientation of seniors is to utilise consultants for all forms of detailed work127.  
The levels of uncertainty in staffing and the complicated accountability relationship between 
officials and their Member States create high levels of competition for resourcing opportunities 
and hence, internal institutional conflict. The APRM experiences such conflict in 2010, 
resulting in the departure of its senior officials. The openly articulated conflict includes 
accusations of corruption and miss-management levelled against different individuals128. 
While there is a view that the system has not stabilised under the new Head, the structural 
condition for conflictual relationships continue, as many officials remain reliant on the 
goodwill of their seniors for contract renewal and hence would not engage in substantive 
reporting when experiencing problems. Such relationships also create immense complexity at 
the AU and official often struggle to secure reappointment on contracts. Many often continue 
in the system between contract renewal initiatives129. AU implementation institutions have 
generally struggled to establish performance systems, given funding uncertainties and the 
complicated accountability relationship of consultants. Day-to-day demands drive 
 
125 An example of this challenge is reflected in an internal memorandum related to the reappointment of 
consultants for a further period. Data files contain numerous further examples of the struggles that consultants 
face within DPA on their appointments. This challenge has also been highlighted in the report on gender 
discrimination in the AUC (AUC, 2018e).  
126 As illustration, a meeting report between IDEA and the DPA provides that’ IDEA committed to replace vacant 
positions and to recruit 1 or 2 junior staffs to support the DPA’ (DPA, 2011j). 
127 All IDEA and GiZ appointments to the DPA are very young individuals. This has been noted in numerous 
ways in online communication by DPA officials.  
128 Details on the human resource challenges are contain in a report drafted by Akere Muna, the Former 
Chairperson of the APRM Panel, titled ‘Reflections On the APRM and the Management of Transition’ (Muna, 
2018).  
129 Documents reviewed contain numerous memoranda requesting contract renewal by consultants appointed 
either through IDEA or GiZ.  
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performance, and hence activity focused, rather than a focus on outputs or outcomes.  
The flow of DP resources and the related realities of internally focused accountability 
arrangements create a high level of active agency amongst officials and consultants in the 
system. Much of the detailed work that unfolds is often not reflected in the overall institutional 
budget and hence not subject to detailed interrogation by Member States.130 The PRC also has 
limited active capability to engage in sector-specific plans and related activities. This reality 
sometimes serves to create a disjuncture between activities and core mandates. While all 
manner of accountability engagement, especially events, may broadly be justifiable, many are 
generally only negotiated with partners and driven by officials following their perspective on 
what is done. The approach is evident in the AGP process and hence in the work of AGA 
Secretariat.  The Secretariat has over the years focused primary attention on arranging 
consultative forums and the organisation of an Annual Dialogue event, as critical strategic 
activities. Within the activities, who is invited and the nature of the content to be engaged is 
determined by AGA Secretariat officials.  Outside of producing event report and outcome 
statements, the precise value to the core mandate of coordination and synergy, are not fully 
articulated. The agency of officials extends substantively as they often share platforms with 
political representatives131 and express perspectives on deepening accountability that often fall 
outside of the articulations expected of professionals who have to implement AU mandates 
neutrally and impersonally.   
3.4 Efficacy of Accountability Interventions 
In order to provide a substantive overview of the efficacy challenges that face to AU in 
accountability interventions, a core set of themes is extracted from the institutional analysis. In 
line with the articulated conceptual framework, the themes capture the challenge that faces the 
AU both in term of the normative frameworks and instruments established, and in respect to 
the modalities of implementation that have unfolded. The approach is to focus only on the core 
issues that relate to accountability in order to avoid duplication. Nonetheless, it is anticipated 
that the challenges apply to other areas, such as the rule of law and state capacity. The 
articulated challenges are brought together in the final chapter to ensure a consolidated 
 
130 As over 80 per cent of budgets are derived from donors, officials spend more time on such relationships than 
on building the core elements derived from formal mandates. The internal documents reviewed indicate 
substantive time is being devoted to drafting reports to DP and responding to TP.  
131 This exercise of agency beyond mandate is reflected in the numerous tweets from AGA Secretariat Members 
on the official twitter account @AGA_Platform  
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perspective on the efficacy of AU multilateral intervention in governance.  
3.4.1 Norm and Instruments Contradictions 
The experience of the AU thus far reflects that it is challenging to get Member States to adhere 
to agreed norms. Even as ACDEG is a legal instrument, with specific provisions around 
accountability processes within Member States. The process of ensuring adherence would, 
however, be enormously challenging outside of peer review type engagements. Continuing the 
path of having the ACDEG as a separate process to the APRM does not make substantive sense. 
At the same time as recognising that full ACDEG implementation is highly unlikely, even with 
the approach of engaging Member States directly, the APRM process cannot continue to unfold 
outside of some recognition of African established standards as contained in ACDEG. At 
present, APRM engagements are predicated on establishing compliance with all international 
instruments and not based on specific AU normative frameworks. The APRM panel also has 
the overarching responsibility for making judgements based on their analysis and engagement 
with role players at the level of Member States. The disjuncture between the two does not bode 
well for the continent, and it is unstainable to continue the path of treating these as separate 
processes. The substantive danger is that further instruments may be introduced that require 
separate institutional processes, such as what has unfolded in the areas of mining, political 
parties, gender and youth participation. The AU system is overwhelmed and cannot afford to 
engage on multiple instruments that embody the overall objective of enhancing accountability 
at the level of Member States.   
3.4.2 Limited Value Engagements  
The observation of elections has historically been a critical accountability strategy of the AU. 
There has also been a substantive shift towards introducing longer-term elections-related 
missions. There is a push towards looking at broad accountability issues in a country and hence 
recognition that elections are not viewed as separate to broader accountability challenges. 
While the demand for observation missions is likely to remain and often vital for establishing 
local confidence, the current path is not sustainable. Outside of the escalating costs of election 
observer missions, including longer-term missions, the duplication of mission within the AU 
itself132 and between the AU and RECs that have been characterised as the building blocks of 
 
132 This duplication is evident by the fact that both the DPS and DPA would deploy teams to countries facing 
particular governance crisis and challenges for research and related diplomatic engagements.  
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the AU, is inefficient, even if there is an argument for much more observations as a basis of 
enhancing electoral credibility. The combination of diplomatic missions, pre and post-election 
technical teams, and elections observations, coupled with APRM related reviews and ACDEG 
compliance initiatives does suggest low levels of operational efficiency in the system. 
Substance reflection on how these processes might be better linked, including rationalisation, 
may pave the way for more effective accountability engagements. Current and historical 
discourse suggests a need for more profound forms of engagements that facilitate context-
specific approaches to accountability and inclusivity may be more appropriate. The efficacy 
challenge would be on linking a peer review orientation with standards and related modalities 
of election-related observations.  
3.4.3 Skewed Agency of Officials   
AUC officials often extend their work initiatives towards including direct engagements with 
stakeholders within Member States. While the practice may imply open interactions with civil 
society, such initiative tends to compete with formal AU established process for civil society 
engagements in the form of ECOSOCC and Member State prerogatives when it comes to local 
level engagements. Part of the challenge arises because there are limited perspectives on the 
value–add of the AU institutions relative to Member States, the appropriate channels for 
engagement and the level of agency and professionalism that needs to be exercised by officials. 
The need for proper role definition of officials is part of the AU reform process, but what this 
means in all areas of engagements have not been specified. One consequence of having 
inexperienced officials is a lack of understanding of the limits of individual agency as a public 
official. This sense of agency is also partly driven by the pressure arising from technical and 
civil society based partners. Civil society partners often have a much higher level of agency 
and often push AU officials to express views that go beyond their formal mandates within AU 
affirmed processes. At a structural level, the agency of officials is contingent on the 
accountability systems and hence mandates.  Establishing modalities of accountability in 
multilateral institutions can be a complicated task. However, without firmer accountability 
arrangements, enhancing the efficacy of AU intervention in accountability is hard to imagine. 
In the EC, accountability is exercised both through a professional system and by way of the 
European Parliament and related engagements from civil society.  African regionally oriented 
civil society are hardly autonomous as they often depend on positive relationships with AU 
institutions for DP funding.  
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3.4.4 Revenue Benefiting Performance  
The ability to supplement salaries through lucrative travel and related events tend to drive the 
performance incentives within AU multilateral institutions. Officials are often driven to plan 
initiatives around events and initiatives that facilitate travel and hence accumulation through 
stipends133.  The event-driven approach is an established tradition, even if formal economic 
incentives to not drive officials. Some attempt has been made to limit this by reducing the 
stipend earning during the time of the Chairpersonship of Nkosazana Zuma134. Earlier attempts 
were also made to limit travel by arranging more meetings in Addis Ababa.  There has been 
substantive resistance to such move from within AU officials and from within the PRC itself 
as many its members attend numerous meetings as representative of their states. Allowing the 
system to continue in the current trajectory will not facilitate change and substantive and 
focused mandated content work. There is very little evidence to suggest that accountability 
related events have substantively contributed to the implementation of mandates135. A simple 
efficacy test on whether objectives are achievable in different ways may well drive an 
alternative culture of using technology and other modes of communication for engagements.  
3.4.5 Over Influence of Technical Partners  
TP and DP exercise substantive direct and indirect influence over AU implementation 
institutions. DP engage in negotiations around implementation plans and are often instrumental 
around the choices made. While there is no substantive evidence that DP determine the agenda 
or exercise undue control, the reality is that they often release resources for activities that seem 
appropriate for expenditure purposes, but that is often not optimal for building the overall 
efficacy of the AU systems of accountability related interventions. TP often have a different 
mandate and historical orientation to the core multilateral mandate of AU institutions. Research 
and knowledge-driven organisations can actively engage in reflective processes around 
accountability development in the continent and can produce knowledge outputs and future 
thinking. The participation of AU implementation officials in such events and activities may 
 
133 This challenge is for example, captured in a forensic review of travel and subsistence claims expenditure 
incurred by the APRM conducted by Deloitte in 2012. The report generally indicates substantive accountability 
and governance challenges with respect to the use of resources made available to the APRM in the preceding 
period (Deloitte, 2012).   
134 It is reported that the Chairperson ‘sought to make the AU travel policy more cost-effective, cutting down on 
some business class travel and reducing the costs of per diems for external consultants’ (Adekeye, 2017). 
135 A key illustration of this is the numerous events arranged around ACDEG. Whilst substantive resources have 
been expanded in arranging the events, only one country (Togo) has submitted a country report in accordance to 
the provisions of ACDEG.  
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well be useful for learning and sharing of ideas, however over reflection from AU officials 
detracts them from core implementation mandate.  Very often, TP would push for the 
attendance of AU officials at their events to affirm their value-adding role to DP, but at the 
expense of having such officials focus on their core mandate at their institutions136. Deeper 
linkages in core mandate areas, beyond events, may assist in building the efficacy of AU 
interventions.  Current arrangements tend to result in AU institutions mirroring practices in 
relatively autonomous technical agencies that have different mandates and accountability 
arrangements.  AU officials are public servants who have to abide by the principles of 
neutrality, impartiality and professionalism in a manner that demonstrates commitment and 
responsiveness to the people of the continent through their representatives. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The AU is relatively unique in the multilateral efforts directed at enhancing accountability at 
the level of its Member States. None of the other regional multilateral institutions have 
established similar strategies and modalities, standards and instruments for compliance 
purposes. In the instance of the EU, the standards are established, but were a product of 
sustained integration over a long period and mainly emerged from accountability practices that 
already exist in Member States (Mattli, 1999). The tension between compliance standards, as 
would be necessary from a more rapid integration approach, stand in stark contrast to the 
realities of what is feasible within Member States from a more gradualist perspective. The 
tension finds its way into institutional practices and implementation approaches within AU 
implementation institutions.   The efficacy analysis points to the importance of finding a 
balance between compliance and an appreciative of an accountability progression approach 
implied by peer review practices. The challenge cannot be fully resolved by Member States 
intervention, outside of recognising the high levels of agency exercised by implementation 
institutions and officials. Intervention within the accountability space cannot also be detangled 
from broader governance intervention, as reflected in the two other areas to be explored in the 
chapters that follow. A collective analysis will serve to consolidate the overall perceptive on 
efficacy in AU multilateralism in governance and hence serve to establish critical pathways 
into the future and an approach for enhancing the overall efficacy of the system.  
 
136 An example of this is an Open Society Invitation to a DPA official for a Regional Meeting on the Intersection 
of Human Rights and Corruption – Abuja, Nigeria 18-19 June 2009, which provides that cost will be covered, 
including accommodation will be provided at the Nicon Luxury Hotel.  
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Chapter 4: African Union Interventions in the Rule of Law  
AU multilateral intervention in the rule of law has unfolded in a more complex and dissimilar 
manner to those in the area of accountability. The focus has historically been on establishing 
Africa wide rule of law instruments and institutions at the level of the AU, on the basis that 
these would serve to enhance the rule of law within Member States. A central AU 
preoccupation has been with matters of legality, subsidiarity and complementarity within the 
global judicial system. Aside from the adoption of basic human rights instruments, several 
specific interventions relating to constitutionalism, transitional justice and international law 
have emerged since the launch of the AU. A historical outline of these precedes a breakdown 
of practices in the different intervention areas. While attempting to cast the history and 
practices into a coherent framework, there is no overall articulated AU strategy on intervention 
in the rule of law as a basis for deepening integration. The rule of law intervention tapestry 
generally reflects a complex combination of instruments and a flurry of activities. The 
institutional analysis that flows from the outline of interventions suggests a continuing struggle 
between sovereignty and intervention, and the ongoing difficulties of balancing actions with 
available resources.  
4.0 Introduction 
The rule of law establishing the principle that all persons and actions are subject to the law 
(Fukuyama, 2011; Fukuyama, 2014). It further embodies rights and responsibilities, and the 
modalities for mutual coexistence and public engagement. The rule of law predicates itself on 
the existence of a constitution that sets out rights and obligation, including the framework 
within which this is to be exercised and affirmed (Shivute, 2009). It provides for the equality 
of all people and the right of access to courts to secure justice. It rests on the foundation that 
there is acceptance of the rules within society, which includes respect for the courts of law and 
the judiciary in general (Kibet & Fombad, 2017). A vital element of the system is appreciation 
within society that fundamental human rights are respected at all levels and hence not just a 
matter for the courts, but a matter that defines how people and institutions interact with each 
other at multiple levels (Fombad, 2011).  
Fundamental to the rule of law is the existence of a human rights regime in all countries and a 
judicial sector that is capable of securing rights and responsibilities. While closely intertwined 
with accountability and state capacity, the rule of law institutions and system stand as separate 
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and fundamental for mutual coexistence and integration. The rule of law interventions at a 
national level, typically embody efforts directed at enhancing the capacity and independence 
of judicial institutions. The rule of law is also dependent on the existence of a legal community, 
lawyer’s associations, a policing and prosecutorial system and an effective penal system 
(Shivute, 2009). Furthermore, the rule of law is founded on the separation of powers, a system 
for the review of the constitutionality of laws and the control over amendments to a 
constitution. To many, the rule of law is sustainable when there is a culture of rights and when 
there are sustained efforts at building awareness of rights (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2004).  
The rule of law links with issues of constitutionalism and human rights at the level of the AU.  
Aside from references to the separation of powers, the respect of rights, the existence of judicial 
institution and constitutions, there is no specific definition of the rule of law and related 
indicators in any of the AU Charters or Conventions. Within the APRM Questionnaire, there 
are provisions relating to constitutionalism and the rule of law, including the levels of internal 
practice around these (Chikwanha, 2007). Aside from linkages established with a democratic 
system, there is no direct definition of what aspects the establishment of the rule of law would 
incorporate. The absence of any firm definition of the rule of law or related discourse on the 
strategy for building the rule of law at the level of Member States, partly reflects that the rule 
of law area has not really benefited from focused engagements, separate from specific aspects, 
such as human rights or from broader deliberations on governance and democracy.  
A combination of a multiplicity of actions and activities in segmented areas, such as transitional 
justice, constitutionalism, international law and in a range of human rights-related engagement, 
render it difficult to paint a fully coherent outline of the rule of law developments in the AU 
system. Nonetheless, establishing a broader and more encompassing picture of the rule of law 
interventions is vital for an overall analysis of the efficacy of AU multilateral intervention in 
governance. In painting such a picture, it emerged as imperative within the research process 
that there is a careful balance, between having a broad picture of what has unfolded for analysis 
and the detailed work that has unfolded in specific sectorial terrains of engagement. 
4.1 The Rule of Law Initiatives within the African Union 
The rule of law interventions includes those embodied within instruments and those that arise 
from the exercise of agency by AU and related partner institutions. The rule of law 
interventions has primarily been at the level of building AU Organs, such as the Banjul 
Commission, the African Court and the International Law Commission.  There is also specific 
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rule of law developments that have unfolded and reflected in, amongst others, deliberations on 
constitutionalism, on the development of an African Human Rights Strategy and related actions 
directed at introducing a framework for transitional justice. It is vital to begin by engaging with 
development, as they arose from within the OAU, to appreciate the overall evolution of the rule 
of law interventions. The approach serves to build a comprehensive global perspective on core 
intervention initiatives on the back of specific activities, rather than as a means of ensuring that 
every minor development within the AU system is in the analysis.  
4.1.1 The Rule of Law and the OAU 
In the OAU, matters relating to the rule of law were by and large considered to be internal 
affairs beyond the scope of multilateral engagements and interventions. The non-
interventionist posture, coupled with the focus on hastening decolonisation, served to focus 
emphasis on the sovereignty of states over the individual rights of citizens. Member States of 
the OAU nonetheless engaged on the development of the global human rights instruments and 
hence remained seized with the matters. Much of the evidence suggests that African States 
were central in championing the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).  The UN General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration in Paris on the 10th December 
1948 (General Assembly Resolution 217 A). On its own, the OAU itself was particularly active 
on matters relating to the full liberation of the continent, and there were several resolutions 
related to the right of self-determination (Murray, 2004:15). They shift towards a more 
substantive human rights focus within the OAU itself was slow. Initial considerations were 
generally diffused and arose in areas, such as workers’ rights, the rights of refugees and the 
rights of women and children (Murray, 2004:21).  
Within the overall framework of international law, the first OAU Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, Egypt from 17th to 21st July 1964 
decided, among others, to establish a Commission of Jurists as a Specialized Commission of 
the OAU (OAU, 1964). There is no detailed elaboration of what the Commission of Jurists 
would do. The general orientation at the time was that the structure would focus on issues 
related to international law and African engagements thereon. The only substantive work that 
unfolded as a result of this initiative was an advisory note produced on the proceedings of the 
Lockerbie case. The initiative nevertheless served as the early momentum towards a priority 
concern of the AU on the jurisdiction of international law and related issues of legal subsidiarity 
of African institutions.  
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The overall African governance shift experienced in the 1970s, as a result of external and 
internal pressures from civil society, encouraged the OAU to begin work on a human rights 
instrument that would be relevant for African countries. To this end, the ACHPR was adopted 
in 1981. The momentum towards the drafting of the ACHPR unfolded, in some way from the 
1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the African Cultural Charter adopted in 1976 
(Murray, 2004).  
4.1.2 Human and Peoples Rights  
Two core documents, the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action (1999) and the Kigali 
Declaration on Human Rights in Africa (2003), are essential to the AU human rights agenda. 
The Grand Bay Declaration, adopted in Mauritius, placed particular attention on the adopted 
ACHPR and called for the removal of all obstacles for the work of the Banjul Commission and 
the urgent need to provide it with adequate human, material and financial resources (Akokpari 
& Zimbler, 2008b). Within the Kigali Declaration, the assembled Ministers of Human Rights 
further affirmed the Grand Bay Declaration and called on ‘AU Policy Organs to review the 
operation and composition of the African Commission on Peoples’ Rights with a view to 
strengthening its independence and operational integrity and ensuring appropriate gender 
representativity and to report on the progress made to the appropriate AU Organs as soon as 
possible’ (AU, 2003c). 
The ACHPR is different from global human rights instruments in that it makes no distinction 
between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. It also introduces 
the concept of people’s duties and responsibilities. The ACHPR came into force in 1996, after 
receiving the minimum number of State ratifications required for it to enter into force. The 
Banjul Commission, with a small Secretariat, has been established in 1997, with its 
headquarters in The Gambia. The mandate of the Commission encompassed a promotional 
role, the protection of rights in terms of the Charter, as well as any other task given by the AU 
Assembly (Ibrahim, 2012). The ACHPR requires Member States to submit two types of report: 
initial report and periodic report. State Parties initial reports are to be submitted two years after 
ratification or accession to the Charter. Periodic reports are submitted every two years after the 
initial report (AU, 1981). Since establishment, only 11 Member States have submitted all of 
the required reports and six have not provided any report at all. The Banjul Commission 
received over 200 communication related to human rights infringements from individuals and 
organisations.  Ninety-seven of these were decided on merit, and others rejected for a variety 
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of reason, including withdrawal and inadmissibility in the instance of over 100 such 
submissions. Several Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups are established to report on 
different aspects of human rights. As a general practice, the Banjul Commission makes 
resolutions on these reports and a variety of other human rights-related issues during the session 
of the Banjul Commission. Since establishment, the Banjul Commission has had over 63 
Ordinary Session and 25 Extraordinary Session. While most sessions are in Banjul, sessions 
have taken place in, amongst others, Ethiopia, Angola, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Algeria and Benin (Murray, 2004).  
By the time of the 63rd Ordinary Session, held in The Gambia in 2018, 518 regional and national 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were granted observer status, with the ability to 
make statements during the open session of the Banjul Commission. Twenty-nine National 
Human Rights Institutions (NHRI’s) have an affiliate status. The session of the Banjul 
Commission is relatively complex and incorporate some element of conference-type reflections 
through various panel presentation on all subjects of interest, reports from special rapporteurs 
and working groups, mission reports, various internal organisation reports, communications 
and periodic reports from Member States. The sessions are usually held over 10 to 15-day 
period on average. Over 600 delegates, including State Party representatives from 27 countries, 
AU institutions, NGOs and media and over 94 members of the Secretariat, attended the 63rd 
Session in 2018 (Banjul Commission, 2018c).    
The number of meetings and scale of work reflected in the session reports suggest broader 
coverage and engagements. There is criticism of the Banjul Commission, and many have 
questioned its power as Member States ignores recommendations, communications, and 
conclusions. While the Commission accounts to the Assembly as part of its activity reports, 
they hardly ever illicit detailed discussions and follow up actions (Mugwanya, 1999). In 
response to the criticism, the Banjul Commission has appointed consultants in 2018 to do a 
detailed study on its impact since establishment (Banjul Commission, 2018b).  While such an 
impact study may be useful for assessing the efficacy of the Banjul Commission in itself, it 
would not add substantive value to a broader reflection on the overall efficacy of AU actions 
in the rule of law and hence the overall governance intervention system137.  The isolation of 
specific intervention outside of the overall governance intervention system and its value for 
integration and governance in Member States may only serve to deepen the fragmentation and 
 
137 At the time of writing, the consultant’s report was not yet publically available for study.  
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incoherence that AGA and the AU reform process is attempting to address.   
4.1.3 Sector Specific Human Rights Instruments  
Aside from the ACHPR, several additional sector-specific human rights instruments and 
protocols have emerged in the AU system. Of particular significance is the adoption of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC). This Charter mirrors the 
ACHPR in many respects and includes the establishment of the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). The Committee was established in 2002 
(Lloyd, 2002). In operational terms, the Department of Social Affairs at the AUC serves as the 
Secretariat to the ACERWC. The ACERWC has held numerous meeting since its 
establishment, which incorporates the consideration of individual country reports and 
individual communications. It largely mirrors the work unfolding within the Banjul 
Commission in its specific terrain of focus (Filali, 2013). Despite the significant role accorded 
to the ACERWC, there is a perspective that it has not been able to function effectively because 
of a lack of resources and adequate human resource capacity (Lloyd, 2002).  
African women rights organisations expressed concern that the ACHPR did not adequately 
address the issue of women rights and after intensive lobbying, the AU Assembly adopted a 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.  The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa 
entered into force in November 2005, after being ratified by 15 African governments. In 
accordance, with the provision of the protocol, compliance with and implementation of the 
protocol will be supervised by the Banjul Commission (Adams & Kang, 2007). As part of the 
overall momentum of expanding considerations, primarily driven by the high levels of civil 
society activism, the AU adopted in 2017 an added protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Older Persons in Africa. A further draft protocol on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
Africa has been formulated for submission to the Assembly. Several guidelines and documents 
have also been developed and include areas such as access to information on elections, the right 
to water, mining and the environment, xenophobia and racism138. Access by civil society to the 
Banjul Commission has generally paved the way for submissions and work from a range of 
organisation seeking to influence the policy environment and actions at the level of Member 
States. Many of the documents drafted are the products of active advocacy actions from CSOs 
and other regional organisations. A general review of all the Communiqué of the Sessions of 
 
138 Information extracted from the website of the Banjul Commission - www.achpr.org/  
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the Banjul Commissions reflects a long history of the broadening of focus and considerations 
that feature in deliberations.  
4.1.4 Constitutionalism  
In addition to the shift towards the incorporation of rights within the overall governance 
architecture of the AU, there was a growing concern within the AU on matters relating to 
constitutionalism and the transfer of political power across African countries. The concern is 
reflected in the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and the 
2000 Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government 
(Vandeginste, 2013:2). These concerns were eventually addressed directly through specific 
provision on constitutionalism in ACDEG. ACDEG details actions against States in the 
instance of unconstitutional changes of government. To many ACDEG serves as the primary 
reference point on issues relating to the transfer of power and the principle of constitutionalism 
at the level of Member States. There have been numerous instances where AU and ACDEG 
served as reference points for internal actors when states amend constitutions for extending the 
terms limits of Presidents or in instances where power transfer is outside of a constitutional 
process (Matlosa, 2008; Matlosa, 2014).  
Since formation, the AU has engaged in a range of diplomatic engagements on the transfer of 
power, especially as they relate to constitutional changes, including, in many instances, the 
extension of term limits of Heads of State and Government. The PSC has since formation 
engaged in deliberation and decisions to secure the constitutional transfer of power (Cilliers et 
al., 2004; Williams, 2014; Wachira, 2017). By February 2009, the Assembly reaffirmed a 
concern with unconstitutional transfer of power and its support for the efforts of the PSC. It 
furthermore called on Member States to ratify ACDEG and called on the Chairperson of the 
Commission ‘to submit concrete recommendations relating to the implementation of 
appropriate preventive measures against unconstitutional changes of government, as well as to 
the enhancement of efficiency and capacity building in early warning, good offices and 
mediation, including the Panel of the Wise’(AU, 2009b).  
Despite various efforts to affirm the AU concern with constitutionalism, and in particular the 
appropriate transfer of power, changes in Egypt in 2014 and Zimbabwe in 2017, raised 
concerns around the broader principle of constitutional changes and the realities that unfold in 
each situation. The concern has encouraged further efforts on the more detailed development 
of guidelines related to the provision of ACDEG.  To this end, the PSC mandated DPA to 
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develop guidelines to ensure AU Member States only amend their constitutions in compliance 
to Article 10 of ACDEG to avoid the possibility of breaching Article 23 of Charter on the 
constitutional transfer of power (AU, 2018d).  By 2018, the matter remains on the agenda of 
the AUC and indication are that further work is unfolding on the development of approaches 
to affirm constitutionality and the appropriate transfer of power139 (AU, 2014a; Wiebusch, 
2016).  
Of some significance to the constitutional momentum within the AU was a decision to create 
an ‘African Constitutional Justice space’ at the initiative of Algeria, during the fifteenth session 
of the Conference of Heads of State and Government held from 25 to 27 July 2010 in Kampala, 
Uganda. The initiative, now known as the Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions in Africa 
(CCJA), with a headquarters in Algeria, is ostensibly established to ‘federate our energies and 
strengthen the commitment of our continent to universal values and principles of the rule of 
law, of democracy and human rights, clearly expressed in the Constituent Act of the AU and 
reasserted in the ACDEG’ (AUC, 2010).  While established by a decision of the AU Assembly, 
the organisation functions autonomously from the AU with direct funding from Judiciaries 
from 34 Member States and with an arm’s length relationship with other AU institutions.  In 
general, the conference creates a space for the exchange of information and knowledge and 
some level of solidarity amongst judicial institutions from Member States140.   
4.1.5 African Human Rights Strategy 
To enhance coordination, the DPA, working with the UN, initiated a process of developing a 
common and overarching African human rights strategy in 2009. The genesis of the idea of 
having an overarching African human rights strategy unfolded within a UN-driven ‘10 Year 
Capacity Building Programme for AU’. The initial rationale for the development of the strategy 
was the UN concern with the existence of overlapping global and continental instruments and, 
in particular, the periodic reporting requirements associated with the global UN human rights 
instruments, relative to the ACHPR process (UNECA, 2014). The AU Human Rights Strategy 
 
139 Within the Annual Report of the Chairperson on the Activities of the African Union Commission, presented to 
the Executive Council Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 23 – 27 January 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it is noted 
that ‘...a workshop took place in Pretoria, South Africa in July 2014. The workshop assessed the state of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa and   highlighted the challenges of entrenching constitutionalism 
and respect for the rule of   law, with a particular focus on unconstitutional changes of government. It also   
contributed to the development of a comprehensive definition of unconstitutional   changes of government that 
will lead to a common understanding of the phenomenon’ (AU, 2014a) 
140 Details of the role and functioning of the Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions in Africa are contained on 
its website http://www.cjca-conf.org/.   
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finalised in 2011 unfolded based on a more detailed ‘mapping study’ of human rights 
interventions across the continent and, in particular, the efforts unfolding within RECs. The 
final and more operational strategy document produced by DPA sets as an objective the 
enhanced coordination and coherence among AU organs, RECs and Member States on human 
rights. The strategy focused on issues of capacity building for human rights, including the 
promotion of human rights instruments (AUC, 2012). At the level of active coordination, it 
primarily suggests that further actions will unfold within the context of AGP cluster on Human 
Rights. One of the significant expressed concerns in the strategy was that there are overlapping 
instruments and institutions amongst RECs. These included the SADC Protocol of 1992 which 
committed its members to human rights and included the establishments of the, now defunct, 
SADC Tribunal. Also, the East African Community established the East Africa Court, which 
included jurisdiction over human rights. In June 2007, the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the EAC adopted a decision to establish a Regional Bill of Rights. ECOWAS 
has also established a Court of Justice (AUC, 2012) 
The human rights strategy initiative preceded the establishment of AGA and directed at 
building a more coordinated approach to human rights across the continent. It culminated in 
the adoption of a working plan on human rights that involved civil society actors. The overall 
orientation was to establish an overarching framework for the coordination of a range of 
activities to be undertaken by continental and regional civil society formation. By March 2017 
the initiative was incorporated into the work of the Human Rights and Transitional Justice 
Cluster of AGA. While the discourse on the plan was that it would guide collective action on 
integration into the future, the momentum was overtaken by the AU declaring 2017 to 2027 
the Decade of Human Rights. By March 2017, the clusters focus shifted towards the 
development of an Action Plan on implementing the Human and Peoples Rights decade in 
Africa, as adopted by the Summit in early 2017. The draft plans mostly focused on the 
possibility of establishing initiatives in the following areas: a) Inculcate a culture of human 
rights awareness, b) enhancement of States commitment to the existing human rights 
obligations, c) human rights institutional strengthening, d) development and African 
integration, and e) transformative human rights leadership (DPA, 2017c). The precise value of 
the collective engagements and strategy and how funded would flow for these are not fully 
engaged upon by the AGP Cluster or by individual members. 
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4.1.6 Transitional Justice  
Embedded in peace, security and mediation approaches in the AU are debates around 
transitional justice. The idea of having a formalised framework for transitional justice has been 
introduced through the activism and advocacy of the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR). The organisation actively pushed the DPA to incorporate a transitional 
justice policy framework. Since 2011, numerous meetings, consultative, conferences and 
engagements too place around a draft African Transitional Justice Policy Framework (ATJPF) 
crafted by officials of CSVR. The documents unfolded through numerous interactions and were 
subject to a variety of engagements with Member States, AU institutions, and groupings of 
experts.  There were also engagements directed at ensuring that the framework incorporates 
gender and youth-related perspectives (CSVR, 2013).  
The development of the ATJPF was on the basis that it would serve to consolidate principles 
of transitional justice embedded in other AU instruments and frameworks. The draft document 
submitted for review by the STC on Justice and Legal Affairs for finalisation. The AU 
Assembly formally adopted the document in 2019 (CSVR, 2019). DPA and CSVR continue to 
arrange conferences and related learning engagements on the implementation of the 
framework. While the ATJPF does not feature as a core priority of the AU, the range of 
activities that have unfolded on the policy framework since 2011 has necessitated substantive 
effort on the part of the DPA. The resources for actual activities flowed from a variety of donors 
and mainly through the efforts of CSVR and most often directly through the financial systems 
of the organisations. While the DPA was a key partner within the process through an agreed 
MOU with CSVR, accountability for resources utilised was with CSVR (CSVR, 2013).  
4.1.7 The African Court  
The protocol establishing the African Court for Human and Peoples Rights (the African Court) 
was adopted on the 10th June 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and entered into force on 
the 1st January 2004. The court’s jurisdiction extends to all cases and disputes submitted to it 
concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter, the protocol and any other 
relevant human rights instruments ratified by Member States. The court has the power to issue 
advisory opinions on issues relevant to the ACHPR. Such an opinion can be requested by 
Member States, AU Organs and any other African organisation recognised by the AU 
(Udombana, 2000a). The protocol on the Court provides that state parties undertake to comply 
with judgements and provides that it notifies the Executive Council, which also monitors 
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execution on the part of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Individuals and non-
governmental organisation can submit cases directly only if their State Parties have made a 
separate declaration that allows the court to hear such cases (Udombana, 2000a). While a 
separate protocol establishes the Court, the AU Constitutive Act provides for the establishment 
of the African Court of Justice. Although the African Court of Justice is meant to be separate 
to the African Court for Human and Peoples Rights, the AU decided during July 2004 to merge 
the African Court with the African Court of Justice. The administration of the protocols would 
be through relevant chambers of the new Court. The protocol for the merged Court has yet to 
be ratified by the required number for its to be in force and hence, the African Court continues 
to function under the initial protocol establishing it (Murungu, 2011).  
The operationalisation of the Court with headquarter is in Arusha, Tanzania has taken some 
time. Access to the Court is limited. States parties, the Banjul Commission, and African 
intergovernmental organisations have standing in contentious cases. Individuals and NGOs 
may petition the Court directly solely where a State has made the optional declaration 
recognising such petitions, under Article 34(6) of the founding Protocol (Jones, 2017). In terms 
of its jurisprudence, the Court issued its first interim judgment in 2009 but did not issue a full 
merits judgment until 2013. To date, the Court has handed down around 50 merits judgments. 
Many of the Court’s judgments have struck at highly sensitive areas of public policy, including 
the constitutional order and the use of state power. Enforcement of court rulings are far from 
guaranteed, and no dedicated body was established to monitor enforcement of the Court’s 
judgments. The Court is required to submit to the Assembly of Heads and Government a report 
on its work in which it ‘shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied 
with the Court’s judgment.’ The Executive Council will assist the Assembly by monitoring the 
execution of the Court’s judgments on its behalf (Ibrahim, 2012).  
4.1.8 The Commission on International Law and Sector STC.  
The provisions of Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU serves to establish the African 
Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL) as an advisory organ of the Union (Kilangi, 
2013). The operational decision to establish the Commission arose from a meeting of experts 
held to review of OAU/AU Treaties. The actual impetus for the AUCIL was the adoption of 
the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, wherein the Member States 
undertook the task to establish the AUCIL under Article 14 of the Pact. The AUCIL primarily 
focuses on developing common approaches to international legal development, as well as to 
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continue to work towards maintaining standards in critical areas of international law (AU, 
2015a). However, it has also affirmed as an objective action directed at assisting in the revision 
of existing AU legal treaties, advise in the identification of areas in which new treaties are 
required and prepare drafts thereof and to conduct studies on legal matters that are of interest 
to Member States (Kilangi, 2013). The Legal Counsel of the AU serves as the Secretariat of 
the AUCIL. Of particular significance to the work of the AUCIL and broader issues relating to 
legality within the AU system, was the launching in 2014 of the STC on Justice and Legal 
Affairs. The STC was historically arranged as meetings of African Ministers of Justice. Since 
the establishment of this STC, the primary focus has been on it serving as a conduit for all AU 
legal instruments and hence not necessarily as a terrain within which there is consideration of 
the rule of law developments within Member States. This orientation also generally ties in with 
the AU preoccupation with issues of subsidiarity, in light of the contestations on matters 
relating to the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (AU, 2011b).  
The participation of AU Member States in the ICC and hence the implication for actions in 
instances where the ICC issued a warrant of arrest for sitting Presidents have forced some 
dialogue on the role of African institutions, such as the African Court. While African countries 
were initially supportive of the ICC, the relationship degenerated in 2008 when the Court 
indicted President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan141. Following this move, the AU adopted a hostile 
posture towards the ICC (AU 2011a). The AU called for its member states to implement a 
policy of non-cooperation with the ICC at the same time as asserting that the African Court 
should implement the anti-impunity norm. While an AU summit voted to expand the 
jurisdiction of the African Court in 2014 to include international crimes, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity, it also voted to exclude sitting Heads of State and Government from 
the new court’s jurisdiction. At the same time as asserting the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Assembly essentially reaffirmed a practice of protecting Heads of State and Government that 
was prevalent in the OAU. Legality, subsidiarity and the ability of citizens to escalate cases at 
the continental and global to seek justice remains a matter of continuing difficulty (Van der 
Wilt, 2017).  
 
141 See for example the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction adopted at the 




4.1.9 Broader Rule of Law Engagements 
While it is possible to speak of an African Multilateral Human Rights systems and relevant 
strategies, even though somewhat disjointed and scattered between protocols and institutions, 
it is difficult to establish and articulate the broad parameters of a system that is directed at 
enhancing the rule of law amongst Member States. Outside of the established protocols relating 
to human rights issues, the more considerable concern with the rule of law, in general, are 
embedded in the APRM process. The first objective of the APRM Questionnaire focuses on 
entrenching constitutionalism and the rule of law (APRM, 2015). The implications of this are 
that the rule of law practices that are established in Members State would be engaged upon by 
the APRM Panel.  
At the level of the DPA, there has been a range of activities directed at enhancing a more 
collective approach to human rights beyond the capacity oriented strategy adopted at an 
operational level. Actions include the promotion of various celebratory or commemoration 
activities at the level of the AU, including African Human Rights Day142 (AUC, 2018b) and 
the Rwanda Genocide (AUC, 2019b). The DPA generally takes the lead on issuing statements 
on African Human Rights Day on the 21st October of each year. The DPA has also continuously 
engaged in research partnerships around the African human rights systems and takes a 
leadership role in the efforts of the human rights cluster in the AGP. In response to concern 
around human rights violations in specific countries, where the AU has a role in brokering 
peace, such as in the instance of Mali and Burundi, the DPA also facilitated the deployment of 
human rights monitoring experts (AUC, 2017b).  
Since 2015 the DPA has arranged several consultative events related to the rule of law, under 
the overall theme of ‘engaging traditional and informal structures and members of the judiciary 
to promote the rule of law’. Amongst the articulated objectives for the events was the sharing 
of experiences and strengthening of national-level justice structures (AUC, 2017c).  The 
precise value of the events and the reason they are consultative is not clear. The DPA also 
worked with IDEA, amongst others on an initiative to develop a database of African 
Constitutions and on the development of a substantive perspective on Constitutionalism in 
Africa (DPA, 2019). The value to the AU mandate of the initiatives, including the DPA 
 
142 During its fifth (5th) Ordinary Session held in Benghazi, Libya in 1989, the ACHPR adopted Resolution 
ACHPR/Res.1(V)89 on the celebration of an African Day of Human and Peoples' Rights. It is for this reason that 




arranged events are not articulated fully in the available documentation and hence generally 
stands as information and knowledge activities. At the level of the AUC, and in particular the 
DPA, the general orientation suggests a movement from event to an event outside of any 
coherence on strategy or mandate. More recently, the DPA has engaged with the Private Sector 
on Human Rights and arranged a series of other forums with partners, such as the UN143. In 
general, there has been a flurry of activities related to all aspects of human rights over the last 
decade, including, amongst others, the linkages with development, health and corruption.  
4.2 Rule of Law Interventions 
It is essential to engage with the rule of law interventions systematically across the different 
intervention modalities to appreciate the development of the AU institutional system and 
related actions that have unfolded. The interventional analysis serves to build a deeper 
understanding of the working implementation modalities, both as it relates to the interactions 
at the level of multilateral engagements and the level of active implementation. The essence of 
the descriptive overview that follows is to provide a more detailed account of how 
implementation actions unfold in the AU system and hence to bring to the fore some of the 
contradiction, challenges and nuances embedded in the mandate establishment and 
implementation nexus.  In the terrain of actions, there is substantive overlap between what 
unfolds in one part of the intervention terrain and other parts. The approach nevertheless is to 
engage methodically to facilitate reflections on the efficacy of the system.   
4.2.1 Compliance and Sanctions 
The compliance value and orientation of ACDEG are engaged upon in the terrain of 
accountability interventions. While ACDEG is now in force for the Member States that have 
ratified, the reality is that reporting on compliance has been slow. ACDEG remains imperative 
for the AU as it an instrument directed at securing the rule of law compliance as it has 
substantive provisions relating to constitutionalism, the separation of powers and on human 
rights. Outside of the formal baseline and periodic reporting process, ACDEG has served to 
inform compliance-related engagements from PSC. The PSC has adopted several ACDEG 
related decisions in situations where changes in government were deemed to be 
unconstitutional. However, aside from the suspension of membership of a country experiences 
 




crisis, further and more direct forms of sanction have proven to be challenging for the AU 
(Wiebusch, 2016). Beyond the deployment of diplomats and technical teams to engage in local 
negotiations to overcome a constitutional crisis, compliance to instances of ACDEG 
contravention has proven difficult for the AU. The general process in situations of crisis, is for 
the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AUC, working on its own or with DPA and 
other institutions, to brief the PSC and produce a substantive resolution or decisions on the 
challenges confronted and the actions to be taken (Wachira, 2017). Even though ACDEG, from 
a State Party reporting perspective, is not implemented, it has, together with preceding AU 
decisions on constitutionalism, been a central point of reference for compliance-related 
engagements. Detailed studies, however, demonstrate that the approach of the PSC has never 
really been consistent with the provisions of ACDEG and generally the approach has been 
towards open mediation to resolve crises in order to avoid conflict, rather than as a strategy to 
ensure compliance (Dersso, 2019). The following table reflects a selection of compliance-
oriented sanctions taken by the AU since establishment in 2002.  
Table 17: Sanction Imposed by the AU  
Country  
 
Year  Country  Year 
Central African Republic  2003  Mali  2012 
Togo  2005  Guinee Bissau  2012 
Guinea  2008  Central African Republic 2013 
Madagascar  2009  Egypt 2011 
Mauritania  2008  Libya 2011 
Niger  2010  Burkina Faso  2014 
  Burundi  2015 
Source: As extracted from the data collated from the AU.  
The sanction approach of the AU has historically unfolded in the form of the suspension of 
membership. Reinstatement of Membership is within a few months after compliance in the 
forms of election or some indication of the reestablishment of constitutional order, including 
appropriate transitional or unity arrangements. This mode of sanction has been considered 
weak and without any substantive compliance effect (Bedzigui, 2018; Sithole, 2018). However, 
the formal announcement of sanctions through membership suspension and continuing focus 
with the matter by the PSC often served to embolden local level pressures for change and 
concomitantly a transition to constitutional order. The sanction is typically accompanied by 
more direct diplomatic mediation efforts led by the PSC (Bedzigui, 2018).  
The rule of law compliance is driven partially through the structure of Banjul Commission and 
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the African Court. The Commission serves as a channel for State Parties reporting on 
compliance with the ACHPR. The Banjul Commission may also hear individual instances of 
human right violation and can engage in studies in specific areas of concern through the 
establishment of Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups. Reports of the Commission are 
made public and can hence serve to drive forward compliance. The report of the Banjul 
Commission is presented in a consolidated summary form to the Executive Council and 
Assembly (Banjul Commission, 2018a). A decision on the Banjul Commissions report serves 
as an added channel for securing compliance. The general presumption is that decisions would 
drive related compliance changes at the level of State Parties and thereby improve respect for 
human rights across Member States. While there remains substantive optimism on the part of 
civil society with the work of the Banjul Commission, the reality is that it does not have any 
substantive power or ability to effect compliance (Wachira & Ayinla, 2006). There are 
numerous instances where recommendations are ignored without any substantive reason. The 
logic of continuing on the part of securing compliance remains an aspirational hope on the part 
of civil society144. While the session of the Banjul Commission has become a source of 
excitement for African civil society and many meetings are held before and in parallel to the 
session, the substantive value and impact of the sessions and related work lack any real 
evidence (Ndulo, 2008; Dinokopila, 2013).  
To many, the establishment of the African Court served to create a much stronger possibility 
of securing respect for justice and human rights in Member States. In instances where 
individuals and organisation are unable to secure rights at a national level, they may, subject to 
whether a State Party has approved such a channel, take the case to the African Court. By the 
time of the Year on Human Rights (2016), the Court reviewed over 54 cases, with a substantive 
number being from the host country, Tanzania145. While the court has made numerous 
judgements, the level of compliance to these has been low, and some states have reported that 
they are unable to implement the Courts orders146 (AU, 2019a). Even though ratification 
implies that there will be compliance with Courts orders, in practice, this is not happening 
 
144  A detailed reading of the activity reports of the Banjul Commission and related sessions held, suggest that 
there is generally substantive interest from wider civil society and much excitement with the sessions and the 
pronouncements that arise from these, but there is little documented evidence on the impact of the Banjul 
Commission and the substantive real governance value that arises from its activities and reports.  
145 In judgements delivered by the Court in 2018, eleven (11) of eighteen (18), were cases from Tanzania (AU, 
2019a).  
146 Evidence of the low levels of compliance is evident in the Activity Report of the African Court On Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session of Executive Council 07 - 08 February 2019, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia (AU, 2019a).  
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(Ndulo, 2008). In theory, non-compliance could facilitate further actions on the part of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, but this has not happened in any of the cases. 
There is much to suggest some level of active resistance and reversals in human rights 
compliance and agency on the part of Member States because of the Banjul Commission and 
the African Court. Compliance on matters of the rule of law, including constitutionalism and 
human rights has generally been difficult to effect within the AU system. While there is a no-
tolerance approach on matters relating to the constitutional transfer of power, the AU system 
has struggled to engage the matter considering the numerous popular uprising that emerged in 
North Africa and more recently in Southern Africa. Popular uprisings have prompted some 
additional reflection within the AU on building a better definition of what constitutes 
unconstitutional changes of government.  
4.2.2 Peer Review and Diplomacy 
Diplomatic engagements on the rule of law issues have unfolded since the formation of the 
AU. Within the framework of APSA, the AU has deployed numerous diplomatic mission and 
delegations to deal with constitutional and human rights related challenges that emerge within 
Member States. Resolutions presented to the PSC by the DPS serve to affirm the diplomatic 
approach to rule of law challenges. The sending of diplomatic peace missions is a standing 
operating approach in situations of crisis for the DPS147. The rationale for such an orientation 
emerged as one of the outcomes of the report of the Panel of the Wise on Conflict and Election 
in Africa, within which the panel recommended that its members serve to assist with 
peacebuilding through longer-term diplomatic engagements (Gerenge, 2015).  
The momentum towards peace negotiations and long sustained diplomatic engagements arose 
since the birth of the AU and related peace-building efforts in the instance of Burundi, the 
DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, CAR and more recently in Libya, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, amongst 
others. Outside of AU peace operations in Darfur and Somalia, diplomatic mission-driven 
approaches fully characterise the work of DPS and unfold somewhat separately to the 
governance work associated with the DPA and other AU institutions that are a party to the 
AGP. Funding for diplomatic engagements to secure peace is through the Peace Fund 
established and managed by PSD. Typically, PSD would deploy technical individuals in 
 
147 This approach to resolving situations of crisis has been documented by numerous authors (Cilliers et al., 2004; 
Engel et al., 2009; Williams, 2014) and is reflected in the numerous decisions of the PSC available on the website 
of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)  https://issafrica.org/pscreport .  
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countries to support senior diplomats, which in many instances are either former Presidents or 
other notable individuals, such as Kofi Anan in the case of Kenya. Of significant importance 
to the diplomatic initiatives of the AU is the established Panel of the Wise. Since its inception, 
the Panel engaged with the tense electoral and political processes in Guinea (2010); Egypt and 
Tunisia in the wake of the Arab Spring; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2011); 
Senegal (2012); Sierra Leone and Ghana (2012); and Kenya (2013) (Van Wyk, 2016).  
While some diplomatic missions may be of a short-term nature or entail a series of structured 
engagements over months, others are of a longer-term nature and entail establishing local 
offices in a country. Local offices have been established in Sudan, Burundi, the DRC and Mali, 
among others. Very often the AU would be one amongst many other actors engaged in local 
negotiations and interactions. The individual leading would also present reports to the PSC, 
especially when these unfold at the level of the Summit. Diplomatic engagements typically 
also unfold in close consultation with REC and the PSD has since around 2011 appointed senior 
officials and placed them at various RECs. As the driving orientation of the diplomatic 
engagements is on securing peace and ‘silencing the guns’ the precise value for securing the 
rule of law requires in-depth reflection. The substantive issue here is to highlight that the 
approach has somewhat emerged as a central operational practice for the AU system and 
probably stands as the most expenditure intensive terrain of all AU related interventions 
(Wachira, 2017).  
 DP and TP, such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(ACCORD), provide direct support for the mediation approach embodied in APSA. Diplomatic 
engagements range from short-run interactions to long-run intervention with the establishment 
of mission offices in specific countries. In several instances, the PSC would establish a high-
level panel for interactions. Diplomatic and mediation efforts are through APSA, which 
includes a variety of related military structures, early warning approaches and the Panel of the 
Wise (Murithi, 2008). While APSA functions somewhat separately to AGA related compliance 
instrument and the APRM, there has historically been a strong motivation for more profound 
synergy, given the imperative of securing governance compliance within mediation process 
(Wachira, 2017). The decision of the November 2018 Extraordinary Summit on Reforms to 
merge DPS and DPA, in part, reflects the commitment of Member States towards more 
functional linkages between mediation and governance compliance.  
At the level of peer review, the focus on the rule of law is an integral part of the APRM process 
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as embodied in the APRM Questionnaire. Questions on the rule of law are dispersed across 
several objective areas (APRM, 2015). The overall peer-review process is captured in the 
accountability chapter. The importance practice-related issue to outline here is that the rule of 
law does not constitute a separate and substantive terrain of focus outside of the areas germane 
to the APRM. Some elements of peer engagement on human rights issues, however, have 
emerged in the context of knowledge and information exchange initiatives that arise from 
conferences and events arranged by the DPA and other AU institutions involved in human 
rights. These will be considered in the sections that follow. As a matter of practice and given 
the substantive overlap between the ACHPR and the APRM Questionnaire, the APRM Panel 
has more recently been presenting its reports for reflection at the Banjul Commission (Banjul 
Commission, 2019).   
4.2.3 Information and Knowledge Exchange 
Since the first African Conference on the rule of law in 1961, which served as an impetus, for 
the Banjul Commission and the African Court, numerous conference, workshops and events 
have been arranged by AU institutions within the broader the rule of law terrain148. Of 
particular significance for the DPA has been Conferences arranged through its partnership with 
technical institutions, such as IDEA. At the level of Constitutionalism, IDEA arranged a 
Conference in 2009 and included the development of a substantive paper on the state of 
Constitutionalism in Africa. The driving perspective from the Conference was that the terrain 
requires much more engagement with Member States of the AU so that the ideas of 
constitutionalism in all countries would take root (Gutto, 2011).  
While the AU continues to engage with the challenge of unconstitutional changes of 
government and how it should respond, in view of numerous instances of popular and 
widespread protest driven changes, as in the instance of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, further 
activities related to Constitutionalism have been arranged by IDEA within the framework of 
its partnership with DPA. A substantive workshop on the challenges to the rule of law has been 
arranged in partnership with the AUC in 2016. The workshop incorporated the production of a 
substantive paper on the issues, as generated by senior consultants on behalf of IDEA. The 
overall logic of the workshop is that it would generate perspectives to assist the AUC and the 
 
148 A general review of available data from the DPA indicates that numerous meetings, workshops and conferences 
have been arranged since 2016 on the issue of Constitutionalism and the rule of law. The outcomes from these 
events and their specific policy and implementation purpose is less clear as, at most, they feature as activities in 
the reports of the Chairperson of the Commission to the AU Assembly.  
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AU with the implementation of initiatives associated with the affirmation of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism in the continent149. While affirmed as an event unfolding in partnership with 
the AUC and benefiting from the participation of relevant DPA officials, the deliberations 
unfolded outside of any direct linkages with AU decision structures or outside of any direct 
impact on what unfolds amongst AU institutions.  
As with the area of accountability, the general approach to work within the DPA is event-driven 
and includes various meetings, workshops, consultation and conferences. The event-driven 
approach has mainly been in the case of Human Rights. Officials in DPA have arranged 
numerous events since the formation of the AU on Human Rights issues. Information and 
knowledge related events include specific engagements with the NHRIN driven by the DPA. 
The area of ‘transitional justice’ reflects the propensity of arranging a range of consultative and 
reflective conferences and workshops within the overall AU system. Very often, the events 
would be directly arranged by a partner institution with funding from DP. In the instance of 
‘transitional justice,’ numerous events were arranged by CSVR directly or in partnership with 
the DPA. The following table provides a summary of some of the events arranged since the 
initiation of the ATJPF process in 2011.  
Table 18: Events Related to Transitional Justice  
Nature of Event 
 
Place Year 
Continental Forum on Transitional Justice in Africa  
 
South Africa  2017  
Workshop for the Human Rights Institutions and the Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms in Darfur on 18-19 July 2016 
Ethiopia  2017 
Two-day validation workshop on the draft African Union Transitional Justice 
Policy 
Zambia  2017 
Dialogue on a Cooperative Framework on Human Rights and Transitional 
Justice Mechanisms in Darfur 
Uganda  2016 
Continental Youth Consultation on the AU Transitional Justice Policy 
(AUTJP) 
Kenya  2016 
Continental Experts Consultative Dialogue: Applying a Gender Lens to the 
Draft African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP).  
Uganda  2016 
Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the AU Transitional Justice 
Policy Framework 
South Africa 2015 
Ensuring A Holistic Gender Approach to The African Transitional Justice 
Policy Framework Expert Consultation.  
Togo  2012 
Expert’s Review of African Transitional Justice Framework 
 
Togo  2012 
African Union Commission Consultation with African Union Member States 
on Transitional Justice 
Ethiopia  2011 
 
149 Details of this are contained in the Challenges to the rule of law in Africa Workshop report 12–13 April 2016 




Expert Consultation with Policy Makers of the relevant AU Organs on 
Transitional Justice 
South Africa  2011 
Consultations on Transitional Justice  
 
The Gambia  2011 
Source: Systematically extracted from the AU website  
Within the DPA, substantive attention is focused on arranging and participating in events. On 
an annual basis, the DPA would arrange events with National Human Rights Institutions and 
with a range of other partners in the terrain, including UN agencies. Within the broader fold of 
the AU–EU partnership, a consultative forum was established on Human Rights, and 
engagements are organised annually for interactions. The event is formally defined as having 
a learning and sharing of experiences purpose, the precise value for the AU and building the 
rule of law, including human rights, at the level of Member States is not clear. Such events are 
also arranged between the AU and UN agencies in the terrain of human rights150.  
While the DPA, the Banjul Commission and the African Court arrange numerous events within 
their terrain of focus, they have been slow in generating knowledge product from these 
initiatives. In general terms, brief reports will be produced for accountability to DP and internal 
submission, but with little follow-up actions. In the main, many of the events arranged would 
be funded directly by DP and often through the active efforts of TP.151 Outside of these AU 
institutions, the Commission of International Law has defined itself as having a more proactive 
knowledge and information role. To this end, the Commission sees itself as ‘conducting studies 
on legal matters of interest to the Union and its Member States; and as having a role to 
encourage the teaching, study, publication and dissemination of literature on international law, 
in particular, the laws of the Union with a view to promoting acceptance of and respect for the 
principles of international law, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for the Union and 
recourse to its Organs, when necessary’(Kilangi, 2013). In a short space of time, the 
Commission has established a Journal of the Commission on International Law. A few issues 
have been published and generally serve to broaden perspectives on the challenges that 
confront the continent in the terrain of international law.  
 
150 Numerous internal documents from the DPA reflect the range of events arranged since the establishment of 
the AU. Events with the NHRIN are generally arranged an annual basis. But these are contingent on the 
availability of DP resources 
151 An example of this is a workshop held on the 27th September on Strengthening Human Rights Based Approach to 




4.2.4 Capacity Building and Technical Support  
As a delivery partner of the AU, IDEA has worked on several initiatives that focus on capacity 
building for Constitutionalism in Africa. The general orientation is to organise workshop-type 
events for country representatives. The substantive value of these for Member States is not a 
subject of engagement.  The DPA initiatives with the National Human Rights Institutes 
Network (NHRIN) has historically unfolded as direct capacity development initiatives. 
However, the events generally unfold as broad conference-type engagements with a focus on 
sharing information on AU initiatives and practice sharing amongst human rights institutions 
(AUC, 2017a). There is no evidence of AU implementation institutions direct efforts to build 
capacity at the level of individual Member States. The general orientation is to arrange 
continental or regional events for knowledge exchange purposes.  
As part of its overall efforts to enhance knowledge and capacity for regional and global law 
engagements, the Commission of International Law is actively promoting the idea of building 
broader capacity in the area and developing curriculum as it relates to International Law. 
Processes around this have been slow, and there have not been any substantive actions in this 
direction. Within the framework of the African Human Rights Strategy, there are provisions 
relating to capacity development of the AU institutions and Member States in human rights. 
However, there is little evidence of implementation, beyond workshops and conferences 
directed at the sharing of information. Within the broader the rule of law space, it is difficult to 
establish if any initiatives directly focus on Member States. While capacity building is an 
expressed objective, there is little available human resources to engage this directly, beyond 
the regional engagements and sharing of information on what is unfolding in the continent on 
human rights.  
4.3 Institutional Analysis  
The analytical overview of the rule of law interventions that have unfolded and the related 
implementation practices point to the reality that much of the AU preoccupation has been in 
the specific terrain of human rights and the functioning of related institutions. There has also 
been a range of interventions directed at broadening the scope of human rights and including 
more extensive areas of concern in the continent, relating to, amongst others, particular 
sectorial communities, such as children, women, the disabled, the aged and the role of the 
business sector. There is furthermore a proliferation of engagements, coordination meetings 
and conferences within the human rights terrain. While an AGA the rule of law cluster exists, 
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the terrain is generally marked by the absence of any real coherence or focused strategic 
orientation. Although there have been numerous Human Rights Strategy Meetings and related 
Action Planning Sessions on the decade of Human Rights, the terrain remains very scattered 
and generally reflects a shifting between events without any substantive real strategic 
orientation or coordination. It is imperative to analyse the interventions at the level of 
multilateral engagements and, in particular, the role of Member States of the AU, and at the 
level of multilateral implementation, as signified by actions that unfolded within 
implementation processes, in order to establish the core efficacy related challenges in the area. 
4.3.1 Multilateral Engagements  
At the level of multilateralism engagements, the rule of law terrain is somewhat different to 
unfolds in the accountability space, as engagements of Member States are primarily within the 
framework of the Banjul Commission and the African Court. Contestations are less about 
competing norms, but more about the issue of sovereignty and subsidiarity of legality within 
the African and international legal system. Before engaging with the rule of law interactions as 
they relate to internal realities in member States, the analysis begins with the matter of power 
and sovereignty as it relates to the rule of law. Since reporting is often secondary to compliance 
in the rule of law space, the second area of analysis fundamentally reflects on the difficulty 
associated with implementation compliance and hence the disjuncture between national levels 
processes and the presumptions associated with having regional and continental mechanisms 
for legal appeal by individuals and organisations. The approach taken remains consistent with 
the overall conceptual and analytical framework of the research.  
4.3.1.1 Power and Sovereignty 
The substantive challenge within the rule of law space related to the power and authority 
exercised by Member States in their interactions with AU established institutions, such as the 
Banjul Commission and the African Court. In the instance of the Banjul Commission, the 
ratification of the ACHPR implies that the Member State will abide by the reporting 
requirements and will implement decisions and recommendations. All evidence points to the 
reality that Member States have mostly failed to submit reports within the required time frames. 
There is, in practice, a much higher propensity to report, per the periodic reporting requirements 
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of the UN instrument, than there is concerning the ACHPR152.  
With variations, Member States have also often ignored the recommendations and decisions of 
the Banjul Commission. There has been a tendency not to report on the implementation of 
decisions or even to respond to situations where there is a violation of individual rights 153. 
There is nothing substantively in the system that forces Member States to respond to decisions 
of the Banjul Commission or act on recommendations. The substance view is that this will 
change with the introduction of the African Court as presumably the decisions of the Court 
would have a binding effect on Member States (Banjul Commission, 2018a). The challenge, 
even before consideration of decisions, is that very few Member States have allowed their 
citizens or local organisations to bring cases to the Court. In each instance, State Parties to the 
African Court have to issue a declaration allowing for direct appeal to the Court by citizens 
and organisations. Only a few countries have done this. Data related to the implementation of 
Court decisions show that many countries indicate that they are unable to implement the 
decisions of the Court154. The failure to implement court decisions creates substantive 
difficulties for the legitimacy of the Court as countries exercise a level of power and 
sovereignty, despite having affirmed the authority of the Court through ratification155.  
Beyond the formal legal process, Member State participation in broader Human Rights 
activities of the AU varies. While the AUC organisers a range of events to facilitate active 
consultations on the Human Rights Strategy, Member States representatives have been absent 
from such engagements, and generally the process has been dominated by a selection of 
national human rights institutions and non-governmental organisations156. The substantive 
 
152 Details of reporting by Member States and related difficulties are generally contained in the activity reports of 
the Banjul Commission. As illustration, the 44th Activity Report of 2018 provides that ‘(o)nly ten (10) countries 
are up to date with their reporting obligations in terms of Article 26 of the Maputo Protocol, namely: Burkina 
Faso, DRC, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Togo. This means that 
thirty-one (31) State Parties to the Maputo Protocol have not submitted reports under the Maputo Protocol ‘ 
(Banjul Commission, 2018a) 
153 This reality has been noted in the numerous activity reports of the Banjul Commission presented to the 
Assembly of the AU. The 42nd Activity Report provides that ‘(t)he Commission noted that State compliance with 
its Decisions, Requests for Provisional Measures and Letters of Urgent Appeal is relatively low, as reflected by 
the information reaching the Commission.’ (Banjul Commission, 2018a) 
154 This is affirmed in an Internal Audit report that provides that ‘(i)t was observed that some provisional measures 
and judgements of the Court were not implemented by the Member States contrary to Article 30 of the Protocol. 
This situation has the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court and consequently the effectiveness 
of the Court’ (AUC, 2018a) 
155 This reality was also reflected on in the Report of the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of Decisions 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 12 - 15 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal (Banjul 
Commission, 2017) . 
156 This is based on a detailed analysis of participants lists for numerous events arranged by the DPA on human 
rights issues.  
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challenge here is that Member States do not exercise oversight and authority over issues that 
unfold within the AUC. In the instance of the African Court, only 8 of the 30 countries have 
agreed for direct access by citizens. Rwanda recently withdrew its willingness to allow civil 
society to report (Kwibuka, 2013). The commitment to implement Court decisions varies and, 
in the main, reflect that the Court or the AU has limited ability to ensure State Parties implement 
its decisions. 
 The exercise of sovereignty also comes into play on issues relating to constitutionalism and 
issues of legal jurisdiction. The issue of power and sovereignty that featured during the period 
of the OAU remains as strong within AU processes. Member States resist attempts to engage 
directly on matters relating to their constitutions and the transfer of power, Despite the non-
tolerance of unconstitutional change of government, the AU through the PSC has been overly 
cautious and has struggled to engage the matters more directly. Several countries have made 
changes to their constitutions on the term limits of Presidents157. While the AU attempted to 
engage on these issues, the general orientation is that the changes made were in accordance to 
the ACDEG and national laws and hence there was no basis for AU intervention or any form 
of negative resolution. The reality within the rule of law terrain is that despite the best intentions 
associated with the introduction of instruments and the establishment of related institutions, 
issues of sovereignty and related willingness to implement define what unfolds in practice158.   
4.3.1.2 Member State Realities  
Outside of consultative and reflective engagements on constitutionalism, transitional justice 
and human rights related engagements, there has been no history of systematic engagement 
with Member States on the rule of law issues. While there is some evidence of change, within 
the context of the Commission on International Law and the elevated role of Ministers of 
 
157 Rwanda was amongst a few other countries that changed their Constitutions to allow for continuity. A similar 
process unfolded in Algeria but met with substantive opposition.  
158 The challenge is somewhat captured in the Report pf the AUC Chairperson to the Assembly which provides 
that a ‘brainstorming workshop on   Expanding the AU Doctrine on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and 
to engage stakeholders in promoting and implementing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance took place in Pretoria, South Africa in July 2014. The workshop assessed the state of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa and   highlighted the challenges of entrenching constitutionalism 
and respect for the rule of   law, with a focus on unconstitutional changes of government. It also   contributed to 
the development of a comprehensive definition of unconstitutional   changes of government that will lead to a 
common understanding of the phenomenon. This was pursuant to the implementation of the AU Assembly 
Decision, which required the Commission to submit concrete   recommendations on the appropriate measures to 
prevent unconstitutional changes of   government, to develop capacity for the AU early warning mechanism, good 




Justice as it relates to AU instruments, the engagements with Member States have thus far been 
confined to interaction with the Banjul Commission and the African Court. However, even at 
this level, the interactions tend to be with specific government institutions, such as Human 
Rights Commissions and not directly with Ministries of Justice.  
The connection with legal communities at the national level has been slow, despite the 
existence of African legal associations, such as the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU) and 
the African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL). There have been no real engagements 
beyond broader conferences on issues of constitutionalism and the rule of law historically. The 
general trend has been to focus on issues as it relates to external engagement and more 
particularly as it relates to the ICC. However, the meeting of Minister of Justice has promoted 
some move towards establishing internal consistency in instruments. As a new policy, all AU 
legal instrument or proposed amendment has to be considered by Ministers of Justice through 
the relevant STC before progressing for a decision to relevant AU Organs.  
In the terrain of human rights, real engagements are confined to interactions during the formal 
hearing at the Banjul Commission. To overcome some of the challenges associated with 
interactions with Member States, both the Banjul Commission and the African Court have 
arranged meetings and planning sessions with the PRC and with Member State representatives. 
In general terms, the focus of the interactions with the PRC has been on the provision of added 
resources159 and more substantive relationships between AU institutions, rather than on 
Member State issues. In the case of the African Court, countries have avoided accepting the 
provisions that allow their citizens from taking cases directly to the Court. The general driving 
assumption behind the existence of the Commission and the Court is that conclusions and 
ruling would serve to shape human rights practices at the state level. While there is respect for 
the principle of subsidiarity to State level institutions, the existence of both African multilateral 
institutions is predicated on providing an added layer of check and balances and hence would 
result in State Parties implementing what arises from both institutions. The realities of practice, 
however, point to a disjuncture between rulings and actions. In the instance of the Banjul 
Commission, the findings hardly ever feature in state-level interactions, and generally, 
outcomes are treated as recommendations that a State party is not obliged to implement.  
 
159 After the PRC and Banjul Commission in Maseru Lesotho, the budget of the Commission substantively 
increased. The use of retreats with the PRC to actively engage on budget issues has since emerged as a practice 
in the AU system and may be construed as perverting the system in favour of those who are able to afford such 
retreats. In all such instances, the costs of PRC members (Ambassadors) would be covered by the AU, largely 
through DP funding.  
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Numerous commentators have historically engaged with the issue of the impact of the 
Commission and more recently on the Court (Akokpari et al., 2008b). While some argue that 
the impact will be over some time (Murray, 2004), the simple reality is that the communication, 
recommendation and decisions are often ignored and very seldom do they feature in 
engagements at the national level. Even in countries where there is a sophisticated and highly 
established legal system, the idea that matters can be referred to a higher court do not feature 
in any substantive discourse. While the Court is structured as a higher-level institution after 
cases are exhausted at the national level, in practice, this is not the case, and very often 
reference is made to the African Court because of the absence of an appropriate response at the 
national level160. The African Court represents an alternative channel, rather than a higher 
channel for African citizens and organisations.  
At the level of the APRM, Member States are required to produce Actions Plans for the 
implementation of the outcomes of the review exercise. The overall consequence of this 
approach is that Member States are engaged with through follow up processes on 
implementation. However, the reality for APRM is that it has limited capacity to focus on both 
the review process and the process of active implementation. The level of response to 
implementation reporting has varied and remains inconsistent (Jaoko, 2016). The challenge is 
that the APRM process is often seen to be separate and disconnected to national development 
plans and related actions 161. Officials are often so engaged with actions at the state level that 
they have little time to prepare separate reports for APRM implementation. Even when these 
are prepared, the level of follow up engagement are low, and hence, State parties do not 
experience substantive pressures towards implementation (Kanbur, 2004; Gruzd, 2014a).  
4.3.2 Multilateral Implementation 
At the level of multilateral institutional implementation, the analysis engages with issues 
related to organisational culture, bureaucratic strategies, financing issues and the related human 
resource limitations. Analysis of the rule of law implementation realities is rendered complex 
as it involves not only the AUC but also two autonomous organs in the human rights arena. 
While there has been some analysis on the operational level function, there is little analysis of 
AUC process and the overall human rights institutional architecture. The analysis seeks to do 
 
160 The high number of cases coming from Tanzania, where the African Court is located, is testimony to this 
orientation.  
161 One commentator provides that ‘(t)he National Plan of Actions produced by the countries have often been little 
more than policy documents whose recommendations remain on paper’ (Jaoko, 2016:20).  
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both to develop an understanding of the core efficacy challenges as they relate to multilateral 
implementation in the rule of law space. As with the approach in the previous chapter, the 
analysis unfolds in two areas: 1) Organisational Culture and Financing, 2) Human Resource 
and Bureaucratic Strategies.  
4.3.2.1 Organisational Culture and Financing 
At the level of the DPA, there is an unarticulated perspective that it would provide overall 
leadership over the AU human rights architecture, including the development of new policy 
areas, such as ‘transitional justice’.  This role has historically emerged as an outcome of 
practices, rather than as a deliberate effort on the part of the AUC. Of significance is that the 
DPA took the lead on the development of an African Human Rights Strategy and the AGA 
Secretariat is operationally responsible for the Human Rights Cluster within the AGP.  
At the level of the DPA, engagements around human rights and the rule of law interactions 
unfold outside of any articulated guiding strategic approach and seem to be driven mainly by 
resource availability and responsiveness to engagements that unfold from DP and TP.  On 
matters related to constitutionalism, especially the challenges associated with the 
unconstitutional transfer of power, proactive responses generally arise from the DPS as it has 
the capacity and engaged in monitoring at the level of Member States facing internal political 
crisis through its early warning system162. The scale of events that unfold within the broader 
human rights space, relative to actual outputs, indicate a firm event-driven organisational 
culture, outside of the issue of substantive outputs as it relates to core mandates. Budgets are 
allocated for events and related activities and not for substantive, engaged work on 
multilateralism in the rule of law or the more focused area of human rights163. In addition to 
events arranged by partners, the DPA also takes the lead in external engagements around 
human rights, mainly centred on the joint dialogue forum with the EU in the human rights 
terrain. The forum has been in existence within the framework of the overall Joint Africa 
Europe Strategy (JAES) and substantively involves civil society actors. However, the value of 
such engagements are not apparent and generally perceived as collective engagements on 
human rights issues in both Africa and Europe. The number of active conferences, workshops 
 
162 This disjuncture is well documented by Wachira ’ (2017) in the paper on ‘Strengthening the Peace and 
Governance Nexus within the African Union. Enhancing synergy between the African Governance Architecture 
(AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)  
163 A key indicator of the propensity towards arranging events is that annual planning, including linkages to 
budgets unfold on the basis of a drafted ‘calendar of meetings’ to be attended for the coming year. One example 
is contained in the plans drafted for 2009  (DPA, 2009b).  
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and meeting related engagements with existing capacity in DPA suggests a substantive focus 
on attending events outside of any time available to engage in substantive work – beyond the 
crafting of concept notes and the management of event logistics164. There has also been a 
history of officials attending the open session of the Banjul Commission and hence spending a 
considerable amount of time in The Gambia outside of any direct formal responsibility165.  
The Commission on International Law is a new formation within AU multilateralism around 
the rule of law. While the mandate is oriented substantively towards issues of international law, 
especially on matters of subsidiarity and on looking at AU instruments, the broader 
engagements suggest a focus on the rule of law in wider terms and hence the potential for more 
profound impact on the multilateral space. The Office of the Legal Counsel manages the 
initiative and reporting is to the Chairperson of the Commission and may well hence have 
broader legitimacy. While coordination with DPA is expected to unfold within the Human 
Rights Cluster of AGA, there appears to be little synergy. Details on the resources available 
for the Commission on International Law remains somewhat sketchy, but indications are that 
it has resources for the meeting it establishes and for its overall mandate. However, its 
orientation is less operationally intensive in comparison to the Banjul Commission and the 
African Court.  
The organisational culture and resourcing elements of the Banjul Commission and the Court is 
more complicated. While it took some time for the establishment of the Banjul Commission, 
direct resources from the AU substantively only increased after interactions between the 
Commission and the PRC. In addition to budget increases arising from the active lobbying of 
the PRC, both the Banjul Commission and the African Court have attracted substantive DP 
resources. As these structures exist as separate AU Organs, DP can fund them directly and 
hence channel of-budget funding for programmatic initiatives. One consequence of this is a 
limited level of direct oversight over DP funded programmes from AU Member States. In the 
instance of the Banjul Commission, the EC has channelled direct funding as part of its strategic 
orientation on building African initiatives that facilitate regional integration and that address 
 
164 There are numerous briefing memorandum and notes on work allocation and activities of the DPA. These notes 
indicate that the work is centred around the arrangements of events, including the drafting of speeches for seniors, 
the arrangements of logistics, including venue, concepts notes and related issues. One example is a briefing note 
to the Commission in 2011 titled: Update Briefing on Activities and Meetings of the DPA, 16-21 March 2011 
(DPA, 2011n) 
165 A common practice in the DPA would be to arrange meetings prior to the sessions of the Banjul Commission. 
Often this would entail officials staying in Banjul for an extended period, which includes attending and observing 
the sessions of the Banjul Commission. This approach is reflected in an internal memorandum justifying a further 
meeting in Banjul (DPA, 2012f).    
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human rights issues that the EU would not want to engage directly with AU Member States 
(Miyandazi, Apiko, Abderrahim & Aggad-Clerx, 2018). While there is no direct evidence that 
DPs control the agenda and decision of institutions, it is crucial not to underestimate the impact 
on the choices made within institutions from the flow of resources166.  
There have been substantive challenges concerning the operations of the Banjul Commission 
since its inception. In addition to issues around the number of officials appointed on a full-time 
basis for the Commission, there has been contestation around the exercise of administrative 
leadership167. The struggle between the Board and the officials has been a matter of constant 
engagement. The AUC primarily appoints senior officials, and this arrangement has proven 
difficult for the Board. The structural arrangements and period of appointment of Board 
members have often rendered it impossible to engage in performance issues sustainably. The 
accountability arrangements have had the impact of rendering it challenging to secure 
answerability over operations. The Secretariat only engages the full Board directly when the 
Commission is in session. Between sessions, the Secretariat has high levels of autonomy. Court 
operations are relatively new, but there have also been concerns on the resources available and 
hence ability to arrange further sessions for additional hearings. The constraint of resources has 
meant that the Court is only able to hear a few cases.  The implementation organisation of the 
Court has faced similar performance realities to the Banjul Commission. The challenges facing 
the APRM and the instability that unfolded have been engaged within the Chapter on 
accountability and hence not repeated here.  
4.3.2.2 Human Resource and Bureaucratic Strategies.  
The reality for the Banjul Commission and other structures is that sustainable core operational 
approved budgetary resources are limited, and hence capacity remains acutely constrained168. 
AU institutions cannot appoint full-time long-term officials if these are not approved and 
 
166 Mindzie (2008:222) reports that ‘a number of state members have, paradoxically, denounced the fact that the 
commission relies accessibly on donor funds, which it claimed, is affecting its independence and credibility’.  
167 Matters of performance are not fully captured in public reports. However, the Activity Report of 2012 indicates 
that the Chairperson of the Banjul Commission had meetings on the issues with other Organs of the AU. The 
report provided that the meeting were to discuss ‘ …appropriate ways and means of giving effect to the decisions 
of the Heads of State and Government regarding the treatment of the members of the African Commission and 
the need to build the human and intellectual capacities of its Secretariat’ (Banjul Commission, 2012).  
168 The 30th Activity Report of 2012 was scathing on this issue and provided that ‘….the staffing situation has 
reached such critical levels that it is no longer physically possible for the Secretariat to provide the Commission 
with the support which it needs to function effectively and deliver on the mandate entrusted to it’ (Banjul 
Commission, 2012).  
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included in the ongoing operational budget169. The general approach of officials to 
engagements and substantive work is not vastly different from the broader AU system. Core 
bureaucrats are incentivised towards event-related activities outside of their home stations. A 
reality that is much more evident for officials at the level of the DPA than there are for officials 
in the Court and Commission.  The Administrative Heads of these institutions are nevertheless 
able to engage broader and often part of the Summits of the AU and tend to remain at the 
Summit for the full duration.  
For substantive analytical and implementation work, reliance by all of the AU implementation 
institution is on consultants, interns and other individual seconded to the institutions on 
consulting type contracts (Mindzie, 2008). The Banjul Commission Secretariat, the African 
Court Registries Offices and other structures are often so overwhelmed with work related to 
elected political structures that they tend to function as event managers and not as substantive 
senior actors involved in shaping the strategic direction and active delivery on mandates. There 
is limited time for substantive work, and, at most, the focus of the administrative structures 
would be on the production of the annual report to Summit and on issuing general statements 
after country hearing reports. APRM approaches are also ad-hoc because of the lack of 
substantive capacity for more detailed engagements. There is little substantive work beyond 
the administration required for the peer-review process. Appointed officials are often caught 
up in logistics around events and hence most often rely on consultants for substantive contents 
work170.  An overall consequence of the system is the appointment of individuals who do not 
have the substantive content capacity and who can survive in the system so long as they have 
logistical value. Representation work is allocated to such individual when APRM participates 
in meetings and conference, but they are often unable to engage substantively on issues.  The 
range of events arranged by all AU implementation institutions suggests that officials are 
generally preoccupied with logistical issues and hence have no substantive value for the content 
work that they are employed to do. Senior officials are very often preoccupied with event-
 
169 The situation in the Banjul Commission only marginally improved and the 2019 report provides that ‘(t)The 
long-term solution proposed to address delays in recruitment processes would be to grant the Commission’s 
request for autonomy with regard to recruitment’ (Banjul Commission, 2019) 
170 Detailed information also points to use of consultants for internal management work related to delivering on 
events. Consultants are most often managed for day-to-day tasks. This approach is reflected in a Terms of 
Reference for a GiZ appointed consultants that provides that ‘t)he consultant will be under the direct supervision 
and control of the Director of the DPA and will on a daily basis work with the Head of Democracy, Governance, 
Human Rights and Elections Division. Though, he is not an employee of the African Union Commission, he must 




related functions which shifts their accountability from outcomes towards procedural 
compliance with finance and logistical type arrangements.   
4.4 Efficacy of the Rule of Law Interventions 
In order to provide a substantive overview of the efficacy challenges that face to AU in the rule 
of law interventions, a core set of themes are extracted from the preceding overview, detailed 
area outline and analysis. The themes capture the substantive challenges faced within the AU 
multilateral institutional process. The approach here is to analytically extract the core themes 
that are specifically germane to the rule of law area without having to repeat those contained 
in the accountability analysis or those that unfold in the area of state capacity. The identified 
challenges are by no means all of the implementation issues that confront the AU in the rule of 
law terrain. They do however stand out as the core considerations that should feature in 
reflections on the overall efficacy of the AU governance intervention system and hence the 
consideration that should ideally feature when reflecting on the future of the AU as it relates to 
governance intervention and integration.  
4.4.1 Premature Separation of Roles 
The structural approach of the AU as it related to the broader rule of law and human rights 
terrain is somewhat similar to what unfolded in the EU. However, in the instance of the EU, 
the comparable Commission on Human Rights became obsolete with the restructuring of the 
European Court in 1998 (Emmert & Carney, 2016:1056).  While the approach of creating 
independent structures such as the Banjul Commission and the African Court may well fit with 
the substantive approach to integration, the reality of practice suggests that such separation of 
authority is premature. Especially in a context where there is limited convergence towards 
common standards and norms and where State Parties have not fully affirmed that elements of 
sovereignty reside with a higher-level Court. The difficulties associated with sovereignty and 
continuing power of Member States is also reflected by the closure of the SADC Tribunal 
(Nathan, 2013). The African reality is that legal differing to higher courts can only be useful in 
a situation where courts at the national level are functional, and when local justice remedies 
work reasonably well. In terms of existing instruments, higher-level considerations are only 
expected to unfold after local remedies are exhausted or where local recourse is proving 
impossible. While high-level courts can serve to establish pressure for local judicial 
improvement, the reality for many Member States is that change takes time and often impacted 
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upon by the availability of resources and complex local political realities.  
The African Court and the Banjul Commission do not function as separate entities in the AU 
system. Despite shifts in the direction of securing more independence and separation, it will 
take a long time for the system to function as expected. Even if the process to secure compliance 
is rushed for deeper integration, AU institutions will only function effectively if local 
democracy and substantive the rule of law exist at the level of Member States. The need to 
build the rule of law in Member States through separate institutions at the level of AU 
multilateralism has somewhat shifted focus away from the need to build these on the back of 
proper rule of law at the national level through other modes of intervention. The AU has not 
established substantive the rule of law standards outside of the ACDEG and continuing 
engagements around constitutionalism. This issue of the rule of law has however been a matter 
for AU level deliberations on a crisis and has often resulted in questions being raised around 
the independence of Member States legal systems when a court makes a pronouncement that 
seems to favour ruling parties.  
4.4.2 Subsidiarity Confusion  
Legal subsidiarity and jurisdiction on at a regional and global level are engaged upon by the 
AU. There has been sensitivity on these issues within the AU, and many Member States have 
emphasised the need for regional courts to engage with matters of difficulty in the African 
context. The first substantive effort on this relates to the Hissen Habré171 case and his trial by 
a special court established in Senegal. In this instance, the AU insisted on the establishment of 
a Special Regional Court to prosecute the former leader of Chad, rather than refer him to the 
ICC (Keppler, 2012). The AU and Member States have also been extremely critical with the 
ICC and particular, in particular, emphasised the notion of double standards when it comes to 
African leaders. Central to some of the contestation is the idea of African resolving their 
problems and the need to utilise African courts to hold leaders accountable (Keppler, 2012). 
There has however been no substantive debate about subsidiary within Africa itself and the 
role of regional legal institutions within RECs. However, even in such instances, Member 
States tend not to take such Court seriously. In the instance of SADC, the established Tribunal 
faced a substantive backlash from Member States when cases have been brought to the court. 
 
171  Hissène Habré is a former Chadian Head of State who was convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and torture, including sexual violence and rape, by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese court 
system and sentenced to life in prison. 
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SADC Member States retracted their support and decided to close the Tribunal (Nathan, 2013). 
In general, the reaction reflected that Member States are not yet prepared to engage issues of 
sovereignty when it comes to legality and the possibility of being judged based on shared 
standards. Such standards and the need for the rule of law in countries has not permeated the 
systems.  
Thinking about subsidiarity issues and higher courts often unfold outside of a recognition that 
there is a substantive lack of capacity at the level of Member States.  Higher Courts must listen 
to cases of appeal that unfold from courts at the lower level or matters that deal directly with 
issues of legal contestation between states. At present, regional courts and related structured 
do not make sense outside of a primary focus on building the rule of law and legal capacity at 
the level of states. It is simply untenable to have a separation of power and subsidiarity 
approach to the rule of law at the region and continent level without higher levels of legal 
convergence and firm AU the rule of law standards (Abebe, 2016). Even if these are conceived 
as unfolding in parallel, the reality is that choices are needed as capacity is limited. Ideally, the 
bias could be on building the rule of law institutions at the national level and ensuring legal 
and regulatory convergence through more active knowledge exchange and through more 
grounded approaches to establishing common standards and norms.  
4.4.3 Norm Proliferation and Diplomatic Incapacity  
Outside of the human rights instruments and provisions related to constitutionalism, there are 
no substantive efforts on the rule of law as an element of collective intervention in AU. While 
human rights and other instruments provide some level of certainty around norms for regional 
adherence and by implication norms for the national level, the general peacebuilding logic 
tends towards avoided legal norm upholding, especially when peace has to be negotiated 
outside of preconditions or without the threat of legal actions followed by potential punitive 
actions. Even as there might be a desire to impose specific normative approaches and ensure 
legality prevails, including in the transfer of power, African contextual realities make it 
extremely difficult to engage in actions that do not inherently embody finding some balance 
between adopted norms and what is best in context172 (Habib, 2009). Norm confusion or the 
failure to articulate common values, often render diplomatic engagements very difficult. AU 
 
172 Habib (2009) engages with this issue in the context of peace negotiations in Sudan, in which he argues that the 
human rights community needs to balance its perspective on the need to uphold values in face of complex local 
realities that require careful negotiations.  
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diplomatic efforts repeatedly unfold outside of precondition or separate of some sense of shared 
values that should drive negotiated arrangements. This reality often serves to make diplomatic 
efforts meaningless to many as they often look towards higher institutions to protect the right 
of the weak and vulnerable. Negotiating outside of shared value and adopted standards tend to 
render efforts meaningless and sometimes bring into question the credibility of negotiators 
deployed in AU multilateral diplomatic missions.  A classic example of this is the engagements 
in Libya, among others. The introduction of the AU framework on Transitional Justice serves 
to deepen norm confusion, rather than as a means for creating certainty as it related to justice 
and hence the optimal functioning of the rule of law.   
Contrary to some perception on the closeness of the AU system, the proliferation of initiatives 
around Africa wide norms, suggests a higher level of openness. Activists and civil society 
organisations can successfully lobby and advocate for particular policy instruments, resolutions 
and decisions.  The terrain is attractive to many NGOs as they can reach all African countries 
through AU channels. AU officials are also attracted to such initiatives as they are engaged 
with directly and invited to a whole range of meetings and events that unfold off-budget in the 
AU system. A classic case of active lobbying and advocacy, coupled with cooperation 
incentives through off-plan meetings is in the area of ‘transitional justice’ initiated by CSVR. 
However, similar orientations unfold in several areas, and the AU remains attractive as a 
channel for influence for many organisations, including UN agencies. Many civil society 
organisations would even mobilise funding based on access and influence over the AU. 
However, an incentive-driven openness amongst officials often does not necessarily suggest a 
complete openness of Member States. Even when documents are adopted and resolutions made 
based on norms entrepreneurship from civil society advocacy, there is little to suggest that these 
would be internalised substantively by Member States (Habib, Padayachee & Muchie). Such 
norms entrepreneurship also serves to overwhelm an institution still struggling with even the 
most essential elements of the mandate.  
4.4.4 The rule of law neglect  
In contrast to other areas of engagements, such as accountability, the rule of law convergence 
and hence intervention have not been a subject of focused engagement within AU institutions. 
While there is a range of accountability and state-building instruments in the AU, the rule of 
law shift has been slow and mainly centred around human rights. The rule of law regime is 
much broader and encompasses matters relating to the independence of courts, building legal 
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institutions across society, including the policing and penal systems. At most, the Human 
Rights cluster of AGA has engaged on a Human Rights Capacity Strategy that focused on 
regional institutions but with little attention and actions as it relates to building national 
institutions, outside of general interactions with human rights institutions. The introduction of 
annual meetings of Ministers of Justice under the administrate authority of the AU Legal 
Counsel suggests that a shift in focus might well be possible. However, the mandate of the 
Legal Counsel is substantively focused on legality at the continental and global level, with no 
real mandate to engage local state level. Conflating such responsibilities within the 
Commission may make it impossible of the Legal Counsel to serve in its counselling role and 
its broad responsibility for legality at the level of the AU, rather than legality and hence the 
rule of law at the level of Member States.   
Within the APRM process, the rule of law issues tends to be lost in broader governance areas 
and not often focused on substantively. Without dedicated attention, it is unlikely that Member 
States would have the type of institutions that would render more regional and continental 
judicial appeal systems relevant, as in the instance of the European Court. It is presumed that 
the proper functioning of the African Court would inherently serve to establish pressures for 
local courts to function in a better manner and hence not be embarrassed by high-level court 
rulings. The reality within Member States is however complex, and such a top-down approach 
may not work at all. Compliance and standards application approaches in governance have not 
worked in the human rights terrain, despite the excitement associated with the numerous events 
of the Banjul Commission and the extensive participation of civil society organisations in and 
during its sessions.  
4.5 Conclusion  
Within the rule of law space, the AU direct interventions have unfolded less in the form of 
standards and much more in the forms of creating higher-level accountability structures, such 
as the Banjul Commission and the African Court. The consequence of the replication of the EU 
integration and structural model is that it has shifted attention away from enhancing the rule of 
law through a balanced approach that included empowering Member States through peer 
engagement and learning as a step towards common standards on the rule of law. The 
substantive tension that unfolds between compliance and sovereignty represents, in many 
ways, the tension between gradualist models and more decisive integration through common 
standards model. Finding a way forward in the context of established institutional modalities 
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would be a fundamental challenge for the future.  The Banjul Commission and the African 
Court cannot be abandoned in the face of delivery, and implementation realities as these have 
emerged out of a process of active engagement and with the support of civil society. However, 
sustaining these in the present form without consideration of their efficacy for governance is 
not feasible and will not facilitate governance progress in the continent. Isolating the 
institutions and the rule of law from other governance intervention areas would render an 
overall analysis of efficacy difficult and hence make it impossible to articulate a system that 




Chapter 5: African Union Interventions in State Capacity 
State capacity has historically been central to global multilateral and bilateral governance 
interventions in Africa. AU multilateral normative frameworks and interventions in the area 
emerged gradually and primarily through the direct agency and leadership of concerned and 
interested Member States. A diverse set of instruments and a range of interventions both within 
and outside of the AU Organs and institutions characterise the state capacity terrain. The history 
of initiatives that have emerged reflects a diversity of concern, ranging from the role and 
performance of the public sector, corruption, local governance and decentralisation. All the 
actions that have unfolded echo a shared disquiet with African state capacity and hence, 
interventions that would facilitate the establishment of the overall capability for state-led 
development at a national level. All sectoral initiatives within the AU system generally have 
elements relating to state capacity for implementation. However, the more significant macro 
initiatives reflect concerted efforts in more encompassing terrains such as public administration 
and local government.  A historical overview of interventions reflects a diversity of actions and 
a move towards consolidation at the level of the AU through the establishment of an STC in 
Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralisation. The analysis of 
intervention and related multilateral institutional processes exhibit a struggle for relevance and 
value add in a terrain of immense Member State diversity. The Chapter concludes with an 
overview of the core challenges that are germane to this specific intervention terrain.  
5.0 Introduction 
At the most basic level, state capacity is predicated on the idea of state sovereignty and the 
capacity of state institutions to assert jurisdictional authority and implement in accordance to 
politically derived mandates within a specific geographical space (Young, 2012). Sovereignty 
and capacity embody the idea that established public institutions have the power to act 
according to the collective will derived from the political process. No competing administrative 
authority can contest or usurp the sovereign status of the state (Fukuyama, 2014).  Such 
capacity is deemed to be contingent both on the ability to deliver services innovatively and to 
exercise a level of discretionary judgment in the delivery process (Fukuyama, 2013). Success 
is on the extent to which delivery reflects what is in the public interest, as derived through 
accountability arrangements, and the capacity to demand compliance and the respect of rights, 
through a functional legal system. State capacity is hence closely linked to accountability and 
the rule of law (Fukuyama, 2014).  
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Perspectives on state capacity have varied with time and often predicated on expectations on 
the role that the state should play in collective coexistence and development. Some conception 
of the state is about minimising its role mainly to the rule of law and security-related 
imperatives. More nuanced notions emphasise the social role of the state and, in particular, the 
provision of community services that the market cannot provide (Fritz & Menocal, 2007). 
Interventionist perspectives assert that the state has a fundamental role in shaping economic 
development. The actual and expected role of the state has evolved with time and often rooted 
in ideological conceptions. In the African discourse space, a substantive orientation has been 
to argue for a stronger role for the state in economic development (UNECA, 2011). In part, the 
orientation stems from a concern with the consequences of structural adjustment on state 
capability and, in particular, the African states ability to shape the development trajectory 
(Meyns & Musamba, 2010).  
Within the state capacity terrain, AU intervention orientations have evolved from the need for 
comprehensive public sector reform initiatives, towards more localised and sector-specific 
strategic interventions. Interactions on state change initiatives range from knowledge exchange 
on elements of structural reforms, as it relates to human resources and financial systems, 
towards those that focus on direct forms of capacity building in the forms of education and 
training initiatives. The substantive logic of all initiatives is that they would collectively serve 
to build state capacity for more substantive development interventions. While state capacity 
features in a range of documents in the AU system, it is often not subject to specific definition 
beyond the general articulated concern that it is essential and ‘that targeted capacity building 
should be given a high priority’(AU, 2011a). Aside from the African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Public Service and Administration, the APRM Questionnaire Objective Five 
focuses on ‘Ensuring Accountable, Efficient and Effective Public Service Delivery at the National 
and Decentralized levels’. It encompasses questions on the efficiency of the public service, the 
levels of decentralisation and anti-corruption measures (APRM, 2015).   
5.1 State Development Initiatives within the African Union 
It is imperative to provide both a historical and substantive account of core initiatives that have 
unfolded to understand and appreciate state capacity focused initiatives that have unfolded 
within AU multilateralism. Core state capacity instruments, such as the African Charter on the 
Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, the AUCPCC and the African 
Charter on Local Governance and Decentralisation, have emerged through separate processes. 
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These instruments have nonetheless intersected within the overall AU system and hence 
essential to be considered as a collective and within the framework of state capacity. Though 
the instruments, as with others in the governance space, have a larger and broader intent, their 
primary orientation relates directly to state capacity development. In addition to the 
instruments, several added intervention activities have emerged from the collective efforts of 
Member States and AU implementation institutions. In the instance of both public 
administration and local government, it is vital to appreciate that the actions unfolded outside 
of the AU institutional system. This reality has and continues to impact on implementation 
processes as it relates to AU institutions.  
5.1.1 State Capacity in the OAU 
The concern with the state in Africa and related capacity for implementation, arose, in part, as 
a reaction to WB structural adjustment initiatives across the continent in the 1980s. By the time 
of the Abuja Treaty and Lagos Plan of Action, OAU Member States and Civil Society 
expressed a deep concern that the African state institutions were eroded because of neo-liberal 
inspired adjustment and that state rebuilding is an essential effort in building African ownership 
for development (Akokpari, 2004; Mkandawire, 2007; Olukoshi, 2010). The NEPAD base 
document was amongst others, the first AU related document, to make direct reference to state 
capacity and the need to focus substantive attention on building such capability for the 
future173. To some, the NEPAD focus on state capacity was an extension of the WB orientation, 
as embodied in structural adjustments, with a particular focus on cutting down on the size of 
the state system (Bond, 2009).  
The most substantive and focused multilateral engagement on state capacity within Africa 
emanated from the efforts of African Ministers of Public or Civil Service from across the 
continent. These Ministers convened, as a collective in Morocco, a non-OAU Member, in 1994. 
As far back as 1964, Morocco drove forward the establishment of the African Training and 
Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) as an African multilateral 
institution focused on state capacity development (Michael, 2005). The introduction of the 
Ministerial Conference was part of the efforts to reaffirm the role of CAFRAD as an 
organisation leading on issues related to state capacity. Morocco convened the first two 
 
173 The NEPAD Strategic Framework documents provides that ‘the weak state remains a major constraint to 
sustainable development in a number of countries. Indeed, one of Africa’s major challenges is to strengthen the 
capacity to govern and to develop long-term policies’ (NEPAD, 2001) 
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conferences, and Namibia convened the third conference (Armstrong, 2005). By the time of 
the 4th conference, there was a substantive push from the Ministers that the initiative is 
integrated into the structures of the AU. By the third Ministerial Conference, an African Charter 
on the Public Service174 was adopted by attending Ministers (Balogun, 2003).  
Separate to the initiative of the Ministers of Public Service, African Ministers of Finance, 
together with a range of DP, took the lead in establishing, in 1991, the ACBF outside of the 
structure of the OAU, with its headquarters in Harare, Zimbabwe. Since its establishment, the 
organisation coordinated capacity development programs worth over 700 million US dollars 
across 48 countries and 8 RECs. More recently, the ACBF is recognised as the AU Specialized 
Agency for Capacity Development. In addition to being a channel for the funding of direct 
educational and capacity initiatives in Member States, the ACBF has a substantive focus on 
information sharing and the production of knowledge outputs as it related to capacity building. 
While having a broader sectoral reach, the primary focus of the ACBF has been on state 
capacity building (Olowu & Sako, 2002; Sako, 2006).  
5.1.2 Ministerial Conferences and the African Charter  
The first African Conference of Ministers of Public or Civil Service took place in Tangiers, 
Morocco, on the 20th and 21st June 1994. The second was held in Rabat, Morocco, from the 
13th to the 15th December 1998, with the support of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). This conference is considered as a landmark as it 
served to create the foundational elements for the Charter for the Public Service in Africa. The 
draft Charter developed with the technical support of UNDESA and discussed at the 2nd 
Conference was eventually presented and adopted with amendments at the 3rd Conference of 
Ministers, held in Namibia on the 5th and 6th February 2001. In form and content, this Charter 
was not perceived as a legal instrument and hence mostly accepted as an aspirational document 
(Balogun, 2003).  
Since initiation by Morocco, the Conference of African Ministers of Public Service primarily 
unfolded outside of OAU, as Morocco was not a member. By the 3rd Conference, attending 
African Ministers began expressing a view on the importance of linking their efforts with 
continental processes, including NEPAD and the imminent launch of the AU in Durban South 
Africa. These matter of linkage with the AU was not directly engaged on at the 3rd Conference, 
 
174 African Charter on the Public Service was the precursor to the AU adopted African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Public Service and Administration.  
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and CAFRAD continued to serve as the Secretariat of the Ministerial Conference. With funding 
from DP, UNDESA also continued to provide financial support for follow up initiatives. 
During the 3rd Conference, South Africa agreed to host the 4th Conference and engage in a 
substantive preparatory process leading to the event (AUC, 2008).  
5.1.3 AU and The Ministers Conference  
The 4th conference of Ministers of Public Service took place on the 6th and 7th May 2003 in 
Stellenbosch South Africa. In preparation for the Conference, South Africa mobilised funding 
from the World Bank Institute (WBI) to engage in research activities that would help to shape 
the substantive content of the conference. In addition to attempts at generating some 
comparative knowledge on public service systems across the continent, several draft papers 
were produced as part of the efforts to ensure quality content engagements as they relate to the 
conference (Armstrong, 2005). The move to engage in research and prepare papers arose from 
a concern that past Ministerial Conferences were shaped through external engagements and not 
from substantive internally African driven initiatives. In addition to the papers, South Africa 
drove forward a process on developing a continental collective capacity development 
programme for approval at the Conference (Armstrong, 2005).  
During the 4th Conference, a decision was taken that the Ministers Conference, together with 
the adopted programme, be incorporated as an initiative of the AU. Substantive initial support 
for the Conference arose from the NEPAD Secretariat. The decisions to incorporate the 
Conference as an AU initiative resulted in the withdrawal of Morocco and hence of CAFRAD. 
Since the 4th Conference, all subsequent conferences are under the overall banner of the AU 
(AUC, 2008). However, given the limited capacity at the level of the DPA, work on the 
Ministerial conference, including its various initiatives unfolded through the direct efforts of 
the sitting conference Chairpersons and their respective Ministry Offices175. During the 4th and 
5th Conference, this unfolded under the overall leadership of South Africa and the 6th and 7th 
under the overall leadership of Kenya. During this period, the popular designation used for the 
conference was the Conference of African Ministers of Public Service (CAMPS)176. 
Substantive support for the activities undertaken was either from the country itself or from 
 
175 Details of the approach are contained in an Internal Memorandum to the Director of Political Affairs: Mission 
Report: Fourth Ministerial Bureau Meeting of the Fifth Pan African Conference of Ministers for Public and Civil 
Service, Windhoek Namibia, 24 to 25 October 2007 (DPA, 2007b).  
176 The designation CAMPS Secretariat was used in many documents. Some of which were drafted by such 
Secretariats within Member States using the AUC letter head. Numerous examples of such documents were 
engaged with in the research process.  
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indirect funding made available by GiZ and the UNDP through its Global Governance 
initiatives (DPA, 2008c). Substantive additional technical and funding support flowed when 
the former Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi of South Africa and Chairperson of the 4th and 
5th Conference took up a position as Head of Governance at the UNDP 177.  
During the period of the 5th Conference of African Ministers of Public Service, under the 
leadership of South Africa, a Ministerial Bureau was elected to support the Chairperson of the 
5th Conference. As part of the follow-up to the 5th Conference, a long-term programme proposal 
had been submitted to the EC for funding. The proposal submitted through NEPAD structures 
was accepted for funding support by the EC. However, the funding never materialised as the 
EC was concerned about the precise legal status of NEPAD and by the time of resolving the 
legal issue, the funding period lapsed, and the EC expressed regret178. As part of the overall 
Ministerial process and the absence of substantive capacity at the level of DPA for the initiative, 
a decision had been made that different countries would champion various programmatic 
activities of the Ministerial Conference. The perimeters of what this meant in practice, relative 
to the role of the DPA of the AUC and a Secretariat within the Office of the Chairperson was 
never fully spelt out. Nigeria would champion anti-corruption, Algeria the African Public 
Service Charter, Mauritius, the African Public Sector Innovation Awards, and Burundi would 
champion issues related to post-conflict reconstruction. Some effort was focused on clarifying 
roles and responsibilities at the 1st and 2nd Bureau meetings held in Nigeria in April 2006 and 
Addis Ababa in December 2006 (DPA, 2006). The general assumption was that active 
initiatives would receive DP support, such as the UNDP (DPA, 2008a).  
The 6th Conference of African Ministers of Public Service took place during July 2008 in South 
Africa and the Chairpersonship was handed over to Kenya. In keeping with the orientation 
established by South Africa, Kenya established a Secretariat in the Office of the Minister of 
Public Service to take forward leadership over the initiative.  While there have been energetic 
engagements from the Ministerial Office, substantive work within the broad purview of the 
Ministerial effort only arose because of funding made available by UNDP under its Global 
Governance Programme179. While there was some level of engagement with the Ministerial 
 
177 Details of the work are scattered in a variety of AUC documents and meeting minutes. Substantive details of 
the initiative and UNDP support are contained in the Consultative Meeting Between AUC/CAMPS and UNDP 
Held at North Coast Beach Hotel, Mombasa Kenya On 26th September, 2011 (DPA, 2011f).  
178 Details of this are contained in the Minutes of The 4th Ministerial Bureau Meeting of the 5th Pan-African 
Conference of Ministers of Public/Civil Service, held in Namibia, 24th and 25th October 2007 (DPA, 2007a) 
179 The UNDP received substantive funding from the Spanish Government for its initiative and much of this was 
spent directly by UNDP.  
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process, the work unfolded through contracts issued by UNDP (DPA, 2008d). Of particular 
significance was UNDP funding allocated for the development of another ‘long-term strategy 
document’ for the Ministerial Conference and a set of management guidelines in particular 
areas of shared public service concern (DPA, 2011k).  The 7th Conference took place in 
Nairobi, Kenya. As a direct outcome of the Ministerial engagement was the establishment of 
AMDIN, comprising State established public sector-focused capacity-building institution180. 
The network primarily focuses on establishing joint training programmes and on sharing 
information, knowledge and expertise on state capacity development initiatives 181. While 
engaging with the AU, the initiative has mostly unfolded outside of the AU system.  
By the time of the 8th Conference of Ministers of Public Service, the UNDP initiative had all 
but dissolved. The 8th Conference did not benefit from much funding from DP and took place 
in Brazzaville Congo. At this stage, the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public 
Service and Administration received the approval of the AU Assembly and hence became the 
primary focus of the Ministerial Conference and the DPA. At the level of the AU, efforts were 
on establishing the STC and hence providing a way of better managing Ministerial 
Conferences. To this end, the STC in Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development 
and Decentralisation was established formally. The launch of the STC coincided with the 
development of a Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance 
and Local Development (DPA, 2017b; AU, 2019b). 
5.1.4 Anti-Corruption in the AU 
The African process on Anti-corruption emerged as a parallel process to the UN Convention 
Against Corruption adopted in 2005. The general perspective was that the AU process is 
different and focused substantive attention on the corruptor as well as the corruptee (Olaniyan, 
2004). The African perspective at the time was that the overemphasis on the recipients of bribes 
shifts attention away from northern multinationals that engage in such activities. The 
convention was formally adopted in 2007 and achieved the required ratification to enter into 
force in 2010. At this stage, and under the guidance of the AU Legal Counsel, the AU assembly 
elected the ten Member of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) 
established in terms of the Convention (Ikubaje, 2010). During the launch of the Advisory 
 
180 See Closing Remarks by Mrs. Julia Dolly Joiner, Commissioner for Political Affairs African Union at The 7th 
Conference of African Ministers of Public Service, Nairobi, Kenya – 14 May 2011 (AUC, 2011). 
181 Details outlined on the website of AMDIN https://amdin.africa/about/  
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Board on Corruption, the AU had not set aside substantive resources for the functioning of the 
Board, and it took some time for the establishment of a Secretariat182.  
During the period leading up to the ratification of the Convention by a minimum number, the 
DPA initiated several conferences with National Anti-Corruptions Bodies. The basic idea 
behind these was that the bodies would be central to promoting the Convention and hence 
become central to the ratification by Member States. Leadership over the conference eventually 
merged with the work of the African Ministers of Public Service who defined corruption as 
central to the work related to State Capacity. As part of the longer-term strategy, the Ministers 
identified corruption and information sharing within the terrain as being of particular 
significance (DPA, 2011f). Just as the second AUABC was in the process of establishment, the 
4th Joint African Union Commission/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(AUC/UNECA) Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development in 2011 resolved to establish the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows 
(UNECA, 2015). A focus on illicit flows was also deemed to the central mandate of the 
AUABC and embodied in the Convention. However, the UN process unfolded separately and 
outside of any direct AUABC involvement. The enthusiasm around illicit financial flows has 
grown, and indications are that the recommendations are to be implemented through an 
independent unit within the Office of the Chairperson of the AUC (AU, 2018a).  
In parallel and a somewhat complementary manner, anti-corruption features as an active and 
overarching element of review from within the work of the APRM. Not only are corruption 
considerations dispersed across the APRM Questionnaire, it strongly features in Objective 5 
(2) the Questionnaire and embedded in many of the completed APRM Country Reports. 
Member States who are part of APRM are hence reporting on corruption issues as part of their 
country self-assessment process. APRM has also established modalities for civil society 
participation within the process (Kututwa, 2005)183. Some other AU instruments and related 
processes also embody provisions related to corruption. In particular, the African Charter on 
the Values and Principles of Public Administration has provisions relating to Codes of Conduct 
for Public Officials. There are also some independent state-related initiatives, such as the 
 
182 The reality of not budgeting for the establishment of the Board is reflected in an internal memorandum which 
provides for the movement of DP funding for such purposes. The memorandum states the fund for the …. ‘setting 
up of Governance Monitoring Centre on the Anti-Corruption Activities and Meeting of National Anti-Corruption 
Bodies to be reallocated for the Meeting of the Advisory Board on Corruption (DPA, 2009c).  
183 Kututwa (2005)  provides a detailed account of the anti-corruption review elements across eight countries that 
have completed the review process.  
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Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies and the African Ombudspersons and Mediators 
Associations (AOMA). Outside of these, State Parties often engage with survey related anti-
corruption instruments from, amongst others, Transparency International, the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation and the Global Integrity Initiative.  
Beyond the formalised state-driven or state engaged initiatives, there is some civil society 
initiatives and media-driven activities on corruption in Africa. Some of these initiatives engage 
directly with issues relating to the illicit flow of resources, exposing corruption and on the 
protection of whistle-blowers. To some extent, these initiatives mirror elements of the stated 
functions of the AUABC, including analysing the conduct of multinationals and advising 
governments on how to deal with corruption. RECs, such as ECOWAS, EAC and SADC have 
also developed instruments relating to corruption. All of these are different stages of 
implementation and embody the establishment of specific oversight processes and reporting 
obligations (UNCEA, 2011). RECs, it is assumed, will coordinate their efforts with the AU 
through established structures, including the AGP.  
Since the coming into force of the Convention and the establishment of the AUABC, Agenda 
2063 has emerged as a framework for planning within the overall AU system. While corruption 
is referenced across the framework and, in particular, in relationship to the financing of the AU 
and building capable states, is not necessarily defined as a core area of programmatic focus 
(AUC, 2015b). Agenda 2063 was introduced as a basis for driving internal institutional change 
and as a framework for shifting resources towards priority programmes. The Secretariat of the 
Advisory Board on Corruption relocated to Arusha from Addis Ababa in 2012, with limited 
human resource capacity. By the time of the second Board, actions were taken to outline an 
operational questionnaire on compliance with the Convention for response by Member States. 
This process unfolded in parallel to the establishment of the Mbeki Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows with support from the UNECA. The UNECA mobilised funding for the development of 
a regional programme on Anti-Corruption in consultation and partnership with the AUABC 
(UNCEA, 2011). The initiative included a substantive emphasis on generating knowledge 
products and initiating learning opportunities for Member States. Limited attention was 
focused on the Convention and its implementation at the level of Member States. The Board 
adopted the questionnaire to guide Member State reporting on the Convention in 2011. The 
questionnaire was distributed to Member States, and 13 State Parties responded (MSWG, 
2018). By the time the AUABC Secretariat received responses, the Board had changed and 
turbulence at the secretariat resulted in no real engagements on the AUABC mandate. The 
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Board then requested a civil society group known as the Multi Sectorial Working Group 
(MSWG), to look at the reports and provide feedback. The general conclusion from civil 
society actors was that the reports based on the initially designed questionnaire lacked 
substance and were hence not valuable for assessing Member State compliance (MSWG, 
2018). By the time the AU designated 2018 as the Year of Anti-Corruption, the AUABC had 
worked with Civil Society on the development of a more detailed questionnaire to guide 
Member States. The initiative unfolded in parallel to the reform initiatives and some 
uncertainty on the future direction of governance initiatives in the continent (MSWG, 2018).   
5.1.5 Local Governance and Decentralisation 
Under the leadership of Cameroon, an All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation 
and Local Development (AMCOD) convened in May 2000 in Yaoundé, Cameroon. AMCOD 
established a Secretariat of the Conference, which served to arrange further Conferences over 
subsequent years (Aschmann, 2011). By the time of the AU Shared Values Summit in 2011, 
AMCOD began engaging with the AU on the integration of its efforts into the AU system. A 
series of technical meetings culminated in an agreement to Draft an African Charter on the 
Values and Principles, of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Development. Core to the 
shift towards the AU was a recognition that AMCOD could not function effectively outside of 
the AU system and some integration was necessary. This Ministerial level initiative unfolded 
in parallel to the establishment of the United Cities and Local Government (UCLGA) of Africa, 
as an umbrella organisation directed at the united voice and representative of local governments 
in Africa. UCLGA was formally founded in 2005 in the City of Tshwane, South Africa as a 
result of the unification of three continental groups of local governments, namely the African 
Union of Local Authorities; the Union des Villes Africaines; and the Africa Chapter of the 
Unao dos Ciudades y Capitaes Lusofono Africana (AU, 2005). UCLGA initially emerged as a 
split organisation with two secretariats, one in South Africa and one in Morocco. The struggle 
focused on the fact that Morocco was not part of the AU and hence could not serve as the host 
for an AU affirmed organisation. After a series of negotiations, the organisation is now 
headquartered in the City of Rabat, in Morocco, where it enjoys diplomatic status as a Pan-
African International Organization. 
After concerted effort from within AMCOD and UCLGA, the Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Local Government and Development was adopted by African Ministers of Local 
Government and presented through AU processes for full adoption. The Assembly adopted this 
217 
 
Charter in 2013 (Chigwata & Ziswa, 2018). The adoption of the Charter coincided with efforts 
in the AU to establish the STC in Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and 
Decentralisation. In this respect, a decision was made to incorporate the work of the Ministers 
of Public Service with the work of Ministers of Local Government under the overall umbrella 
of a single STC, The Committee has met twice and generally functions in the same manner as 
a Ministerial Conference.  
5.2 State Capacity Interventions 
The spread of initiatives within the state capacity terrain and the widely differing levels of 
implementation and related activities renders a descriptive analysis of the interventions a 
difficult exercise. The approach taken is to engage with the intervention activities in a manner 
that builds an understanding of the modalities of engagement with Member States and related 
expectation as it related to state capacity and hence, substantive integration. Rather than capture 
all elements of details, the approach is to engage the substantive orientation and related 
activities in each of the intervention areas. It is expected that a brief review of these would 
enhance understandings on AU multilateral implementation on state capacity and hence serve 
to bring to the fore some of the contradiction, challenges and nuances embedded in the mandate 
establishment and implementation nexus.  In the terrain of actions, there is substantive overlap 
between what unfolds in one part of the intervention terrain and other parts. The approach is to 
engage systematically to facilitate reflections on the AU institutional implementation 
challenges.  
5.2.1 Compliance and Sanctions 
Within the area of state capacity, there are three specific compliance-related instruments, which 
incorporate some elements of sanction for noncompliance. While the African Union 
Convention on Combating and Prevention Corruption is considered a broader instrument 
impacting on wider sectors, the content is substantively focused on the state and hence ending 
the scourge of corruption within public institutions. Article 22 (7) of the Convention specifies 
the reporting obligation of State Parties and provides that they shall communicate to the 
AUABC within a year after coming into force of the instrument, on the progress made in 
implementing of this convention (AU, 2003a). Each State Party would also ensure that the 
national anti-corruption authorities or agencies report to the Board at least once a year before 
the ordinary session of the policy organs of the AU. To give effect to state reporting on 
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compliance, the AUABC developed a questionnaire for such purposes, and this was 
communicated to State Parties through relevant Embassies in Addis Ababa during 2013. In line 
with the initial questionnaire, only 13 of the 40 State Parties who ratified have provided reports. 
The reports are generally considered weak but remain under review by the AUABC through a 
gradual process of scheduling one or two for its regular sessions. The AUABC Secretariats 
capacity is also limited, and the term of Board members makes it difficult for them to generate 
any substantive conclusions on each of the reports. The instrument compels the AUABC to 
deliver a report to the Executive Councils on each state parties’ submission184. The AUABC, 
it is presumed, would be able to make a recommendation on the fight against corruption. The 
approval of such recommendation may well have some persuasive force over actions at the 
level of Member States. By the time of the 2018 AU Year on Anti-Corruption, the AUABC 
had not submitted any inputs on State Party submissions to the Executive Council and was 
generally struggling to fulfil this mandate (MSWG, 2018). In compliance terms, the general 
assumption was that the AUABC would be able to outline some of the gaps within a Member 
States so that these can be raised directly for compliance by the Executive Council. In theory, 
the Executive Council can impose some sanction for non-compliance. Given the legal form of 
the instrument, it may well also be possible for organisation and individuals to take their States 
to Court for non-compliance with a ratified instrument (Ikubaje, 2010).   
Both the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration and the African 
Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local 
Development. have not yet been ratified by the minimum number of State Parties to enter into 
force.  Article 24 of the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration 
provides that State Parties will report on implementation every two years. It further provides 
that the AUC will provide support for implementation and that consolidated report will be 
submitted to the Assembly through the Executive Council (AU, 2011a; AU, 2014b). The 
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local 
Development replicates the support and reporting requirement. However, in this instance, 
reports have to be provided every three years (AU, 2014b). In line with standard practices in 
the AU system, in both instances, the AUC would have to develop guidelines for reporting by 
 
184 The internal audit report of the AUC provides that ‘(t)he audit review indicated that AUABC did not achieve 
most of the functions spelled out on its Convention; The activity report for year ended December 2015 submitted 
to the Executive Council indicated that only 1per cent of its strategic plan (i.e., 2011 to 2015) objectives were 




Member States. In essence, this would mean replicating the actions that have unfolded in other 
instruments. Both instruments also make reference to the establishment of appropriate 
Secretariats for implementation, capacity building and knowledge exchange (AU, 2011a; AU, 
2014b). 
As the Public Service and Local Government instruments have not yet entered into force, there 
is little to suggest further actions on the part of the DPA as the current custodian of the 
established STC that covers these specific instruments. During 2014 there was some attempt 
on the part of AMDIN to develop a framework for implementation of the Public Service 
Charter (AMDIN, 2018). The AMDIN initiative, however, unfolds outside of AU processes 
and remain to be incorporated as a formal step in the direction of securing compliance with the 
instrument.  The extent to which both instruments will facilitate positive actions on the part of 
State Parties is yet to be tested. Of concern is the capacity to implement these instruments 
together with all other instruments in the governance space. While conditionality to secure 
policy compliance have been a crucial part of WB engagements on African States, the AU 
instruments, in substance and form, are more oriented towards peer engagement than towards 
substantive compliance-related actions185. While the instruments have legal standing, it is 
difficult to anticipate how the AU would be able to ensure adherence and act in instances where 
State Parties are not compliant. The rationale for having such legal instruments is the 
perspective that such documents would serve to ensure that the issues of Public Service and 
Local Governance would be on the radar of AU multilateralism. However, there has been little 
further actions and reflection on the substantive implications of engaging with multiple reports 
and on ensuring compliance with instruments. Outside of the arrangements of event-driven 
interactions, there is a lack of real engagements on the capacity and implementation 
implications of what has formally unfolded in the state capacity space.  
5.2.2 Peer Review and Diplomacy 
The APRM process has historically included a focus on state capability and hence, the overall 
macro–structuring of state systems. All concluded Peer Reports make some reference to the 
public administration systems at the level of individual states. As an illustration, in the instance 
 
185 As illustration, Article 19 and 20 of the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation 
focuses centrally on establishing a system for recognising good performance and for the exchange of experiences 
and less on the imperatives of compliance (AU, 2014b).  Article 25 of the African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Public Administration does the same and generally focuses on knowledge exchange as a vehicle for 
change (AU, 2011a). 
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of the first Ghana Peer Review report, substantive recommendations were made on reducing 
the size of the Public Service. Such conclusions filtered into the Action Plan of Ghana and 
resulted in the reduction in the number of actual Ministries (Grimm et al., 2009). There is also 
evidence of a focus on the state in all other Peer Reports. However, the peer process has limited 
involvement of Ministers of Public Service and hence perhaps not as impactful as is intended 
by the APRM process. There several objectives and indicators within the APRM questionnaire 
that deal with state capacity. These are nevertheless dispersed across various sections and often 
not subject to detailed peer-level engagements.  Nevertheless, and judging based on 
conclusions related to state capacity in some completed reviews, such as Ghana, there has been 
much more substantive interactions on state capacity efforts within Member States in the 
APRM, than there has been through the other established instruments and initiatives. However, 
given the more political emphasis of the APRM Questionnaire, there is minimal inclusion of 
matters relating to local governance and decentralisation, as incorporated in the relevant AU 
instrument.  
Since the 5th Conference of Ministers of Public Service, there has been anticipation that 
diplomatic support type engagement on state-building would feature in interactions on post-
conflict reconstruction. There is, however, limited evidence that this has unfolded 
systematically from within the DPS. During the period of the 6th Conference of African 
Ministers, the DPA arranged an event in Burundi related to the post-conflict reconstruction of 
the state (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2008). Outside of exchanges 
during the event and some perspectives on future actions, there were no further substantive 
efforts from the DPA or broader AU institutions. The more considerable identified challenge 
at the time was that any actions have to unfold within the framework of the established post-
conflict reconstruction programme established by PSD. The general and more substantive 
concern of PSD has always been on peace and security and hence engaging in negotiated 
interaction to prevent violence. DPA at one stage engaged in a mission to the Central African 
Republic to advise on matters relating to state-building the mission concluded with several 
recommendations. However, the capacity of the AU to provide active and substantive support 
for reconstruction and state-building is limited and very unclear. South Africa historically 
engaged in state capacity building in the DRC and Kenya engaged in direct forms of support 
for Public Administration in South Sudan (National School of Government, 2013). These 
relationships were, however of a bilateral nature and not a part of AU multilateral initiatives 
within the state capacity terrain.  
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As part of efforts within the broader fold of AMDIN, South Africa mobilised support from 
CIDA for a capacity-building initiative involving Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan. The logic of 
this initiative was that each country would develop a programme for capacity building and 
would benefit from south-south cooperation (National School of Government, 2013). The 
precise value of the initiative is unclear, and it does not stand within the multilateral initiative 
of the AU. In the main, the available evidence suggests that the more substantive peer review 
interaction on state capacity are from within the APRM process (Chikwanha, 2007). While the 
existing instruments point towards peer-level engagements, the general orientation is that they 
are legal instruments and the implementation approach would be to assess the level of active 
compliance. In order to encourage actions on the implementation of the Anti-Corruption 
Convention, the AUABC has introduced a practice of sending popularisation and 
implementation follow up missions to various countries (AU, 2013). In practice, these function 
as diplomatic type missions directed at facilitating state compliance. Reports from such mission 
are incorporated as part of the annual activity reports of the AUABC and hence perceive to be 
an added channel for encouraging State Party ratification and compliance with the instrument.  
5.2.3 Information and Knowledge Exchange 
Information sharing and knowledge exchange have always been central to the effort of the 
Ministers of Public Service. Outside of the adoption of Charters, Ministerial Conferences were 
considered terrains for information and knowledge exchange. How this unfolded across 
conferences varied and often entailed the presentation of papers by experts in sessions, coupled 
with presentations by individuals from Member States. There is little evidence to suggest 
substantive research, aside from initial activities that preceded the 4th Conference of Ministers 
of Public Services186. Embedded in the work of the Ministerial Conference is the idea of active 
information and knowledge exchange amongst Member States. The knowledge exchange 
rationale was, the driving logic for the establishment of CAFRAD by Morocco. Even outside 
of AU processes, CAFRAD continues to function and has over the years arranged numerous 
conferences and workshops in the terrain of public administration. It has also continued to 
arrange separate Ministerial level events outside of AU process. The future of the initiative, in 
light of the re-entry of Morocco, is likely to be a matter for future discourse as CAFRAD is 
somewhat dependent on financial contributions from African States. Morocco has nevertheless 
 
186 As illustration, during the 4th Conference of Ministers of Public Service a set of Case Studies (Collection of 
African Experiences in Public Sector Reform Initiatives) was produced for wider distribution (NEPAD, 2003) 
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been the central funder of CAFRADs initiatives. The following table provides a broad 
illustration selection of ‘information and knowledge’ related events arranged by CAFRAD over 
the last few years.  
Table 19: CAFRAD Information and Knowledge Exchange Events 
Event 
 
Year  Country 
Cultural Dimension of Administrative Reform in Africa 
 
2016 Morocco 
Prevention of Public Wealth Violations: New Challenge of Public Finance 
Supreme Audit Institutions in Africa 
2016 Cameroon 
Conference of Diplomatic Career Training Schools and Institutes 
 
2017 Cameroon 
Pan-African Conference of Permanent Secretaries and Directors of Human 
Resources of State Institutions 
2014 Morocco 
Seminar on Sharing Success Stories and Challenges in e-Governance/e-
Administration 
2014 Morocco 
Creating Conditions for Open, Inclusive, Transparent, Accountable 
and Performance-Oriented Governance and Public Administration in 
African countries  
2013 Morocco 
Enhancing synergies between Policy Makers and Technocrats in 
Implementing Results-Based Management in the Public Service  
2013 Morocco 
Evaluation of programs and projects on the innovation of public service and 
governance through performance and results-based management (RBM)  
2011 Morocco 
New Approaches of Reform, Innovation and Modernization of Public 
Service and State Institutions 
2010 Morocco 
Reform of Public Finance and Budget Management through the 
Implementation of Performance and Results-Based Management, Auditing, 
Inspection and Control 
2009  Morocco 
Source: Systematically extracted from the website of CAFRAD - www.cafrad.int/en/ 
 
Before the 4th Conference of Ministers of Public Service, the WBI provided support to South 
Africa to research Public Services across Africa. The general orientation was to build a 
database of information on different systems to facilitate more significant cross-country 
learning (Armstrong, 2005). The initiative was managed outside of the AU systems and hence 
did not facilitate a situation that allowed for continuity. Several further knowledge initiatives 
emerged as the responsibility for the Ministerial Conference moved between countries. 
Documents and engagements unfolded as arranged by Member States under the umbrella of 
the AU, but with limited ownership by the DPA. Under the leadership of Kenya and with the 
support of the UNDP, the Ministerial Conference engaged in a process to produce substantive 
knowledge guiding documents on three areas of ongoing concern 187. The driving logic behind 
 
187 Three consultants were appointed to draft guides for the public service. The expressed logic was that these 
would serve as best practices for implementation at the national level. The guides where the Leadership and 
Management Development Guide, Human Resource Planning and Policy Architecture in Public Service Guide 
and Performance Management and Measurement including Monitoring and Evaluation Guide. There is no 
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these was that they would serve to guide states on appropriate practices at the national level.  
The documents, while produced have been lost to the broader AU engagements as they only 
served as products of UNDP reporting and as examples of the work that unfolded during the 
Chairpersonship of the 7th and 8th Conference of Ministers of Public service.  
Core to knowledge and information exchange was the ACBF. It has over the years produced 
several publications on state capacity building and has engaged in specific sectoral areas for 
detailed reflection (Olowu et al., 2002; Sako, 2006). NEPAD also championed an initiative that 
focused on capacity building of regional institutions. The initiative primarily unfolded outside 
of the formal structures of the AU and did not serve in any substantive way as a strategy into 
the future. While the range of Ministerial Conferences, including within the space of local 
governance, reflects a commitment to knowledge exchange, these generally unfolded on an 
event by event basis, with no real institutional continuity for the recurrent sharing of the 
information and papers produced. One consequence of the decentralised championing of 
initiatives was the absence of a central repository for information within the AU system. A 
useful illustration of the learning and knowledge orientation of the Ministerial Conference was 
the establishment of the All Africa Public Service Innovation Awards (AUC, 2018d). While 
considered a central initiative of the Ministerial Conference, the process has over the years 
been managed by the Centre for Public Service Innovation (CPSI) in South Africa. The only 
records of innovations recognised and documented are with CPSI and hence not incorporated 
into the formal institutional system of the AU188.  
The reality of knowledge and information generation related to AU work unfolding outside of 
AU implementation institutions has been prevalent in the terrain of local government, among 
others. Conferences and event held, while serving as a means for exchange, are not fully 
documented or captured for the future and very often historical data and exchanges are lost or 
confined to those who have attended specific events. In the terrain of anti-corruption, several 
events have also been arranged by the AUABC, among others189. While many of the AU 
 
evidence that these documents have been used in anyway and there is no publicly available evidence of these as 
an online resource. According to available data, the consultants were paid USD 15 000,00 each for the products. 
This excludes their direct costs of travel in the continent for research and for presentation of the documents. The 
documents were, as an example, presented at a meeting on the Public Service Charter in Burundi in May 2012 
(DPA, 2012e). 
188 A detailed search reveals that the only documentation available on the All Africa Innovation Awards are on 
the website of the CPSI. Details on the innovation are not included on the AU website or any internal repository.  
189 As illustration, the AUABC arranged an Annual African Anti-Corruption Dialogue on Corruption 
Measurement from 2 to 4 October 2018 in Arusha, Tanzania. The initiative was supported by DP, but there is no 
substantive indicator of the output derived from such an initiative for mandate implementation (AUABC, 2018).  
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implementation institutional events are included in ‘activity reports’ of specific structures, their 
future value gets lost because of institutional incoherence. These events are generally 
financially supported by DP and other TP of AU institutions.  
5.2.4 Capacity Building and Technical Support  
Direct capacity building and technical support initiatives on state-building have historically 
been the preserve of traditional donors or Member States themselves. However, the 
establishment of AMDIN was meant to facilitate more significant interchange and more 
regionalised capacity initiatives. The most prominent African institution active in the state 
capacity building space is the ACBF. While established outside of AU processes, it is more 
recently defined as an AU technical institution responsible for capacity building. ACBF has 
historically been a conduit for DP funding for capacity building and has focused on providing 
funding for national-level initiatives to enhance the capacity of the state. It has also over the 
years supported more regional initiatives, including in the terrain of building the capacity of 
AU institutions and RECs (Olowu et al., 2002). More recently, the ACBF provided substantive 
financial support to the AUC for capacity building initiatives. In this respect, the AUC 
established AU Leadership Academy (AULA) in 2014. While the substantive focus of the 
AULA is on building capacity of AU institutions and officials, it has also developed initiatives 
for the training of officials within Member States190. AULA has developed many short-term 
training initiatives and produced a range of publications related to capacity building within the 
overall AU system and broader191. The following table provides a listing of some of the 
initiatives introduced since establishment. In addition to the selection of capacity building 
initiatives in the table, AULA arranges sensitisation workshops for Members of the PRC and 
other related seminars for AU officials and Member State representatives.  
Table 20: Selection of AULA Capacity Building Programmes 
Nature of Capacity Initiative Target Group as defined by the AULA 
 
Duration  
Public Policy Analysis, Formulation 
and Implementation 
 
Selected public sector employees Three 
days  
Combating Corruption in Public 
Financial Management 
 
AUC staff, Government officials; finance and trade 
officials, staff of financial regulatory and trade bodies; 
Five days 
 
190 Information extracted from the website of the African Union Leadership Academy - 
https://www.auleadershipacademy.com/.   
191 While the emphasis of the AULA is on the training of staff within the AU system, it has incorporated as an 
objective and focus ‘to develop learning content and delivery modes for capacity building solutions in Africa’s 
public sector’.  
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academics, legal professionals from the public sector 
civil society representatives 
Innovation in Public Service Sector 
management 
 
Senior civil servants, Project Managers, officers and 
Operations Managers, academics and Policy Advisors, 
National Programme and Project staff 
Three 
days 
Leadership for Africa’s 
Transformation programs 
 
Selected public sector employees from public sectors Three 
days  
Enhancing women’s leadership in 
Africa’s public sector transformation 
Target audience:  
Women and men from AUC, Women leaders from 




Emerging Young African Leaders for 
Public Sector Transformation 
 
Young Africans from, public sector and who are at the 
beginning stages of their careers, and young leaders 
from NGOs and private sector 
Three 
days  
Policy Programme Dialogue PPDs 
 
Diverse stakeholders from senior levels of African 
governments, political parties, civil society 
organisations, academia, think tanks, the private sector, 
youth and the media from around the continent. 
Three 
days 
Transformation of National Judiciary 
Systems Through Information 
Technology 
 





Youth and entrepreneurship: what 
role for government policy 
 




The role of Public-Private 
Partnerships. Credibility and 
institutional mechanisms. 
AUC senior managers, public professional’s sector 
planners and public procurement specialists, private 
sector professionals and developers currently working or 
considering public, private partnerships 
Four 
days 
Source: Data extracted from the AU website, and AULA reports.  
Outside of the formal structures of the AU and its implementation institutions, several African 
regional institutions have emerged in the broader capacity building terrain. The following table 
provides a listing of some of the more prominent formations that have emerged with a specific 
capacity-building orientation within the African context. Many of these emerge from 
interactions amongst AU Member States, and a few have structured relationships with the 
AUC.  
Table 21: African Initiatives that focus on State Capacity. 
Nature of Organisation 
 
Capacity Building Role  
The African Training and Research Centre in 
Administration for Development (CAFRAD) is a Pan 
African intergovernmental organisation. Established 1964.  
CAFRAD work areas generally cover the full terrain 
of work defined in the long-term strategy of the 
Ministerial Conference. Its activities include 
publications, workshops, seminars and the 
organisation of training. 
 
The African Association for Public Administration and 
Management (AAPAM) is a continental professional 
organisation for high-level public sector administrators 
and managers in Africa. 
 
AAPAM primary value –add is its annual conference. 
It also, with limited funding, organises workshops 




The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative 
(CABRI) is a professional network of senior budget 
officials in African Ministries of Finance and Planning. 
CABRI was launched on 14 May 2008.  
CABRI seeks to support senior budget officials by 
building capacity and promoting training and 
research in the field of public finance management. It 
conducts research, produces guiding manuals and 
arranges workshops and meetings for budget 
Officials. 
 
The Africa Human Resource Managers' Network (APS-
HRMnet) had been launched during the capacity building 
workshop of UNDESA in Arusha, Tanzania on 27 
February 2009.  The main objective of APS-HRMnet is to 
enhance the capacity of human resource managers in the 
public service in Africa.  
 
APS-HRMnet organises workshops and produces 
publications relevant to Public Sector Human 
Resource Managers. It is expected that it would 
conduct research and facilitate the establishment of 
further learning communities within its core focus 
area. 
The African Evaluation Association (AfrEA) was founded 
in 1999. It is an umbrella organisation for more than 20 
national Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) associations 
and networks in Africa. 
AfrEA is primarily focused on developing standards 
for Monitoring and Evaluation and facilitating 
learning amongst African Member States. It has a 
long history and conducts research, organises 
learning engagements and Conferences.  
An Association of African Public Services Commissions 
(AAPSCom) was established on 9 April 2008 through a 
Memorandum of Understanding between twenty (20) 
African Public Services Commissions representing fifteen 
(15) countries in Africa. 
 
As with other similar networks, the association has 
been established to facilitate learning and sharing of 
information on monitoring and oversight over Public 
Service issues. It is mainly focused on the 
arrangement of annual meetings of its members. 
The Centre for Specialization in Public Administration and 
Management (CESPAM) located at the University of 
Botswana was established in June 2000 as the SADC 
Centre of learning. 
 
While established through SADC, CESPAM is 
relatively autonomous and does not report directly to 
SADC. In addition to providing training on a regional 
basis, CESPAM also provides consulting and 
research services.  
L'Observatoire des Fonctions Publiques Africaines 
(OFPA) is a Benin based French-speaking organisation 
established to focus on learning and exchange in Public 
Administration. It was established in 1991.  
 
OFPA is primarily focused on research and exchange 
in Public Administration for French-speaking African 
countries. It does conduct some research and has in 
the past also arranged training initiatives 
Source: Extracted from websites of the various institutions and AUC DPA documents.  
The terrain of state capacity building reflects a proliferation of African ‘multilateral type’ 
initiatives. In many instances, direct linkages are established with AU institutions to facilitate 
a level of legitimacy and reach. The UNDP support long-term strategy for the African 
Ministerial Conference articulates various possibilities for enhancing state capacity (DPA, 
2011k). While the strategy was crafted with the possibility of mobilising substantive resources, 
it has been shelved after the establishment of the STC in Public Service, Local Government, 
Urban Development and Decentralisation. Within the anti-corruption terrain, the AUABC has 
broadly engaged the capacity building terrain and initiated some related activities. As with 
many other AU governance intervention terrain, it has worked with UNECA to develop a 
model law on anti-corruption. The general logic of the model law is that it serves as a template 
for AU Member States in the process of implementing the Convention (UNCEA, 2011).  
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5.3 Institutional Analysis  
The terrain of state capacity is characterised by wide-ranging initiatives that have unfolded 
directly from Member State and outside of the formal AU system. The history of initiatives 
reflects a strong push amongst Member State Ministers and officials for the inclusion of state 
capacity initiatives, especially as they relate to Public Administration and Local Governance. 
One consequence of the process is that many initiatives unfolded outside of direct and active 
agency of AU implementation institutions and officials. While fragmentation and a multiplicity 
of separate initiatives are a reality and inevitable product of differential actions from a range 
of ‘practice communities’ in the state capacity terrain, the structuring of relationship and the 
introduction of new legal instruments has had consequences for both state-level institutional 
engagement and for implementation by AU established institutions. The analysis that follows 
engages with the state capacity intervention logic and related interventions as they have 
unfolded in order to establish the core efficacy challenges within this terrain of focus.  The 
analytical emphasis is on both the internal and external institutional factors, including the social 
and material dimensions outlined in the analysis framework. 
5.3.1 Multilateral Engagements  
Initiatives relating to public administration and local governance within the terrain of state 
capacity larger unfolded by way of the direct agency of AU Member States through the 
Conferences of relevant African Ministers192. Member States themselves drove forward the 
development of both charters and related actions 193. Sovereignty and power in terms of shaping 
the norms and related instruments, thus unfolded differently to those that emerged in the areas 
of accountability and the rule of law. The involved Member State officials were primarily 
responsible for the drafting of the relevant charters and were significant, with their Ministers, 
in ensuring that the charter was approved through relevant AU Organs. In both the public 
administration and local governance terrain, the approach in introducing the Charters was that 
they would provide the most direct avenue for ensuring that the issues of concern are implanted 
firmly on the overall AU integration agenda. The agency of Member States in the process, 
 
192 The Ministers of Public Service and of Local Government were initially convened outside of AU processes. In 
the instance of Ministers of Public Service, this was largely the case until the 6th Conference. However, even the 
7th and 8th Conferences were largely led by the hosting Member State. Ministers of Local Government continue 
to engage outside of the formal AU system. It was anticipated that the STC would take the place of the Ministerial 
Conferences, but this has not really happened.  
193 In both Charter instances, the core writing work was done by officials from Member States. In the Case of the 
Public Service, officials from Algeria took the lead in drafting together with officials from South Africa.  AUC 
officials played a minimal role. In the case of local government, writing was largely from officials in UCLGA. 
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however, stands in contrast to the realities of what is possible at the state level when it comes 
to implementation. It is necessary to engage both with power and sovereignty as exercised by 
Member States and with internal implementation realities and related disjuncture with what has 
unfolded within this area of AU multilateralism in governance to appreciate the challenges in 
the state capacity areas.   
5.3.1.1 Power and Sovereignty   
The AU Convention on anti-Corruption has its roots in the CSSDCA process that unfolded in 
Nigeria, where the specific emphasis was on fighting corruption. However, the more 
substantive push arose as African Member States interacted within the framework of the UN 
driven process which culminated in the adoption of the UN Convention. Within this process, 
African Member States were particularly concerned that the UN process, with strong support 
from countries in the north, did not adequately engage the issue of cross-border corruption and 
hence the focus on the corruptee  (Ikubaje, 2010). For many African countries, the corruptors 
were from multinationals from the northern hemisphere. The driving motivation for the 
Convention was hence less about corruption in Member States and more about corruption 
perpetrated by northern multinational and the proposition that the proceeds of corruption are 
hidden in developed countries.  
Outside of the expressed motivation for the African Convention, Member States continued to 
participate in both the UN and AU processes. In practice, the UN process has historically been 
much better resourced and has hence benefited from higher levels of active agency from 
African countries. Most of African State Parties have submitted review reports within the UN 
process and many have received DP support for their efforts directly or through the relevant 
UN agency. The UN process is extensive and includes a range of capacity building and related 
support initiatives. Numerous guides on the UN Convention are available, and civil society 
groupings have launched the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
Coalition for ongoing engagements. This process stands in sharp contrast to AU processes. 
While the AU process unfolded with some level of political determination from Member States, 
these were somewhat lost in the implementation phase, in part because of the slow pace by 
which the AUABC Secretariat194 was established and related actions to follow up with Member 
 
194 The financial challenges related to the Board are aptly captured in the minutes of the 7th Board Meeting (March 
2011) which provides that ‘that AU is undergoing financial challenges in terms of its budget given the crisis that 
is happening in the North Africa and Egypt and Libya are the biggest funders of the AU budget and hence the 
need for austerity measures the AU administration is undertaking which are directly affecting the Board functions. 
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States (MSWG, 2018).  
At the level of Member States, the period of a lapse between adoption and ratification often 
meant that new people occupied institutions that were part of initial processes. One 
consequence of implementation slowness at the level of the AUABC was the establishment of 
the Mbeki Panel to address issues of illicit financial flow, which in theory was a core function 
of the AUABC. Unlike the AUABC, the Mbeki Panel benefited from direct and capable 
support from the UNECA (UNECA, 2015).  Even as the UNECA developed a joint programme 
with the AUABC (UNCEA, 2011), the focus of the initiative was substantively on completing 
the work of the Mbeki Panel. One consequence of the separation between the AUABC and the 
Mbeki Panel was that the AU itself has two competing institutional processes. The Mbeki panel 
has since graduated to be a unit within the Office of the Chairperson reporting directly to 
President Obasanjo and the wider panel. While there was engagement with Member States, 
how the initiatives unfolded remains somewhat outside of their oversight. The AUABC, on the 
other hand, continues to struggle with its efforts, both at the level of resource mobilisation and 
at the level of encouraging higher levels of Member State engagement 195. Outside of the 
initially submitted reports, there is little evidence of active Member State interest with the AU 
Convention196. However, given that the AUABC has generally struggled to establish the 
required Secretariat capacity for effective follow-up197, the lack of active Member State 
engagements cannot be attributed to the absence of commitment to reporting and the fight 
against corruption. On the contrary, Member States themselves had approved 2018 as the Year 
of Anti-Corruption (AU, 2018c).  
In the space of local governance and public administration, the benefits of direct Member State 
agency are visible by the fact that countries were directly involved in champions the adoption 
 
It was resolved that there is a need to strengthen the coordination and working relationship between the Board and 
other Departments of the AU’ (AUABC, 2011).  
195 This challenge is somewhat embodied in the decision of the Executive Council of the AU on the Fourth Report 
of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, which ‘Commends States Parties that have submitted their 
reports to the AUABC and Urges those that have not yet done so to comply with the obligations set out in Articles 
20 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption’ (AU, 2013).   
196 The AUC Internal Audit Report provides that ‘(f)or the period from January 2016 to August 2018, AU ABAC 
conducted only one sensitization mission (in 2016, in Mauritius) and only one evaluation mission (in 2017, in 
Uganda) despite that this is one of their key functions as per the convention’ (AUC, 2018a). 
197 This struggle is somewhat also reflected in the decision of the Executive Council which ‘Requests the AUABC 
to submit financial and administrative issues to the PRC, through its Sub-Committee on Structures and the Sub-
Committee on Administrative, Financial and Budgetary Matters in order to enable the AU Policy Organs to 
allocate adequate human, material and financial resources to the AUABC to enable the Board to fulfil its mandate 
in an efficient manner’ (AU, 2013).  
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of a particular instrument. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognise that Member States 
sometimes support and drive forward an initiative as part of a broader diplomatic posture and 
not as a substantive matter198.  Member States are often motivated to take forward specific 
instruments as a matter of prestige. While the AUC provided the platform for hosting relevant 
meeting leading to the production of both instruments, individual Member States were directly 
involved in the process and served to champion the instruments through the relevant AU 
structures. In the instance of the African Charter on the Principles and Values of Public Service 
and Administration, the Minister of Public Service of Kenya attended the meetings of the PRC 
and Executive Council to present the Charter and encourage its adoption. At the level of the 
PRC and Executive Council, there was minimum real engagement on the substantive content 
of the documents, as was generally presumed to have benefited from the inputs of Member 
States. The lack of engagements perhaps reflecting that Member States did not perceive these 
instruments as controversial or as requiring substantive inputs.  
While Member State activism is sustained through Ministerial collegiality in the period from 
the 4th to the 8th Conference of Ministers of Public Service199, it has not been sustained for 
ratification purposes, in the period after. Since the 9th Conference and the establishment of the 
STC, reliance for driving the process forward shifted to the DPA with its minimal capacity for 
promotion and mobilisation of States200. The more substantive challenge facing the AU system 
in state capacity is the extent Member States will be willing to comply with the provisions of 
both Charters. While the contents of the Charters are general, they do create some level of 
obligation and hence a shifting of some level of sovereignty over state capacity for 
development to the AU. As with many other instruments in governance, a more in-depth 
reading of the contents of the legal instruments and the anticipated process, suggest compliance 
 
198 In a briefing a briefing to National Council of Provinces (NCOP) Committee on Cooperative Governance & 
Traditional Affairs, Water and Sanitation and Human Settlements, the responsible official went as far as to indicate 
that the “…charter is and will remain a living testimony to South Africa’s prolific role in shaping the edifice of 
this enduring Ministerial platform from a mere information and experience exchange construct to a 
programmatically focused implementation outfit’(DPSA) .  
199 The activism of the Ministers was noted in the 2010 Report of the AUC Chairperson to the Executive Council 
as follows: The Chairperson of the 6th Conference of African Ministers of Public Service (Kenya) continues to 
take a lead in driving forward the implementation of the Public Service Programme and the decisions of the 6th 
Conference of Ministers. The Chairperson has held meetings with Ministers of Public Service within ECOWAS 
to facilitate wider participation. The Minister has also engaged with other regions to ensure that there is active 
support and participation in the activities directed at enhancing state capability for development’ (AU, 2010b). 
200 The DPA produced a plan titled: Priorities for The Next Two-Year Work-Plan of The AU-STC 8 Sub-
Committee On Public Service and Administration (PSA) (2017 - 2018), but with no visible indication of how this 
would be funded and delivered upon (DPA, 2017b).  
231 
 
through peer engagements, rather than formal criteria driven compliance actions201. While the 
state capacity terrain demonstrates the benefits of Member State agency in driving forward 
norm establishment and related initiatives, it also brings to the fore the challenges of sustaining 
such agency for follow up and implementation.  
Across all state capacity instruments, there is little evidence to affirm the lack of commitment 
on the part of Member States. While higher-level conferences attract the attention of Ministers, 
detailed level of engagements on compliance and related reporting would be the preserve of 
AUC officials. The initial commitment to specific instruments is difficult to sustain beyond 
political processes that involve Ministers. One reality of the overall policy drive within the 
state capacity fold has been the lack of driving agency from officials who would be directly 
involved in the implementation of instruments202. The initial energy towards instruments has 
dissipated as a result of low capacity and agency within AU implementation institutions and 
related capacity continuity challenges at the level of Member States. The DPA has not 
established substantive capacity for the follow up on the adopted charters. The AUC generally 
devoted little attention on ensuring active follow up with relevant Ministries and Departments 
within Member States. As with other governance-related instruments, communications often 
get lost between embassies in Addis Ababa, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and relevant 
departments and institutions at the national level. The realities of multilateral institutional 
processes and capacity should not be underestimated, even while appreciating the influence of 
sovereignty and power over ratification and implementation commitment.  
5.3.1.2 Member State Realties    
One of the challenges for AU instruments, including the outcomes of APRM Review exercises, 
is the substantive value that ratification or implementation of recommendations brings to 
Member States. At one level, Member States sometimes express the prestige of adhering to 
particular African standards, such as those embodied in the instruments, but at another level, 
ratification creates a reporting burden with minimal direct value to either the state or the 
officials involved. In the instance of anti-corruption, the UN process has attracted much more 
attention from African countries than the AU process. Part of this is explainable by the fact that 
the UN process attracted more DP resources and is also attractive to officials as engages them 
 
201 Article 23 (2) I J provides that the AUC should ‘(u)ndertake periodic review of the Charter and make 
recommendations to the Policy Organs of the African Union (AU, 2011a). 
202 Minutes and reports of meetings in the terrain of Public Service reflects that most of these were attended by 
Ministers and not officials with the technical capacity.  
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directly within the reporting and review process203. The AU process tends to emphasise 
political representation more than the UN process and thereby rendering it less attractive for 
engagement and compliance push from officials who have to do the real work. The UN process 
is better resourced, and hence State Party officials benefit directly from a wide range of 
initiatives. Follow up implementation actions also attract support from UN agency and hence 
from DP funding.  
While there has been substantive Member States championing of the Local Government and 
Public Service Charter, this has not translated into substantive actions at the level of Member 
States. While States remain active in some activities associated with the Ministerial 
Conference, including Africa Public Service Day and the All Africa Public Service Innovation 
Awards, the Charters do not necessarily resonate with efforts at a local level and do not appear 
to inspire actions towards compliance with agreed norms and standards. Part of the challenge 
at the level of State implementation is that local state realities are diverse and that a push 
towards compliance or fitting in with particulate templates may not always be suitable for local 
contexts204. The range of Ministerial Conferences and the numerous exchange events that have 
unfolded in the broader terrain of state capacity in Africa reflects a substantive desire for 
information sharing and knowledge exchange. Outside of the systematic work that has unfolded 
in CABRI, which largely duplicates the peer methodologies and research approaches of the 
OECD, many of the other initiatives lack any sense of continuity and quality knowledge 
content205. Many also unfold as discrete events or training engagements only relevant for the 
official who happens to be responsible for attending. As most of these events unfold from DP 
resources, their efficacy for state capacity at the level of Member States calls for deeper forms 
of evaluative assessment. The general overall conclusion over the past decade is that the history 
of state capacity building initiatives in Africa has substantively failed to effect positive and 
lasting changes (Levy, 2014).  
The need for ratification based on common standards for state capacity was conceptualised and 
unfolded in an intellectual environment where the notion of ‘one size fits all’ state capacity 
approach is rejected. The overall orientation is that all national and local realities are very 
 
203 This matter has been noted by civil society actors in the anti-corruption space. Many of who also participate in 
the UN anti-corruption process (MSWG, 2018) 
204 As illustration, Ethiopia responded to a follow on the Charter indicating that it has problems with specific 
aspects of the Charter relating to the definition of what constitutes the Civil Service and hence would only be able 
to ratify if these were resolved to accommodate local realities (DPA, 2011l).   
205 The approach of CABRI is documented on its website https://www.cabri-sbo.org/.  
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different and hence need to be engaged with as such (Andrews, 2010; Andrews, 2013; Andrews 
et al., 2013). Standards in the state capacity related instruments are often based on a specific 
conception of optimality and may well resonate for the longer term but seemingly struggle to 
get the current attention of senior officials. At most, compliance and related engagements 
activities are reduced as elements to be engaged with by junior officials. While officials in 
Member States often refer to African instruments as part of their internal efforts, actual 
willingness to commit to instruments by way of ratification, systematic implementation and 
reporting remain low206.  The diversity of institutions, available capacity and related 
challenges, suggest that Member States are much more inclined towards peer-level learning 
engagement than they are towards compliance with instruments, with the added burden of 
reporting. At the same time, there must be a recognition that when officials lead processes, and 
these are coupled with substantive research, as in the case of CABRI, they are more likely to 
influence change and be beneficial to state-level capacity initiatives.  
5.3.2 Multilateral Implementation  
At the level of multilateral institutional implementation, the analysis engages with issues 
related to organisational culture, bureaucratic strategies, financing issues and the related human 
resource realities. In addition to drawing on the historical analysis and related intervention in 
state capacity, reliance is on reports related to the functioning of AU multilateral 
implementation institutions. This terrain is rendered a little more complicated, as initiatives 
often unfolded from outside the immediate agency of AU institutions and often entailed a 
higher level of active agency on the part of Member States. The external push was particularly 
evident in the terrain of Public Administration, were over a sustained period, leading Member 
State Ministers established specific offices for championing initiatives, with some perspective 
on the incorporated of responsible Member States officials into AU implementation 
institutions. In line with the conceptual framework, the analysis unfolds in two areas: 1) 
Organisational Culture and Financing, 2) Human Resource and Bureaucratic Strategies.  
5.3.2.1 Organisational Culture and Financing  
While there has been a growth in the number of state building related instruments, there is little 
 
206 While the Ministerial Conferences have attracted high levels of participation from Member States, very few 
have responded to numerous calls that the instrument be ratified. The call for ratification is reflected in numerous 
Assembly decisions. This is most recently reflected in the Assembly Decision on the AU Specialized Technical, 
Committee on Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralization (AU, 2019b).  
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regards for the capacity to implement as the process unfolded. Both the Public Administration 
and Local Governance instruments make a vague reference to the establishment of Secretariats 
for implementation207. The policy and implementation nexus in the AU system is characterised 
by a culture within which there is little reflection on the organisation and financial implications 
of initiatives. The consequence of the policy-implementation gap is that budget consideration, 
and related active lobbying only unfold after the full establishment of legal commitment. This 
failure to plan was particularly evident in the instance of the AUABC. After its initial launch, 
it became evident that the AU system had not anticipated the costs of setting up a separate 
Secretariat208. Funding for the initial AUABC was only from DP resources. While the 
operational budget is incorporated into the overall AU budget, actual resources were deemed 
very limited for the adopted mandate 209.  
Coupled with low resources, the AUABC Secretariat emerged as an outgrowth from the rest of 
the AUC institutional system and culture. The implication of this is that the small Secretariat 
primarily focused on arranging AUABC meetings and other events. Including attending the 
many events arranged in the wider AU system. To augment its capacity, the Secretariat was 
initially able to recruit additional to fixed establishment officials on the basis on annual 
contracts through DP funding (UNCEA, 2011). This strategy untraveled in 2015, after reports 
of the mismanagement of resources in the Secretariat and the subsequent suspension of its first 
Executive Secretary 210.  Similar reports emerged in 2018, after the resignation of a Board 
member, who alleged corruption on the part of the Secretariat and the wider AUC211. While 
effort has unfolded to counter the corruption accusations and to launch an investigation, the 
 
207  A report of a meeting between the DPA and Ministerial Office responsible for the Conference of Ministers of 
Public Service (CAMPS) provides that  ‘(t)here was a general consensus that the interim Secretariat should be 
main-streamed into the structure and processes of the AUC and should be situated within the Division of 
Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Elections, Department of Political Affairs’ (DPA, 2011b). 
208 In a report of the AUC Chairperson of the Commission to Assembly it is noted that ‘(w)hen a budget is made 
available for the Advisory Board on   Corruption, it is expected that the momentum for their work will increase 
and they will be in   a position to Report to the Executive Council, as per their mandate’ (AU, 2009d) 
209 The matter of capacity and resources also featured in a decision of the Executive Council of the AU in 2015, 
which ‘called upon the Commission to provide to the Advisory Board the requisite human and financial resources 
within the allocated budgetary provisions to enable it fulfils its mandate. In this regard, the AUC should be urged 
to fill the position of Executive Secretary in an expedient manner’ (AU, 2013).  
210 This was noted in the decision of the AU Executive Council in which it Expressed ‘its grave concern on the 
alleged Misappropriation of Resources Allocated to The Board and requests the AUC and its Audit Services 
Directorate to submit, as soon as possible, a comprehensive report on the investigation being undertaken and 
measures to be put in place to redress this situation, at the January 2015 Summit’ (AU, 2013). 
211 In his letter of resignation, Daniel Batidam, who served as chair of the board in 2017, provided that ‘(a)fter 
witnessing several instances and degrees of bad governance, including the abuse of entrusted power (or 
corruption), lack of probity, accountability, transparency and integrity at the Secretariat of the AUABC and some 
Departments of the AU Commission itself for over a period of three years now, while all efforts at seeking redress 
have yielded no result, I have decided on grounds of principle that enough is enough’ (Allison, 2018a).  
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reality for the AUABC is that DP would be hesitant to support the work further and hence 
reliance has to be placed on the available Member State budget. While the budget provided has 
grown since the establishment of the Secretariat, the reality in practice is that it is minimal and 
covers very few events and engagements from AUABC. The direct costs for AUABC session 
are very high and include costs of flights, accommodation and related stipends for the full 
duration of events. More recently, there has also been dialogue within the AUABC on members 
receiving an honorarium for their time. Such payments are an issue for all such structures in 
the AU and a matter that is subject to an ongoing dialogue212. Of importance to note in this 
respect, is that in the governance terrain the AU has established several such elected bodies. 
While some of the individuals are provided with some compensation for time, the broadening 
of this may be well beyond the capacity of an institution struggling to secure resources.  
Given the limited resources for the Secretariat of the AUABC, reliance is on DP who are 
increasingly wary of providing such support. Some support has come from GiZ and other 
partners. These DP nevertheless exercise direct oversight over which activities they would 
support. Given the limited available resources and the processes relating to the appointment of 
officials, the Secretariat, as with other implementation institutions, has struggled to attract 
individuals with the required capacity to engage with implementation work beyond the 
organisation and attendance of events213. General reliance is on consultants and other partners 
for work that should otherwise be led by the Secretariat. As an illustration, the AUABC has 
requested a civil society formation, referred to as the Multi-Sectorial Working Group (MSWG) 
(MSWG, 2018)) on Corruption, to assist with, among others, the redrafting of the baseline 
questionnaire. Outside of arranging for the translation of documents, the Secretariat has not 
played any role in the process. Officials from the Secretariat would nevertheless busy 
themselves by attending external events relevant to their mandate, but not core to the expected 
implementation work.  
The realities of limited financial resources and related event-driven organisational culture 
within the AU system are increasingly also apparent in the terrain of Public Administration and 
Local Government. When Member States actively drove the initiatives, there was some level 
of momentum around a range of activities, including, amongst others, the All Africa Public 
 
212 This challenge is reflected on in a Decision relating to the Banjul Commission which provided that the ‘ACHPR 
to prepare proposals on the honorarium, per diem and other allowances to be paid to the Members of ACHPR, for 
consideration by   the AU Policy Organs’ (AU, 2008c). There is no evidence of this matter ever being solved.  
213 The internal AUC reports highlights this by indicating that there is a ‘(l)ack of clear roles for participants 
and the Secretariat employees attending meetings’ (AUC, 2018a). 
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Service Innovation Awards and Africa Public Service Day214. In part, also because these 
initiatives attracted UNDP mobilised resources. Before incorporation into the AU, AMCOD 
also attracted resources from GiZ. In both instances, there was a recognition that the initiatives 
were not sustainable outside of the AU and hence the momentum towards full incorporation, 
in part, through the establishment and adoption of related Charters. In both instances, there 
were strong arguments around the incorporation of AMCOD officials and officials in the Office 
of the Chairperson of the 6th and 7th Conference of Ministers of Public Service 215. While the 
DPA has expanded its structures to appoint an official responsible for the STC, resources for 
implementation at the anticipated scale are not available216. The substantive disjuncture 
between resources and the entrenched institutional event-driven culture is likely only to come 
to the fore when the instruments are ratified by the required number to enter into force and 
when (and if) Member States and civil society organisations place pressure for active 
implementation.  
5.3.2.2 Human Resource and Bureaucratic Strategies  
In the terrain of anti-corruption, the realities of human resources constraints to support the 
AUABC are in the preceding analysis. One consequence of weak institutional capacity for 
implementation is that the burden of work would either shift to consultants employed on short 
term contracts or to an elected individual who are mainly in place to exercise oversight and 
provide conceptual leadership. A combination of enthusiasm on the part of elected AUABC 
members and weak institutional capacity has placed a substantive work-related burden on 
Board members217. A similar reality may well confront other governance institutions and often 
part of the reasons why such elected members are increasingly demanding some form of 
 
214 The realities of Member State role and UNDP support for the Public Administration initiative are aptly captured 
in a statement from Permanent Secretary, Ministry of State for Public Service, Kenya in which ‘… he lauded 
UNDP for the support accorded to CAMPS and informed the meeting that the Ministers Programme was largely 
financed by UNDP, Government of Kenya and the Republic of South Africa’ (DPA, 2011f) 
215 An internal report on the DPAs achievements provides that One of these is the ‘(f)inalization of the 
transformation of AMCOD and CAMPS into African structures through the establishment of appropriate 
Specialized Technical Committees (DPA, 2012b). During this period, CAMPS officials from Member States went 
as far as to produce an AUC funding proposal on creating an interim structure outside of the formal AU system 
(DPA, 2011h).  
216  This challenges is somewhat captured in an Executive Council decision on the STC, which urges the 
‘DPA/AUC to, in view of the reforms in the African Union, propose an appropriate structure of the Secretariat of 
the STC 8 (taking into account the  specificities of each of the Sub-Committees) to the AU Reform Team for  
consideration and incorporation in the proposal for the overall structure of AUC  that will be tabled for approval 
by the policy organs in June 2019’(AU, 2019b).  
217 This reality is somewhat contained in the decision of the Executive Council which ‘call(ed) on all stakeholders, 
including Member States, the Commission and other relevant AU policy organs to strengthen the financial and 
human resources of the Secretariat to enable the Board to fulfil its mandate in an efficient manner’ (AU, 2011c).  
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payment or honorarium for their efforts218.  
In the instance of public administration and local government, many of the historical efforts, 
including Ministerial related conferences, were mainly arranged by officials from Member 
States.  DPA officials would participate in such events across the continent, with minimal work 
effort on their part.  Given the personal benefits derived from attending events outside of any 
reflection on their value-add to AU multilateral process, officials would welcome such Member 
State-driven initiatives without providing any advice on how these are to be sustained for the 
future. Benefits from arranged events are fulfilled without there being a consideration of the 
long-term implications of what has unfolded. In the instance of Public Service, Member State 
officials have driven many initiatives on the assumption that these would be valuable at a 
multilateral level and that these will be incorporated eventually into the AUC219. The 
momentum to expand DP resources and complete various event-related activities, such as the 
Management Manuals and the Long-Term Strategy, outside of future considerations were very 
germane to the Public Administration initiative220. DPA officials who were, presumably, more 
knowledgeable of multilateral practices, were not incentivised to limit the activities or advise 
on alternative value addition intervention modalities. Advise to championing Member States 
is often confined to processes relating to the adoption of the instruments developed 
substantively by Member States.     
The multilateral bureaucratic event-driven incentive approach of AU officials also serves to 
encourage the momentum established through the agency of Member States. There was simply 
no reason for DPA officials to advise on the considerations that should feature as the range of 
instruments are expanded and hence the realities of multilateral capacity limitations. Even if 
there was pressure from Member States to shape the agenda of the AU in areas of state capacity 
concern, there was little to encourage a more sustainable approach, either by way of limiting 
the number of instruments or by encouraging the incorporation of concerns into the APRM 
process221. Current human resource capacity realities in the DPA suggest that it would not be 
 
218 The matter of payments to elected part-time Commissioners does not appear to have been resolved. This matter 
was embodied in a decision of the Assembly as far back as 2008. In the decision, it was provided that the 
Commission must ‘prepare proposals on the honorarium, per diem and   other allowances to be paid to the 
Members …for consideration by the AU Policy Organs’ (AU, 2008b).  
219 The idea of incorporating the offices into the AUC are contained in an internal report on the issue of establishing 
such a Secretariat (DPA, 2011g).  
220 The data contains numerous records of meetings and workshop being funded by DP, including UNDP and GiZ.  
221 While DPA officials attended numerous meetings with AMCOD and CAMPS officials, there is no record of 
them raising concerns around these issues. Where matters of incorporation arose, the DPA individuals would 
broadly indicate that this is not provided for in structures or that they would consult further.  
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possible to engage in follow up activities on both the Public Service and Local Government 
Charters outside of substantive rapid increase in the number of officials. This terrain has also 
not necessarily attracted DP resources at scale, relative to accountability and the rule of law 
interventions.  
It is recalled that, in the instance of Public Service related initiatives, much of the initial work 
that unfolded was primarily through offices located in the Minister that served as the 
Chairperson of the Conference. Officials in these instances were able to draw on both their 
budgets and resources made available by DP through, amongst others, the UNDP (DPA, 
2011f). While there was some attempt to encourage other Member States to engage similarly, 
by appointing champions, this approach never really took hold as Member States were 
differently resourced and often those in poorer championing countries were unable to take 
forward initiatives. In the instance of the Charter, Algeria played a stronger role and arranged 
some of the initial technical meetings. UNDP, however, funded participants and resource 
person for the process. One consequence of the initial low participation of AU officials was 
that the draft Charter did not entirely fit the overall language of the AU and it took some time 
and more direct involvement of AU officials to finalise the draft222. The final draft also 
benefited from inputs from the AU Legal Counsel, amongst others. However, given limitations 
within the AU implementation system itself, there are no substantive engagements on the logic 
and real value of having a legal instrument for state capacity development. An added 
consequence of weak capacity within DPA for the Public Service initiative was the failure to 
ensure continuity from the flurry of efforts that emerged at the level of Member States. UNDP 
support did not also contribute towards ensuring that the capacity is established in the AU for 
the terrain of work. In the main, UNDP directed some resources for the attendance of meeting 
and events arranged by itself with the Offices of Ministers responsible. The work-flow culture 
was chaotic with no strategic thought on future capabilities for implementation, and there were 
no collective considerations of the implications of initiatives that unfolded from within the 
Conference of Ministers223. Outside of the All Africa Public Service awards managed by CPSI, 
 
222 This is reflected in numerous meeting reports. In the instance of the Public Service Charter, the propensity was 
to use the weakness of a document to arrange further technical meetings. One such meeting was an Experts Meeting 
on the Draft Charter on the Principles and Values of Public Service, from 6th to 8th September 2010, in Maputo, 
Mozambique, funded by UNDP. There is no substantive rational for having such a meeting away from the AUC in 
Addis Ababa other than the idea of AU visibility in Member States.  
223 The chaotic manner in which the initiatives unfolded is somewhat reflected in the Minutes of the AUC-CAMPS 
Technical Retreat, 18th – 20th August 2011, Nazareth, Ethiopia which included discussions around the movement 
of officials from Member States to the AUC and the establishment of an Open Source Centre in one of the Member 
states (DPA, 2011c).  
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the work that unfolded dissipated by the time of the 9th Conference of Ministers and the 
establishment of the STC.  
A critical reflection of the failure to consider the capacity implications of adopted instruments 
is aptly reflected in the anti-corruption terrain. By the time of the election of the AUABC, the 
AUC had not set aside a budget for the institutionalisation of the structure or its work. A few 
months after the election of the AUABC, it was recognised that no budget was set aside for the 
work of the Board. The first meeting was arranged ten months after the election of Board 
Members and only after some rechannelling of donor resources for the initiative. It also took 
some time before a full budget was set aside for the work of the AUABC. The first person to 
take the lead in serving as the Secretariat for the work of the Board was an official appointed 
by International IDEA and seconded for democracy-related work to the AU. Institutional shifts 
and allocation unfold on an ad-hoc basis with no substantive resources earmarked during the 
initial period. In the instance of local government, the process was focused on by another 
seconded IDEA official, but the substantive energy for detailed work was from the 
championing Member States and organisations, such as AMCOD and UCLGA224.  
The bureaucratic approach to the growth in instruments was generally ad-hoc without much 
reflection on the substantive implications of taking on further instruments within the AU 
system. There is no evidence of interactions on the institutional implications of the adopted 
instruments and hence the ability of the AUC to engage on details within both programmatic 
areas. By and large, the limited capacity is primarily focused on arranging the meetings of the 
STC in Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralisation. Despite 
the existence of the AGP by 2012, there was no substantive reflective work on how the 
instruments and related programmatic work would unfold at the level of the AU or within RECs 
The areas of Public Service and Local Government do not feature in direct ways in RECs. 
However, as outlined, many RECs have instruments relating to Anti-Corruption. There have 
historically been very limited substantive engagements on overlapping instruments between 
the AU and RECs and how these impact on Member States. The history of instrument 
establishment, adoption and ratification, suggest that the process will be slow and that even 
after the instrument enters into force, there is likely to be slow movement from within the AU 
system on implementation.  
 





5.4 Efficacy of State Building Interventions 
The efficacy challenges in state capacity that emerge from the analysis substantively mirror 
many of those that emerge in the accountability and the rule of law terrain. It includes issues 
relating to the skewed agency of officials, the personal revenue benefiting performance culture 
and the realities of norm proliferation. However, for focused analysis and with a view that the 
identified challenges in each area will collectively contribute to a more global analysis, the 
approach here is to extract from the analysis those challenges that are strongly germane to the 
area of state capacity as it has evolved in the AU system. The overall issue of norm proliferation 
has been engaged upon in the rule of law terrain analysis. In the instance of the state capacity 
areas, the reality norm proliferation emerged in a very different manner and mainly from the 
direct agency of Member States. It is hence worth engaging with this challenge further as it has 
emerged in the state capacity terrain.  
5.4.1 Norm and Standard Proliferation  
One of the consequences of Member State agency and passion for particular areas of 
engagement is the reality of norm and instrument proliferation. Ministers in particular terrains 
of engagements, such as Public Administration and Local Governance often develop a passion 
for their areas and seek to champion these as part of AU processes. Some of this enthusiasm is 
driven by the desire to contribute to changing African realities outside of expressed 
consideration of the overall AU capability realities which are engaged with by members of the 
PRC and Executive Council. Norm entrepreneurship by Member States in the instance of state 
capacity has resulted in a substantive increase in the number of instruments that have to be 
implemented by the AU. While AU officials may well have no substantive authority to resist 
Member State agency and related actions through AU multilateral processes, the incorporation 
of an ever-expanding range of instruments is not strategically engaged with from the 
perspective of effective coordination and AU implementation capability realities as they are 
and will unfold in the short, medium and long-term. Even outside of budget considerations, 
any rapid institutional growth is likely to be a challenge for any organisation.  
There are too many instruments and low levels of real capacity for implementation. Instruments 
are adopted without substantive consideration on implementation, and the type of capacity that 
is needed for substantive follow up. The general presumption is that actions will unfold at a 
later stage. When instruments are developed within specific interest communities, very little 
attention is on the fact that there are other related instruments and how such new instruments 
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may deepen existing implementation difficulties. In both the instance of Public Administration 
and Local Governance, there have been active engagements outside of the formal structure of 
the AU before the introduction of the instruments. Some of these were purely predicated on 
ongoing experience exchange and could have been sustained differently. There is a range of 
multilateral technical engagements in the terrain of Public Administration, and many of these 
provide substantive and adequate platforms for knowledge exchange in specific state capacity 
terrain. One element of drive in both the Public Administration and Local Governance areas is 
the expressed desire for the incorporated of the secretariats of AMCOD and the Conference of 
African Ministers of Public Service into the structures of the AUC.  The incorporation was not 
feasible and would substantively compromise the appointment rules of the AUC and the quota 
system established for such appointment.  
5.4.2 The politicisation of Technical Capacity  
An immense reality in AU multilateral initiative is the that political levels engagements at the 
level of Ministers tend to overwhelm the system. To overcome the proliferation of Ministerial 
Conference and meetings, the initial architects of the AU sought to cluster these within specific 
STC’s. The realities of the overemphasise and proliferation on political level engagements were 
particularly evident in the instance of the work of the Ministers of Public Service that emerged 
between the 4th and 8th Conferences. Numerous Ministerial level engagements are introduced, 
with little or no substantive prior technical levels engagements. The consequence of this is that 
no real work takes place at the level of senior officials, and very often they merely served as 
event managers for ministerial-level engagements. Documents tend to repeat issues previously 
engaged upon, and there has been a tendency to seek approval of Ministers for operational 
types documents.  
The area of state capacity is substantively technical in so much as it impacts on the work of 
public servants and how they drive the overall development of state systems. While state reform 
at the level of Member State requires political commitment and buy-in, the substantive real 
work and knowledge interactions fall into the domain of what is generally driven by senior 
officials in Departments of Public Service and Local Government. An over preponderance of 
Ministerial engagements has had the overall effect of diluting the substantive contents of the 
work that has unfolded. Success is in institutions that maintain a workable space between 
technical level interactions and political oversight. CABRI functions under the oversight of 
Ministers of Finance of Member Countries. Much of its work, however, unfolds through 
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meetings of budget officials and hence it has been able to produce substantive research content 
to assist and drive change at the level of Member States. CABRI operates outside of the formal 
AU implementation system.  
5.4.3 One Size Fits all Orientation  
As with other areas of governance, the idea of introducing norms and standards through 
instruments is that these would drive change and secure more appropriate state capacity for the 
future. However, in the design of such instruments, there is limited reflection on the change 
process and the substantive value-add that these would bring to Member State own initiatives 
and diverse local realities. Beyond the broad assumptions of information sharing as a change 
strategy, there is an inadequate reflection on how such common standards may be used to 
engage Member States and ensure that they have capable institutions. While the idea behind 
the instruments is that they provide for minimum standards, the legalistic orientation 
establishes that they require a level of compliance by Member States that have ratified.  
The ‘one size fits all’ orientation embedded in the instruments runs counter to growing 
international trend that recognises that local realities are often complex and the application of 
specific templates, such as those embodied in Charters, would not work and is 
counterproductive for local reform initiatives. State development is a long-term process and 
often predicated on several local contingencies.  While Charters may be relevant for 
aspirational purposes, their substantive value for change is often limited and hence a legalistic 
orientation to the application may well create some disincentives for engagement on the part 
of Member States that would otherwise benefit from peer-level engagements.  
There is little evidence to suggest that Member States actual value the existence of state 
capacity related instruments. At most, Member States would make pronouncements on the 
instrument and broadly indicate that they are informed by it for political and prestige reasons, 
but in practice states often do not see any real substantive value of using the instruments to 
establish standards or as a guide for driving their state capacity efforts. Each state system is so 
complex that it is difficult to perceive of an instrument being valuable as a guide for practice. 
The idea of sharing best practice is also contradictory to the overall African orientation on the 




5.4.4 Lack of Peer Engagement Diffusion   
The core of instruments in the state-building terrain is focused on deeper forms of peer 
engagement. Although instruments have been introduced to creates legal obligation after 
ratification, the general orientation is peer to peer engagements between Ministers and between 
officials. The substantive challenge, as with other governance instruments, is that peer review 
custodianship is centralised within the APRM, to the extent that there is a presumption that 
there are no other relevant peer-related engagements within specific sectors or at a lower 
leadership level. The APRM peer model is primarily confined to interactions between Heads 
of State and Government as a matter of structure and practice. While APRM Country Reports 
contains information on local governance and public service delivery, there is no real attempt 
to get Ministers in the terrain to engage in peer discussions as part of the process. This 
centralised approach to peer engagement contradicts the reality that many instruments 
incorporate peer-related approaches. Even if there is a perception that instruments require legal 
compliance, the reality is it would take a long time before common standards unfold in the 
same manner as the EU. Progression to common standards is only likely to develop on the basis 
of peer influence and change over a more extended period.  
Unlike the APRM, the peer review approach is diffused in the OECD and a practice that has 
permeated all areas of work in the organisation (Pagani, 2002). The centralised custodianship 
of the APRM process has resulted in a lack of appreciation that peer review practices are 
ingrained in many of the Charters in governance and specifically within the instruments related 
to state capacity. Substantive historical interactions suggest that Ministers and officials want to 
engage and learn from each other in the continent and are less inclined towards instruments 
predicated on ensuring compliance through a one size fits all orientation. While such 
interactions may well unfold through conference and other events, there has been a historical 
push for higher levels of substance and more comparative research. In many respect, there is a 
strong push towards evidence-based engagements that are substantive and that facilitate more 
detailed engagements between state officials that goes beyond the academic exchanges that 
characterise many of the Public Administration and Local Governance conferences across the 
world. More detailed research-driven peer engagements methodologies generally characterise 
the work of the OECD and has been a practice that has worked in, for example, organisations 




At one level, the evolution of state capacity instruments and initiatives from outside of AU 
implementation institutions reflects the energy and commitment of AU Member States towards 
multilateralism. At another level, this reality of implementation reflects that those within AU 
multilateral organisations have historically not considered the terrain of engagement a priority. 
The overall consequence of the aspiration-capacity gap is that initiatives that have unfolded 
have not received the required AU implementation energy, and there has been minimal 
continuity in the effort. Outside of the Anti-Corruption initiative, many of the other state 
capacity efforts reflect a determination to engage in cross-country interactions and substantive 
learning engagements. The introduction of the instruments may well have not been directed to 
secure compliance or impose singular approaches to multifaceted institutional development 
approaches across Member States. Without a deeper appreciation of intent and related action, 
it is possible to lose sight of what is probable for the future.  State capacity is impacted on by 
the rule of law systems and accountability modalities, hence cannot be valued separately to the 
overall AGA and what is possible for the future. Much of what has unfolded and continuing 
actions reflect a hold onto the form of what has emerged and not the substance of what was 
intended. Bureaucracies are conservative by nature, and the propensity would be to continue 
on the paths established in the hope that resources will eventually flow on a much larger scale 
and institutional practices would be replicated across all governance areas. Even if resources 
do flow, the failures and challenges in AU multilateral engagements and implementation came 
at a price for broader society and traditional approaches cannot be unrelenting purely because 




Explanatory Note: Macro Analysis, Core Finding and Future Recommendations 
The overall purpose of the research was to provide analytical guidance on optimising AU 
multilateral practices to inform intervention decisions and for the appropriate utilisation of 
resources for the implementation of governance frameworks and instruments for continental 
integration and development. In line with this overall purpose, it is imperative to provide a 
consolidated macro perspective on the efficacy of AU governance interventions. It is 
anticipated that the analysis would lend towards establishing an appropriate framework for the 
future and articulating a set of clear perspectives on the future. The way this unfolds in the 
following two Chapters is broadly explained below.  
Macro Analysis:  Although the more detailed analysis may be useful for actors within each of 
the governance areas, they do not provide a consolidated perspective for the overall AU 
governance implementation system. In practice, there is both the reality of overlaps between 
the different areas and a related need for more effective coordination as a basis for enhanced 
efficacy. Chapter 6 hence provide a consolidated analysis of the core issues as they emerge 
from each of the substantive chapters.  
Core Findings: Even though there are variations in the conclusions that emanate from the 
detailed analysis over the three core governance areas, it is possible to establish a set of core 
conclusions that cut across each of the areas. This is vital, as the study seeks to provide an 
overall analysis of the efficacy of intervention across each of the intervention modalities. 
Drawing on the initial analysis, Chapter 6.2 serves to provide a more consolidated perspective. 
Some repetition has been necessary to provide a globalised perspective.  
Future Recommendations: A perspective on the future and a more appropriate approach in 
light of the efficacy of current interventions was expressed as an underlying purpose for the 
study. Chapter 7 serves to articulate an overall framework for AU governance intervention in 
lieu of existing efficacy challenges. The framework for the future emerges from a core set of 
future-oriented conclusions that are derived from the analysis.  
The explanatory note serves to guide engagement with the study and how the information is 
presented. This is crucial as the thesis does not have a traditional data chapter or a related 
chapter for analysis and findings. Data presentation, analysis and findings are all incorporated 




Chapter 6: Efficacy of Multilateralism in Governance 
Building a macro analytical perspective on AU interventions from deeper micro-level 
analytical engagements in each of the three governance areas is a crucial concluding step in re-
joining the analysis to the articulated research problem, purpose, and questions. As a prelude 
to the concluding exploration, it is vital to provide an integrated summary of the core challenges 
that emerged in the terrains of AU multilateral governance engagements and implementation. 
This synopsis, together with a summative efficacy overview of each mode of intervention 
serves to provide a consolidated perspective on AU multilateralism in governance. The macro 
analysis is vital as it serves to provide a consolidate perspective on governance intervention 
and the challenges that are evident at the level of multilateral engagements and at the level of 
multilateral implementation. The analysis further serves to go beyond the propensity to view 
interventions in isolation from each other. Efficacy challenges are often more pronounced when 
viewing the AU system as a whole and avoiding the propensity to address difficulties and 
opportunities in isolation from wider interdependence and the optimal use of resources.  
6.0 Introduction 
The research focused on building an understanding of AU multilateral intervention in 
governance across three defined focus areas and four intervention modalities (supra Table 4). 
The history of interventions is outlined within each of the areas, together with the modalities 
of implementation. A detailed analysis is provided in each area across the two levels of 
institutional concern: multilateral engagement and implementation. In each focus terrain, the 
core efficacy challenges that emerged were extracted from the analysis. Fundamental to the 
data collated and related analysis is providing a lens into the institutional ‘black box’ of AU 
multilateralism in governance (supra 1.4.4).   
The information presented in the three substantive chapters (three, four and five) demonstrates 
that the AU governance intervention system is complex, with deep variation across the focus 
areas and with substantive overlaps between different modes of implementation engagement 
(supra 3.1.4.1 and 5.1). While the detailed historical outline provides a picture of what has 
unfolded, it is evident that the full scale of intervention, especially as it relates to the many 
individual activities can never be fully captured in the space of a single research initiative. An 
overall global picture of AU governance intervention is nonetheless the essential thrust of the 
research and core to the reform-related efficacy challenges facing AU multilateralism in 
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governance. The global perspective across all the governance areas and modes of intervention 
is crucial for future academic reflection and practice related intervention within the broader 
space of AU multilateralism. 
6.1 Consolidated Macro Analysis  
The analysis on accountability, the rule of law and state capacity unfolded at two levels. At the 
level of multilateral engagements, the exploration was focused on the overall decision process 
on norm establishment and incorporated a focus on the challenges arising from competing 
norms, power relations and realities at the state level as it pertains to engagements with AU 
multilateralism in governance.  In the instance of multilateral implementation, the inquiry 
focused on institutional modalities and incorporated a focus on organisational culture and 
finance, and human resources and bureaucratic strategies (supra Table 3). Collectively these 
provided a basis for establishing the efficacy of different areas of engagement. Building on the 
details that emerged in each governance area, this section provides a consolidated macro-
perspective on the challenges within multilateral engagements and implementation. As a 
prelude to an overarching perspective, the following table provides a summary of the 
challenges arising from more detailed engagements in the core governance areas. Each 
challenge is in the analysis area in which it mostly resides in order to facilitate an integrated 
analytical approach. The summary serves as a reminder of the core challenges that were 
extracted in each of the areas of focus (accountability, rule of law and state capacity). These 
are further categorised in accordance with their relevance at the level of multilateral 
engagements or at the level of multilateral implementation. The approach is consistent with the 
overall methodological orientation articulated (supra 1.2) and the broader framework for 
analysis captured in Figure 2 and Table 3. A more detailed consolidation of the core challenges 
follows on from the summary table. Rather than repeat the details contained in the analysis that 
unfolded in the core chapters (3,4 and 5) the approach has been towards providing a structures 
summation. Where necessary for clarity, the evidence is restated, referenced to appropriate 







Table 22: Summary of Core Efficacy Challenges 
Areas of Focus  Core Efficacy Challenges 
Multilateral Engagements  
 
Multilateral Implementation  
Accountability • Norm and Instrument 
Contradictions 
• Limited Value Engagements 
• Over-influence of technical 
partners   
 
• Skewed Agency of Officials 
• Revenue Benefiting Performance  
 
The rule of law  • Premature Separation of Roles  
• Subsidiarity Confusion  
 
• Norm Confusion and Diplomatic 
Incapacity 
• The rule of law Neglect 
 
State Capacity • Norm and Standards Proliferation  
• Lack of Peer Engagement 
Diffusion  
 
• The politicisation of Technical 
Capacity  
• One Size fits all Orientation 
Source: Extracted from the analysis in Chapters Three, Four and Five.  
It is imperative to appreciate that in multilateral practice, there is a close connection between 
engagements and institutional implementation (Barnett et al., 1999). While International 
Relations realists (Matlosa, 2008; Khadiagala et al., 2016; Lopes, 2016) may well emphasise 
power and sovereignty exercised by Member States on the overall efficacy of the AU system, 
the analysis in each area demonstrated that the manner in which this unfolds is contingent on 
institutional processes and practices.  In the same vein, more idealistic perspectives (Murithi, 
2017)  emphasise the agency associated with normative instruments, while the analysis 
demonstrates that what emerges and is acted upon is contingent on institutional processes as it 
relates to implementation (supra 3.3,4.3 and 5.3). In summary, the history of what has 
unfolded, and related institutional processes and practices matter and are central to 
understanding the efficacy of AU interventions in governance.     
6.1.1 Multilateral Engagements  
The approach towards multilateral engagements has been to focus attention on the exercise of 
agency within AU institutional processes both at the level of norm formation and at the level 
of engagements, as they relate to implementation interactions with Member States. It is crucial 
to recollect that the research approach has been to analyse through an institutional lens (supra 
1.2.2) rather than from a traditional realist or idealistic perspective on the exercise of power, 
sovereignty and agency. As an institutional analysis embodies some elements of realism and 
idealism, the general orientation is at the level of institutional engagements rather than at the 
level of power and sovereignty outside of such interactions (supra 1.1.4). The element of 
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challenge outline below represents a summation of the core overarching multilateral 
engagement challenges that face the AU system in governance.  
6.1.1.1 Competing Normative Framework  
Norms, standard, values and related instruments in governance have unfolded incoherently and 
outside of any structured or coordinating AU framework (supra 2.1.4). Many instruments are 
championed within specific communities and through some level of norm entrepreneurship. 
One example of this is the introduction of the Transitional Justice instrument by a civil society 
organisation (supra 4.1.6). The instrument development terrain reflects, in part, a level of 
competitiveness between different policy communities. Stakeholders assert their normative 
perspectives on the agenda of the AU for a variety of reasons, including the possibility that 
such inclusion would create the foundations for resource mobilisation225. The substantive 
challenge with the different frameworks is that there are limited considerations of the capacity 
of AU multilateral institutions to engage in follow up activities and the reality of limited 
implementation resources.  
In addition to norm proliferation at the level of the AU, several RECs have also initiated 
processes that include the development of instruments in a variety of governance areas. A range 
of normative instruments have been established in, for example, anti-corruption, elections and 
human rights (supra 2.3.1). The implication is that Member States must ensure compliance 
with something contradictory and overlapping instruments. Part of the overall norm 
proliferation challenge resides in the fact that there has never been substantive policy and 
implementation adjustment-oriented dialogue on a more coordinative approach with RECs as 
it relates to specific instruments226. Neither AU institutions, nor RECs have engaged in a 
detailed manner on the overlaps and harmonisation for substantive governance impact. The 
lack of harmonisation continues even though all of the institutions have an implied commitment 
to ensure more significant coordinative approaches to standards and norms, and their 
substantive implementations as part of the AGP (Wachira, 2014).  
In addition to overlapping normative frameworks in governance between the AU and RECs, 
 
225 This has been demonstrated in the instance of the Public Service and Local Governance. Without the activism 
of CSVR, it is also highly unlikely that the AU would have adopted the Transitional Justice Framework. As 
explained (supra 4.1.6), ACDEG also arises from civil society activism beginning at the IEC conference and 
culminating in the entry into force of the instrument in 2011 (supra 3.1.5).  
226 There is no substantive evidence that the AGP or its clusters have engaged in any detail on overlapping 
instruments and the imperatives of a more coordinated approach with RECs.  
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there are substantive overlaps with UN-related frameworks. Overlaps are particularly evident 
in the area of human rights (supra 4.1.5) and anti-corruption (supra 5.1.4). UN processes 
benefit from substantive global support from more developed countries and able to command 
more direct forms of state-level involvement. Member States officials are often inclined to 
respond to UN processes much more readily than to comparable African processes227. The 
incentive structured for UN participation tends to be higher. Within the human rights and anti-
corruption space, participation in UN initiatives also comes with direct financial aid. Norm 
competition does nothing more than pervert incentives for actual compliance-related 
participation amongst a range of African and global actors. While norm overlap and 
competition will continue to remain a reality for some time, there remains a fundamental need 
for some level of active engagement with how these limit progress in the governance fold 
across Africa.  
6.1.1.2 Power and Sovereignty  
Member States exercise some level of autonomy and sovereignty when it comes to the 
adoption, ratification and implementation of instruments (Lopes, 2016). How states exercise, 
sovereignty is often much more complicated than realist suggest. Member States do not express 
or demonstrate direct opposition to the adoption, ratification and implementation of 
instruments. While non-ratification implies a lack of commitment, the reality is that Member 
States and responsible officials may not always see the benefits that come with the ratification 
of instruments and sometimes are too busy doing their work to bother with processes as they 
relate to the AU (supra 3.3.1.2, 4.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.2).   
There is a tendency of treating Member States as singular entities within which power is 
consolidated or exercised in a formalised and centralised manner. State systems are complex 
with power diffused in different parts of the systems, and individuals exercise authority in 
varied ways in organisations (Burchill et al., 2013:46). International Relations realist often do 
not engage authority diffusion at the level of a state and hence fail to appreciate that power 
exercise unfolds in a multifaceted manner. The failure to act is sometimes purely a matter of 
incompetence at the level of a Member State Department or Ministry. The need for active 
 
227 There is more active participation of African countries on the UN Convention on Corruption than there is in 
the instance of the African Convention. Based on a detailed comparative analysis, one commentator goes as far 
as to suggest that ‘State Parties to the AU Corruption Convention and all other nations who wish to fight corruption 
through international law must accede to the UNCAC. That is the best way of addressing issues involved in the 
cross continent corruption that is seriously affecting Africa's development today’ (Snider & Kidane, 2007).  
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compliance and for ensuring appropriate follow up often gets lost between Ministries, different 
offices and individuals, and not because of the absence of substantive commitment. While there 
may well be arguments for political commitment to ensure follow up, the reality is that 
instruments often have a life beyond the period of office of individual Ministers. There hence 
needs to be some appreciation of the agency of officials as it impacts on implementation.  
Recognition of power diffusion should, however, not detract from the fact that sometimes 
Member States would not ratify because they do not want to adhere to particular standards. 
Proving the lack of commitment is a little more complicated, and causality cannot just be 
presumed purely based on domestic political interests. Member States hardly ever articulated 
opposition to standards or instruments. The only substantive case in point is the SADC tribunal 
and its closure by Member States (Nathan, 2013). However, even in this instance, the approach 
may be a little more complicated and cannot merely be a blanket conclusion on all countries in 
the SADC region. A much more in-depth understanding of the exercise of power and authority 
within states can facilitate substantive implementation follow up from within the AU 
multilateral institutional systems. Very often ‘state power and sovereignty’ is used as an excuse 
for the lack of implementation228. The exercise of sovereignty may well not be the case, and 
most often, there is a lack of substantive follow up from within the AU system itself. Officials 
often do not engage Member State representatives as they should and sometimes there is over-
reliance on formalised diplomatic channels, even when other channels for engagement exist.   
Compliance reporting requires resources and time of officials.  Assigning responsibility for 
different aspects of ratification and implementation at the level of states is often a multifaceted 
exercise (Kane, 2008). Governance instruments reporting requires cooperation across 
Department and Ministries. Documents get lost within a country, and ratification and 
implementation is not always a priority. Seldom is a budget set aside for such processes. In the 
instance of the APRM, countries often do not set aside the required budget for initiating the 
process. APRM is somewhat reliant on the country contribution for its follow-up work. It is 
often assumed that the country that is a subject of review would set aside a budget to establish 
the overall national coordinating structures (Gruzd, 2014a). A similar failure to budget also 
confronts countries as it relates to other governance instruments. One overarching reason for 
this is because officials at a multilateral level do not substantively consider the reporting burden 
 
228 In articles published by an AUC official constant reference is made to the commitment of Member States. 
Matlosa (2014) comments that the fact ‘that not all of the 54 AU member states have acceded to the APRM may 
be a demonstration of low commitment to democratic governance in Africa’. 
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that faces countries and the internalisation of instruments. The shift towards providing 
resources, such as model laws, do not assist the process in developmental ways, as these tend 
to add a further work burden to what has already unfolded.  
6.1.1.3 Commitment to Implementation  
The general commitment to governance compliance has arisen due to multiple factors in the 
global environment and because of internal pressures and realities (Adejumobi et al., 2009). 
The lack of direct actions on specific instruments or related willingness to report and engage 
with AU processes cannot inherently be presumed to be because of a lack of commitment to 
governance. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Member States are engaged with, 
coherently. There are also no substantive implications for not reporting or engaging in detailed 
implementation processes. Officials may well participate in meetings called by AU institutions 
on specific instruments, but officials attending would be those who are available and not 
necessarily those who carry implementation or follow up responsibility. This reality raises 
fundamental challenges around AU protocols for communication and the reality that meetings 
are often attended by officials from the Ministries responsible for foreign engagements and not 
necessarily those from line Departments that are responsible for implementation229.  
Multiple processes and different instruments often render it difficult for implementation and 
compliance follow up to take place. Even in situations where states ratify instruments and 
indicate their focal contact points, changes at the state level make it very difficult to establish 
appropriate and substantive follow up engagements (Kane, 2008). Direct forms of 
implementation are difficult, especially when states actors face multiple instruments and 
standards230. Capacity variations and resource availability amongst Member State render it 
hard to devote attention to responding to multilateral information request or for the generation 
of specific reports on multilateral instruments. Sometimes Member States would respond based 
on local pressures for reporting and hence broader accountability. Where there is a robust local 
community on a particular instrument, this serves to create a momentum around the instruments 
and hence pushes state actors to respond (Ekhator, 2015). However, states often lapse into 
ignoring obligations where there is no substantive follow up on issues.  
 
229 This is reflected in numerous attendance lists of meetings arranged by AU governance implementation 
institutions. In numerous cases, expert meetings on topics would be attended by officials based at embassies even 
though funding would have allowed for travel by experts located within a Member State.  
230 Member States have, for example, largely ignored the requests for reports to be provided on the implementation 
of ACDEG (supra 3.1.5 and 3.2.1)  
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6.1.1.4 Implementation Realities within Member States 
The most substantive issue for African governance norms and standards is both their 
importance for integration and the value they bring to Member States. The significance for 
regional integration is rooted in the idea of commonality and hence shared values. The realities 
at a more grounded state level are that governments often have to contend with varied local 
contexts as they relate to accountability, the rule of law and state-building, in a way that is 
accommodative of local political, social and economic challenges (Levy, 2014). Compliance 
with regional, continental and global standards may well provide a vehicle for effecting change. 
However, such norm and standard relating templates may well not accord to problem-driven 
approaches to challenges faced at a national level (Andrews, 2010).  
While countries might commit to instruments, integrating such commitment into existing 
modalities might not always be easy. There has been a global shift away from a standard 
approach towards one of engaging in practices that are good enough under given circumstances 
(Andrews, 2013). While idealised frameworks serve as points of aspiration, these may not be 
feasible in particular contexts. As an illustration, while all states may well want to promote the 
establishment of local municipalities, the historical realities and resourcing requirements may 
not render such actions possible at a point in time (Grindle, 2004). In the instance of public 
service, states may well want to establish specific modalities for appointment and procurement, 
but grounded realities suggest that under existing conditions, compliance with particulate 
standards might not be possible. A more peer engaged approach would encourage appreciative 
discussions around what is possible and feasible (Achieng, 2014). Naturally, such engagements 
should unfold on the basis of approved standards as benchmarks for Member States, but not as 
a compliance framework, as is assumed within existing legal instruments. Realities in Member 
States serve to push away from a top-down model on governance standards, towards a more 
bottom-up approach to integration and value establishment (Grindle, 2007). Finding an 
appropriate balance is crucial for the future and hence, forces reflection on a different approach 
to governance within the regional integration imperatives.  
6.1.2 Multilateral Implementation  
The approach towards multilateral implementation has been to focus attention on how officials 
and other stakeholders within AU institutional implementation processes exercise agency. The 
analysis in each governance areas has been to engage in detail on how implementation work 
unfolds in order to appreciate the choices made on what gets done. The approach seeks to build 
254 
 
a deeper understanding of the driving organisational culture, financial approaches, human 
resource, capacity realities and related bureaucratic strategies from an open, engaged 
perspective. Drawing on what has unfolded, the following core implementations challenges are 
identifiable.  
6.1.2.1 Leadership Complexities  
The oversight and administrative leadership exercised within the African multilateral 
institutional governance space is a complicated matter with a variety of challenges. At the apex, 
the spread of AU governance instruments has resulted in the establishment of a variety of 
structures that require the election of individuals to occupy senior-level oversight roles (supra 
Table 9). As AU Heads of State and Government elect the personalities into such positions, 
these individuals tend to view themselves as having higher levels of authority and status in the 
manner of their treated and how their time is valued (AUC, 2018a). There have been ongoing 
engagements within the AU on the compensation of elected officials and the authority 
exercised. The remuneration of these persons is expensive and a challenging process. The 
levels of remuneration for time varies across institutions. Generally, the time of these 
individuals is treated as a matter of voluntary contribution, while all expenses are covered.  
The relationship between elected individuals and appointed officials at the apex of the 
institution often embodies high levels of operational tensions. Open conflict has arisen in 
several institutions, and there have been various cases where elected officials have resigned or 
complained about the power and managerial ethics of appointed officials. Conflictual 
relationships have been evident in the APRM, the Banjul Commission and the AUABC. 
Having two levels of political control over institutions and having to balance these with lines 
of administrative accountability have created challenges. Officials who face pressures to act in 
a particular way by elected officials would use alternative administrative accountability 
channels to protect themselves. There is evidence of this in the case of the AUABC and the 
Banjul Commission. Officials at the level of the APRM have also attempted to use such 
channels to protect themselves in the face of the authority or demands from elected 
individuals231.   
At the level of administrative leadership, the appointment process in the AU often creates a 
 
231 Details on some of this is contained in the Internal Audit Reports On Performance Audit and Recruitment 
Audit of AU Organs (ACHPR, AU Court, AU ABAC and NPCA) (AUC, 2018a).  
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level of added complexity232. Appointments take a long time and subject to substantively active 
lobbying by Member States. While advertising of personnel positions is open and transparent, 
actual appointments can be complicated and often involves direct lobbying by Member States, 
with the added complexities of quota-based appointments and the current push for gender 
representation. Officials are often able to play the system and seek protection from their own 
and the other Member States when faced with performance concerns. AU bureaucrats have a 
strong incentive to actively lobby their Member States to protect their preferences within 
implementation structures (supra 3.4.3. and 5.4.2). Ambassadors at the level of AU would 
engage in direct communication with senior elected individuals and others to secure the 
position of officials from their countries and put pressure on the system as it relates to the 
accountability of individuals. There has also been a growing tendency to accord specific 
designations to appointed officials within AU structures to facilitate a higher level of 
authority233. Some officials who are accorded a status of Ambassador by their own countries 
would function as thou they occupy a higher status than being ordinary accountable 
functionaries within a multilateral institution.  
6.1.2.2 Bureaucratic Dysfunctions 
The bureaucratic system of the AU is dysfunctional for a variety of reasons. At the centre of 
which is that the modalities of accountability for performance are weak and driven much more 
by activities and not by outputs or outcomes as they relate to the core mandate of the institution. 
Planning is activity driven and mainly on the back of resources provided by DP (supra 2.3.3.2 
and 3.4.5). Substantive work is performed by consultants or seconded officials and not really 
by those who occupy the formal positions as per the approved structures of the organisation.   
Performance accountability is generally predicated on the organisation of events and related 
participation and not through active value-adding engagement on substantive issues. In the 
instance of the many governance events arranged, AU bureaucrats spend much of their time on 
logistical arrangement and communication with invitees (supra 3.4.4). At most, they might 
 
232 This was also highlighted in the Internal Audit report, which in the instance of one of the structures provided 
that ‘(t)he Governance of the recruitment process was weakened in that the body setting the recruitment policy 
(oversight role) was actually also executing the policy (management role). Hence the checks and balances were 
compromised’ (AUC, 2018) .  
233 Some junior officials would be given recognition as Ambassadors in their own country and carry this within 
the AU institutional system although such designation has no formal meaning to their positions as AU officers. 
See for example the designation of the Senior Human Rights Expert within the DPA as publicized on the AU 
website (AUC, 2015d).  
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produce concept notes and programme and draft internal reports on events. In general, there is 
competition amongst officials on the attendance of events and not on substantive issues relating 
to the delivery of mandates234. The recruitment process of the AU does not facilitate the 
appointment of the best and brightest. Consultants are unable to challenge the system for fear 
of contracts non-renewal. Contract renewal of seconded officials is dependent on permanent 
officials who must make such request. The system breeds relationships of reciprocity and hence 
discourages performance that challenges existing dysfunctionality235. 
The consequence of internal patronage modalities and the link with external parties such as the 
Ambassadors in the PRC tends to drive the overall orientation. Ambassadors and officials in 
embassies have a direct interest in internal modalities and the events that are organised by AU 
bureaucrats in the governance space. Events provide them with the opportunities for travel and 
often used to supplement the salaries embassy officials receive. The system is dysfunctional 
with perverted incentives for what gets done and who participate within processes. Officials 
build relationships with external parties to enhance their perspectives internally and hence to 
shape and influence decision processes (supra 3.4.3) They would go as far as to lobby partners 
and others to shape choices around internal operational decisions. Partners would also seek to 
affirm relationships and access by promoting the perspectives of their internal contacts.  
Coupled with this, AU institutions must contend with language and cultural differences among 
employees and patronage-based engagements from individual coming from endemically 
corrupt countries.  Several authors have highlighted how official can pursue self-interest in 
multilateral institutions. As Lindoso and Nina (2016:12)  note  that ‘rather than designing the 
most appropriate and efficient rules and procedures to accomplish their missions, bureaucracies 
often tailor their missions to fit the existing, well-known and comfortable rulebook.’  
6.1.2.3 Performance Culture  
The performance culture of AU implementation institutions is difficult to describe outside of 
the reality the outputs and focus of officials. Actual delivery suggests a propensity to focus on 
those elements within which official derive additional substantive revenue (supra 3.4.4). The 
focus hence tends to be on the arrangement of events, which embody little substance work and 
within which content may be contracted out by way of inputs into the conference process. 
 
234 This reality is evident in the numerous events arranged, the list of attendees and the work that unfolds on such 
events. The issue has been highlighter across the analysis in all three areas of governance intervention.  
235 These matters have also been highlighted in the outcome of the investigation of allegations of harassment 
against women and other institutional malpractices in the African Union Commission (AUC, 2018e).  
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Rather than focus directly on the Member State relevant work as it relates to established 
instruments, AU bureaucrats would concentrate on arranging topical events which seem 
relevant for their mandate236. There is, however, little to suggest that these add substantive 
value to outputs relevant to the implementation dimension of the established mandates.  
The performance approach may well not just be driven by immediate incentives, but also by 
the history of what gets done and the culture of institutions. Official embrace traditional 
modalities to justify specific performance orientations. They would justify having specific 
events a part of the tradition of actively building a people-driven AU and thereby implying that 
the events organised are part of an overall institutional process and hence justifiable. Included 
are the arrangement of many pre-summit events, ostensibly to facilitate the active participation 
of different groups, such as women and the youth. There is no real reflection on the value of 
the events for the implementation of core mandated outside of general arguments on the 
importance of specific constituencies. Numerous events are organised and supported by 
partners with little or no engagement with how these directly contribute to core mandate 
implementation (supra 3.1.7).  
During many of these governance-related events, AU officials will take on an agency that goes 
beyond their role as public servants. They would often share the stage with political leaders at 
the local level as part of affirming their standing and without regards to the fact that they are, 
in all respects, public servants with the mandate to implement and not with the mandate to 
engage in broader political level articulation. Even while the dividing line is small in 
multilateral engagements, how officials exercise agency suggest that they sometimes take on a 
higher than expected political profile and somewhat celebrated for their leadership, beyond an 
appreciation that their role is to implement mandates and not to engage in contestation around 
what generally unfolds in the governance space. Officials are public servants and not political 
representatives. Even where they carry the title of Ambassador, as confirmed by their Member 
States, their agency and hence culture would be tied to implementation in accordance to their 
appointment and according to the rules of conduct that govern their work as public servants, 
 
236 A good example of this is the Youth Engagement Strategy (YES) established by the AGA Secretariat in DPA, 
which, whilst justified in documents as part of AU outreach tends to shift away from the core mandate of AGA to 
coordinate governance interventions and secure substantive impact.  
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rather than as political representatives 237.  
Real work in the systems is often pushed down to consultants or outwards to partner 
institutions. The general practice for partner-related events is for such collaborators to produce 
what the event requires with little direct inputs on the programme and substantive content by 
AU bureaucrats. The benefits to AU officials is that they get to attend an event, usually away 
from Addis Ababa or other headquartered locations, with no direct costs or effort on their part 
or the part of AU institutions. The systems seem to function to the benefit of AU officials as 
they do not have to account outside of affirming that the partners are working with them and 
hence facilitating the release of resources from DP (supra 4.2.3).  
Partner interactions generally serve to reinforce activity focused performance culture of AU 
implementation institutions. Very often TPs are reliant on relationships with AU officials to 
sustain their funding sources. By the mere fact that they need AUC sign-off on further resource 
mobilisation, they tend to agree with what is required by the AU bureaucrats, which may 
include shaping their work by the personal needs of officials. TP would hardly ever pose a 
challenge and generally would often have a different agenda to that of the AU institutions. 
Partners would push their agenda and engage in a way that promotes their outputs, often despite 
the core mandate implementation elements that should be the focus of AU governance 
implementation institutions. Competitions among TP would often overwhelm the system238. 
They compete to secure the attention of AU bureaucrats for their event, which may include 
using the AU logo to promote and legitimate their event239. AU implementation bureaucrats 
would sometimes also use the opportunities within the system to promote the interest of their 
own countries. An event may be organised with AU resources to promote local politicians or 
to affirm their standing within local political spaces. Events can and are arranged for political 
affirmation reasons in places that would otherwise not be suitable.  
 
237 In face of numerous ethical challenges as it relates to the performance of officials, the AUC has gone as far as 
to establish an Ethic Office with the goal of cultivating ‘ an enduring respect for and adherence to ethical principles 
and standards derived from the African Union values in order to enhance the protection of staff and the integrity 
of the Union as well as promote good governance. To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization 
in the delivery of its mandate through awareness, understanding and compliance with the African Union ethical 
values and principles; regulations, rules and procedures’ (AUC, 2019a). 
238 See for example, the workshop related to the implementation of ACDEG held in Kigali , Rwanda in October 
2018 (DPA, 2018). The workshop was largely arranged and funded by Oxfam Ghana from resources mobilised 
from DP.  
239 The list of events arranged by IDEA (Table 16) provides an illustration of this reality. Resources are mobilised 
on the bases of AU legitimacy and possible impact, with minimal direct formal agency by the DPA or any other 
entity within formal AU implementation.  
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6.1.2.4 Staffing and Capacity  
A substantive reality for the overall AU system is that the lack of personnel needed for 
implementation of mandates is acute. Institutions do not have the required number of people to 
implement what is required (as example supra 3.2.2.2). A situation that is driven to ever more 
desperate levels by the fact that those who are in position are often not the best and brightest 
and do not have to perform in substantive ways to demonstrate delivery. Actual personnel 
numbers and performance do not match the reality of mandates, and plans overstretch what is 
possible with available resources240.  
As part of the contracting out of real work and internal institutional modalities, substantive 
work is often contracted out or pushed down to young and energetic, but inexperienced, interns 
and consultants appointed through donor funds and related secondment arrangements. The use 
of interns and consultants is a reality across all areas of intervention and all AU governance 
intervention institutions. The real work of drafting reports and substantive work is often 
contracted out to consultants or to an individual who is seconded to institutions and hence who 
have no options but produce what is required. Young, energetic consultants are driven to be 
compliant with requirements, as often the position they occupy represents their first formal 
employment opportunity and hence would work actively towards pleasing their supervisors to 
ensure contracts renewal. They do not challenge work modalities and the reality of how things 
function out of fear of job or contract loss. There are hence no real internal engagements on 
choices made and how work gets done. The most capable of individuals often leave in 
frustration and by recognising that AU mediocracy might not be suitable for their overall 
development. The consequence of the culture and related turnover is that the AU continues to 
attract the wrong people, thereby deepening a culture of non-performance and hence, 
weaknesses in the institutions241.  
There is no firmly articulated approach to institution development in the AU and the balances 
 
240 There are numerous instances of Assembly decisions on enhancing capacity in institutions which are not 
implemented because of a lack of resources.  
241    This was highlighted in the outcome of the Investigation of allegations of harassment against women and 
other institutional malpractices in the African Union Commission, which provides that ‘human resources 
malpractices and irregularities, including backlog in staff recruitment, seconded staff disadvantaged, management 
of youth volunteers and interns, lack of consistency in the implementation of rules relating to acting appointments, 
continued extension of contracts of retirees whereas this should be done in a limited way, challenges in the 
shortlisting processes, instances of gender discrimination in recruitment, challenges in career development, 




needed to ensure that pronouncements around future possibilities are based on an anticipation 
of the implication and detailed resource planning. Decisions are made on improving funding 
and staffing levels but are never fully implemented as they unfold outside of the consideration 
of actual budget availability. The AU Assembly would sometimes decide on improving 
capacity and budgets as per recommendations, with officials fully aware that such decisions 
are not implementable as real resources are constrained. Over the analysis period, the AU has 
been substantively reliant on DP resources for programmatic activities (Engel, 2015). While 
there is not much to suggest that the donors control the substantive mandate, the reality of 
practice indicates that they tend to exercise control over which activities are funded and which 
are not.  
The detailed leverage exercised by DP officials often serves to create perverse performance 
incentives. Even where resources are earmarked for real substantive follow up work on core 
mandates, unless linked to resources associated with events, these are not actively pursued. The 
primary incentives are for work related to events and not on the production of substantive 
reports or related engagements that would facilitate implementation. Consultants are used for 
closing operational gaps, rather than to engage in substantive work. Many of the individuals 
would be driven to focus on events outside of substantive engagement on work (supra 3.3.2.2, 
4.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.2).  
6.2 Efficacy of Interventions 
As illustrated in the overall analysis of multilateral engagements and implementation, AU 
governance interventions are shaped by a combination of norm proliferation, budget and human 
resource availability, bureaucratic preference and the efforts of external partners. The mode of 
engagement is often not articulated systematically, as has been outlined in this research. 
Nonetheless, the framework used to outline the different interventions facilitated more 
profound reflections on practices and how these unfold within the AU system. The analysis 
provided a basis for engaging with the efficacy of interventions within the different areas of 
engagement. Drawing on the detailed that unfolded over each of the focus areas, the following 
provides a consolidated perspective of the efficacy of each mode of engagement.  
6.2.1 Compliance and Sanctions 
The reality within the AU systems is that the current integration trajectory, as embodied in the 
idea of Member State compliance to shared norms within instruments seems to be a very 
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unlikely aspiration. Country-level diversity makes it difficult even to generate and submit the 
most basic of reports on the level of compliance with specific instruments242. While the AU 
has been able to extract some level of governance compliance, this has mostly been in the 
overall area of constitutional changes in government (Moolakkattu, 2010; Williams, 2014; 
Sithole, 2018). At a more detailed level of governance instruments, this has become impossible. 
Member States cannot ensure systematic compliance, nor can they respond to the reporting 
requirements of instruments, as has been established.  
Although the adoption of normative governance frameworks is celebrated, the substantive 
value for countries struggling with governance issue is not apparent. While civil society 
formations may well want to use the frameworks to drive governance change and hold Member 
States accountable, the overall system does not make it possible (Masterson, 2006; WITS 
School of Governance, 2017; MSWG, 2018). Even where there is a lack of compliance, the 
AU is not able to fully implement any form of direct sanction, outside of suspending 
membership for a brief period (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002b). Sanctions generally only unfold in 
case of unconstitutional government changes, and even here, the issue has proven to be 
complicated. Many Member States already face sanctions because of delays in paying their 
subscriptions. The AU has had a flexible approach in this respects, and members often continue 
to participate despite having not paid their dues (Magliveras, 2011).  
In the space where compliance forcing and sanctions have little effect, it does not make much 
sense to pursue the implementation of related instruments. The type of capacity required to do 
a detailed analysis of reports does not exist, even if done within the established AGP structure. 
Analysis of reports to assess levels of compliance embodies substantive analytical and research 
work on the part of officials. The organisation does not have analysts and is unlikely to have 
the required resources to do additional substantive work in the short and medium-term. The 
terrain that appears to work in a better way and is reasonably resources is the APRM (Grimm 
et al., 2009).  
While the AU sanctions model seems to be inspired by the frameworks established within the 
EU, African, on the ground realities, preclude the possibility of having the ability to do the 
same and engage in the required detailed work that is undertaken by EC officials. It will take 
the AU long to develop the capacity needed for doing on the ground type analysis that EU 
 
242 See as examples to low levels of reporting on ACDEG (supra 3.1.5), the African Charter (supra 4.1.2) and the 
Anti-Corruption Convention (supra 5.1.4).  
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officials do when it comes to ensuring compliance with EU standards for integration and 
harmonisation purposes. Even the EC, with its long history and capacity, appears to struggle 
with the issue of compliance within the governance space (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Emmert et 
al., 2016). The movement to compliance is possible, but will take time and may require a 
graduation model for member states that arises from peer engagements, rather than from formal 
compliance-oriented instruments. For such to be possible, the standards and norms are needed, 
but should not be perceived in instrumental terms and hence outside of peer support and 
capacity orientation towards graduations. It is well possible for countries to graduate from one 
level of compliance towards another. 
A stronger PAP and Court may serve to achieve compliance over the longer term. However, 
for these to become meaningful for the African integration process, it will take a longer time 
of maturation. PAP and the Courts may well want to begin focusing their attention on the 
harmonisation of legislation within the AU system, hence creating the foundations that they 
would be the ultimate custodians of laws and legality. A process that would place them in a 
position to repeal all current instruments and gradually establish new instruments as 
compliance to standard’s unfold on an area by areas basis. The current separation of power 
reality in the overall AU system does not exist, and hence, PAP does not function as a 
traditional parliament within Member States. Nor does the African Court function as the 
channel of last resort for Africans. Pretending that these have authority as part of future 
aspiration (see supra 4.4.1) does not bode well for existing practices.  
6.2.2 Peer Review and Diplomacy 
The APRM stands as an anomaly to the overall AU architecture of norms and standards, as it 
is not predicated on securing formal legal compliance of Member States as is the case with all 
other governance instruments. However, the self-review APRM Questionnaire, does, in many 
respects, embody norms and standards. Countries reviewed are also required to report on the 
levels of compliance with African and global instruments (Grimm et al., 2009). Outside of the 
APRM process, many of the existing AU governance instruments, suggest that the reporting 
modalities are orientated towards peer engagements within the ‘interest’ community of the 
specific instruments. In other words, there is an expectation that reports submitted by Member 
States will be engaged upon by state actors within the space, be it in local government, anti-
corruption, human rights, democracy or public administration. Having these unfold outside of 
an overall peer-review process does not make substantive institutional logic beyond the fact 
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that APRM is a very centralised process by design as it only involves Heads of State and 
Government as peers.  
A diffused orientation towards peer engagement would make more substantive sense. 
However, the peer review process, as established by the APRM, is exclusionary and does not 
lead to fundamental and more in-depth forms of peer engagement across and within Member 
States. While the involvement of Heads of State and Government in discussions on the peer 
reports is praiseworthy, most analysis of the actual event, reveals that the level of discourse 
tends to be low and generally Heads of State tend to complement each other despite the findings 
of the APRM Panel. A more diffused orientation, such as in the OECD (Pagani, 2002), with 
broader cross-country peer engagements within specific communities, is likely to be more 
appropriate. The current APRM Questionnaire framework does not facilitate such dialogue, 
and generally, APRM Secretariat officials seem to want to sustain a system that is exclusionary 
and puts them in a commanding position when it comes to the content of the reports and 
engagements thereon.  
It is rather difficult to engage the substantive value of diplomatic country-level engagements 
by special envoys and representative of the AU. While registering some governance successes 
and conflict avoidance from well supported high-level engagements, the overall picture of 
direct engagements, especially in the forms of diplomats stationed in a country, suggests that 
positive movement is not achieved, as finding appropriate governance solutions within 
complex political negotiations is difficult (supra 3.2.2). It is mostly where there are 
concentrated negotiations, driven by a mediation approach of the DPS, that success is 
registered. It is expensive for the AU to be stationed in a country or to send fact-finding teams 
who generate reports that do not add substantive value to what is possible. An example of a 
valueless process is the pre-election missions sent to countries (supra 3.1.3). These missions 
generally derive information that is freely available on the media. The challenge is having the 
ability to mediate and propose strategies out of crises. Success in this instance has generally 
been from shorter engagements from either senior elected official from within the systems or 
high level diplomatic in the forms of former Heads of State or other notables, as in the case of 
Kenya, by Kofi Annan. With higher flows of information across the globe, it is rather hard to 
appreciate the need for longer-term missions in countries, as is the case for election observation 
initiatives. The terrain of negotiations and peacebuilding is nevertheless complex and subject 
to wide-ranging perspectives on AU successes and failures (Williams, 2014; Khadiagala, 2015; 
Van Wyk, 2016; Murithi, 2017). From the perspective of this overall assessment of efficacy, 
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shorter and well supported diplomatic engagements make much more sense for a poorly 
resourced institutional system. 
6.2.3 Information and Knowledge Exchange 
While numerous publications are produced that carry the AU logo in the governance space, the 
value of these for substantive Member States engagements and governance improvements is 
not apparent or a given. While all forms of knowledge production may be deemed valuable in 
themselves, the substantive danger for the AU system is that knowledge products that carry the 
AU logo, unless expressly stated, give the impression of being official AU policy. The 
propensity in the AU systems seems to be one where TP and others within a policy community 
would use the AU logo to establish greater legitimacy for their outputs. Many of the documents 
produced do not often reflect real AU positions and sometimes contradict formal policy 
orientations of the organisation (supra 3.2.3, 4.2.3 and 5.2.3). Publications unfold outside of 
formal approval processes within the AU but carry the AU logo and seemingly embody some 
affirmation of the content. In general, publications produced embody generic discourse and 
portray the AU as a thinking institution, akin to a research organisation, rather than as a 
substantive mandate driven organisation.  
For AUC to produce publications of a reflective nature may not be unusual relative to other 
multilateral bodies, such the UN, however, the substantive issue has to be on whether the 
publications are of benefit to Member States and whether they are a product of Member States 
interactions. To appreciate value–drive knowledge exchange initiatives and outputs, AU 
implementation institution in governance should look at the example of the OECD or to 
technically focused multilateral initiatives such as CABRI which produces sound comparative 
studies with the active participation of officials. Such publications serve as peer review 
documents and often arise from a long process of research with officials at the national level 
and therefore able to secure higher levels of local ownership for the produced outputs (Porter 
et al., 2007; CABRI, 2008).  
Knowledge products are often not seen as a progressive information exchange strategy, but 
much more as an event output strategy. Part of the challenge within the overall systems is the 
failure to think through the different modalities of intervention and how these might be used to 
influence actions within Member States. The knowledge production ability of the AU 
institutions has generally been weak as they cannot produce outputs linked to their core 
mandate. Knowledge products may be very valuable within the AU system, but there is no real 
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reflection. Partners generate knowledge products for very different purposes. This approach is 
especially so in the case of IDEA, where knowledge products and exchange events have always 
been central to the organisation's strategic orientation. A key challenge for knowledge products 
generated by partners is that they do not link adequately to policy processes. AU diplomats are 
not well placed to engage with governance knowledge products, and those within Member 
States remain far removed from the products unless they actively search for these when 
engaging in policy processes. While inviting some expert officials to information events, the 
connection is generally more informal and does not build obligations into the future as it relates 
to the knowledge products produced. Although knowledge sharing and diffusion is complex, 
the example for the OECD point to a direction on how these should be thought of into the future 
(Porter et al., 2007). In current form, the governance knowledge products produced are 
substantively irrelevant to implementation and only of benefits to a few actors who engage in 
the space either as consultants or as researchers and academics.  
6.2.4 Capacity Building and Technical Support  
The need for capacity building for the implementation of common standards and norms in 
Member States may well exist to support officials in countries who are not familiar with the 
instruments and actions that would be needed. However, core AU governance implementation 
institutions are not geared for such initiatives. Even when these unfold through partnership 
arrangements, they represent a substantive distracting from core mandates. At most, the AU 
can engage in training to capacity building for its officials243 or that which involves individually 
directly involved in implementing its mandate, as in the case of those engaged in elections 
observation or those involved in peer engagement exercises.  
For the AU to train people in Member States and to engage in technical support, when it is 
struggling with fundamental implementation issues does not seem to make much sense. Even 
when AU institutions position themselves as channels for technical support, the initiative 
makes little sense as the AU is not well-positioned to decide on the capacity needed and 
placement in a Member State. Neither does it have the capacity to supervise such an exercise244. 
While such approaches may well be relevant in the long–run when necessary capacity exists 
 
243 The AU has established its own Training Institute for such purposes. While the institution does some training 
of Member State officials, its primary mandate and focus is on AU officials (supra 5.2.4).  
244 This has been the case in support to Electoral Management Bodies and generally has been an area of difficulty 
for the DPA to deliver on. This was affirmed in the Report of the Commission On Governance in Africa (With 




and where there has been an upward shift in standard compliance, there is little to suggest that 
the AU is capable of adding any value in the terrain in the current and foreseeable future. 
Capacity initiatives are best left to ACBF, amongst others, to perform with little or no direct 
involvement from AU officials. Where AU bureaucrats are involved, the chances are that 
officials would shape interventions is in a way that facilitates added travel opportunities, rather 
than as substantive value-adding activity. To assist the process, the AU could well make 
available peer reports and governance standards to help ACBF and others ensure that capacity 
building initiative links to regional integration imperatives. Civil society formation and TP are 
much better positioned, at this stage, to engage in capacity initiatives at the level of Member 
States. The imperative of not engaging the AU in such capacity building activities needs to be 
appreciated by DP as pushing the organisation in this direction serves to shift focus away from 
core mandates. Capacity-building should be articulated as a local imperative, while knowledge 
exchange is a more regional and continental imperative.  
In general, capacity development initiatives have emerged on an ad-hoc basis and mostly 
because DP funding was available. Even in the instance of the AULA, the courses offered to 
Member States, beyond those that relate to direct multilateralism, stand as anomalies in the 
overall capacity building terrain. Aside from other regional capacity-building organisations, 
such as the ACBF, AMDIN and CAFRAD, most Member States have their internal processes 
and institutions for capacity building (supra 5.2.4). At most, AU institution can work with 
these to broadening their offering to include AU priority implementation issues. Attempting to 
replicate and compete with existing formations because of DP funding flows, is a distraction 
and does not accord to the expressed desire to enhance the efficacy of AU multilateralism in 
governance.   
6.3 Conclusion 
The governance trajectory at the level of the AU multilateralism remains somewhat uncertain. 
The system may well continue to function in the current manner, with deep confusion around 
the substantive value and a continuous movement on activities outside of substantive impact. 
Alternatively, the AU reform process may well give rise to decisive actions on the part of AU 
decision structures and may force a movement outside of current incapacity. Even if there is a 
shift at the policy level, the chances are that the move will be slow and that there would be 
substantive resistance to full and more effective coordinated approaches. Part of what may well 
drive the AU system to retain current modes would be the availability of resources. If 
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substantive resources begin to flow from the new AU financing modalities, the incentives to 
change may be limited as the AU would then be able to afford its deficiencies and hence 
continue to churn on in all fronts despite efficacy considerations.  
Part of the challenge for the future is also how partners engage the terrain. The desire to spend 
and mobilise money in the name of the AU may well continue to drive forward norm 
proliferations and hence different institutional modalities for delivery. Partners tend to benefit 
in situations where they can pursue goals with competing AU implementation institutions. In 
such a context, they will work with the amenable and ignore the ones who are asserting their 
agenda. The approach has been the case in election observations in the past, as illustrated by 
different observation groups from within the AU and may well continue to be the case in the 
future. One of the fundamental reasons for a ‘more of the same approach’ in the AU is the 
absence of a consolidated framework that serves to provide a base for shaping a more realistic 
future. The detailed and macro analysis of AU governance intervention is driven by a 
realisation that this study would be incomplete without a normative articulation of what the 
research means for the future. This is a matter that is engaged directly in the final chapter of 






Chapter 7: The Future of AU Multilateralism in Governance 
Drawing from the analysis and the overall theoretical pronouncements on governance 
intervention, a set of crucial future-orientated conclusions for AU multilateralism in 
governance are derived. In line with the stated research purpose of providing a theory-based 
framework for shaping choices on multilateral governance interventions (supra 1.0.3.2), a 
normative governance graduating framework for AU multilateralism, together with a 
conceptual model to assess the value-add of different modes of intervention, within a more 
realistic integration staging approach, is put forward. The research journey and analysis have 
the inevitable consequence of exposing knowledge gaps for future exploration. This Chapter 
hence concludes with some perspective on new and deeper terrains of research engagement in 
AU multilateralism.  
7.0 Introduction 
The discussion on the macro challenges with AU multilateral intervention on governance 
served to provide a broad summary of institutional and implementation difficulty.  Together 
with the substantive and detailed analysis in the three core governance areas, it provided a basis 
for a complete and in-depth analysis of what unfolds within AU institutions tasked with 
implementation responsibilities. The evidence-driven research analysis served to uncover the 
‘institutional;’ process that unfolds within a specific terrain of engagement. The analysis further 
served to confirm the overall research problem articulated, that AU multilateral institutional 
efforts in governance have floundered at the level of implementation and their substantive 
intervention worth do not accord with the integration and development aspirations embodied 
in adopted normative frameworks and instruments (supra 10.3.1). 
The macro analysis also served to confirm the working hypotheses that there is some degree of 
causality or correlation between choices made around institutional implementation modalities, 
practices and approaches and multilateral governance intervention success or failure. The 
working hypothesis was established for the purpose of exploration. It further served as a basis 
to generate a working framework on the efficacy of different AU multilateral intervention in 
governance (supra 10.3.1). A core objective of the research is that it will also seek to provide 
a theory-based framework for shaping choices on multilateral governance interventions (supra 
10.3.2). Central to the articulated research purpose was ‘to provide analytical guidance on 
optimising AU multilateral practices to inform intervention decisions and for the appropriate 
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utilisation of resources for the implementation of governance frameworks and instruments for 
continental integration and development’ (supra 10.3.2)  The framework, as put forward and 
as it emerges from the analysis serves to engage directly with the overall research question: 
What are the optimal AU multilateral governance interventions from an institutional 
perspective? (supra 10.3.3). In keeping with the articulated purpose of the research, the section 
that follows is primarily directed at articulating the core future-oriented propositions that 
emerge from the research. This is followed by articulating the overall efficacy framework for 
the future.  
7.1 Building the Efficacy of AU Interventions in Governance 
Analysis often embodies an orientation towards substantive criticality and hence a level of 
pessimism in what has transpired in the AU governance intervention space. The reality is that 
many initiatives have unfolded and there is a shared values foundation for the future. However, 
as has been expressed by President Paul Kagame, the AU cannot continue as it has in the past, 
without adding substantive visible value for Member States (Kagame, 2017). Shifting towards 
high-value intervention requires that the reform process be based on systematic research, rather 
than on general anecdotes on what does not work. Based on the overall analysis, the following 
are specific propositions for enhanced efficacy in the governance terrain.   
7.1.1 Intervention Realism 
The growth in the number of instruments and the range of norms and standards, often in 
contradiction with each other, suggest a need for higher levels of implementation realism 
within the overall AU system. Norm coordination is precisely the reason AGA was affirmed 
and why Member States agreed to create the AGP (Wachira, 2014). Member States face a range 
of instruments that leaves many perplexed on how to respond. It also that it takes a very long 
time for instruments to be adopted, for ratification to unfold and for actual monitoring to be in 
place (AUC, 2009a). The current trajectory does not bode well for governance success as it 
would be difficult for the AU to have the required capacity to monitor compliance in the manner 
presumed within the instruments. A gradualist approach with a higher level of realism should 
push the institution away from the current trajectory of continuing down the path of 
impossibility. 
Attempting to do everything and increase the range of instruments and interactions, gives rise 
to a situation where the AU system does a lot, is visible through conference and related events, 
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but does not achieve much and is not taken seriously by Member States and global partners. 
While specific stakeholders may well benefit from attending AU events and thereby appreciate 
some of the AU governance instruments, the actual local level impact of these initiatives is 
minimal. Even as civil society, stakeholders can influence resolutions; these are often 
meaningless to Member States and very often only serve to affirm external organisations 
agenda and funding strategies.  While AGA and the AU reforms suggest a particulate trajectory 
towards consolidation and impact, the commitment to comply on the part of officials is 
minimal. There is no incentive for working towards a more consolidated governance approach. 
A more value-driven outcomes performance approach might well push all stakeholders in this 
direction, but AU bureaucrats are likely to hide behind the content of existing instruments and 
are unlikely to go back to decision structures to advise that the mandate does not make any 
sense and a strategically different orientation is required. Such a reform move requires 
substantive cooperation amongst the Administrative Heads of AGP institutions and a 
willingness to generate the required technical document that would facilitate decision on the 
part of Member States. Aside from individual lobbying by institutions, there is little to suggest 
that Member States would resist a more consolidated approach towards governance that falls 
within a peer-based graduating model for governance. Such a graduating model will serve to 
ensure that peer processes unfold based on a set of standards and hence would push Member 
States to a higher level of governance practice. To shift towards a more realistic model, require 
that there be substantive engagement with the burden that existing instruments and approaches 
place on Member States. In current forms, Member States are required to send delegations to 
numerous governance-related engagements and tend to have to push officials between different 
compliance requirements terrains.  
7.1.2 Moving beyond Norm Proliferation  
Norms diffusions arise because of the range of different interest that permeate the AU system. 
While the AUC and DPA may be well placed to ensure some level of coordination for the 
future, numerous instruments were adopted under its watch with little coordinative reflection 
on the institutional implications of such instruments and the varied interventions they embody. 
Existing normative frameworks were shaped and pushed by different policy communities, 
including different Ministers, with little or no attention to their implications for the AU system 
or any sense of coordination with RECs. Since a policy and expectation momentum in each of 
the policy communities exists, decisive administrative engagement and political level dialogue 
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would be needed to affirm an alternative and more consolidated approach. In the attempt to 
affirm a higher level of coordination and actions as it related to norms and instruments, the AU 
has affirmed the apex role of Ministers of Justice through the relevant STC. While this is 
positive as it facilitates a higher level of harmonisation and coordination, the AU Ministers of 
Justice may not have a grasp of institutional implementation realities and broader development 
and constraints within normative areas, such as in governance. Aside from looking at the 
consistency of the instrument provided, the Ministers of Justice have no basis to engage issue 
on the larger value-add and the substantive contradiction and challenges embedded in the 
different intervention terrains. While the process may assist with improving the quality of legal 
documents, there is little to suggest that it would serve to engage historical challenges and 
sector-specific concerns when engaging in developed and submitted instruments. Building 
efficacy requires engaging with the substantive reality within the terrain of focus and having a 
clear sense of value add in such a terrain.  
7.1.3 Institutional Pragmatism  
The diffusion of governance capacity over a range of AU institutional structures is not an 
efficient use of resources for a system that struggles to mobilise the required funding and within 
which there is general performance criticism. A much more pragmatic institutional approach, 
where people can move between different AU implementation institutions will be needed. The 
AU would need to act with speed and determination, or it would be impossible to move towards 
a more efficient framework. For example, the AUABC is promised new building in Arusha by 
Tanzania. While the government for Tanzania is acting within the framework of its 
commitment, having a new office, without having the required financial resources and human 
capacity, will not bode well for the future. 
At present, the AU has governance-related structures across four countries (Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Gambia and South Africa)245  When considering the added governance interventions structures 
created by RECs and capacity within these institutions, the spread is not manageable and does 
not bode well for performance coherence. If some logic prevails and there is added reflection 
on impact, it may well be possible to find a way to consolidate all within the AU governance 
fold to create a new and higher-performing institution. Such a move would require substantive 
drive and efforts on the part of institutional leaders and a willingness to move beyond existing 
 
245 Details on this reality are reflected in Table 9 and 10 which outlines the overall governance structures, the 
related secretariat and their physical location.  
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perverse incentives that drive separation and hence a non-willingness to sacrifice instruments 
that do not accord to the reality of what is possible. Limiting the instrument, however, should 
not mean sacrificing the norms and values that many struggled to establish. Actors involved in 
shaping specific instruments are often passionate about achievements and their buy-in into a 
new model should be fundamental for the way forward.  
Building a capable high performing institution takes time and can be done on the back of efforts 
towards consolidating existing capacities. Currently (2019), all AU institutions are 
overwhelmed by the reality of what needs to be done and hence have little energy to reflect on 
alternative organisational modalities. It is highly unlikely that officials will engage in sensible 
discussions on moving beyond current incapacity, outside of a strong push at a political level. 
The AU reform process provides some hope for the future, but would still require a substantive 
authoritative push from a more technocratic centre that is prepared to mobilise officials towards 
substantive reflections on how a more integrated approach is to be fostered on the back of 
current diffusion, bureaucratic dysfunctionality and general fragmentation. Most will resist if 
they perceive consolidation creates the possibility of a cutting down of numbers of people. It 
is nonetheless highly unlikely that the number of bureaucrats needed will reduce. A 
consolidated governance mandate may well entail appointing more people, but in a manner that 
facilitates cost-effective approaches and that enhances overall impact at the level of the AU 
and hence within Member States. A pragmatic approach would also require much deeper 
engagements with RECs on role separations and terrains of possible overlap. It is not optimal 
for AU efficacy for RECs to have their governance instruments, such as Governance Charters 
or Anti-Corruption Conventions, or to duplicate what exists at the level of the AU. RECs might 
also be better placed to do elections observation and hence allow the AU to focus on other 
governance imperatives. This separation of roles is also often implied in existing instruments.  
7.1.4 Diffusion of Peer Review Practices  
Core to a different approach towards the future is the diffusion of peer review practices so that 
it cuts across all areas of governance and benefits from the participation of a broader range of 
peer policy and implementation communities. Peer approaches are generally built into existing 
governance instruments and hence not a substantive departure from what is already agreed. 
However, it does mean engaging with the current APRM Secretariats monopoly approach to 
peer review in governance across the continent. The APRM has affirmed itself as the sole 
custodian of peer review within the AU system. To facilitate a new, more consolidated 
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approach to governance, the APRM would need to move beyond its current centralised model 
and the implied definition of governance that shapes its work. A diffused approach should not 
be complicated if the APRM works with government representatives from Member States and 
not just with a small community of focal point members who are not aware of the larger 
imperative.  
No matter the limitations of peer review in a context where compliance to standards are deemed 
essential, the approach and associated practices are fundamental for governance improvements 
predicated on an appreciation of local realities and constraints (Landsberg, 2012a). How the 
peer review process has emerged within the APRM do not stand outside of the articulation of 
norms and standards. While the peer practice is associated with appreciative engagements on 
the different realities of Member States, the designed APRM Questionnaire and the 
perspectives of APRM Panel member’s points to the reality of normative assertions on 
governance within Member States. The challenge for a more diffused approach to peer 
engagements is to find a balance between normative perspectives on governance and the 
realities that each Member State faces. Such appreciative engagement is the essence of peer 
review and hence needs to be reaffirmed for the future.  
7.1.5 Knowledge Products  
There is a space for substantive knowledge products within the AU systems, and these can be 
valuable for driving change within Member States. Such knowledge products are, however, 
best established as part of a collective process. The AU is not a university or research institution 
and has a multilateral mandate. While research has a place within multilateralism, the reality 
is that it must be looked within multilateral engagement process and need to focus on shaping 
policies and practices at the local level. The OECD has established a variety of practices as it 
comes to generating its knowledge products, however, unlike the AU it does not have an 
intervention related mandate and hence can produce products that go beyond direct Member 
State interactions. OECD knowledge products, especially those generated as part of peer 
engagement exercises, have proven to be valuable for driving change at the local level (Pagani, 
2002; Porter et al., 2007) and hence very possible for the AU to emulate the methodology and 
overall orientation to knowledge.  
Rather than seek to churn out multiple documents that stakeholders do not engage with, AU 
multilateral institutional formations would be better of generating well-crafted documents that 
arise from peer-review engagements with the active participation of Member State 
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representatives. Such knowledge products are oriented towards comparative peer-analysis 
based on agreed standards or perspectives. These products serve to facilitate peer-level debates 
between Member States and drives forward a culture of improvement based on aspirations in 
the forms of standards and best practices. Comparative studies in focused areas that cut across 
all governance areas will serve to enhance actions at the level of Member States. Such studies 
are often based on data collected and collated by Member States themselves and with officials 
taking the lead in ensuring that these are crafted adequately and in accordance to the 
frameworks established by content experts within multilateral institutions. The experiences 
shared also serve to create an aspirational culture among official from different states. A 
movement towards more substantive documents and greater regulation around the use of AU 
logos on research documents would pave the way for more significant impact and more sound 
appreciation of the value of the AU as a multilateral organisation and not a research 
organisation. Although research may well be an element of what it does, such research is of an 
applied nature and meant to drive change rather than only contribute to academic discourse.  
7.1.6 Accountability and Agency  
A central strategic orientation for better governance impact and more appropriate actions 
amongst multilateral officials is creating a professional environment in which bureaucrats 
appreciate and understand the extent and limits of their agency. Officials who have little 
Member States experiences in line department, often do not appreciate that their agency is 
partial and that their voices are secondary to the overall authority exercised through established 
political processes (Moore, 2013). The analysis reveals that AU bureaucrats in the governance 
space often make pronouncements that go well beyond their mandate and often position 
themselves as political actors involved in the mobilisation of the youth and other actors to shape 
the AU agendas. The practice of exercising political agency suggests a level of naivety and 
lack of appreciation of multilateral democratic processes, no matter their limitations.  
To be effective, AU bureaucrats need to have a much deeper appreciation of the separation of 
roles and that they are appointed to implement mandate and not to determine mandate, outside 
of Member State decision processes. While they might have some role in shaping policy and 
often do draft documents for decisions, such actions must unfold with deep circumspect and 
not in the manner that they stand as separate actors relative to representatives from Member 
States. This form of professionalism also implies that the officials need to stand separate to the 
policy process and hence avoid momentums, which creates a broader and more substantive 
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identity for themselves. Identity assertion includes the naïve practice of using titles and 
designations that go beyond their instrumental role within the AU system or making inputs that 
detract from core mandates. While AU official may be invited to conferences to express their 
views or may participate in general reflection, the area of representation must be such that 
officials do not develop an agency or identity beyond that of a professional public servant. AU 
officials are not politicians and hence need to avoid situations where it is perceived that they 
have such agency.  
The propensity to engage in debates and express views on Member States commitments or 
governance issues is very problematic and often surprising that AU officials ignore their 
professional codes of conduct. Such codes are necessary and reinforced through training. 
However, the review suggests that that much more need to be done to attract the best and the 
brightest who have experience in Member States and not just officials who have limited 
experience within a democratic system or who are yet to appreciate the limits of their agency 
within multilateral institutions. The agency exercised must be in the context of mandates. When 
faced with such realities, weak officials would often defer responsibility to Member States and 
claim a lack of commitment. This study shows that this is substantively untrue and that failures 
to implement and make a difference often arises because of internal bureaucratic dysfunctional 
and poor leadership. While finances are a challenge, the overwhelming reality is that available 
resources are poorly utilised and often used to affirm bureaucratic position and to supplement 
salaries.  
7.2 Efficacy Analysis Framework for the Future 
The evidence collated on governance interventions points to the importance of having a 
framework to guide actions within the multilateral governance space. Such a framework would 
need to combine some reflection on consolidating standard’s and norms within the governance 
space and hence on having some level of clustered coherence on focus areas. It would also need 
to be predicated on a system to guide choices around intervention that would be most 
reasonable, given the availability of resources and what would make the most significant 
difference. Naturally, the AU multilateral system is evolving, and the framework put forward, 
as derived from the conclusions of the study, needs to be appreciated in such a context.  
7.2.1 Normative Governance Framework   
The current proliferation of norms and standards in governance, coupled with those embedded 
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in the questions from the APRM process, makes it very difficult for Member States to engage 
openly on challenges faced. Member States of the AU are at various stages of governance 
development and confront different challenges as they attempt to establish systems and 
practices that accord with pressures towards compliance. Compliance with established 
governance instruments can be complicated and should not unfold in a manner that pushes 
countries on a trajectory of actions and practices over which they lack capacity, and which 
might not be relevant in context. A graduating framework that is rooted in the logic of peer 
engagements, as most instruments imply, would be more feasible in the current context. Such 
a framework would accommodate widely differencing realities of what is possible in a given 
context and will be in line with notions of good enough governance (Grindle, 2004) or working 
with the grain (Levy, 2014).  
A graduating normative or shared values framework would not mean abandoning existing 
instruments but would imply less of a focus on compliance and much more on the practice of 
peer engagements. Civil society actors, amongst others, would actively resist the dilution of 
existing instruments, and many would argue that these gains must be sustained. Many would 
further argue that the instruments contain minimum standards and need to be applied 
consistently across countries (Masterson, 2006; Dinokopila, 2013; WITS School of 
Governance, 2017). The idea of a more graduating framework in governance is not a strategy 
to abandon the substantive normative standards but to affirm the process to achieve these across 
Member States. Such an approach hence requires recognising the imperatives of supporting 
Member States through active peer-related dialogue, rather than through a compliance shaming 
exercise. The reality of practice demonstrated that a compliance approach has limitation’s, and, 
at best, existing instruments serve as aspirational frameworks for the future. In practice, this 
means moving beyond the pretence that reporting on an existing instrument would unfold as 
envisage in the short run and focusing on the peer review approach that has registered some 
level of success. However, even in the instance of the peer review process, as it exists within 
the APRM, the orientation would ideally be that Member States are engaged with openly as 
part of a strategy of building compliance to higher-level norms and standards over a period 
time. Such an approach requires appreciating the different stages of a country’s development. 
In line with this orientation, the following table outlines a framework for thinking through 





Table 23: Shared Values Graduation Framework 
Area  Governance Norms and Standards 
 
 Basic Mid-Level  High Level  
 
Accountability Political Accountability: 
Basic systems of multiparty 
elections are in place and 
elections unfold regularly.  
 
Social Accountability: 
Political institutions able to 
accommodate deeper forms 
of participation and ongoing 
inclusion of civil society.  
 
Economic Accountability:  
Deeper forms of 
accountability and 
inclusivity in wider 
economic space is achieved.  
 




security system in place and 
able to assert its authority 
within a specific 
geographical region. 
  
Functional Legal System: 
There is a functional legal 
system and people able to 
access courts and there is 
adjudication over disputes.  
Substantive rule of law: 
There is substantive 
separation and system of 
rights respected with 
independent, impartial and 
capable legal system.  
 
The State Basic State: Government 
institutions exist and able to 
function and deliver basic 
services to citizens.  
 
Functional State: 
Institutions of government 
are broadly functional, 
reports produced, and 
meetings held.  
 
Capable State: Institutions 
of government able to 
deliver according to 




The existing AU normative instruments in governance generally embody basic and higher-
level standards that require Member State compliance.  They exist as templates to be applied, 
despite local contexts and vastly different realities between Member States. Some Member 
States, such as Somalia are struggling with the essential elements of governance, whiles others 
such as Cape Verde can push the boundary and engage and act on higher-level governance 
issues. The current, either or, approach to instrument compliance does not accommodate the 
realities of diversity and graduation. The compliance orientation leads to substantive debates 
around countries being judged unfairly, given resource availability and the realities of what has 
unfolded in the past. A more graduating and appreciative approach, as outlined in the table, 
would assist in shifting countries away from hiding behind the issue of sovereignty. A less 
compliance-driven approach would facilitate more open engagements and hence, more peer 
supporting interactions. Rather than focusing on compliance with standards at a higher level, 
the approach would allow for a deeper appreciation of existing realities. Such an approach 
would, however, not mean that the AU should abandon the instruments established. It would 
nevertheless imply that peer review becomes the dominant form of practice across all terrains 
of governance intervention. The table represents initial perspectives on what is possible at three 
different levels (basic, mid and high) in the three governance areas. In each, there is an 
articulation of implied overall aspirational standard. Peer engagements in each area would 
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facilitate reflections that serve to push Member States to a higher compliance level, at the same 
time as appreciating existing realities and what is possible in each context.  
7.2.2 Value Add of Multilateral Interventions  
AU multilateral governance interventions are wedged between gradualism and deepening 
integration through shared values, norms and standards. At one level, the normative 
frameworks may well serve to drive forward legal harmonisation and hence a movement 
forward to a common future. However, at another level, they are established outside of the 
realities within Member States and do not often accord to what is possible within circumstance 
and the certainty of what intervention modalities would be most valuable to Member States.  A 
more phased approach would facilitate in-depth reflection on how interventions should be 
shaped given Member State contexts. They would hence also than be based on what is possible 
in the current conjuncture and as AU institutions of multilateralism evolve towards a better 
future.  
In line with the analysis and what has emerged, a careful reconsideration of interventions is 
needed, together with some guiding principles on what would be appropriate, given resource 
limitations and realities of what is achievable within the short, medium and long run. In order 
to move beyond the current fragmented approach and hence low levels of active 
implementation, it is necessary to consider the possibility of limiting the type of interventions 
that can be done at this stage of growth and gradually shifting to higher levels as the AU 
institutional system matures.  While it is inevitable that there might well be a propensity to 
engage in higher-level intervention at this stage, this would not be prudent as it would detract 
from engaging in core activities as they relate to established mandates. A specific danger in the 
process is the propensity for TP and DP to push for higher-order interventions.  
Core to the approach is engaging in some level of institutional consolidation within the 
governance space as part of the overall strategy of gradually building the AU multilateral 
system. This issue of driving the reforms process will be addressed in the next section as one 
engages the issue of legality in the AU and the exercise of power. The substantive issue here 
is shaping interventions in line with existing capacity and Member States realities. The table 
below broadly captures the relevant intervention approaches and is in keeping with the analysis 




Table 24: Future Intervention Modalities in Governance  
Intervention 




Limit formal compliance to 
elections and constitutional 
transfer of power. Elections 
observation and any form of 
sanction in full partnership 
with RECs.  
To facilitate a move towards 
higher levels of compliance, 
conduct basic comparative 
studies on compliance levels 
across all governance areas.  
Building on studies, 
establish compliance 
plans of actions for all 
Member States and 
actively monitor 





Re-establish peer review by 
ensuring the diffusion of the 
practice across all AU 
governance interventions in 
a coordinated manner. Limit 
Diplomatic Missions to only 
those sanctioned by the PSC.  
Peer Review fully 
established across all 
governance areas and related 
Country Review Reports and 
Implementation Actions 
Plans informs all multilateral 
supportive interventions in 
Governance.  
Shift from Peer Review 
to Compliance Review 
based on adopted and 
ratified instruments 
across all Governance 







information and knowledge 
exchange confined to 
Member States interactions. 
Only internally sanctioned 
knowledge products.  
Gradually broadening of 
engagements beyond 
Member States and produce 
research-driven knowledge 
products with partners.  
Affirm the knowledge 
and future thinking role 
of AU implementation 
institutions through 
deeper engagements 
across the system and by 
way of producing 
knowledge products to 






Capacity building initiatives 
confined to building basic 
multilateral performance 
systems/ethos and attracting 
the best technocrats who are 
knowledge of Member State 
realities and practices.   
Gradually shift towards 
building the capacity of state 
institutions and individuals 
for engagements with 
multilateral governance 
intervention processes.   
Deepening capacity 
building and technical 
support at the level of 
states based on an 
established coordinated 
system for such 
initiatives.  
 
Establishing a time frame for what constitutes the short-term, relative to the medium and long 
terms is difficult as much of what is possible is contingent on capacity, including financial and 
human resource capacities. Based on the analysis, it would probably be prudent that the short 
term is perceived as at least the next ten years and the longer-term to be in accordance to the 
aspirations articulated in AU Agenda 2063. The short-term period would be the time needed to 
consolidate existing modalities and ensure that peer review processes are diffused and, at the 
same time, be engaged upon in a consolidated and coherent manner. Such a reform process 
requires some engagement with the legal shifts needed and hence the exercise of authority by 
Member States. The current proliferation of activities within all areas of intervention is not 
sustainable and often driven by the needs and orientation of DP and TP. The AU system and 
institutions must make choices on what would be most feasible and effective in context. 
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Building AU efficacy in governance is a process and institutions must have a basis for making 
choices on what is possible, feasible and most valuable for Member States.  
7.2.3 Driving the Reform Efforts  
While implementing institutions may well hide behind the legality of instruments as they 
engage with the reforms process, the reality is that such legalistic orientation in the AU system 
is often of secondary consideration by Member States. Many do not comply fully with 
instruments and only a few systematically fulfil the legal reporting requirements established 
within specific instruments. What is more fundamental to integration and governance 
improvement would be the exercise of authority when it comes to reforming the system and 
pushing forward an agenda for actions. The substantive challenge here is that AU 
implementation institutions and individual actors may well mobilise Member States to secure 
their position for the future and hence resist substantive reforms efforts that would change 
existing institutional configurations.  The reform process may well entail a reduction in the 
number of elected structures related to governance interventions if taken to its logical 
conclusion, 
The reform process requires a substantive push from a grouping of Member States who 
recognise that the current system does not work and is not functioning adequately. How this 
plays out within a consensus-driven organisation may prove difficult. The power plays and 
demand for consultations have proven to be challenging for the AU reform process. As the 
process unfolded and challenges became apparent, Member States demanded broader 
consultations and hence expanding the number of Heads of State and Government directly 
involved in the process. Beyond the internal legal games played by officials, it is well possible 
for the AU to be decisive in the face of the challenge and drive forward some immediate steps 
to ensure that there is movement forward. Consolidating the work of disparate institutional 
entities, such as the DPA, DPS, APRM, and the AUABC would require an executive decision 
at the highest level.  The reform process that culminated in the November 2018 Special Summit 
did not go far enough in the governance terrain and mainly focused on the incorporation of the 
APRM into the AU budget system and the integration of DPS and DPA into a single AUC 
Department (AU, 2017c). The integration and the affirmation that the APRM would deliver a 
consolidated report on’ Governance in Africa’ at future AU Summits (AU, 2019c) opens the 
possibility that there would be further consolidation towards building the overall efficacy of 
AU multilateral intervention in governance.  
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7.3 Building Deeper Knowledge   
Outside of substantive resource or related crisis, shifting modalities of what gets done, how it 
gets done and who does what takes a long time. There is a dearth of multilateral institutional 
analysis and in-depth studies that provide a rich exploration of performance and related 
challenges. AU multilateral institutions are complex and peering inside of them is very 
difficult. However, as the study shows, more profound forms of analysis provide insights into 
choices people make and how an institution can continue with specific pathways despite the 
lack of substantive progress and impact.  
This study has been broad in focus, as it sought to engage the overall tapestry of AU multilateral 
intervention in governance. Within the research process, it was apparent that more detailed 
analysis in specific task areas, such as in election observation, amongst others, could add 
substantive value towards an understanding of the efficacy of such interventions. More 
knowledge of what unfolds within such processes is needed. Such knowledge should include 
how observation unfolds, the movement of people, the nature of actual observations and what 
drives forward the reports generated, and the perspectives articulated. Similarly, detailed 
studies may be conducted in a range of areas from an institutional perspective. Institutional 
studies of national state systems have matured substantively, and they provide analytical tools 
for a more detailed understanding of multilateral institutions. There is little analysis of all 
multilateral institutions in Africa, including the numerous RECs established. International 
Relations scholars could do well by cooperating with those institutional scholars coming from 
a Public Administration background to peer deeper into the functioning of multilateral 
institutions. Such a move requires a shift away from dominating realist or idealistic 
perspectives. Outside of criticism of an institutional approach, it does serve to provide much 
more details on the implementation process, than does the more realist or idealistic 
perspectives.  
We do not know enough about the connection between multilateralism and state-level 
engagements. The connection and the modalities of communication have not been engaged 
with substantively. We also do not know enough about the tactics of linking multilateral 
institutions to citizens in countries. The current consultative approaches are limited, and at 
times, seems to bypass the agency of Member States at the national level. How multilateralism 
can be linked more effectively with the functioning of national state systems in Africa requires 
more research, theorisation and policy reflection.  We have historically approached multilateral 
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from the point of norms setting and compliance and not as a product arising from localised 
integration shifts that involve the flow of people and ideas. Much more engaged studies are on 
local level norm formation and diffusion across borders. Such diffusion and commonality of 
norms serve to establish shared values. Equally, we do not know enough around why countries 
and people hold on to different values despite high levels of interaction amongst people. For 
example, some people still hold on to traditional systems, even though they are surrounded by 
countries that have long moved beyond such modalities and norms. Outside of norms diffusion 
through standard’s established at regional, continental and global level, there is a need for more 
in-depth analysis on localised norm diffusion efforts and what would work better as we seek to 
enhance the state of governance in the continent.  
Norm diffusion has been more rapid in other parts of the world. Comparative studies between 
the EU and Africa, for example, would add to our understanding of what is possible and how 
best norm diffusion might unfold in Africa. Current comparative studies tend to be very general 
and do not engage in detail as it relates to people and improvements in governance systems. 
We also know too little of the models used to graduate countries before they become full EU 
members and how compliance is established in this process. The experience of new EU 
countries and how official worked towards compliance may well be instructive for developing 
the AU compliance system, and the kind of technical support Member States need. Managing 
technical assistance for graduation is an area of substantive success in the instance of the EU, 
and knowledge of this may well assist the AU shapes its intervention modalities.  
7.4 Conclusion  
Key to a better future is building a robust African governance community that can balance 
vision with realism. The balance is somewhat challenging as the African movement has been 
dominant by idealists with a firm orientation towards demanding immediate compliance with 
instruments. The demand for compliance exists, even though such modalities have only worked 
on paper and not in practice. Moving the discourse within such communities is fundamental 
for the future and could pave the way for strategies that are accommodative of current realities 
and aspirations. The approach would require appreciating the norms graduating models 
presented and the intervention framework proposed for the future. Value-driven approaches do 
not unfold on their own. It must be driven by a combination of visionary ownership and 
diffused efforts from multiple different actors. While diversity and experimentation are 
necessary, this should not come at the expense of tearing apart a system and rendering it 
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dysfunctional. A better and more effective, efficient, and responsive AU multilateralism is 
possible and can be built on more in-depth forms of research and an appreciation that 




Annexure One: Data Management  
Data Sources: 
1. AU Assembly, Executive Council, PSC and PRC Documents (All available from AU 
website and AU Archives website). These were systematically downloaded and filed for 
search accordingly.  
2. OAU Assembly Documents since 1964 (These have been obtained from the Department of 
Political Affairs of the AUC) 
3. Implementation Documents from AU Governance implementation institutions (including 
reports, memorandum planning documents and meeting minutes). Some documents were 
available from the website of structures and others obtained from the Department of 
Political Affairs of the AUC.  
4. Partner Documents (many of these are available online through systematic search and 
includes reports, evaluations and plans).  
The database produced included over 5500 documents. All efforts were made to remove 
duplicates, but this was not always possible, given the scale and number of documents. 
Documents were collected and filed since 2000. Permission for using internal documents (non-
public documents) was secured from the Department of Political Affairs of the AUC.  
Data Organisation:  
The data was arranged in the following folders to facilitate appropriate search and analysis.  
1. OAU Documents 
2. AU Official Formal and Public Documents 
3. AU Implementation Institution Documents 
4. Governance Partner Documents 
The organisation of the documents in folders was both for practical database functionality 
reasons and to allow for more focused searches and analysis during periods and across levels 
of formality.  
Data Search and Coding:  
The following general search codes were utilised to develop a comprehensive perspective of 
AU governance interventions. However, were appropriate for deeper levels analysis, additional 
codes were used to extract relevant evidence. 
1. Governance 
2. The rule of law 
3. Accountability 
4. Human Rights 
Strategy 
5. State Capacity 
6. Constitutionalism 
7. Human Rights 
8. Public Service 
9. Local Government  
10. Anti- Corruption 
11. Urban Development 





17. Elections Observation  
18. Corruption  
19. Public Administration  
20. Justice 
21. Legality  
22. ACDEG  
23. Shared values 
24. Charter 
25. Human Resources 
26. Donors  
27. Elections Fund 
28. Mediation 
29. Diplomacy 
30. Peer Review 
31. Funding 
32. Transitional Justice  
33. Partnerships 
34. Negotiations 
35. Mediation  
36. Reforms 
37. Structures 
38. Implementation  
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